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ABSTRACT	
	The	 transition	 to	 post-fossil	 future	 and	 widespread	 utilization	 of	 renewable	 energy	technologies	have	become	inevitable	across	the	globe,	not	only	due	to	limited	amount	of	fossil	energy	sources,	but	also	the	impacts	of	human-dominated	activities	on	the	planet	Earth.	Turkey,	 is	one	of	the	countries,	having	scant	amount	of	fossil	energy,	but	rich	in	various	 renewable	 sources	with	 the	 sufficient	 capacity	 to	 contribute	Turkey’s	primary	energy	 goals;	 such	 as	 diminishing	 energy	 dependency,	 increasing	 supply	 security	 and	diversification	of	energy	sources.	Nevertheless,	the	country	is	still	highly	dependent	on	natural	 gas	 and	 crude-oil	 imports	 to	 meet	 its	 growing	 energy	 hunger	 as	 a	 result	 of	economic	and	demographic	expansion	as	well	as	the	insufficient	implementation	of	the	energy	 efficiency	 technologies.	 The	 rising	 energy	 imports	 and	 therewith	 the	 current	account	deficit	put	a	big	burden	on	country’s	vulnerable	economy.	Turkish	government	plans	to	raise	the	share	of	renewable	energy	sources	in	electricity	production	to	at	least	30%	by	2023.	The	calculations	show	that	geothermal	power	and	biomass-based	energy	production	 will	 achieve	 the	 2023	 targets,	 while	 solar	 energy	 installations	 remain	insufficient	 in	number.	Wind-	and	hydropower	with	 their	high	potential	 and	adequate	number	 of	 proposed	 facilities	 will	 contribute	 to	 the	 total	 electricity	 generation	 in	considerable	 amount.	 The	 public	 awareness	 and	 social	 acceptance	 of	 utilization	renewable	 energy	 plants	 have	 positive	 impacts	 to	 the	 gradual	 development	 of	 these	plants.		
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PREFACE		 The	thesis	 „Energy	dependency,	 the	potential	supply	of	renewable	energies	and	the	 political	 responses	 in	 Turkey	 in	 the	 decades	 since	 the	 oil-crisis”	 is	 made	 up	 as	 a	completion	of	the	doctoral	studies	in	political	science	between	2012-2018.	The	research	interest	in	the	field	of	Energy	Politics	of	Turkey	has	initially	emerged	during	my	master	studies	 in	 Turkey	 and	 Germany.	 After	 my	 graduation	 in	 Master	 of	 Arts	 in	 European	Studies	in	the	field	of	Turkey	and	the	European	Union	Energy	Politics,	I	decided	to	put	more	 emphasis	 on	 the	 role	 and	 potential	 of	 renewable	 energies	 for	 diminishing	 the	external	energy	dependency	of	Turkey,	and	herewith	started	my	doctoral	studies.	With	its	 unique	 geographical	 situation	 and	 abundant	 amount	 of	 renewable	 energy	 sources,	Turkey	 has	 a	 very	 special	 geostrategic	 position	 between	 East	 and	 West.	 Therefore,	energy	plays	a	major	role	for	the	country	in	accomplishing	its	foreign	policy	goals.	From	the	time	I	started	my	research	until	I	finished	it,	no	major	changes	have	been	taken	place	in	country’s	energy	policy	goals	and	strategies.	The	country	is	still	highly	dependent	on	fossil	fuel	energy	sources,	ultimately	energy	imports,	and	has	scant	capacity	of	using	its	renewable	energy	sources	such	as	wind,	hydro,	geothermal	and	biomass.	 In	 its	 foreign	policy,	 there	 had	 been	 significant	 changes,	 which	 dramatically	 influenced	 country’s	relationships	with	its	neighbour	countries	as	well	as	its	energy	cooperation	and	pipeline	agreements.	 Not	 only	 externally,	 the	 country	 experience	 significant	 internal	 political	challenges	 and	 serious	 economic	 instabilities.	 During	 these	 vicissitudes	 concerning	internal	 and	 external	 affairs	 of	 Turkey,	 analysing	 their	 impacts	 on	 country’s	 energy	policy	have	been	interesting	as	well	as	quite	challenging.			 In	 this	context,	 it	would	have	not	been	possible	 to	write	 this	 thesis	without	 the	guidance	and	invaluable	contributions	of	my	previous	advisor	Prof.	Dr.	Elmar	Altvater.	I	feel	indebted	for	his	generosity	in	sharing	his	time,	as	well	as	his	continued	support	and	patience	in	each	stage	of	my	thesis.		 Furthermore,	I	am	very	thankful	to	my	current	advisor,	Prof.	Dr.	Michèle	Knodt,	for	her	gracious	support	and	time,	her	supervision	and	to	review	my	thesis.			 Finally,	my	gratitude	goes	also	to	my	mother	and	father	for	their	encouragement	and	trust	in	me.	
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1.	 INTRODUCTION	
1.1.	 Research	framework		 Despite	 the	vast	quantities	of	 energy	 coming	 from	 the	Sun,	 humans	have	 always	been	compelled	 to	explore	other	 sources.	As	Elmar	Altvater	 stated,	 “in	terms	of	energy	
supply,	 we	 help	 ourselves	 to	 the	 solar	 energy	 stored	 in	 fossilized	 form	 in	 coal	 seams,	
reservoirs	 of	 natural	 gas,	 instead	 of	 using	 the	 endless	 flow	 of	 beams	 from	 the	 sun."	(Altvater,	2014).	In	today’s	world,	our	ability	to	access	these	energy	sources	shapes	the	way	we	communicate,	 live	and	travel.	The	relationship	between	humans	and	energy	is	getting	stronger,	and	therefore,	the	issues;	namely,	cost,	sustainability	and	reliability	of	sources,	 become	 universal.	 In	 many	 regions	 and	 provinces	 across	 the	 world,	communities	have	limited	or	no	access	to	reliable	and	secure	energy	supplies.	This	lack	of	 access	 to	modern	 energy	 sources	 hinders	 socio-economic	 development;	which	 is	 a	major	part	of	sustainable	development.	The	predictions	 tell	 us	 that	 the	Earth	does	not	 have	unlimited	 amounts	 of	 those	resources,	 which	 are	 essential	 for	 the	 life	 span	 of	 human	 beings	 and	 other	 living	creatures.	Defining	the	boundaries	of	the	Earth,	to	act	as	a	proverbial	guardrail	and	keep	us	 from	 going	 over	 the	 edge,	 is	 essential	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 disastrous	 outcomes	 for	humanity.	These	planetary	boundaries	will	neither	hinder	growth	and	development	nor	slow	down	the	progress	of	drivers.	They	are	there	to	prevent	a	catastrophe	(Rockström,	et	 al.,	 2015	 S.	 59).	We	 can	 no	 longer	 exploit	minerals,	 fish,	 living	 species,	 freshwater,	land,	oil,	coal	and	natural,	without	threatening	the	survival	of	life	of	the	Planet	Earth.	In	‘Dialectics	of	Nature’	Friedrich	Engels	argues	 that	 the	power	of	nature	conquers	every	living	creature	and	that	we,	 the	human	beings,	as	a	part	of	nature,	will	never	“win”	or	rule	over	it:		"Let	 us	 not,	 however,	 flatter	 ourselves	 overmuch	 on	 account	 of	 our	 human	
victories	over	nature.	For	each	such	triumph,	nature	takes	 its	revenge	on	us.	
Thus	at	every	step	we	are	reminded	that	we	by	no	means	rule	over	nature	like	
a	 conqueror	over	a	 foreign	people,	 like	 someone	 standing	outside	nature	—	
but	 that	 we,	 with	 flesh,	 blood,	 and	 brain,	 belong	 to	 nature,	 and	 exist	 in	 its	
midst,	 and	 that	 all	 our	 mastery	 of	 it	 consists	 in	 the	 fact	 that	 we	 have	 the	
advantage	over	all	other	beings	of	being	able	to	learn	its	laws	and	apply	them	
correctly”	(eds.	Cohen	et.	al.,	2010).	
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We	 no	 longer	 need	 to	 question	whether	 ecological	 and	 social	 catastrophes	 are	approaching,	as	we	are	already	experiencing	this	change	in	various	facets	of	life.	Instead,	the	question	is	to	ask	how	strong	they	will	be	(Rockström,	et	al.,	2015).	We	are	missing	a	developmental	 framework	that	simultaneously	respects	 the	 true	 functioning	of	Earth’s	climatic,	 geophysical,	 atmospheric	 and	 ecological	 processes.	 As	 it	 is	 propounded	 by	Henri	 Lefebvre,	 a	 famous	 French	 Marxist	 philosopher	 and	 sociologist:	 the	 (physical)	natural	space	is	disappearing.	While	there	is	a	universal	wish	to	protect	and	save	nature;	nobody	is	willing	to	allow	nature	to	retrieve	its	authenticity	(Lefebvre,	et	al.,	1991)	and,	in	 the	 meantime,	 the	 Earth	 is	 becoming	 hotter	 than	 was	 ever	 before	 experienced	 by	humans.	 James	 Lovelock,	 an	 influential	 scientist	 and	 creator	 of	 Gaia	 theory,	 considers	that	 "the	planet	Earth	has	reached	a	state	now	that	it	is	profoundly	dangerous	to	us	and	
our	 civilization."	 (Lovelock,	 2005).	 Lovelock	 argues	 that	 the	 governments	 across	 the	globe	 are	 already	 too	 late	 to	 apply	 green	 and	 sustainable	 concepts,	 such	 as	 the	development	 of	 environmentally	 friendly	 energy	 technologies	 and	 utilization	 of	renewable	energies.	Therefore,	in	order	to	meet	the	rapidly	growing	global	energy	need,	Lovelock	perceives	only	 the	only	reasonable,	 secure	and	reliable	alternative	 is	nuclear	energy	(Lovelock,	2005).	The	question	that	remains	is:	what	can	be	done	to	maintain	the	Holocene-like	 conditions	 on	 the	 Planet	 Earth	 when	 we	 are	 already	 living	 in	Anthropocene?	Today,	 with	 the	 Anthropocene	 era	 in	 which	 we	 are	 living,	 the	 "man-made	fingerprint	 of	 global	warming"	 is	 not	 the	only	problem;	 every	major	 ecosystem	 in	 the	planet	 is	 in	 decline.	 Up	 until	 now,	 Earth	 has	managed	 to	 absorb	 disturbances,	 hiding	away	90%	of	the	heat	from	greenhouse	gas	emissions	in	the	ocean,	and	soaking	up	more	than	50%	of	our	CO2	emissions	in	natural	ecosystems.	So	long	as	nature	is	in	good	shape,	the	Earth’s	resilience	is	high,	however,	as	Earth’s	resilience	declines,	the	critical	systems	are	likely	to	cross	thresholds	which	change	the	Earth	from	friend	to	foe	(Rockström,	et	al.,	2015).	With	this	in	mind,	humans	need	to	respect	planetary	boundaries;	a	term	which	was	coined	by	 Johan	Rockström	and	his	 colleagues	 in	2009	and	updated	 in	2014.	The	assessment	 shows	 that	 there	 are	 nine	 planetary	 boundaries:	 1)	 Climate	 change,	 2)	Stratospheric	 ozone	 depletion,	 3)	 Rate	 of	 biodiversity	 loss,	 4)	 Chemical	 pollution,	 5)	Ocean	 acidification,	 6)	 Freshwater	 consumption,	 7)	 Land-use	 change,	 8)	Nitrogen	 and	phosphorus	pollution	and	9)	Air	pollution	or	aerosol	loading	These	 planetary	 boundaries	 can	 be	 divided	 into	 three	 groups	 relative	 to	 their	volume	of	risk:	The	first	group	includes	processes	with	sharply	defined	thresholds,	such	
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as	the	risk	of	melting	in	the	Greenland	and	Antarctic	ice	sheets;	namely,	climate	change,	stratospheric	 ozone	 depletion	 and	 ocean	 acidification	 (Rockström,	 et	 al.,	 2015	 S.	 69).	The	 second	 group	 includes	 boundaries	 based	 on	 slow	 planetary	 variables	 that	contribute	to	the	underlying	resilience	of	the	Earth.	These	“slow	boundaries”	are	land-use	 change,	 freshwater	 use,	 biodiversity	 loss	 and	 nitrogen	 and	 phosphorus	 pollution	(Rockström,	et	al.,	2015	S.	69).	The	 third	group	of	boundaries	 consists	of	 two	human-made	 threats:	 air	 pollution/aerosol	 loading	 and	 chemical	 pollutions,	 such	 as	 heavy	metals	and	organic	pollutants	(Rockström,	et	al.,	2015	S.	69).		The	man-made,	ecological	degradation	we	are	 facing	 is	not	only	 threatening	us,	but	all	living	creatures	existing	within	the	ecosystem.	Foster	(Foster,	2009)	emphasizes	the	 significance	 of	 harmony	 by	 highlighting	 Marx’s	 “metabolic	 rift”	 theory	 between	nature	and	society,	which	uses	the	example	of	the	19th	century	soil	crisis.	Marx	clarified	the	fact	that	"soil	nutrients	(nitrogen,	phosphorus,	and	potassium)	were	removed	from	the	
land	 and	 shipped	 hundreds	 and	 thousands	 of	 miles	 to	 the	 cities	 where	 they	 ended	 up	
polluting	 the	 water	 and	 the	 air	 and	 contributing	 to	 the	 poor	 health	 of	 the	 workers"	(Foster,	 2009	 S.	 49).	 According	 to	Marx,	 this	 symbolised	 a	 rip	 in	 the	metabolic	 cycle	between	nature	and	society,	which	must	be	"restored"	for	the	continuity	of	"successive	generations".	Which,	he	argued,	would	only	be	possible	by	creating	a	harmony	between	nature	and	society.	This	raises	the	issue	of	‘ecological	sustainability’,	not	only	in	relation	to	the	scale	of	the	economy,	but	also	in	the	form	and	intensity	of	the	interaction	between	nature	and	society	under	capitalism	(Foster,	2009	S.	49).	In	 reference	 to	 these	 challenges,	 my	 thesis	 utilises	 Turkey	 as	 a	 case	 country.	Current	 studies	 in	 sustainability	 and	 the	 environment	 show	 that	 Turkish	 social	 and	business	 cultures	 have	 traditionally	 possessed	 a	 harmony	 in	 working	 with	environmental	awareness.	However,	the	lack	of	future	orientation,	a	paternalist	way	of	management	and	the	survival	concerns	of	the	individuals	and	businesses	cause	a	certain	lack	 of	 environmental	 initiative	 (Cakar,	 et	 al.,	 2014).	 In	 addition,	 the	 country	 is	geographically	 situated	 between	 fossil-energy-poor	 European	 and	 fossil-energy-rich	Middle-Eastern	and	Caspian	regions	and	therefore	plays	a	significant	role,	as	a	natural	energy	 hub	 particularly	 for	 the	 EU	 energy	 markets.	 Except	 for	 coal,	 Turkey	 itself	 is	deficient	in	domestic	fossil	energy	sources.	The	country	requires	high	amounts	of	fossil	fuel	 imports	 to	meet	 its	domestic	energy	demands,	which	are	delivered	through	crude	oil	 and	 natural	 gas	 pipelines.	 This	 high	 dependency	 on	 fossil	 imports	 decreases	 the	capacity	 for	 energy	 supply	 security	 and	 the	 possibility	 to	 diversify	 energy	 sources	 or	
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manoeuvre	between	various	energy	supply	options.	In	the	past	few	decades	these	issues	have	substantially	increased	the	country’s	debt,	which	burdens	Turkey’s	already	fragile	and	volatile	economy.	In	Turkey,	the	industrial	sector	is	the	major	energy	consumer	contributing	3.1%	(or	30.9	mtoe)	of	 the	 total	energy	consumption	 in	2014	and	representing	 the	primary	reason	 for	 the	 country’s	 growing	 demand	 for	 energy.	 The	 energy	 use	 of	 the	 industry	sector	has	 increased	by	20.3%	since	2004,	 followed	by	 the	 transport	sector	with	24%	(or	 20.6	 mtoe).	 Additionally,	 households	 contribute	 22.3%	 (or	 19.1	 mtoe)	 and	commercial	and	public	services	(including	agriculture)	account	for	17.6%	(or	15.1	mtoe)	of	 the	 total	 energy	 consumption	 (IEA	2016).	While	 the	 energy	 demand	 in	 households	has	shown	a	slight	 increase	of	5.8%	since	2004,	 the	demand	 in	 the	commercial	 sector	grew	by	the	extreme	amount	of	105.4%,	more	 than	 in	any	other	sector	(IEA	2016).	 In	order	to	meet	this	rising	energy	demand	in	various	sectors,	Turkey	is	in	urgent	need	of	implementing	 sustainable	 and	 efficient	 energy	 policies,	 which	 aim	 at	 substantial	elimination	of	fossil	energy	usage,	diversification	of	energy	sources	and	routes	towards	the	wider	utilisation	of	renewable	energy	sources.		In	the	global	energy	market,	the	cost	of	energy	is	an	important	factor	for	a	country	to	exist	and	act	competitively.	Due	to	the	high	prices	attached	to	energy,	the	competitive	power	 of	 Turkey	 in	 a	 global	 context	 remains	 weak.	 It	 is	 therefore	 fundamental	 for	Turkey	 to	 redefine	 its	 energy	 policies	 and	 reshape	 its	 energy	 strategy	 in	 order	 to	 be	more	competitive	in	the	global	market.		Since	 the	 Justice	 and	Development	Party	 (AKP)	 came	 into	 force	 in	 2002,	 Turkey	has	 been	 following	 a	 multi-dimensional	 energy	 strategy,	 which	 has	 integrated	 the	following	energy	goals:	1)	the	diversification	of	energy	supply	sources	and	routes,	2)	the	contribution	 to	domestic	 and	European	 energy	 security	 by	 acting	 as	 a	 reliable	 energy	hub,	and	3)	an	increase	of	renewables	in	country’s	total	energy	production.	Predictions	show	 that	 the	 potential	 of	 renewable	 sources	 in	 Turkey,	 including	 hydro,	wind,	 solar,	geothermal	 and	 biomass,	 are	 sufficient	 to	 establish	 Turkey	 as	 an	 energy-independent	country.	The	substantial	 increase	of	 renewable	energy	sources	 in	 the	 total	energy	mix	would	 also	 contribute	 to	 the	 sustainable	 development	 of	 Turkey,	 by	 decreasing	 its	energy	dependency	on	natural	gas	and	crude	oil	imports.		
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1.2.	 Hypothesis		 Civilisation	has	witnessed	many	disasters	caused	by	man-made	interference	with	the	natural	foundations	of	life	and	the	subsequent	destabilization	of	the	earth's	climate.	Regardless	of	the	era	of	human	development,	society	has	always	required	energy	to	live,	to	 be	 nourished,	 to	 cook,	 to	 heat	 and	 to	 work.	 In	 light	 of	 this	 background,	 we	 may	trichotomize	those	past,	current	and	upcoming	eras	which	world	energy	has,	does	and	will	face,	in	correlation	with	Marx's	classifications	of	the	development	of	humanity	and	production:	 Pre-fossil-,	 fossil-	 and	 the	 post-fossil	 energy	 eras	 (Altvater,	 2014).	 The	emergence	of	energy	eras	and	the	transformation	to	new	energy	regimes	cause	not	only	vicissitude	 in	 the	 interaction	of	 human	being	with	nature	 and	 climate,	 but	 also	 reveal	economic	and	political	novelties	between	the	actors	in	global	sense.	As	Turkey	has	only	negligible	 amount	 of	 fossil	 resources,	 the	 transition	 from	 pre-fossil	 to	 a	 fossil	 energy	regime	in	response	to	the	economic	expansion	and	population	growth,	has	engendered	external	energy	dependency	.	In	the	pre-fossil	or	pre-industrial	era,	humans	and	their	activities	have	not	played	a	major	force	in	the	dynamics	of	the	Earth	System.	In	this	period,	the	energy	resources	came	 primarily	 in	 the	 form	 of	 human	 and	 animal	 muscle	 as	 well	 as	 biomass.	 The	population	 growth	 and	 the	 limited	 land	 availability,	 combined	with	 restrictions	 upon	further	 expansion	 and	 economic	 growth,	 dictated	 a	 transition	 towards	 a	 fossil	 energy	regime.	 The	 transformation	 from	 pre-fossil	 to	 fossil	 era	 was	 not	 solely	 an	 energy	transformation,	 but	 also	 an	economic	 and	 societal	 change.	The	energy	 transition	 from	pre-fossil	 to	 fossil	 era	 accelerated	 after	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 Ottoman	 Empire	 and	 the	foundation	 of	 new	 Republic	 in	 Turkey,	 in	 parallel	 to	 industrialisation	 efforts,	demographical	 and	 economic	 growth.	 As	 Turkey’s	 economic	 growth	 model	 is	 import	rather	than	export-oriented,	the	energy	transition	from	pre-fossil	to	fossil	era	caused	a	substantial	 increase	 in	Turkey’s	energy	dependency	and	 long-lasting	budget	deficit.	 In	light	of	this,	Turkey	should	not	construct	a	fossil	fuel	future	for	its	energy	policy.	Rather,	Turkey	needs	to	realise	its	energy	transition	to	a	post-fossil	energy	regime.	On	the	one	hand	the	country	possesses	a	sufficient	amount	of	renewable	energy	sources	and	on	the	other	hand,	there	is	also	a	commitment	to	reduce	the	amount	of	energy	consumed	per	unit	gross	domestic	product	(GDP)	by	the	year	2023,	by	at	least	20%	(regarding	energy	intensity)	compared	 to	2011	(MENR,	2015).	 It	 is	 therefore	 important	 to	evaluate	each	energy	era	in	order	to	better	understand	the	current	situation	and	challenges	Turkey	is	
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faced	 with,	 while	 also	 demonstrating	 the	 future	 prospects	 of	 the	 country’s	 energy	potential.		Today,	as	we	are	still	 living	in	a	fossil	era,	the	Earth	is	very	much	dominated	by	human	 activities.	 Responsibility	 lies	 with	 a	 rising	 energy	 demand	 resulting	 from	 the	rapid	 increase	 in	population,	 the	positive	demographic	 trends	 and	 industrialisation	 in	the	20th	 century.	According	 to	 the	projections	of	 the	United	States	Energy	 Information	Administration’s	 (EIA)	 International	 Energy	 Outlook	 2016	 report,	 the	 world	 energy	consumption	will	grow	by	48%	between	2012	and	2040.	It	is	expected	that	most	of	this	growth	 will	 come	 from	 countries	 that	 are	 not	 in	 the	 Organisation	 for	 Economic	Cooperation	 and	 Development	 (OECD).	 Over	 the	 projection	 period,	 non-OECD	 Asia,	including	China	and	India,	will	contribute	more	than	half	of	the	world's	total	increase	in	energy	consumption	(EIA,	2016).	During	 the	 last	 century,	 the	 world	 population	 has	 increased	 more	 than	 three	times,	while	 the	 corresponding	 fossil	 fuel	 consumption	 has	 risen	 twenty	 times	 higher	than	previous	records.	Many	geologists	estimate	that	the	global	oil	supplies	will	run	out	and	eventually	the	world	will	reach	peak	oil	or	its	highest	production	level	by	2050.	It	is	expected	 that,	 in	pursuit	of	 reaching	peak	oil,	 the	petroleum	production	will	decrease,	which	also	indicates	a	rise	in	costs	for	the	remaining	supply.		In	parallel	 to	 the	growing	population	and	economic	expansion,	Turkey	has	also	become	one	of	the	fastest	growing	countries	in	the	world	over	the	last	two	decades.	The	economic	 and	 demographic	 widening	 of	 country	 has	 brought	 with	 it	 rising	 energy	demands.	The	growing	energy	demand	has	also	brought	growing	energy	dependence	on	external	imports	due	to	an	insufficient	amount	of	domestic	energy	production.		In	 regard	 to	 energy	 demand,	 in	 2015	 Turkey	 met	 35%	 of	 its	 total	 primary	energy	demand	 from	natural	gas,	28.5%	 from	coal,	27%	 from	oil,	7%	 from	hydro	and	only	2.5%	from	other	renewables.	The	country	imports	around	99%	of	the	natural	gas	and	 89%	 of	 its	 oil	 supplies.	 Regarding	 energy	 supply,	 the	 country’s	 total	 primary	energy	supply	has	significantly	risen	over	the	past	40	years	from	24.4	mtoe	in	1973	to	129.7	mtoe	 in	 2015.	 Accordingly,	 the	 amount	 of	 natural	 gas	 and	 crude	 oil	 imports	 in	Turkey’s	total	primary	energy	supply,	have	gradually	increased	each	year	up	until	2018.	The	remaining	amount	of	energy	supply	was	derived	 from	 indigenous	energy	sources,	such	as	domestic	coal	and	renewable	energies,	as	well	as	imported	coal	(MENR,	2015).	As	 a	 result	 of	 raising	 natural	 gas	 and	 crude	 oil	 imports,	 the	 external	 energy	dependency	of	Turkey	has	 also	been	 increasing	 incrementally	 since	1990.	The	 energy	
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dependence	reached	75%	at	the	end	of	2014,	from	51.6%	in	1990.	This	heavy	reliance	combined	 with	 inaccurate	 monetary	 exchange	 rate	 policies,	 have	 deepened	 Turkey’s	current	economic	deficit.	 So	 long	as	Turkey	 remains	a	 larger	 consumer	 than	producer	and	 resists	 the	 inclusion	 of	 a	 considerable	 amount	 of	 renewable	 energy	 sources,	 the	current	 deficit	 problem	 will	 continue.	 In	 this	 regard,	 it	 is	 identified	 that	 the	 energy	dependence	 and	 current	 economic	 budget	 deficit	 are	 interrelated	 and	 directly	proportional	with	each	other.	Despite	 country's	 immense	 potential	 for	 renewable	 energy,	 Turkey	 has	 only	 a	modest	 plan	 to	 increase	 the	 share	 of	 renewable	 energies	 up	 to	 30%	 of	 the	 total	electricity	generation	mix.	It	is	also	planned	for	renewable	energies	to	meet	10%	of	the	energy	 requirements	 in	 the	 transportation	 sector	 by	 the	 year	 2030.	 Turkey	 also	possesses	 a	 high	 potential	 for	 unconventional	 hydrocarbon	 sources.	 Based	 on	 the	estimations	of	the	US	EIA,	exploration	activities	conducted	by	Turkish	Petroleum	(Türk	
Petrol	Anonim	Ortakligi	-	TP),	 Shell	 and	other	 international	 corporations,	Turkey	has	 a	considerable	 amount	 of	 shale	 gas,	 especially	 in	 the	 Thrace	 Basin	 and	 south-eastern	Anatolia	 region.	 Nevertheless,	 there	 are	 environmental,	 geographical,	 technological,	legal	and	economical	obstacles	hinder	the	shale	gas	extractions	in	both	regions.		In	 addition	 to	 its	 renewable	 and	 shale	 gas	 resources,	 Turkey	 forms	 a	 natural	energy	 bridge,	 by	 hosting	 important	 crude	 oil	 and	 natural	 gas	 pipelines	 between	 the	energy-rich	Caspian	Basin,	Middle	East,	and	energy-scarce	European	region.	Therefore,	an	uninterrupted	 flow	of	 the	 conventional	 energy	 sources	 to	Turkey	 and	 to	Europe	 is	essential.	 Nonetheless,	 due	 to	 the	 long-lasting	 conflicts	 in	 the	 south-eastern	 parts	 of	Turkey	and	 its	neighbouring	countries,	 the	crude	oil	and	natural	gas	 flow	exists	under	constant	domestic,	 political	 and	 security	 challenges.	Particularly,	 the	ongoing	 terrorist	attacks	 of	 the	 Kurdistan	Workers'	 Party	 (PKK)	 and	wars	 in	 bordering	 countries	 have	been	major	 threats	 to	 the	energy	security	of	Turkey.	The	presence	of	 these	challenges	undermines	the	development	of	further	planned	energy	pipeline	projects	and	highlight	the	 urgency	 of	 energy	 independence	 and	 the	 transformation	 from	 fossil	 to	 post-fossil	through	 the	 increased	 use	 of	 renewable	 energies.	 To	 confront	 these	 challenges,	 the	policy	recommendations	are	explained	in	the	conclusions	chapter	of	this	thesis.	Turkey	displays	the	highest	growth	energy	demand	of	all	OECD	countries	and	its	domestic	energy	production	only	meets	around	one-quarter	of	its	total	energy	use.	It	is	therefore	not	 foreseeable	 that	 the	 renewables	 could	 subrogate	 fossil	 fuels	 to	meet	 the	energy	hunger	in	Turkey.	As	‘reducing	import	dependence’	is	one	of	the	short-	and	long	
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term	national	energy	strategies	of	Turkey,	the	government	canalises	its	investments	on	nuclear	power	and	coal.	The	abundance	of	domestic	coal	reserves	and	the	significance	of	the	coal	extraction	industry,	which	is	connected	to	the	construction	industry,	is	vital	for	Turkey.	Coal	 is	 the	backbone	of	 the	domestic-led	growth	strategy	 in	Turkey.	However,	Turkish	coal	has	a	low	quality,	consisting	primarily	of	lignite	and	possessing	a	low	hear	capacity	 and	high	 level	 of	 pollution.	 Instead	of	 promoting	 renewable	 energies,	Turkey	has	 turned	 to	 nuclear	 energy.	 Much	 like	 coal	 plants,	 nuclear	 power	 plants	 can	 only	survive	 with	 government	 support	 and	 subsidies.	 Furthermore,	 the	 construction	 of	nuclear	power	plants	contradicts	the	country’s	national	energy	strategy.	In	addition,	the	fuel	for	the	Akkuyu	Nuclear	Power	Plant	will	be	produced	in	and	delivered	from	Russia.	These	are	primary	factors	which	hinder	the	development	of	renewable	energy	sources	in	Turkey.	 In	addition	to	these,	Turkey	has	the	strictest	 local	content	requirements	for	renewables	of	any	country	in	the	world.	Another	challenge	is	country’s	steep	domestic	content	requirements	regarding	the	development	of	a	domestic	capacity	for	renewables	manufacturing.	In	this	context,	this	thesis	 intends	to	analyse	and	answer	the	following	research	question:	Why	Turkey	does	not	have	a	high	share	of	renewable	energy	in	its	total	
energy	 mix	 despite	 the	 potential	 and	 sufficient	 capacity	 of	 renewable	 energy	
sources?		With	 regard	 to	 this	 research	 question,	 the	 outcomes	 propound	 that	 Turkey	 is	possesses	a	substantial	amount	of	renewable	energy	sources.	The	significant	reduction	and	even	elimination	of	fossil	energy	sources	can	only	be	possible	through	substantially	increasing	 multiple	 sources	 of	 renewable	 energy	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 electricity	generation.	In	this	way,	the	power	production	from	renewable	energy	sources	will	play	a	 fundamental	 role,	 in	 contributing	 to	 sustainable	 development,	 in	 the	 pursuit	 of	 an	incremental	 reduction	 in	 external	 energy	dependence	and	 thus	 in	 country’s	 long-term	current	economic	debt.	The	energy	liberalisation	process	(which	has	already	begun)	and	the	private	sector	investments,	play	a	crucial	role	in	the	widespread	usage	of	renewable	energies.	 Nonetheless,	 dependence	 on	 foreign	 technology	 for	 hydroelectric	 and	 wind	power	equipment	poses	a	challenge,	regarding	the	development	of	renewable	energy.	In	order	 to	 accomplish	 a	 post-fossil	 future	 with	 a	 global	 renewable	 energy	 vision	 four	things	must	happen:	1)	the	competitive	financial	power	of	renewable	energy	resources	must	 be	 improved,	 2)	 the	 implementation	 and	 exploitation	 of	 the	 renewable	 energy	resources	must	be	increased,	3)	the	administrative	processes	to	integrate	the	renewable	
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energy	resources	into	a	national	grid	must	be	eased	and	4)	the	technical	barriers	in	front	of	 the	 electrical	 grid	 connections	 must	 be	 removed.	 	 In	 addition	 to	 these	 economic,	technical	and	administrative	improvements	in	the	field	of	renewable	energy,	the	social	level	also	needs	to	be	taken	into	the	consideration.	The	significance	of	renewable	energy	sources	 must	 be	 communicated	 to	 the	 public	 and	 the	 construction	 of	 the	 renewable	plants	must	be	accepted	by	the	inhabitants.	In	this	regard,	social	awareness	and	public	acceptance	play	a	major	role	in	Turkey	for	the	faster	establishment	of	renewable	power	plants	on	local	and	national	levels.	The	extension	of	renewable	energies	in	the	total	energy	production	does	not	only	correspond	to	the	main	energy	strategies	of	Turkish	government,	it	also	contributes	to	the	country’s	national	and	international	climate	strategies;	i.e.	fulfilling	the	greenhouse	gas	emission	targets	within	the	framework	of	Paris	agreement.	Up	until	now,	the	energy	related	 acts	 of	 Turkish	 government	 remain	 inconsistent	 with	 its	 energy	 and	 climate	goals,	 as	 the	 government	 continues	 with	 its	 fossil-energy-oriented	 strategies.	 For	example;	 by	 the	 year	 2023,	 the	 country	 aims	 to	 add	nuclear	 power	 to	 add	more	 than	10,000	 MW	 to	 its	 total	 energy	 mix	 and	 achieve	 full	 utilisation	 of	 domestic	 coal	 in	electricity	 generation,	 regardless	 that	 burning	 coal	 predominantly	 responsible	 for	 the	country’s	 greenhouse	 gas	 emissions,	 contributing	 to	 167.2	 million	 tons	 of	 the	 259.8	million	 tons	 of	 emission	 increase	 between	 1990	 and	 2014.	 These	 targets	 are	 neither	compatible	 with	 country’s	 national	 climate	 nor	 its	 energy	 (milli	 enerji)	 strategies.	Moreover,	 the	 current	 renewable	 energy	 strategy	 has	 two	 major	 deficiencies:	 First,	Turkey’s	 energy	 targets	 were	 drafted	 when	 renewable	 energy	 was	 still	 relatively	expensive,	therefore,	these	targets	fail	to	reflect	the	actual	achievable	potential.	Second,	the	targets	-	along	with	Turkey’s	energy	and	climate	policy	–	are	only	set	for	the	short	term,	focusing	on	2023.	
1.3.	 Methodology		 The	research	method	of	 this	doctoral	 thesis	relies	mainly	on	a	detailed	 literature	review	 as	well	 as	 empirical	 and	 statistical	 analyses.	 Therefore,	mostly	 qualitative,	 but	also	 quantitative	 methods	 are	 used.	 The	 aim	 of	 the	 thesis	 is	 to	 provide	 a	 broader	understanding	 of	 Turkey’s	 current	 energy	 and	 climate	 challenges,	 including	 energy	supply	 security	 and	 energy	 dependency	 problems	 by	 explaining	 the	 theoretical	background	 of	 the	 pre-fossil,	 fossil	 and	 emerging	 post-fossil	 energy	 eras.	 In	 order	 to	
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analyse	 each	 energy	 scenario	 and	 to	 provide	 a	 clear	 credible	 body	 of	 research,	 the	following	resources	are	frequently	used:	- Regarding	 the	 former	 utilisation,	 current	 situation,	 developments	 and	 future	forecasts	of	the	hydrocarbon	and	renewable	energy	sources	in	Turkey,	the	official	documents,	 annual	 reports,	 strategy	 papers,	 graphics	 and	maps	 of	 the	 Turkish	Ministry	of	Energy	and	Natural	Resources	 (MENR),	Turkish	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	 (MFA),	 Energy	Market	Regulatory	Authority	 of	 Turkey	 (EMRA),	 General	Directorate	 of	 Renewable	 Energy	 (YEGM),	 Turkish	 Petroleum	 Corporation	(TPAO),	International	Energy	Agency	(IEA),	the	United	States	Energy	Information	Administration	 (EIA),	 Organization	 of	 Economic	 Cooperation	 and	 Development	(OECD);	- Statistical	data	from	the	Turkish	Statistical	Institute	and	European	Commission’s	Eurostat;	- Legal	framework	documents	and	amendments	of	Turkey’s	Environment	Law.	These	 resources	 have	 contributed	 to	 propound	 Turkey’s	 geopolitical	 situation	 and	energy	 dependence	 and	 identify	 Turkey’s	 energy	 mix.	 In	 addition	 to	 these,	 several	expert	 interviews	were	 conducted	 to	understand	 the	 legal	 framework	and	 installation	capacity	of	renewable	energy	sources.	
1.4.	 Content	overview		 The	 first	 chapter	gives	a	general	 introduction	 to	 the	aims	of	 this	 thesis	based	on	the	research	questions,	hypothesis	and	desired	outcomes.	The	research	challenges	are	also	discussed.	The	 second	 chapter	 propounds	 the	 theoretical	 background	 of	 the	 research	question,	which	 is	 based	on	 three	 energy	 eras:	Pre-fossil,	 fossil	 and	post-fossil	 energy	eras.	 The	 characteristics	 of	 these	 energy	 areas	 and	 inevitable	 energy	 transformation	from	fossil	to	post-fossil	energy	era	will	be	discussed.		The	third	chapter	examines	the	production,	utilisation	and	electricity	generation	of	conventional	energy	sources	in	Turkey;	which	include,	oil,	natural	gas,	coal	and	nuclear	energy.	 This	 chapter	 examines	 the	 crude	 oil	 and	 gas	 imports	 to	 Turkey,	 the	 pipelines	that	 facilitate	 the	 transportation	 of	 such	 fossil	 fuels	 through	 Turkey	 and	 the	corresponding	 increase	 of	 dependence	 on	 such	 fossil	 fuels	 between	 Turkey	 and	 its	neighbouring	countries.	Primary	sources	of	information	were	derived	from	the	Turkish	
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Ministry	of	Energy	and	Natural	Resources,	the	Turkish	Energy	Regulatory	Authority,	and	the	Turkish	Petroleum	Pipeline	Corporation	(BOTAS).	The	 fourth	 chapter	 provides	 background	 information	 about	 the	 pre-history	(Ottoman	 Empire),	 early	 history	 and	 the	 current	 situation	 of	 Turkey	 as	 well	 as	 the	detailed	 economic	 and	 political	 analysis	 of	 Turkey’s	 foreign	 and	 energy	 policies	concerning	energy	supply	security	and	energy	dependency	issues.	Not	only	energy,	but	also	economic	and	political	aspects	of	the	country	which	have	a	correlative	relationship	with	Turkey’s	energy	dependency	problem	will	be	elucidated.		The	 fifth	 chapter	 analyses	 the	 potential	 contribution	 of	 non-conventional	(renewable)	 energy	 sources	 to	 Turkey’s	 energy	 infrastructure.	 The	 chapter	demonstrates	 that	 Turkey	 has	 a	 vast	 amount	 of	 renewable	 energy	 sources;	 including,	hydro,	wind,	 and	 geothermal,	 biomass	 and	 solar,	 that	may	 reduce	 energy	dependence	and	 increase	 the	 energy	 security	 of	 Turkey.	 Nevertheless,	 Turkey	 has	 not	 adequately	exploited	this	potential,	primarily	due	to	the	of	absence	of	renewable	energy	regulations	and	 incentives	and	 the	 continued	use	of	 energy	policies	dependant	on	 the	wide	 range	utilisation	of	fossil	fuels.		The	sixth	chapter	explains	 the	potential	of	unconventional	energy	sources	 (shale	gas)	in	Turkey,	based	on	the	data	of	the	U.S.	EIA.	The	seventh	chapter	analyses	the	energy	forecasts	at	a	global	level	as	well	as	peak	oil	 and	challenges	 regarding	 the	 future	of	 energy	 resources.	 It	 is	 important	 to	analyse	global	 challenges	 in	 order	 to	 better	 understand	 their	 implications	 on	Turkey’s	 energy	problem	The	eighth	chapter	concludes	this	thesis,	which	aggregates	the	addressed	points	of	the	whole	chapters,	major	outcomes	and	policy	recommendations.		
2.	 THEORETICAL	BACKGROUND	AND	THE	ENERGY	ERAS		
2.1.	 Pre-fossil	Energy	Era		Around	 4.6	 billion	 years	 ago,	 as	 the	 first	 signs	 of	 life	 appeared	 during	 the	Archaean	age,	the	living	conditions	were	far	less	hospitable	than	they	are	today.	During	this	era,	for	more	than	two	billion	years,	the	Earth	remained	almost	unchanged.	Human	beings	have	lived	the	majority	of	their	time	on	the	Earth	as	simple	hunter-gatherers	and	have	faced	several	crises	as	the	Earth	shifted	back	and	forth	between	ice	ages	and	lush	warm	 periods;	 for	 example,	 during	 the	 Palaeolithic	 period	 (Rockström,	 et	 al.,	 2015	 S.	
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31).	 The	 population	 was	 between	 a	 few	 million	 and	 10	 million	 and	 people	 used	 a	combination	 of	 physical	 strength	 and	 simple	 tools	 to	 sharpen	 the	 stones	 for	 the	procuring	food	by	hunting,	fishing	or	by	gathering	seeds,	berries	and	roots.	During	the	Mesolithic	 period,	 the	 agricultural	 development	 contributed	 to	 the	 rise	 of	 permanent	settlements	by	the	water's	edge.	Around	75,000	years	ago,	in	a	critical	cold	period,	the	entire	human	population	might	have	dwindled	down	to	15,000	fertile	adults,	located	in	the	high	plateau	in	northern	Ethiopia	(Rockström,	et	al.,	2015	S.	31).	This	period	was	a	critical	 period	 for	 human	 beings,	 as	 it	 came	 close	 to	 signalling	 the	 extinction	 of	 our	species.	However,	around	11,700	years	ago,	the	Earth’s	stormy	climate	became	milder,	as	the	Earth	left	the	ice	age	and	entered	the	period	referred	to	as	“Holocene”.	During	the	Holocene	 period,	 around	 10,200	 years	 ago,	 the	 Neolithic	 era	 had	 begun	 and	 people	processed	trees	to	create	essential	tools	to	begin	agricultural	activities.	They	started	to	tame	 and	 train	 animals	 for	 their	 personal	 use	 and	 set	 them	 to	work.	 In	 the	 course	 of	history,	 humankind	 has	 also	 benefited	 from	wind-	 and	 hydropower.	 The	 civilizations	expanded	 and	 villages,	 towns	 and	 eventually	 cities,	 came	 into	 existence.	As	 crops	 and	animals	 could	 be	 raised	 to	meet	 the	 demand,	 a	 global	 population	 explosion	 occurred.	Cattle,	 goats,	 sheep,	 and	 pigs	 all	 have	 their	 origins	 as	 farmed	 animals	 in	 the	 so-called	Fertile	 Crescent,	 a	 region	 covering	 eastern	 Turkey,	 Iraq,	 and	 southwestern	 Iran	 (The	Genographic	Project	2016),	which	triggered	the	Neolithic	Revolution.		Looking	 back	 to	 the	 historical	 process	 of	 human	 beings	 on	 the	 Earth,	 even	160,000	years	 earlier	 than	 today,	 survival	was	no	 easy	 task.	The	world’s	 climate	kept	alternating	between	cold	episodes	of	expanding	ice	sheets,	water	scarcity,	low	sea	levels,	and	food	shortages;	and	warm	episodes	of	abundant	water,	high	seas,	and	lush	biomass	resources	 (Rockström,	 et	 al.,	 2015	 S.	 31).	 The	 needs	 of	 humankind	 have	 undergone	 a	change	 in	 the	 course	 of	 time.	 It	 has	 only	 been	 during	 the	 past	 10,000	 years	 that	 the	conditions	 necessary	 for	 human	 societies	 to	 develop	 have	 been	 reliably	 present	(Rockström,	et	al.,	2015	S.	31).	In	 the	 pre-fossil	 era,	 the	 (economic)	 growth	 was	 dependent	 on	 population	growth,	which,	in	turn,	depended	on	the	supply	of	goods	and	services	for	sustenance	and	reproduction	(Altvater,	2001).	In	this	era,	energy	was	produced	by	the	agricultural	and	forestry	 sectors,	 using	 land	 as	 an	 input.	 The	 primary	 energy	 sources	 were	 physical	labour,	animal	labour,	and	biomass.	The	energy	systems	were	designed	to	produce	the	most	output	with	the	least	amount	of	human	input,	in	order	to	generate	energy.	Animal	power	was	utilised	in	the	form	of	horse	mills,	wind	power	in	the	form	of	windmills	and	
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hydropower	with	the	utilisation	of	a	water	wheel	for	industrial	purposes	(CMU,	2003	S.	1-5).	Wood	 and	 coal	were	 the	 primary	 fuels	 for	 cooking,	 heating,	 and	 other	 domestic	uses.	Most	 of	 the	 energy	 generated	 from	 biomass	 sources	 (primarily	wood	 and	 peat)	was	 drawn	 up	 into	 chimneys	 rather	 than	 into	 the	 room	 or	 cooking	 pots.	 Wood	combustion	 to	 generate	 heat	 throughout	 the	 centuries	 caused	 deforestation,	 which	 is	still	observable	in	the	regional	and	global	environment	on	a	large	scale	(CMU,	2003	S.	1-5).	 The	technologies	from	the	pre-fossil	energy	era	may	give	us	some	clues	regarding	how	we	 can	 utilise	 nature	without	 destroying	 it;	 the	 three-field	 crop	 rotation	 system,	timber-frame	 construction,	 windmills,	 and	 sailing	 ships	 all	 have	 a	 similar	 logic	 that	humans	must	first	learn	to	fit	in	with	natural	flows	before	they	can	harness	and	manage	them	for	their	benefit	(Unmuessig,	et	al.,	2012	S.	1-52).	In	addition	to	energy,	population	and	economic	growth	aspects,	the	pre-fossil	era	and	 the	 Holocene	 period	 witnessed	 the	 birth	 of	 different	 human	 cultures	 and	civilizations.	This	included	the	Longshan	Neolithic	agrarian	cultures	of	the	Yellow	River	Valley	 in	 China;	 the	 ancient	 Egyptian	 irrigation	 societies	 along	 the	 Nile;	 the	Mesopotamian	 irrigation	 societies	 along	 the	 Tigris	 and	 Euphrates	 rivers;	 the	 Greek,	Roman	 and	 Ottoman	 empires;	 the	 Islamic	 civilizations	 in	 a	 large	 part	 of	 Africa	 and	Central	 Asia;	 the	 agricultural	 societies	 of	 the	 Maya	 civilization	 in	 Central	 America	(Rockström	et.	al.,	2009	S.	32).		The	Ottoman	Empire	 represents	 the	history	of	 the	Turkish	Republic	during	 the	pre-fossil	 energy	 era.	 In	 a	 pre-fossil	 society	 without	 steam	 engines,	 trucks,	 or	 other	mechanised	 forms	of	 technology,	animals	 served	as	 the	heavy	 lifters,	 stores	of	energy,	and	 long	distance	 transporters	needed	 to	power	 the	 economy	of	 the	Ottoman	Empire	(Mikhail,	 2017).	 During	 the	 pre-fossil	 energy	 era,	 the	 Ottomans	 took	 their	 primary	energy	needs	from	traditional	biomass	sources.	Until	the	early	1800s,	virtually	all	of	the	energy	 used	 and	 produced	 in	 the	 Ottoman	 Empire	 came	 from	 wood	 biomass.	 The	Ottoman	 territory	 was	 rich	 with	 dense	 forests.	 Nonetheless,	 the	 demographic	development	 of	 the	 population	 and	 the	 constant	 aspiration	 for	 survival,	 led	 to	 the	maximum	exploitation	of	nature.	The	woods	were	constantly	being	harvested	to	use	as	firewood	 to	 heat	 the	 Ottoman	 Palace,	 trees	 were	 also	 cut	 down	 to	 use	 for	 building	material,	 i.e.	 timber	for	the	navy	shipyards,	an	energy	source	 in	the	army	for	the	arms	production	 or	 for	 their	 leaves	which	were	 used	 to	 feed	 domestic	 animals.	 One	 of	 the	main	reasons	for	cutting	down	woods	and	thus	causing	intensive	deforestation	was	the	
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cultivation	of	areas	for	pastures.	Production	of	wood	charcoal	used	for	heating	baths	and	residences	 of	 the	 Sultan,	 masters	 and	 beggars	 during	 the	 wintertime,	 were	 also	prominent	purposes.	There	was	no	official	registration	system	identifying	the	quantity	of	timber	obtained	from	the	natural	forests.	Not	only	the	Ottoman	Empire,	but	the	wellbeing	of	all	societies	around	the	world	are	derived	from	the	Holocene	era,	which	provided	us	with	fresh	water,	productive	soils,	quality	of	air,	fish,	stable	equilibrium	of	forests	and	a	stable	climate.	Nevertheless,	it	did	not	 take	 too	much	 time	until	 the	world	was	 pushed	 out	 of	 the	Holocene	 into	 another	epoch,	due	 to	 the	 increased	 technological	potency	of	human	activities.	These	activities	have	 consistently	 influenced	 and	 even	 dominated	 many	 aspects	 of	 the	 Earth's	environment,	and	its	functioning.	Since	the	beginning	of	the	fossil-fuel	era	and	the	great	
acceleration	of	 the	human	enterprise	 in	 the	1950s,	humanity’s	wide-ranging	 impacts	–	including	climate	change,	chemical	pollution,	air	pollution,	land	and	water	degradation,	nutrient	overload,	and	the	massive	loss	of	species	and	habitats	(Rockström,	et	al.,	2015	S.	33),	Earth’s	major	systems	and	tipping	points	were	put	under	pressure.	Consequently,	we	have	introduced	our	own	geological	epoch,	the	“Anthropocene”.	
2.2.	 Fossil	Energy	Era			 Before	 industrialisation,	 humans	 had	 already	 begun	 to	 extract	 and	 use	 some	fossil	sources.	Between	the	11th	and	14th	centuries,	medieval	Europe	experienced	rapid	population	growth,	 leading	to	new	settlements	 throughout	central	and	eastern	Europe	(Moore,	2002	S.	303).	In	the	early	13th	century,	coal	mining	began	and	energy	from	coal	was	 used	 mainly	 for	 the	 forcing	 and	 melting	 of	 metals	 (CMU,	 2003).	 There	 was	significant	 growth	 of	 manufacturing	 output	 and	 cash-crop	 agriculture,	 as	 part	 of	 a	generalised	 wave	 of	 commercial	 expansion	 throughout	 Afro-Eurasia	 (Moore,	 2002	 S.	303).	In	the	14th	century	the	feudal	system	in	Europe	was	faced	with	a	crisis.	By	the	end	of	 the	 15th	 century,	 the	 feudalism	 in	 Europe	 came	 close	 to	 its	 demise	 when	 "proto-capitalist"	development	especially	 in	Poland,	eastern	Germany,	Czech,	 the	Balkans	and	parts	of	northern	Italy	came	into	existence.	In	the	16th	century,	feudalism’s	demise	and	capitalism’s	ascent	had	begun.	At	 the	beginning	of	 the	17th	 century,	 the	need	 for	 large	quantities	of	accessible,	dependable,	transportable	and	powerful	energy,	encouraged	the	exploration	of	more	energy	sources.	Great	Britain	experienced	an	energy	crisis	due	to	a	shortage	of	wood	and	began	using	coal	as	a	substitute	fuel	source	for	domestic	purposes	
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(Nef,	 1977	 S.	 140).	 In	 the	 18th	 century	 the	 transition	 from	 feudalism	 to	 capitalism	brought	about	the	inevitable	emergence	of	the	classless	socialist	society.	Feudalism	led	to	 a	 class	 struggle	 between	 the	 feudal	 ruling	 class	 and	 the	 emerging	 capitalist	 class,	which	 also	 highlights	 to	 the	 transition	 point	 from	 pre-fossil	 to	 fossil	 energy.	 The	inventions	 and	 discoveries	 generated	 the	 Industrial	 Revolution,	which	 began	 in	 Great	Britain	and	spread	to	Western	Europe	and	the	United	States	within	a	few	decades.		The	beginning	of	the	fossil	energy	era	dates	back	to	the	middle	of	the	18th	century	together	with	the	industrial	revolution,	as	the	people	learned	how	to	exploit	fossil	fuels	as	 a	 new,	 cheap	 and	 efficient	 energy	 source.	 Within	 the	 fossil	 energy	 era,	 nature,	humanity,	 politics	 and	 the	 economy	 became	 interconnected.	 The	 relationships	 of	humankind	within	the	web	of	life	became	denser,	fully	connected	and	every	link	of	the	chain	mattered	(Rockström,	et	al.,	2015).	The	foundations	of	capitalism	were	established	during	the	fossil	energy	era.	The	transformation	from	pre-fossil	to	the	fossil	era	was	not	solely	 an	 energy	 transformation,	 but	 also	 an	 economic	 and	 societal	 change.	 As	 Karl	
Polanyi	explains,	up	until	the	19th	century,	the	human	economy	was	always	embedded	in	society.	 The	 term	 “embeddedness”	 expresses	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 economy	 is	 not	autonomous,	as	it	must	be	in	economic	theory,	but	subordinated	to	politics,	religion	and	social	 relations	 (Polanyi,	 2001	 S.	 xxiv).	 Polanyi	 argues	 that	 creating	 a	 fully	 self-regulating	market	economy	requires	that	human	beings	and	the	natural	environment	be	turned	 into	 pure	 commodities,	which	 assures	 the	 destruction	 of	 both	 society	 and	 the	natural	environment	(Polanyi,	2001	S.	xxv).	There	are	two	levels	to	Polanyi’s	argument:	The	 first	 is	 a	 moral	 argument,	 that	 it	 is	 wrong	 to	 treat	 nature	 and	 human	 beings	 as	objects	whose	price	will	 be	determined	 entirely	by	 the	market	 (Polanyi,	 2001	S.	 xxv).	Otherwise,	such	concepts	would	violate	the	principle,	which	has	always	persisted,	 that		humans	and	nature	have	always	been	recognised	as	 important	dimensions	and	not	as	the	 subordinated	 objects	 of	 the	 market.	 The	 second	 level	 of	 Polanyi’s	 argument	propounds	 that,	despite	 the	economy’s	apparent	 self-regulating	nature,	 the	 state	must	play	 the	 ongoing	 role	 of	 adjusting	 the	 supply	 of	 money	 and	 credit	 to	 avoid	 the	 twin	dangers	of	inflation	and	deflation	(Polanyi,	2001	S.	xxvi).	According	 to	 Polanyi,	 in	 all	 societies	 there	 are	 a	 number	 of	 institutions	 that	regulate	economy,	ensure	the	 livelihood	and	survival	of	people;	 for	example,	state	and	state-like	 institutions	 are	 one	 of	 them.	 The	 family	 is	 of	 course	 very	 important	 at	 all	times.	Moreover,	communities	and	tribes	were	very	important	to	the	old	societies	that	Polanyi	 researched	 and	
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functions.	Market	is	an	important	institution,	which	determines	the	livelihood	of	people	and	 coordinates	 economic	 life.	 But	 Polanyi	 says,	 “the	 market	 is	 different”,	 because,	unlike	 the	 state	 and	 the	 family,	 the	 only	 function	 of	 the	market	 is	 economic	 function.	Therefore,	if	the	concept	of	humanity	is	reduced	to	an	economic	institution,	which	only	has	economic	meaning,	then	human	life	become	an	accessory	of	the	economy.	The	idea	of	 society	becoming	an	accessory	of	 the	market	 is	particularly	 important	 today,	 as	we	can	currently	observe	it	taking	place.	Privatisations,	the	elimination	of	rules	regulating	the	labour	market	and	the	attack	on	all	regulatory	institutions	up	to	the	minimum	wage,	can	 be	 identified	 as	 attempts	 to	 make	 human	 society	 an	 accessory	 of	 the	 market.	According	 to	 Polanyi,	 this	 does	 not	 occur	 naturally.	 He	 further	 explains	 that	 the	emergence	of	the	market,	which	operates	according	to	its	own	rules,	exists	not	by	itself	but	through	intervention.		Based	 on	 Polanyi’s	 assumptions,	 we	 can	 assert	 that	 through	 the	 societal	 and	economic	 transformation	 to	 the	 fossil	 era	 from	 pre-fossil	 society,	 nature	 and	 human	were	 seen	 as	 objects	 to	 be	 subordinated	 under	 the	 market	 and	 the	 state	 has	 a	 vital	economic	 role	 to	 supply	 money,	 as	 well	 as	 to	 guide	 the	 avoidance	 of	 inflation	 and	deflation.	The	social	relationships,	the	nature	and	human	are	embedded	in	the	economic	system.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 in	 pre-industrial	 societies,	 social	 relationships	 are	 deeply	embedded	in	all	economic	activities	and	institutions.	While	humans	work	to	earn	their	living	(economic	activities),	they	are	involved	in	their	communities	and	act	in	ways	that	ensure	 the	 community’s	 well-being,	 to	 protect	 the	 social	 harmony	 and	 foster	 social	cohesion	 (social	 relationships).	 The	 community	 members	 also	 maintain	 social	 ties	through	mutual	 reciprocity	 and	 the	 redistribution	 of	 resources.	 These	 reciprocal	 acts	hold	communities	together	as	they	support	each	other	in	meeting	the	demands	of	daily	living;	in	this	way,	the	community	maintains	social	cohesion.	As	 the	 transformation	 of	 pre-industrial	 societies	 into	 industrial	 societies	 took	place,	 the	 economic	 activities	 became	 removed	 from	 the	 community.	 The	 USA,	which	was	the	instrument	of	the	new	capitalist	elites,	created	markets	to	allow	the	owners	of	capital	 to	 produce	 and	 sell	 products,	 treating	 land,	 labour,	 and	 capital	 as	 if	 they	were	commodities.	 Furthermore,	 they	 placed	 constraints	 on	 community	 rights,	 limited	community	access	 to	common	property	and	removed	 traditional	barriers	 to	 trade	and	finance	(Rice,	et	al.,	2013).	Since	land,	labour	and	capital	are	not	'natural'	commodities,	the	 governments	had	 to	 enforce	 this	 fiction	 through	 the	mechanisms	of	 contracts	 and	laws.	 The	most	 damaging	 part	 of	 this	 system	was	 that	 it	 undermined	 the	 cooperative	
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aspects	of	civil	society,	maintained	the	separation	of	civil	society	from	the	economy	and	consequently,	business	interests	and	governments	underestimated	both	the	cooperation	of	 community	members	 and	 the	 importance	of	 reciprocity	 and	 redistribution	 (Rice,	 et	al.,	2013).	The	governments	dignified	the	notion	of	private	property	and	reinforced	the	idea	that	people	actually	should	take	care	of	 themselves	and	become	vying	 individuals	who	 would	 willingly	 relinquish	 their	 commodities	 to	 find	 work	 in	 the	 new	industrialising	societies	(Rice,	et	al.,	2013).	The	capitalist	system	in	the	fossil	epoch	developed	the	subrogation	of	fossil	fuels	instead	of	workers.	Polanyi	propounds	the	results	of	such	a	system	as	the	following:			“To	allow	the	market	mechanism	to	be	sole	director	of	the	fate	of	human	beings	and	
their	natural	environment	indeed,	even	of	the	amount	and	use	of	purchasing	power,	
would	 result	 in	 the	 demolition	 of	 society...Robbed	 of	 the	 protective	 covering	 of	
cultural	institutions,	human	beings	would	perish	from	the	effects	of	social	exposure;	
they	would	die	 as	 the	 victims	of	 acute	 social	 dislocation	 through	 vice,	 perversion,	
crime,	 and	 starvation.	 Nature	 would	 be	 reduced	 to	 its	 elements,	 neighbourhoods	
and	 landscapes	de-	 filed,	 rivers	polluted,	military	 safety	 jeopardized,	 the	power	 to	
produce	 food	and	raw	materials	destroyed...Undoubtedly,	 labour,	 land,	and	money	
markets	are	essential	to	a	market	economy.	But	no	society	could	stand	the	effects	of	
such	a	system	of	crude	fictions	even	for	the	shortest	stretch	of	time	unless	its	human	
and	natural	 substance	as	well	 as	 its	 business	 organization	was	protected	against	
the	ravages	of	this	satanic	mill.”	(Polanyi,	2001	S.	76)		Polanyi	 analysed	 how,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 Industrial	 Revolution,	 the	 production	factors,	 i.e.	 labour,	 land	 and	 capital	 –	 and	 with	 them,	 people	 too	 –	 had	 lost	 their	embeddedness	in	a	broader	cultural	context	and	were	exposed	to	the	forces	of	supply	and	 demand.	 With	 their	 livelihoods	 and	 survival	 at	 risk,	 many	 people	 reacted	 by	calling	 for	 a	 strong	 state	 –	 such	 as	 in	 the	 communist	 countries	 and	 in	 National	Socialist	 Germany.	 The	 present	 situation	 in	 many	 affected	 countries	 is	 equally	challenging,	the	economic	and	food-shortage	crises	have	made	people	into	pawns	of	the	 market.	 The	 way	 out	 of	 current	 situation	 is	 undecided,	 however,	 it	 can	 be	managed	successfully.	Now,	it’s	all	about	re-embedding:	The	financial	system	into	the	economic	system;	the	economic	system	into	the	socio-cultural	system;	and	the	socio-
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cultural	 system	 into	 the	 natural	 environment	 (Figure	 1).	 No	 doubt	 about	 it	 –	 it’s	 a	major	challenge	for	our	own	and	the	upcoming	generations.	
Figure	1.	Embeddedness	vs.	Re-Embeddedness	
	Polanyi	observed	that	the	road	to	the	free	market	was	opened	and	kept	open	by	an	enormous	increase	in	continuous,	centrally	organised	and	controlled	interventionism	(Onder,	 2015	 S.	 140).	 Since	 the	 1980s	 Turkey	 has	 demonstrated	 the	 paradox	 of	 the	opening	of	markets	going	hand	 in	hand	with	the	strengthening	of	 the	state’s	 iron	grip.	The	reforms	that	opened	up	the	Turkish	economy	to	international	forces	after	the	1980	coup	 were	 pushed	 by	 an	 oppressive,	 nationalistic	 military	 junta	 and	 later	 eagerly	followed	by	civilian	governments.	According	to	Nilgün	Önder,	an	associate	Professor	at	the	University	of	Regina,	in	the	1980s	Turkish	state	intervention	in	the	economy	did	not	actually	 decline;	 rather,	 its	 direction	 changed.	 Through	 a	 systematic	 centralisation	 of	policy	 powers,	 there	 was	 a	 “reinforcement	 and	 expansion	 of	 [the	 state’s]	 coercive	powers	over	society	(Armstrong,	2010).	Forty	years	later,	the	situation	in	Turkey	shows	that	 an	 open	 economy	 and	 a	 liberal	 state	 are	 far	 from	 inevitable	 counterpoints	(Armstrong,	2010).	The	economic	globalisation	of	the	 late	20th	century	brought	about	a	world-wide	expansion	 of	 markets	 to	 areas	 which	 were	 previously	 outside	 the	 orbit	 of	 market	relations.	 Societies	 throughout	 the	 world	 have	 been	 affected	 by	 the	 challenges	 of	globalisation	 (Bugra,	 2020).	 Although	 welfare	 state	 institutions	 and	 policies	 have	undergone	 important	 changes	 and	 transformations,	 social	 policy	 has	 not	 lost	 its	importance	 in	advanced	capitalist	countries	and	 it	has	acquired	a	novel	significance	 in	the	 late	 industrialising	 countries	 of	 the	 periphery,	 where	 public	 social	 spending	 has	increased	and	new	instruments	of	social	policy	have	been	introduced	(Bugra,	2020).	In	
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both	 late-industrialising	and	advanced	 industrialised	countries,	 the	new	developments	in	 social	 policy	 have	 been	 situated	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 new	 global	 capitalism.	 These	changes	 in	 policies	 and	 institutions	 constitute	 a	 response	 to	 the	 challenges	 of	 a	 new,	market-dominated	 economic	 order	 (Bugra,	 2020).	 Capitalism	 is	 a	 system	 of	 “cheap	nature”,	where	 energy	 can	be	 obtained	 at	 a	 low	 cost.	 Cheap	nature	 is	 central	 because	every	 era	 of	 high	 economic	 development	 growth	 of	 the	 modern	 world	 has	 been	premised	on	the	‘four	cheaps’.	Every	era	of	capitalism	carries	with	it	‘new	imperialism’,	‘new	extractivism’,	‘new	colonialism’,	‘new	ways	to	getting	cheap	labour’,	‘new	industrial	revolutions’,	 ‘new	 agricultural	 revolutions’	 or	 ‘new	 scientific	 revolutions’.	 As	 the	relationship	 of	 human	 beings	 with	 the	 web	 of	 life	 has	 become	 denser,	 the	 limits	 of	nature	 have	 become	much	more	 visible.	 According	 to	 Jason	Moore	 these	 limits	which	elicit	capital	accumulation	can	be	called	the	“limits	of	the	frontiers”:	labour	power,	food,	energy	and	raw	materials	(Moore,	2016).	As	labour,	food,	energy	and	raw	materials	are	made	cheaply	–	 through	 the	appropriation	of	 the	unpaid	work	of	 “women,	nature	and	colonies”	 –	 they	 become	 what	 Jason	 Moore	 identifies	 as	 the	 “Four	 Cheaps”	 (Moore,	2014).	 According	 to	 Moore,	 as	 the	 Four	 Cheaps	 are	 restored,	 new	 opportunities	 for	capital	accumulation	appear;	for	instance,	the	railroad	revolution	of	the	19th	century	or	the	automobile	revolution	of	the	20th	century.	Over	time,	the	Four	Cheaps	stopped	being	cheap,	 “because	 the	 squeezing	 out	 of	 unpaid	work	 in	 the	upswing	of	 an	 accumulation	cycle	 exhausts	 the	 resilience	 of	 uncommodified	 relations	 of	 reproduction”	 (Moore,	2014).	Accordingly,	labour	costs	have	risen	along	with	the	costs	of	food,	energy	and	raw	material	prices.	The	opportunities	for	accumulation	in	the	zone	of	material	production	then	 stagnate	 and	begin	 to	 contract.	 Financial	 expansions	 tend	 to	 begin	when	 the	Big	Four	inputs	become	more	expensive.	The	value	composition	of	the	labour,	food,	energy	and	raw	materials	then	rises	rather	than	falls	(Moore,	2014).	The	ability	to	access	cheap	energy	sources	and	raw	materials	has	become	a	very	crucial	 factor	 in	 the	 fossil	 energy	era.	 If	 there	 is	no	possibility	 to	 attain	 abundant	 and	inexpensive	 raw	materials,	 the	 labour	productivity	 stagnates	 in	 the	presence	 of	 rising	energy	 prices.	 In	 a	 capitalist	 production	 system,	 the	 growth	 of	 labour	 productivity	requires	 the	 substitution	 of	 labour	 for	 fossil	 energy	 and	 its	 technical	 and	 social	conversion	 system.	 In	 the	 course	 of	 capitalist	 streamlining,	 the	 exploitation	 of	 energy	sources	 is	 not	 rational.	 During	 the	 fossil	 industrial	 revolution,	 the	 energy	 basis	 is	radically	converted	from	biotic	to	non-biotic	(mainly	fossil)	sources	(Altvater,	2001).	
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The	 capitalist	 streamlining	 begins	 with	 the	 restraining	 of	 the	 wind	 and	 hydro	power,	 which,	 like	 stationary,	 are	 grounded	 energy	 sources,	 and	 are	 incapable	 of	supporting	 the	 spatial	 mobility,	 urban-industrial	 agglomeration	 and	 temporal	acceleration	 that	 the	 capitalist	 accumulation	 requires	 (Altvater,	 2001).	 Renewable	energy	sources	are	not	always	available	where	and	when	they	are	needed.	Along	with	the	 industrial	 revolution,	 the	 machine	 power	 began	 to	 replace	 human	 labour	 in	 the	production	 of	 goods	 for	 the	 first	 time	 in	 history.	 It	 was	with	 the	 use	 of	 fossil	 energy	sources	 since	 the	 18th	 century,	 that	 the	 limits	 presented	 by	 time	 and	 space	 and	 their	physical	 energy	 came	 to	 an	 end	 (Altvater,	 2001).	 In	 1763,	 the	 steam	 engine	 was	designed	 and	 built	 by	 James	 Watt.	 In	 1767,	 the	 first	 solar	 thermal	 collector	 was	developed	by	the	Swiss	scientist	Horace	de	Saussure	(CMU,	2003)	and	used	in	America	as	an	energy	source	 for	cooking	purposes	until	oil	and	gas	became	more	 frequent	and	reliable	ways	to	generate	power.	Coal	and	wood	were,	for	the	first	time,	available	as	the	primary	 fuel	 sources	 for	 the	 steam	 engine,	 particularly	 after	 the	 1800s	 in	 regard	 to	locomotives	(CMU,	2003).	 In	1816,	natural	gas	was	piped	 into	cities	 for	domestic	uses	such	as	cooking,	home	illumination	and	street	lighting	(CMU,	2003).	In	1859,	for	the	first	time,	petroleum	was	drilled	in	Titusville,	Pennsylvania	and	it	began	to	replace	coal	as	a	plentiful	 energy	 source.	 Petroleum	 was	 easy	 to	 obtain	 and	 transport;	 it	 emitted	 less	particulate	pollution	than	coal,	and	it	replaced	scarce	whale	oil	as	a	fuel	for	lamps	(CMU,	2003).	In	1861,	crude	oil	was	used	as	the	liquid	fuel	for	the	internal	combustion	engine.	Thus,	 coal	 became	 gradually	 unfavourable	 for	 consumers	 due	 to	 the	 labour	 issues	surrounding	 the	 mining	 industry.	 Miners	 had	 started	 to	 strike	 for	 safer	 working	conditions	and	more	money,	which	subsequently	affected	the	amount	of	coal	available	to	the	consumer.		In	 the	 1900s	 photoelectricity,	 which	 is	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 photovoltaic	 cells,	 was	discovered.	Nevertheless,	 the	development	of	 the	material	 technology	 for	photovoltaic	panels	occurred	slowly	and	thus,	 the	photovoltaic	did	not	become	a	primary	source	of	electricity.	 In	 the	 1950s	 the	 large-scale	 use	 of	 photovoltaic	 solar	 energy	 became	prevalent.	Contrary	to	sluggish	developments	in	the	photovoltaic	area,	wind	power	was	developed	 on	 a	 large	 scale	 in	 the	 USA	 as	 a	 source	 of	 energy	 for	 farms	 and	 railroad	stations,	using	tall	windmills	to	pump	water	from	underground	wells	(CMU,	2003).	The	20th	century	process	was	defined	by	Eric	Hobsbawm	as	“the	death	of	the	peasantry”,	as	the	most	dramatic	change	of	the	century	(Hobsbawm,	1994).	Hobsbawm	ascertains	the	disappearance	 of	 this	 truly	 world-historical	 anachronism	 in	 the	 ‘revolution	 of	 global	
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society'	 or	 ‘global	 transformation'	 from	 the	1950s,	 that	 extended	 industrial	 capitalism	beyond	its	historic	heartlands	of	Western	and	Central	Europe,	as	well	as	North	America.	All	culture	which	is	stemmed	from	agriculture,	must	now	be	derived	from	industry	and	must	be	concentrated	in	cities	(Altvater,	2001).	From	 Moore's	 perspective,	 in	 the	 fossil	 energy	 era,	 capitalism	 tends	 toward	ecosystem	simplification:	accessing	the	resources	as	fast,	easily	and	cheaply	as	possible	without	considering	potential	environmental	impacts.	As	coal	and	other	fossil	fuels	were	easier	 to	 use	 and	 available	 in	 abundance	 and	 required	 little	 effort,	 research	 and	investment	went	into	photovoltaic	research.	Capitalism	is	not	an	economic	system,	but	a	way	of	organising	nature	to	commit	to	an	endless	cycle	of	capital	accumulation	and	an	infinite	economic	growth.	From	its	emergence	in	the	16th	century,	it	has	been	premised	on	 endless	 capital	 accumulation.	 The	 idea	 of	 “continuous”	 accumulation	 proceeds	through	 a	 strange	 crystallisation	 of	 wealth:	 “labour	 productivity”	 in	 commodity	production.	The	accumulation	of	wealth	entails	a	geometrically	rising	demand	for	‘Cheap	Natures’.	The	major	line	of	thinking	surrounds	continuously	taking	from	nature	for	free	or	 at	 a	 low	 cost.	 Within	 this	 transition,	 new	 diseases	 occurred	 through	 biological	transformations	(Moore,	2016).	In	 the	 late	19th	 and	20th	 centuries,	 the	steam	turbine	was	developed	as	a	cheap	source	to	generate	electricity,	by	using	coal	as	a	fuel	source	(CMU,	2003).	The	beginning	of	 the	 enormous	 use	 of	 fossil	 fuels	 coincides	 with	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 60-acre	Highland	 Park	 automotive	 plant,	 complete	 with	 a	 moving	 assembly	 line,	 opened	 by	Henry	 Ford	 in	 1910	 (CMU,	 2003).	 In	 the	Middle	 East	 crude	 oils	were	 already	 known	from	natural	seepage	and	pools,	but	they	were	used	rather	as	protective	coatings	than	as	fuels	(Vaclav,	2000).	Those	years	foreshadowed	that	the	Middle	East	would	become	one	of	the	world's	biggest	oil	producers	and	one	of	the	global	powers	in	the	oil	 industry	in	the	future.		Energy	technologies	developed	rapidly	and	by	the	20th	century	crude	oil	and	its	products	 had	 become	 an	 indispensable	 part	 of	 the	 industrial	 economy	 (CMU,	 2003).	Consequently,	 in	1960,	countries	with	plenty	of	oil	reserves	came	together	to	establish	an	international	organization	and	economic	cartel,	called	Organization	of	the	Petroleum	Exporting	 Countries	 (OPEC),	 to	 control	 the	 flow	 of	 oil	 as	 well	 as	 to	 coordinate	 the	policies	of	the	oil-producing	countries.	The	Islamic	Republic	of	Iran,	Iraq,	Kuwait,	Saudi	Arabia	and	Venezuela	are	the	founding	countries	of	the	OPEC.	With	the	participation	of	Qatar,	 Indonesia,	 Libya,	 the	 United	 Arab	 Emirates,	 Algeria,	 Nigeria,	 Ecuador,	 Gabon,	
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Angola,	 Equatorial	 Guinea	 and	 Congo	 the	 organisation	 totals	 15	 member-countries	(OPEC,	2018).	In	1973,	six	Persian	Gulf	oil	producers	voted	to	raise	their	benchmark	oil	price	by	70%.	In	the	same	year	OPEC	cut	production	and	stopped	oil	shipments	to	the	U.S.	 and	 other	 countries.	 By	 the	 time	 the	 embargo	 was	 lifted	 in	 March	 1974,	 the	 oil	prices	 had	 soared	 to	 US	 $12	 per	 barrel,	 almost	 four	 times	 the	 pre-crisis	 price.	While	OPEC	states	enjoyed	new	geopolitical	influence,	the	U.S.	and	other	oil	importer	countries	suffered	from	unprecedented	fuel	costs	and	recessions.	This	oil	shock	caused	an	energy	crisis	 and	 the	 energy	 crisis	brought	 energy	 shortage	 concerning	all	 nations,	 especially	the	 U.S.,	 which	 was	 highly	 dependent	 on	 imported	 oil.	 This	 crisis	 brought	 sweeping	changes	to	global	energy	policies	in	the	1970s	and	1980s	and	led	to	energy	conservation	and	 investment	 policies	 that	 aimed	 at	massive	 reductions	 in	 global	 carbon	 emissions.	Thereby,	 the	 emerging	 interest	 to	 explore	 renewable	 energy	 sources	 for	 large	 scale	generation	of	electricity	and	other	energy	needs	was	born	(CMU,	2003).		In	pursuit	of	an	acute	need	of	alternative	energy	sources	in	the	19th	century,	the	social	analysts	became	aware	of	the	negative	relation	of	capitalism	to	the	environment,	the	issue	of	revolutionary	changes	taking	place	in	the	mode	of	production	and	how	this	was	 transforming	 the	 human	 relationship	 to	 nature.	 Consequently,	 environmental	sociologists	 in	 the	 USA	 drew	 predominantly	 on	 three	 interrelated	 ideas	 derived	 from	Marx	and	the	critique	of	the	capitalist	political	economy:	(1)	the	treadmill	of	production;	(2)	 the	 second	 contradiction	 of	 capitalism;	 and	 (3)	 the	metabolic	 rift	 (Foster,	 2009	 S.	48).	
The	treadmill	of	production	describes	capitalism	as	an	inexpungable,	accelerating	treadmill	 that	 constantly	 increases	 the	 scale	 of	 the	 throughput	 of	 energy	 and	 raw	materials	as	part	of	its	quest	for	profit	and	accumulation.	This,	inevitably	pressing	on	the	earth's	absorptive	capacity	(Foster,	2009	S.	48).	
The	 second	 contradiction	 of	 capitalism	 refers	 to	 the	 idea	 that	 capitalism,	 in	addition	 to	 its	 primary	 economic	 contradiction	 arising	 from	 class	 inequalities	 in	production	and	distribution,	also	devastates	the	human	and	environmental	conditions	of	production,	on	which	its	economic	progress	eventually	rests.	In	this	conception,	once	the	ecological	damage	turned	 into	an	economic	crisis	of	capitalism,	a	 feedback	mechanism	was	 set	 into	 play	 (Foster,	 2002).	 Nevertheless,	 it	 is	 speculative	 that	 the	 notion	 of	"Second	Contradiction"	exists.	According	to	John	Bellamy	Foster	and	some	other	social	scientists,	 there	 is	no	 such	 convenient	 feedback	mechanism	 for	 capitalism	as	 a	whole.	Because	 capitalism	 never	 runs	 out	 of	 new	ways	 to	 extract	 surplus	 value,	 even	 in	 the	
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worst	social	and	environmental	disasters	(White	2016),	like	the	aftermath	of	Hurricane	Katrina	in	2005,	the	2010	Haiti	earthquake	or	the	Deepwater	Horizon	oil	spill	in	the	Gulf	of	Mexico	in	2010.	It	is	what	Naomi	Klein,	a	Canadian	author	and	a	social	activist,	calls	"the	 rise	 of	 disaster	 capitalism".	 As	 the	 public	 becomes	 disoriented	 in	 situations	following	massive	collective	shocks;	such	as,	wars,	terrorist	attacks,	or	natural	disasters,	there	are	new	opportunities	to	make	profits	and	achieve	control,	by	imposing	‘economic	shock	therapy’.	(Klein,	2007).	According	to	Foster,	capitalism's	intention	to	swap	over	environmental	problems,	implies	 that	 the	earth	 remains,	 far	and	wide,	 a	 "gift	 to	 capital".	Capitalism,	 in	essence,	uses	 the	 whole	 biosphere	 as	 a	 huge	 garbage	 can,	 and	 runs	 from	 one	 ecosystem	 to	another,	damaging	them	respectively	(Foster,	2009).	Foster	emphasises	in	his	book,	the	
Ecological	Revolution:	"We	 should	 not	 underestimate	 capitalism's	 capacity	 to	 accumulate	 in	 the	
midst	of	the	most	blatant	ecological	destruction,	to	profit	from	environmental	
degradation	 (for	 example	 through	 the	 growth	 of	 the	 waste	 management	
industry),	and	to	continue	to	destroy	the	earth	to	the	point	of	no	return	–	both	
for	human	society	and	 for	most	of	 the	world's	 living	species.	 In	other	words,	
the	 dangers	 of	 a	 deepening	 ecological	 problem	 are	 all	 the	 more	 severe	
because	 the	 system	 does	 not	 have	 an	 internal	 (or	 external)	 regulatory	
mechanism	that	causes	it	to	recognize.”	(Foster,	2009)	The	third	notion,	the	metabolic	rift,	refers	to	the	logic	of	capital	accumulation	that	creates	a	harsh	rift	in	the	metabolism	between	society	and	nature,	severing	fundamental	processes	 of	 natural	 reproduction	 (Foster,	 2009	 S.	 49).	 By	 articulating	 the	 concept	 of	metabolism,	 Justus	 von	 Liebig,	 and	 his	 analysis	 of	 the	 ecological	 contradictions	 of	industrialised	capitalist	agriculture	greatly	influenced	Marx	in	his	time.	According	to	this	notion,	 all	 life	 derives	 from	 metabolic	 processes	 between	 organisms	 and	 their	environment.	 All	 living	 creatures	 carry	 out	 an	 exchange	 of	 energy	 with	 their	surroundings,	 which	 is	 then	 integrated	 into	 their	 internal	 life	 processes.	 Thus,	 Marx	defined	 the	 labour	 process	 as	 a	 "metabolic	 interaction	 between	 nature	 and	 man"	(Foster,	2013).	The	metabolic	rift	between	nature	and	man,	(or	soil	and	worker	 in	 the	example	of	the	big	crisis	of	capitalist	agriculture	in	the	nineteenth	century	in	England)	(Foster,	 2007),	 pointed	 out	 the	 necessity	 of	 the	 restoration	 of	 nature	 through	sustainable	production.	According	to	Marx,	the	metabolic	rift	represented	a	problem	of	sustainability.	 He	 remarked	 that	 capitalism	 undermined	 the	 vitality	 of	 the	 everlasting	
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sources	of	wealth	–	the	soil	and	the	worker	–	and	pointed	out	the	necessity	of	a	much	more	 sustainable	 relation	 of	 human	 beings	 to	 harmonious	 production	with	 ecological	systems,	rather	than	merely	economic	notions	(Foster	2009).	Regarding	 the	 Ottoman	 Empire,	 we	 may	 assert	 that	 the	 Ottomans	 did	 not	‘successfully’	achieve	their	transition	to	capitalism,	as	their	“Western”	counterparts	did.	According	 to	Polanyi,	 in	 non-capitalist	 class	 societies,	 the	 ‘economy’	 or	 the	 ‘market’	 is	instituted	 as	 networks	 of	 patronage	 and	 thereby,	 organised	 through	 the	 hierarchical	allocation	 of	 political	 rights	 and	 privileges	 (Polanyi,	 1977).	 It	 is	 almost	 unanimously	accepted	 that	 the	 Ottoman	 Empire	 radically	 diverged	 from	 Western	 Europe,	 as	 its	“provisionist”	 and	 “fiscalist”	 economic	 policies	 sharply	 contrasted	 with	 European	“mercantilist”	 practices	 (Düzgün,	 2017	 S.	 25).	 It	 is	 contended	 that	 a	 particular	 set	 of	economic	 policies,	 which	 involved	 price	 regulations,	 export	 restrictions,	 and	military/urban	 subsidies,	 remained	 in	 place	 throughout	 the	 early	 modern	 period,	thereby	preventing	 the	growth	of	 ‘merchant	 capitalism’	 in	 the	Ottoman	Empire	 (Genc,	2009	S.	53).	Although	the	Ottomans	built	a	world	empire,	they	were	not	part	of	the	core	of	the	emerging	capitalist	system	in	the	late	16th	century,	which	eventually	steered	the	Empire	 toward	 the	 periphery.	 The	 marginalisation	 of	 the	 Empire	 started	 in	 the	 16th	century	and	was	completed	by	the	end	of	the	19th	century.	Accordingly,	the	Empire	was	victimised	by	the	emergence	of	the	capitalist	system	(Evrensel,	et	al.,	2017).	The	Era	which	saw	the	utilisation	of	conventional	energy	and	fossil	energy	 first	began	with	the	extraction	of	coal	in	the	Ottoman	Empire	between	1829	and	1858.	Sultan	Mahmud	II	with	his	decree	of	July	29,	1843	(in	Turkish:	Sadaret	Tezkeresi)	made,	for	the	first	time,	coal	production	in	the	Eregli	and	Amasya	provinces	possible	and	called	for	it	to	 put	 on	 the	 market	 in	 Istanbul	 to	 make	 a	 valuable	 contribution	 to	 the	 Ottoman	treasury.	The	aim	was	to	build	domestic	steamships	and	to	power	them	with	domestic	coal.	Nevertheless,	domestic	coal	was	not	sufficient	enough	to	realise	 the	 intentions	of	the	Sultan	(Ediger,	et	al.,	2010).	In	1848,	the	number	of	Ottoman	steamships	had	risen	to	18,	and	the	mines	 in	Zonguldak	began	producing	around	40,000	tons	of	coal	per	year.	During	 the	 1877-1878	 Ottoman-Russian	 Wartime,	 the	 mine	 production	 considerably	increased	and	reached	181,000	tons.	The	wartime	had	a	significant	impact,	not	only	on	coal	 production,	 but	 also	 largely	 on	petroleum.	During	 this	period,	Russia	became	 the	first	major	competitor	in	the	oil	market,	particularly	in	the	Black	Sea	region,	due	to	the	disruption	of	the	transportation	of	American	oil.	Russia	then	became	a	major	oil	supplier	to	 the	 Ottoman	 Empire.	 The	 1905	 petroleum	 crisis	 in	 Russia	 caused	 a	 decline	 in	
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production,	which	adversely	affected	the	oil	supply	of	the	Ottoman	Empire	despite	the	oil	consumption	level	being	relatively	low	(Ediger,	et	al.,	2010).	The	first	electrification	efforts	in	the	Ottoman	Empire	had	first	begun	during	the	reign	 of	 Sultan	 Abdulhamid	 II.	 (1876-1909).	 Izmir	 and	 Thessaloniki	 were	 the	 first	Ottoman	 cities	 met	 with	 electricity.	 Abdulhamid	 II	 abstained	 from	 electricity	 and	therefore,	during	his	reign,	electricity	was	used	only	in	the	palace	and	hotels	of	Istanbul,	rather	than	in	the	whole	city	(Geyikdagi,	2011).	In	1902,	Tarsus,	a	province	in	the	south	of	Turkey,	Italian	and	Swiss	companies	initiated	the	first	electrification	process,	with	an	installed	 capacity	 of	 120-horse	 power	 (1	 horsepower	 =	 0.7	 kW)	 hydropower	 plant	(Gürbüz,	et	al.,	2007).	The	plan	was	to	connect	2	kW	dynamo	to	the	mill	and	the	power	plant	 (Geyikdagi,	 2011).	 Therefore,	 the	 necessary	 equipment	 including	 dynamo,	 line,	and	 other	 electrical	 materials	 were	 sourced	 externally	 and	 imported.	 After	 the	installation	 of	 the	 hardware	 and	 dynamo,	 the	 power	 plant	 was	 able	 to	 produce	electricity	 –	 however,	 it	 only	 provided	 electricity	 to	 some	 of	 the	 private	 dwellings	(Geyikdagi,	 2011).	 A	 similar	 system	 continued	 to	 operate	 in	 the	 early	 years	 of	 the	Turkish	Republic	 until	 1938,	when	 all	 power	 plants	were	 nationalised	 (Gürbüz,	 et	 al.,	2007).	After	 the	 deposition	 of	 Abdulhamid	 II,	 the	 production,	 and	 utilisation	 of	electricity	became	widespread	in	Istanbul	(Geyikdagi,	2011).	Due	to	the	absence	of	any	steam	 powerful	 enough	 to	 operate	 a	 hydraulic	 plant	 in	 the	 vicinity	 of	 Istanbul,	 the	construction	 of	 a	 steam	 plant	 had	 been	 considered	 as	 a	 solution	 (Kirac,	 et	 al.,	 2003).	
Halic	(English:	Golden	Horn),	a	horn-shaped	inlet	of	the	Bosporus	was	determined	as	the	best	 place	 for	 the	 plants.	 Halic	 is	 a	 natural,	 sheltered	 harbour,	 which	 had	 sufficient	supply	 of	 fresh	 water,	 facilitated	 coal	 transportation	 and	 enabled	 the	 efficient	distribution	 of	 power	 to	 the	 whole	 city	 (Kirac,	 et	 al.,	 2003).	 In	 electrification	 of	 the	European	and	Asian	sides	of	Istanbul,	a	transmission	cable	crossed	the	Bosporus	under	the	 Marmara	 Sea.	 The	 construction	 of	 the	 essential	 plant	 and	 power	 distribution	network	was	completed	 in	1914.	The	power	plant,	which	was	 the	 first	power	plant	of	the	Ottoman	Empire,	 had	been	established	 in	 an	area	of	120,000	m2	 on	 the	European	side	 of	 Istanbul.	 It	 was	 the	 Silahtaraga	 Power	 Station,	 a	 coal-fired	 generating	 station	with	a	capacity	of	storage	for	around	40,000	tons	of	coal	and	remained	in	use	from	1914	to	 1983	 (Kirac,	 et	 al.,	 2003).	 The	 electricity	 sector	 was	 mostly	 contingent	 on	 foreign	investments.	 In	 1923,	 the	 total	 installed	 power	 capacity	 was	 33	 MW	 and	 the	 total	electricity	 production	 was	 45	 million	 kwh.	 The	 power	 activities	 were	 under	 the	
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direction	of	 foreign	 companies	 from	Belgium,	Germany,	 Italy	and	Hungary,	which	also	held	a	certain	degree	of	independence	in	management.	The	plant	continued	to	produce	electricity	in	its	original	capacity	until	1920.	Due	to	the	increasing	need	of	power,	the	construction	of	additional	new	boilers	and	engine	rooms	 took	 place	 in	 the	 upcoming	 years.	 The	 plant	 was	 nationalised	 in	 1937	 and	operated	 under	 the	 direction	 of	 the	 Municipality	 of	 Istanbul	 until	 1970.	 The	 Turkish	Electricity	Administration	took	over	the	management	of	the	plant	from	the	Municipality	in	 the	 1970s	 (Kirac,	 et	 al.,	 2003).	With	 four	 engines	 and	 four	 boiling	 rooms,	 the	 total	producing	capacity	reached	100,000	kW.	The	Silahtarağa	power	station	was	shut	down	in	1983	due	to	the	lack	of	the	cooling	water	in	the	stream.	After	its	closure,	the	plant	was	converted	into	a	university	campus	for	the	Istanbul	Bilgi	University	and	now	houses	two	museums	and	several	other	facilities.	The	Ottoman	 Empire	managed	 to	maintain	 its	 own	 power	 generation	 until	 the	late	17th	century.	Thereafter,	the	Ottomans	became	progressively	weaker	in	comparison	to	 their	 Western	 rivals.	 Since	 the	 industrial	 revolution,	 the	 energy	 sources	 like	 coal,	petroleum,	steam,	and	electricity	have	been	a	driving	 force	 for	 the	modern	civilisation	development.	 The	 Ottomans,	 however,	 were	 lagging	 behind	 the	 industrial	 and	technological	 development	 of	 the	 West,	 and	 hence	 became	 even	 more	 dependent	 on	Europe.	Towards	the	end	of	the	19th	century,	the	first	petroleum	exploration	activities	by	drilling	 took	 place	 in	 Iskenderun	 and	 the	 Thrace	 region	 within	 the	 boundaries	 of	Ottoman	 Empire.	 Nevertheless,	 very	minor	 oil	 and	 gas	 discoveries	were	made.	 There	were	no	serious	exploration	activities	until	the	establishment	of	“Petroleum	Exploration	and	 Operation	 Management”	 by	 the	 Law	 Number	 2189	 on	 May	 20,	 1933.	 The	establishment	of	 the	Law	saw	geological	 investigations	conducted	of	all	 regions	which	had	the	potential	of	petroleum	discovery	and	was	 led	by	 two	American	geologists	and	one	Swiss	palaeontologist.	Following	 the	geological	 investigation	and	drilling	activities	conducted	once	more	in	the	Iskenderun	region,	no	positive	results	were	achieved.	In	the	Thrace	region,	a	strong	gas	flow	was	discovered,	but	completely	dried	out	at	the	end	of	the	second	month	of	drilling	activities.	The	first	and	economic	commercial	oil	discovery	in	Turkey	was	made	in	the	Raman	province	in	the	Southeast	Anatolian	region.	In	1940,	petroleum	was	 discovered	 at	 Raman-1	well	 and	 production	 started	 from	 the	 1,052	m	depth.	 The	 daily	 production	 capacity	 of	 the	 Raman-1	well	 was	 10	 tons	 of	 petroleum.	Until	 1954,	 84	 million	 Turkish	 liras,	 (around	 21	 million	 Euros),	 were	 spent	 for	 the	
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petroleum	 exploration	 activities	 in	 Turkey.	 During	 this	 period	 37	 explorations,	 13	productions	 and	 19	 geological	 investigation	 activities	 were	 performed.	 The	 total	production	of	petroleum	was	95,881	tons.	During	 very	 first	 years	 of	 the	 newly	 founded	 Republic	 of	 Turkey	 (1925-1937),	64%	of	total	wood	production	was	utilised	as	firewood.	Wood	biomass	met	60%	of	the	country's	 primary	 energy	 consumption.	 Correspondingly,	 in	 1926,	 the	 biggest	lumbermill	 of	 Europe	 began	 operation	 in	Ayancik	 province	 in	 the	Black	 Sea	 region	 of	Turkey.	The	goal	of	the	factory	was	to	set	up	a	simple	system	to	generate	electricity	from	the	 timber	 residue.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 designing	 company	 disregarded	 some	 of	 the	contractual	 obligations,	 which	 led	 to	 excessive	 deforestation	 in	 Ayancik.	 The	 factory	continued	 its	 activities	 until	 the	 end	 of	 1994	 under	 the	 direction	 of	 the	 Ayancik	Government	(Akyol,	2014).	The	 combined	 demands	 of	 industrialisation	 and	 urbanisation	 in	 Turkey	 almost	tripled	the	energy	consumption	in	the	1960s	and	1970s	(Chapin	Metz,	1995).	 In	1960,	more	 than	 half	 of	 the	 primary	 energy	 consumed	 came	 from	 non-commercial	 sources.	This	was	primarily	firewood,	however	it	was	also	comprised	of	manure	and	agricultural	waste.	These	non-commercial	energy,	domestic	coal,	and	 lignite	sources	accounted	 for	more	 than	80%	of	all	primary	energy	consumption,	whereas	oil	 supplied	only	18%	of	the	 energy	 used	 (Chapin	 Metz,	 1995).	 During	 the	 1970s,	 the	 demand	 for	 electricity	began	to	exceed	the	supply,	and	by	late	1979	the	power	gap	began	to	restrain	industry.	After	1977,	the	constant	power	blackouts	affected	industrial,	commercial	and	residential	consumers	(Chapin	Metz,	1995).	By	1979,	the	restricted	imports	of	crude	oil	meant	that	fuel	 for	 cars,	 trucks,	 and	 tractors	had	 to	be	 rationed	 (Chapin	Metz,	1995).	 In	 the	mid-1980s	Turkish	government,	 under	 the	presidency	of	Turgut	Özal,	 launched	 the	 “build,	operate	and	transfer	-	BOT”	system.	The	primary	goal	of	the	BOT	system	was	to	open	the	floodgates	 for	 foreign	 investors,	who	would	provide	 the	 capital	 and	 the	 technology	 to	build	 plants,	 operate	 them	 for	 several	 years	 with	 guaranteed	 revenues	 and	 finally	transfer	 the	units	 to	 the	government	when	 the	 investment	had	been	entirely	 returned	(Chapin	Metz,	1995).	Thereafter,	through	the	setup	of	hydroelectric	dams	and	coal-run	thermal	power	plants,	the	share	of	wood-biomass	in	total	energy	production	decreased	to	 14%.	 By	 1980,	 oil	 supplied	 about	 47%	 of	 the	 primary	 energy	 consumed,	 coal	 and	lignite	 about	 2%,	 hydroelectric	 power	 8%	 and	 non-commercial	 sources	 only	 23%.	By	1992,	43.5%	of	 final	energy	consumption	came	from	crude	oil,	31.1%	from	lignite	and	
		 36	
hard	coal,	4.1%	from	hydroelectric	power,	6.9%	from	natural	gas	and	14.4%	from	other	sources	like	solid	fuels,	geothermal,	solar	and	wind	power	(Chapin	Metz,	1995).	The	 energy	 transition	 from	pre-fossil	 to	 fossil	 era	 had	 taken	 place	much	 faster	after	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 Ottoman	 Empire	 and	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	 new	 republic	 in	Turkey	 was	 established	 in	 parallel	 to	 industrialisation	 efforts,	 demographical	 and	economic	growth.	While	the	use	of	traditional	biomass	and	coal	saw	the	country	meeting	almost	 80%	of	 its	 energy	needs,	 the	 economic	 and	demographic	 consumption	pushed	the	energy	demand	ratio	higher,	which	brought	with	it	a	dependency	on	external	energy.	As	Turkey’s	economic	growth	model	 is	 import	rather	than	export-oriented,	 the	energy	transition	from	pre-fossil	to	fossil	era	and	the	subsequent	energy	dependency	created	a	long-lasting	economic	budget	deficit	for	the	country.		In	the	20th	century,	access	to	energy	resources	had	become	a	determining	factor	in	 winning	 wars,	 influencing	 neighbours	 and	 challenging	 enemies,	 thus	 gaining	 a	geopolitical	 power	 over	 other	 countries.	 The	 connection	between	 energy	 security	 and	the	military	had	been	 established,	 focusing	on	 the	 “defence	of	 international	 oil	 tanker	chokepoints	 and	 the	 free	 flow	 of	 oil	 through	 these	 trade	 routes”	 (Nuttall	 and	 Manz	2008).	 Not	 withstanding	 this,	 towards	 the	 end	 of	 the	 20th	 century,	 a	 new	 energy	approach	 began	 to	 emanate,	 driven	 by	 technological	 developments,	 environmental	concerns,	resource	constraints	and	socioeconomic	demands.	This	new	energy	paradigm	led	 to	 the	 shift	 from	 fossil	 energy	 to	 renewables	–	which	are	abundant,	 as	 long	as	 the	planet	Earth	exists.	Even	 though	 it	 seems	 like	 the	 transition	 from	 fossil	 energy	 era	 to	 post-fossil	energy	era	might	deemphasise	territorial	applications	of	geopolitics,	the	significance	of	oil	and	natural	gas	will	remain	until	the	transition	period	to	post-fossil	energy	regime	is	fully	realised.	In	this	context,	despite	its	external	dependency	on	the	energy-rich	Middle	East,	 Central	 Asian	 regions	 and	 the	 “energy-scarce”	 Europe,	 Turkey	 sits	 in	 a	 unique	geographical	 position.	 Eastern	 Thrace	 of	 Turkey	 in	 the	 Marmara	 region,	 which	 is	geographically	 part	 of	 South-eastern	 Europe,	 constitutes	 3%	 of	 the	 territory	 of	 the	country;	 whereas	 97%	 of	 Turkish	 land	 lies	 in	 the	 Anatolia	 (Asia)	 region.	 Bosporus	(Bogazici)	 and	 Dardanelles	 (Canakkale)	 divide	 and	 connect	 the	 European	 and	 Asian	continents.	 Turkey	 plays	 a	 pivotal	 role	 in	 the	 region	 as	 a	 transit	 corridor	 for	 energy	resources,	which	flow	from	the	producer	states	to	the	consumers	and	consequently,	give	Turkey	the	chance	to	benefit	the	 ‘strategic	regional	power’	of	 its	 location	(Aribogan,	et	al.,	2009).	 In	this	current	fossil	energy	era,	the	energy-superpower	countries	enjoy	the	
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benefits	of	holding	a	high	amount	of	hydrocarbon	reserves.	Turkey	is	not	a	superpower	in	 the	 region,	 but	 an	 influential	 player	 on	 the	 world	 stage	 and	 can	 therefore	 be	considered	as	an	emerging	regional	energy	player.	As	a	natural	hub	between	energy	rich	and	 energy	 scarce	 countries,	 Turkey	 could	 benefit	 from	 its	 geographical	 position	 by	implementing	well-designed,	comprehensive	and	coherent	long-term	energy	policies.	By	doing	this,	the	country	could	achieve	a	gradual	transition	to	post-fossil	ere	and	develop	its	economic	expansion	concepts	in	parallel	to	its	energy	transition	strategy.	The	beginning	of	the	fossil	energy	epoch	 in	Turkey	dates	back	to	the	time	before	industrialisation.	The	negative	impacts	of	this	era	on	the	environment,	climate	and	fauna	have	more	 than	doubled	 since	 the	 transition	 from	a	 feudal	 to	 a	 capitalist	 system.	The	immense	use	of	fossil	energy	resources	during	the	past	50	years	has	caused	a	doubling	in	global	CO2	emissions.	Due	to	the	capacity	of	CO2	 to	stay	in	the	atmosphere	for	up	to	1,000	years,	one	would	expect	that	the	entire	amount	of	CO2	emitted	has	contributed	to	the	1°C	increase	in	warming	observed	during	this	period.	Nevertheless,	in	reality,	ocean	and	 land	 ecosystems	 of	 the	 biosphere	 each	 absorb	 roughly	 25%	 of	 our	 emissions,	leaving	 only	 half	 of	 the	 total	 in	 the	 atmosphere	 (Rockström,	 et	 al.,	 2015	 S.	 70).	 This	means	that	in	the	past	half	century,	the	amount	of	CO2	absorbed	by	nature	has	increased	from	 2	 billion	 tons	 to	 4	 billion	 tons	 (Rockström,	 et	 al.,	 2015	 S.	 70).	 The	 human-dominated	fossil	era	has	pushed	the	planet	out	of	the	Holocene	to	the	Anthropocene	Era.	The	 transition	 from	 fossil	 to	 post	 fossil	 era	 is	 not	 only	 necessary	 due	 to	 the	 limited	resources	of	 the	Planet	Earth,	but	 rather,	 it	 is	 essential	 in	order	 to	prevent	 the	Planet	from	becoming	a	‘Hothouse	Earth’	(Saplakoglu,	et	al.,	2018).	
2.3.	 Post-fossil	Energy	Era		 The	planet	Earth	has	limited	sources	of	fossil	and	nuclear	energy.	Additionally,	it	has	a	limited	capacity	to	absorb	polluting	gasses,	to	adapt	to	climate	change	and	to	deal	with	 the	 increasing	 greenhouse	 gas	 emissions	 in	 the	 atmosphere.	 Contrary	 to	 nuclear	and	conventional	sources,	solar	energy	existed	prior	to	the	industrial	history	of	human	beings	and	will	still	be	available	in	the	post-industrial	future,	as	long	as	the	Sun	exists.	The	 utilisation	 of	 renewable	 energy	 sources	 can	 be	 applied	 to	 all	 areas	 of	 usage	 in	society,	 such	 as	 mobilisation,	 alimentation,	 communication,	 social	 and	 political	regulations	and	participations.	However,	even	renewable	energy	and	resources	do	not	exist	without	 certain	 limitations;	most	 notably,	 there	 is	 little	 scope	 for	 expanding	 the	
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total	 land	 available	 for	 bioenergy	 and	 biomass	 production	 without	 putting	 food	production	and	nature	conservation	at	risk	(Unmuessig,	et	al.,	2012).	From	the	year	1750	to	the	mid-1950s,	humans	and	human	activities	had	a	limited	impact	 on	 the	 Earth’s	 ecosystem.	 After	 the	 1950s,	 the	 observations	 show	 that	 the	significant	changes	in	the	Earth	system	are	very	much	directly	linked	to	the	variations	in	the	 global	 economic	 system.	 Therefore,	 humanity	 had	 a	 new	 and	 cumbersome	responsibility	for	the	planet.	The	Planet	Earth	was	being	pushed	out	of	the	Holocene	Era	by	 human-dominated,	 large-scale,	 economic	 activities.	 The	 beginning	 of	 this	 new	 era,	called	 Anthropocene	 started	 in	 the	 mid-1950s	 with	 ‘the	 Great	 Acceleration’.	
Anthropocene	is	derived	from	the	word	"anthropogenic"	or	"anthropos,"	meaning	made	from	human	activity.	The	primary	reasons	causing	the	Earth	system	to	undergo	radical	change	are	listed	below	(Steffen,	et	al.,	2004):	
Ø In	the	last	150	years,	humankind	has	exhausted	40%	of	the	known	oil	reserves	that	
took	several	hundred	million	years	to	generate.	
Ø Nearly	50%	of	the	land	surface	has	been	transformed	by	direct	human	action,	with	
significant	consequences	for	biodiversity,	nutrient	cycling,	soil	structure,	soil	biology,	
and	climate.	
Ø More	nitrogen	is	now	fixed	synthetically	for	fertilisers	and	through	fossil	fuel	
combustion	than	is	fixed	naturally	in	all	terrestrial	ecosystems.	
Ø More	than	half	of	all	accessible	freshwater	is	appropriated	for	human	purposes,	and	
under-	ground	water	resources	are	being	depleted	rapidly	in	many	areas.	
Ø The	concentrations	of	several	climatically	significant	greenhouse	gasses,	in	addition	
to	carbon	dioxide	and	methane,	have	substantially	increased	in	the	atmosphere.	
Ø Coastal	and	marine	habitats	are	undergoing	a	change;	50%	of	mangroves	have	died	
out,	and	wetlands	have	shrunk	by	one-half.	
Ø About	22%	of	recognised	marine	fisheries	are	overexploited	or	already	depleted,	and	
44%	more	are	at	their	limit	of	exploitation.	
Ø Extinction	rates	are	increasing	sharply	in	aquatic	and	terrestrial	ecosystems	around	
the	world;	the	Earth	is	now	in	the	midst	of	its	first	great	extinction	event	caused	by	
the	activities	of	a	single	biological	species	(humankind).	The	empirical	observations	of	certain	parameters	from	1750	until	 today	show	us	how	 the	 drivers	 of	 change	 have	 shifted.	 At	 the	 global	 scale,	 the	 pattern	 of	 the	 curve	between	this	 timeframe	increases	 for	the	twelve	 indicators	that	depict	human	activity.	For	example:	primary	energy	use,	world	population,	urban	population,	real	GDP	growth,	
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foreign	 direct	 investments,	 large	 dams,	 water	 extractions,	 paper	 production,	 fertiliser	consumption,	 transportation,	 telecommunications	 and	 international	 tourism.	 These	indicators	have	 impacts	on	significant	environmental	components	of	 the	Earth	system.	Carbon	 dioxide,	 methane	 release	 from	 agriculture,	 nitrous	 oxide	 from	 air	 pollution,	surface	 temperatures,	 stratospheric	 ozone	 layer	 depletion,	 overfishing	 in	 the	 oceans,	ocean	 acidification,	 nitrogen	 overload,	 shrimp	 aquaculture	 crisis,	 deforestation,	 land	expansion	and	terrestrial	biosphere	degradation	are	all	examples	of	this.		As	 humankind	 is	 confronted	 with	 social,	 natural,	 financial	 and	 ecological	limitations,	 it	 is	 becoming	 clearer	 that	 we	 are	 close	 to	 exceeding	 the	 “limits	 of	 the	nature”.	 Since	 2003,	 the	 four	 cheap	 nature	 elements	 (labour,	 food,	 energy,	 raw	materials)	 have	 become	 more	 expensive.	 The	 gradual	 depletion	 of	 cheap	 natural	elements	 was	 underpinned	 by	 a	 long	 cycle	 of	 world	 economic	 expansion	 and	 "new	extractivism",	in	its	varied	forms.	Rather	than	perceiving	the	end	of	cheap	nature	as	the	reassertion	of	external	 limits	to	growth,	Moore	argues	that	capitalism,	 in	our	time,	has	exhausted	the	historical	relation	that	produced	cheap	nature	(Moore,	2014),	i.e.	 labour	costs	 are	 increasing	 and	will	 continue	 to	 increase	 in	 the	 future.	 As	 a	 consequence	 of	climate	 change,	 suppression	 on	 yield	 productivity	 of	 many	 crops	 like	 alfalfa,	 beans,	peanuts,	 potatoes,	 rice,	 soy,	 and	 wheat,	 along	 with	 the	 continuing	 failure	 of	 the	genetically	 modified	 organisms	 “revolution”	 to	 revive	 yield	 productivity	 growth,	 the	world	 is	 coming	 to	 the	 end	 of	 the	 era	 of	 cheap	 food.	Moreover,	 the	world	 has	 "new"	problems	with	capitalism	that	are	currently	emerging,	which	cannot	be	fixed	by	the	old	technological	regimes,	such	as	new	diseases,	superbugs	or	superweeds.	The	post-fossil	energy	regime,	which	is	the	world's	new	energy	paradigm,	is	based	on	the	physics	and	economics	of	renewables	and	is	being	reflected	in	the	landscape	as	distributed,	 decentralised	 and	 diversified	 patterns	 of	 power	 generation.	 However,	 the	transition	 from	 fossil	 to	 post-fossil	 energy	 regime	 has	 been	 a	 slow	 process.	 The	transition	 to	renewable	energy	requires	even	more	appropriate	social	 institutions	and	economic	forms	(Altvater,	2010	S.	54).	Such	a	‘renewable	revolution’	refers	to	involving	a	radical	transformation	of	the	patterns	of	production	and	consumption,	life	and	work,	gender	relations	and	the	spatial	and	temporal	organisation	of	social	life	(Altvater,	2010	S.	 54).	 There	 are	 some	 essential	 factors,	 which	 make	 the	 whole	 practice	 even	 more	difficult.	First,	the	existence	of	big	players	in	the	energy	arena.	The	global	giant	energy	companies	have	a	powerful	share	and	influence	in	power	generation	(electricity	supply	companies)	and	energy	distribution	(grids	and	pipelines)	(Altvater,	2010).	Furthermore,	
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the	 transition	of	 the	production	patterns	 (including	 technologies)	of	 the	 fossil	 fuel	era	and	 the	 primary	 components	 (production	 plants,	 infrastructures),	 along	 with	 main	drivers	(profit	seeking,	global	and	market	competitiveness,	mental	support),	efficiency	and	 consistency	 of	 energy	 consumption	 and	 the	 corresponding	 consumption	 patterns	(including	petrifying	and	concreting	infrastructures),	transport,	municipal	planning,	and	sufficiency,	 is	 performed.	 In	 the	 post-fossil	 era,	 the	 renewable	 energy	 scheme	 will	become	dominant	 and	 "residual".	 The	 integration	 of	 the	 fossil	 energy	 system	 into	 the	renewable	regime	will	occur	as	a	result	of	this.	
3. CONVENTIONAL ENERGY SOURCES OF TURKEY 
3.1. Oil 	Turkey's	economy	is	one	of	the	fastest	growing	economies	in	the	world.	Although	the	Turkish	 economy	was	 scaled	down	during	 the	 global	 economic	 crisis	 of	 2009,	 the	country	 achieved	 a	 12.4%	 increase	 in	 annual	 growth	 in	 2010.	 In	 2012,	 the	 Turkish	economy	slowed	down.	After	growing	4.2%	in	2013,	the	economy	again	slowed	to	2.9%	in	 2014	 (The	 World	 Bank,	 2017).	 	 The	 election-related	 uncertainties,	 geopolitical	developments	 and	 concerns	 over	 the	 Turkish	 Government's	 handling	 of	 corruption	allegations,	 tarnished	 confidence	 and	 weakened	 private	 demand.	 Despite	 distrusting	consumers	 and	 long-winded	 election	 uncertainty,	 Turkey	 achieved	 a	 4.2%	 economic	growth	 in	 2015.	 (The	World	 Bank,	 2017).	 According	 to	 the	 economic	 outlook	 data	 of	
Focus	Economics,	economic	growth	in	Turkey	will	likely	weaken	in	the	coming	quarters,	due	to	tighter	financial	conditions,	shaky	investor	sentiment	and	a	high	oil	import	bill	as	a	result	of	growing	crude	oil	imports.	The	economic	growth	is	expected	to	total	3.5%	in	2019	(Focus	Economics,	2018).	As	 a	 fossil-energy-dependent	 country,	 Turkey,	 with	 its	 scant	 amount	 of	conventional	 resources,	 is	 not	 able	 to	 meet	 its	 rising	 energy	 demand	 with	 domestic	crude	 oil.	 The	 estimations	 and	 exploration	 activities	 of	 the	U.S.	 Geological	 Survey,	 TP,	Shell	Oil	and	Mobil	have	shown	that	Turkey	has	neither	the	sufficient	amount	of	crude	oil	resources,	nor	the	necessary	infrastructure	and	technological	competence	to	perform	oil	 drilling	 activities.	 The	 U.S.	 Geological	 Survey	 estimated	 that	 there	 are	 around	 438	million	barrels	of	oil,	yet	undiscovered,	in	the	South-eastern	onshore	part	of	Turkey,	in	the	 Batman	 and	 Adiyaman	 provinces.	 Further	 deposits	 are	 located	 in	 Thrace	 in	 the	Northwestern	region.	Shell	Oil	have	determined	that	 the	oil	 located	at	Paleozoic	 levels	
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would	be	 recoverable	and	 further	 investigations	proved	significant	deposits	 in	 central	Anatolia	under	the	salt	flats	in	the	plain	north	of	Konya	(Chapin	Metz,	1995).	To	expedite	the	 exploration	 process,	 in	 1983	 the	 Turkish	 government	 facilitated	 the	 easing	 of	regulations	 on	 exploration	 activities,	 allowing	 foreign	 companies	 to	 export	 35%	 of	production	 from	 fields	 discovered	 in	 Anatolia	 and	 45%	 from	 offshore	 fields.	 The	explorations	showed	that	the	oil	deposits	of	Turkey	are	at	very	deep	levels.	However,	it	was	not	possible	to	discover	how	large	the	oil	deposits	might	be.	TP,	 Shell	 Oil	 and	 Mobil	 controlled	 most	 of	 the	 petroleum	 output,	 which	 had	climbed	 gradually	 to	 a	 peak	 of	 3.6	 million	 tonnes	 in	 1969	 but	 declined	 to	 about	 2.1	million	 tonnes	 in	1985	as	deposits	depleted.	By	 the	early	1990s,	output	had	 increased	once	again	 to	nearly	4.4	million	 tonnes.	The	main	petroleum	project	during	 the	1980s	was	 an	 attempt	 at	 secondary	 recovery	 at	 the	 Bati	 Raman	 fields	 in	 the	 south-eastern	Anatolia,	 which	 were	 expected	 to	 produce	 roughly	 1.5	 million	 tonnes	 a	 year	 over	 a	twenty-year	period	(Chapin	Metz,	1995).	After	 the	 liberalisation	 package	 came	 into	 force	 in	 1984,	 several	 foreign	 firms	started	 their	 exploration	 activities.	 Until	 the	 mid-1990s	 no	 major	 findings	 had	 been	reported.	Only	TP	pushed	up	 their	 oil	 exploration	 efforts	 at	 home	and	 in	 the	offshore	areas,	 in	 expectation	 of	 raising	 output.	 However,	 the	 escalating	 conflict	 with	 Kurdish	rebels	 in	 the	 south-eastern	 part	 of	 Turkey	 jeopardised	 their	 prospects.	 After	 several	attacks	and	bombardments	on	oil	installations	by	the	PKK,	the	western	operators	in	the	area	 became	 concerned	 with	 the	 safety	 of	 their	 operations.	 Mobil,	 one	 of	 the	 major	operators	in	the	area,	restricted	their	operations	to	3,200	barrels	of	oil	per	day	in	Selmo	field	 and	 at	 other	 smaller	 sites,	 after	 terrorist	 attacks	 on	 their	 staff.	 Shell	Oil's	 25,000	barrels	 of	 oil	 per	 day	 capacity	 rig,	 near	 the	 Batman	 refinery,	 was	 also	 attacked	 by	terrorists	several	times.	In	1991,	British	Petroleum	began	its	exploration	activities	in	offshore	areas	of	the	Black	 Sea.	 However,	 hopes	 for	 finding	 reserves	 offshore	 were	 shattered	 as	 BP’s	 oil	exploration	 failed	 to	 locate	 any	 reserves	 in	 the	 marine	 regions	 of	 Turkey’s	 northern	coastline,	 despite	 this,	 the	 explorations	 in	 the	 Black	 Sea	 coastline	 continue	 (OGIB	Research	Team,	2013).	Projections	that	the	Aegean	shelf	contains	substantial	petroleum	deposits,	also	exist.	However,	due	to	tense	relationships	between	Greece	and	Turkey,	the	exploration	prospects	 in	 the	Aegean	Sea	continue	to	be	on	standby.	Turkey’s	domestic	oil	 production	 has	 remained	 almost	 the	 same	 over	 the	 years	 and	 has	 only	 a	 slight	contribution	 to	 the	 country’s	 total	 energy	 mix	 (Figure	 2).	 As	 a	 consequence,	 Turkey	
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remains	heavily	dependent	on	oil	imports	and	will	do	so	as	long	as	diversification	of	the	primary	energy	sources	 remain	unimplemented.	The	gradual	 integration	of	 renewable	energy	 sources	 to	 the	 primary	 energy	production	 is	 necessary	 for	 further	 progress	 in	this	area.	
Figure	2.	Turkey’s	domestic	crude	oil	production,	imports	of	crude	oil	and	other	products	(in	bbpd)	
	
Data	source:	Own	illustration	based	on	the	data	from	(Turkish	Petroleum,	2016).		The	 rapid	economic	boost	 caused	an	expansion	 in	Turkey's	oil	 consumption.	 In	2015,	Turkey's	crude	oil	consumption	reached	over	710	thousand	bpd	(EIA	2015c).	The	country	produced	2.5	million	tonnes	of	crude	oil,	 less	than	half	the	peak	production	of	4.4	million	tonnes	in	1991	(IEA,	2016).	This	was	produced	from	1,334	crude	oil	wells	in	134	 different	 production	 areas,	mainly	 in	 the	Batman	 and	Adiyaman	provinces	 in	 the	south-east	 Anatolian	 region.	 Turkish	 Petroleum,	 the	 country’s	 dominant	 oil	 and	 gas	exploration	 and	 production	 company,	 produced	 around	 75%	 of	 this	 total	 amount	 of	crude	oil.	Onshore	oil	production	achieved	around	17.5	million	barrels	and	offshore	oil	production	amounted	12.9	million	barrels.	Over	 the	 past	 decade,	 net	 crude	 oil	 imports	 have	 increased	 by	 7.2%,	while	 net	imports	of	oil	products	have	grown	by	260%	(IEA,	2016).	Because	Turkey	produces	only	a	 small	 amount	 of	 crude	 oil,	 to	 meet	 its	 huge	 rate	 of	 oil	 consumption,	 the	 country	imported	 89%	 of	 its	 oil	 supplies,	 which	 is	 around	 25.1	million	 tons	 of	 crude	 oil.	 The	major	crude	oil	imports	were	45.6%	from	Iraq,	followed	by	Iran	with	22.4%,	Russia	with	12.4%	and	Saudi	Arabia	with	9.6%.	Other	countries	holding	smaller	shares	in	Turkey's	crude	oil	imports	are	Columbia	with	3.5%,	Kazakhstan	with	2.6%	and	Nigeria	with	2.1%	
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(MFA,	2017).	In	2016,	the	country	exported	14.6	million	tonnes	of	petroleum	products	and	imported	10.8	million	tonnes	(MFA,	2017).	Oil	imports	have	seen	volatility	for	decades	in	accordance	with	economic	growth	and	regional	production	curves.	Iran,	Iraq	and	Saudi	Arabia	have	been	representing	the	largest	shares	in	Turkey’s	oil	imports.	The	share	of	Russian	crude	oil	in	total	imports	has	declined	 sharply	 from	 37.9%	 in	 2007	 to	 12.4%	 in	 2015	 (IEA,	 2016).	 The	 crude	 oil	imports	from	Egypt	and	Libya	have	almost	run	out.	The	Turkish	MENR,	General	Directory	of	Petroleum	(PIGM),	TP	and	EPDK	are	the	primary	 entities	 involved	 in	 the	 oil	 sector.	 MENR	 is	 responsible	 for	 the	 definition	 of	targets	and	 implementation	of	energy	policies	 in	 coordination	with	public	and	private	entities.	 The	 PIGM	 is	 the	 principal	 policy-making	 body	 within	 the	 MENR.	 It	 executes	energy	policies	 and	 conducts	 studies	 on	 energy	markets,	 energy	policy,	 efficiency	 and	environment.	 EPDK	 is	 the	 regulatory	 agency	 for	 the	 downstream	 market	 in	 Turkey,	which	monitors	actual	pump	prices,	 issues	 licenses	 to	oil	 companies	and	retailers	and	defines	and	supervises	quality	standards.	TP,	founded	in	1954,	is	a	state-owned	national	oil	 company,	 involved	 in	 hydrocarbon	 exploration,	 drilling,	 production,	 refinery	 and	marketing	 activities.	 It	 also	 actively	 conducts	 production	 and	 exploration	 projects	 in	Azerbaijan,	Kazakhstan,	Iraq	and	Libya.	The	corporation	is	one	of	the	biggest	investors	in	 the	 Caspian	 region	 and	 has	 been	 carrying	 out	 activities	 in	 the	 area	 for	more	 than	twenty	years.	Turkey	 restructured	 its	 upstream	 regime	 to	 attract	 investment	 in	 local	production.	 The	 new	 Turkish	 Petroleum	 Law	 No.	 6491,	 enacted	 on	 June	 11,	 2013,	 is	streamlining	 the	 liberalisation	of	 the	oil	 and	 gas	 exploration	 and	production	 activities	and	 guaranteeing	 a	 more	 transparent	 investment	 environment	 for	 the	 industry	 (IEA,	2016).	In	 Turkey,	 the	 downstream	 market	 is	 open,	 and	 pricing	 is	 liberal	 (GIZ	International	Fuel	Price	database,	2014).	Petroleum	downstream	activities	are	governed	by	the	Petroleum	Market	Law	No.	5015.	EPDK	carries	out	the	regulatory	oversight	of	the	activities	 and	 monitors	 the	 nearest-accessible	 global	 free	 market	 prices	 and	 Turkish	petroleum	market	prices	 (IEA,	2016).	Nevertheless,	 prices	 for	 gasoline	 and	diesel	 fuel	are	among	the	highest	 in	the	world	because	of	high	excise	taxes	on	fuel	(OECD,	2016).	This	 is	 due	 to	 the	 huge	 domestic	 debts	 and	 budget	 deficits,	which	Turkey	 has	 always	encountered.	 Accordingly,	 the	 country	 is	 benefiting	 from	 the	 high	motor	 fuel	 taxes	 to	raise	 revenue	 to	 bridge	 its	 financial	 gap.	 According	 to	 Erkan	 Erdogdu,	 former	 senior	
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energy	market	 specialist	 at	 the	EPDK,	 "the	main	 reason	 for	 relative	 high	 fuel	 taxes	 in	Turkey	 has	 mostly	 been	 purely	 fiscal;	 that	 is,	 revenues	 are	 needed	 for	 fiscal	consolidation,	 and	 fuel	 taxes	 are	 relatively	 difficult	 to	 evade	 compared	with	 Turkey's	income	tax	system"	(Erdogdu,	2014).	
3.1.1. Oil Pipelines  	In	the	domestic	network	of	Turkey,	there	are	28	active	transmission	companies.	The	main	crude	oil	pipelines	in	operation	to	transport	domestically	produced	crude	oil	are:	 Batman-Dörtyol,	 Şelmo-Batman	 and	 Ceyhan-Kırıkkale.	 There	 are	 also	 two	international	 crude	 oil	 pipelines	 running	 through	 the	 country,	which	 are:	 Baku-Tbilisi	Ceyhan	(BTC)	and	Iraq-Turkey	(Map	1	and	Table	1).	The	total	length	of	the	three	crude	oil	pipelines	reaches	to	3.374	km.	In	2012,	the	annual	handling	capacity	was	2,8	million	bpd	(IEA,	2013).	BOTAS	is	responsible	for	the	operation	of	these	pipelines.		
Map	1.	Domestic	and	international	crude	oil	pipelines	of	Turkey	
	
Data	source:	(BOTAS,	2018).											
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Table	1.	Currently	Operating	Crude	Oil	Pipelines	(COP)	of	Turkey	
Pipeline	 Capacity	(Mt/year)	 Start	of	operation	 Length	(km)	 Supply	origin	
Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan	COP	 50	 2006	 	 Turkey	 Total	 Caspian	region	(Azerbaijan	and	Kazakhstan)		 1,076	 1,776	
Iraq-Turkey	
COP	 70.9	 1977/1987	 	 Turkey	 Total	 Iraq	I.	Line	 641	 986	II.	Line	 656	 890	Total	 1,297	 1,876	
Ceyhan-
Kirikkale	
COP	
7.2	 1986	 	 448	 	 Connecting	Ceyhan	port	and	oil	refinery	
Batman-
Dörtyol	COP	 4.5	 1967	 	 511	 	 Transport	of	oil	produced	in	southeast	Anatolia	to	Dörtyol	terminal	
Data	source:	Own	illustration	based	on	the	data	from	(BOTAS,	2018).		 The	 511km	 long	Batman-Dörtyol	 Crude	Oil	 Pipeline,	 began	 operation	 in	 1967	under	 Turkish	 Petroleum,	 before	 being	 transferred	 to	 BOTAS	 in	 1984.	 The	 annual	capacity	of	this	pipeline	is	4.5	million	tonnes.	The	pipeline	transports	crude	oil	produced	in	south-eastern	Anatolia	 region	 to	 the	Dörtyol	Marine	Terminal	 (IEA,	2013).	 In	2014,	the	transport	of	2.5	million	tonnes	(17.7	million	barrels)	of	crude	oil	took	place	through	this	 line	 (BOTAS,	 2014).	 The	 42km	 long	 Şelmo-Batman	 Crude	 Oil	 Pipeline	 has	 an	annual	capacity	to	transfer	5.7	million	barrels	of	crude	oils	produced	in	the	Şelmo	area	to	 the	 Batman	 Terminal.	 This	 pipeline,	 however,	 has	 not	 been	 active	 since	 2007.	
Ceyhan-Kırıkkale	 Crude	 Oil	 Pipeline	 is	 448km	 long	 and	 has	 an	 annual	 capacity	 to	transfer	5	million	tonnes	(TÜPRAS,	2018).	Two	 major	 international	 crude	 oil	 pipelines	 are	 running	 through	 the	 country:	Kirkuk-Ceyhan	(Iraq-Turkey)	and	Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan.	Additionally,	to	prevent	possible	maritime	accidents	and	to	enhance	the	security	for	the	straits,	Turkey	signed	a	protocol	with	 the	 Russian	 government	 for	 another	 oil	 pipeline:	 Samsun-Ceyhan	 by-pass	 oil	pipeline.	Thanks	to	the	proximity	of	Samsun	to	the	oil	outlets	on	the	Eastern	Black	Sea,	the	seaborne	transportation	of	oil	in	the	Black	Sea	was	minimised.	Despite	having	better	environmental	 conditions,	 this	 pipeline	 project	 fell	 into	 abeyance,	 as	 it	 was	 not	economically	competitive	enough.		
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3.1.1.1.	 Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan	Crude	Oil	Pipeline		Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan	 (BTC)	 is	 the	 largest	 component	 of	 the	 East-West	 Energy	Corridor	 and	 carries	 the	 crude	 oil	 from	Azeri-Chirag-Güneşli	 field	 through	 Azerbaijan	and	 Georgia	 to	 Ceyhan	 on	 the	 Mediterranean	 coast	 of	 Turkey,	 bypassing	 the	environmentally-critical	 Black	 Sea	 and	 the	 Turkish	 Straits	 (MFA,	 2017).	 The	 idea	 of	constructing	a	new	oil	pipeline	on	the	East-West	route	had	emerged	in	the	early	1990s	in	Turkey.	There	were	several	reasons	for	the	new	oil	pipeline	project:	Firstly,	following	the	Gulf	War,	the	Kirkuk-Yumurtalik	pipeline	that	had	been	transporting	Iraqi	oil	to	the	Turkish	 Mediterranean	 port	 Ceyhan,	 was	 closed	 under	 the	 United	 Nations	 Security	Council	resolution	661	in	1990.	The	resolution	had	a	heavy,	negative	economic	 impact	on	Turkey.	Secondly,	the	potential	value	of	Central	Asian	and	Caspian	oil	reserves	were	considered	on	the	condition	that	they	were	accessible	to	western	customers.	Therefore,	the	need	for	a	safe	and	secure	route	out	of	the	Caspian	Sea	emerged.	Thirdly,	as	a	NATO	member	and	strategic	partner	of	 the	U.S.	and	Western	Europe,	Turkey	believed	 that	 it	was	possible	to	gain	leverage	in	the	region	with	the	construction	of	the	new	pipeline.	As	opposed	to	their	competing	major	suppliers;	Iran	and	Russia,	a	Turkish	partnership	with	Azerbaijan	was	 formed,	which	helped	 to	reinforce	 future	 integration	 into	regional	and	international	 institutions	 of	 this	 newly-independent	 state.	 It	 also	 increased	 Turkey’s	strategic	 importance.	 Turkey	 was	 not	 the	 only	 country	 whose	 decision	 primarily	stemmed	 from	 geopolitics.	 Azerbaijan	 also	 believed	 that	 shipping	 its	 oil	 to	 markets	through	 an	 oil-scarce,	 NATO	member	 country	would	 bring	 long-term	 energy	 security,	compared	 to	 shipping	 via	 countries	 that	 had	 huge	 local	 amounts	 of	 oil	 sources.	Ultimately,	 the	 Azerbaijani	 International	 Operating	 Company	 (AIOC)	 consortium	preferred	BTC	pipeline	as	the	cheapest	and	most	secure	option	for	exporting	oil	to	the	world	markets.	 The	 U.S.	 was	widely	 engaged	 and	 supported	 the	 BTC	 pipeline	 project	(Baran,	2005).	The	Turkish	Foreign	Ministry	strongly	promoted	the	BTC	pipeline,	asserting	that	the	 logistical,	 environmental	 and	 security	 related	 problems,	 resulting	 from	 the	substantial	increase	in	traffic	through	the	Turkish	Straits,	would	diminish	when	the	BTC	began	to	operate.	In	this	context,	the	Turkish	policy	was	primarily	focused	on	ensuring	the	 environmental	 health	 and	 security	 of	 the	Turkish	 Straits	 and	particularly	 those	 of	Istanbul.	On	 the	 contrary,	 the	 oil	 companies	 considered	 the	 Straits	 to	 be	 the	 cheapest	
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option	 commercially,	 compared	 to	 the	 pipelines	 for	 the	 transportation	 of	 Caspian	 oil	(Baran,	2005).	 It	 took	some	time	for	 the	companies	to	recognise	that	 the	BTC	pipeline	was	a	more	sustainable	and	commercially	beneficial	option	for	transportation	of	crude	oil	in	the	long	term.	BTC	is	a	major	part	of	the	“east-west	energy	corridor”	project,	which	was	initially	created	by	the	US	government	to	transport	rich	oil	and	gas	sources	 in	the	Caspian	Sea	and	 the	Middle	East,	 securely	 to	 the	West.	 It	also	 facilitated	Turkey’s	aim	to	become	a	major	energy	player	 in	the	region.	Turkey’s	close	relations	with	the	U.S.	 from	the	mid-1990s	 until	 2000	 played	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 the	 development	 of	 BTC	 and	 the	 overall	east-west	energy	corridor	projects.	One	of	the	main	reasons	behind	the	US	support	for	BTC	was	to	ensure	the	 transportation	of	Caspian	oil	 to	market,	via	a	stable	NATO	ally,	rather	than	through	Iran	or	Russia	(Baran,	2005).	Another	driving	force	for	the	project	was	 Turkey’s	 environmental	 and	 security	 concerns	 regarding	 the	 maritime	 route	passing	via	the	Turkish	Straits.		The	BTC	began	operation	 in	2006	by	BOTAS	in	Turkish	territory.	BP	p.l.c.	owns	30%	 of	 BTC,	 while	 Azeri	 company	 Azerbaijan	 SOCAR	 holds	 25%.	 Other	 major	shareholders	are	US	Chevron	(8.9%),	Norway’s	StatoilHydro	(8.7%),	Turkish	Petroleum	(6.5%),	Italy’s	Eni	(5%)	and	France’s	TOTAL	(5%)	(SOCAR,	2016).	In	2011,	this	pipeline	brought	257.2	million	barrels	of	crude	oil	from	the	Caspian	Sea	to	Turkey	(IEA,	2013).	
3.1.1.2.	 Kirkuk-Ceyhan	(Iraq-Turkey)	Crude	Oil	Pipeline		The	 operation	 of	 this	 pipeline	 started	 in	 1976,	 transporting	 oil	 produced	 in	Kirkuk	 and	 other	 locations	 in	 Iraq	 to	 Ceyhan	 (Yumurtalık)	 Marine	 Terminal	 (MFA,	2017).	Through	the	implementation	of	various	projects,	 the	annual	capacity	of	the	line	reached	 70.9	million	 tonnes	 in	 1987.	 In	 September	 2012,	 Iraq	 and	 Turkey	 agreed	 to	extend	 Iraqi	 crude	 oil	 import	 through	 this	 pipeline	 by	 15	 years	 (IEA,	 2013).	 The	transport	of	oil	from	the	Kurdish	Region	occurs	through	the	Kirkuk-Ceyhan	pipeline	to	Turkey.	In	2013,	the	Kurdistan	Regional	Government	(KRG)	completed	construction	of	a	new	pipeline,	beginning	at	Taq	field	near	Erbil	in	the	KRG-controlled	portion	of	northern	Iraq	and	 joining	 the	existing	pipeline	 to	Ceyhan,	Turkey,	near	 the	 Iraq-Turkey	border.	The	crude	oil	flows	on	the	KRG	line	are	low,	as	the	Iraqi	central	government	objected	to	the	KRG	selling	oil	without	 the	approval	or	 involvement	of	 the	central	government.	 In	2015,	26.1	million	tonnes	(192.4	million	barrels)	of	crude	oil	were	transported	through	this	 line	 (BOTAS,	2015).	 Furthermore,	 exports	differ	 from	month	 to	month	due	 to	 the	
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security	 issues	 on	 both	 sides	 of	 the	 Turkish-Iraqi	 border	 and	 long-standing	 dissensus	between	 the	 KRG	 and	 the	 central	 Iraqi	 government	 regarding	 the	 sharing	 of	 oil	revenues.	The	pipeline	is	perpetually	under	the	threat	of	the	PKK	terrorist	organisation.	The	 PKK	 has	 sabotaged	 pipelines	 carrying	 crude	 oil	 from	 the	 Kurdistan	 Region's	 oil	fields	to	Turkey	many	times	in	the	last	decades.	Turkey,	 benefiting	 from	 its	 geographical	 advantage,	 offered	 a	 low	 cost	 and	reliable	 transit	 option	 for	 exporting	 oil	 to	 the	 international	 market.	 Due	 to	 its	geopolitical	 position,	 Ceyhan	 (Yumurtalik)	Marine	 Terminal	was	 identified	 as	 a	major	trading	 and	 energy	 hub	 for	 crude	 oil	 in	 the	 region.	 Since	 the	 construction	 of	 an	 oil	refinery	 and	 an	 LNG	 terminal,	more	 than	 one	million	 barrels	 of	 crude	 oil	 per	 day	 are	currently	exported	from	Ceyhan	Terminal	to	the	global	markets	(MFA,	2017).	Both	the	BTC	and	Kirkuk-Ceyhan	pipelines	are	transit	pipelines.	All	the	crude	oil	reaching	the	Port	of	Ceyhan	is	delivered	to	the	world	market	(IEA,	2016).	So	far,	Turkey	has	 not	 purchased	 crude	 oil	 from	 the	BTC,	 but	 is	 benefiting	 from	 all	 indirect	 revenue	generated	 within	 the	 BTC	 project.	 Furthermore,	 the	 country	 will	 collect	 $140-200	million	 in	 the	 first	 16	 years	 of	 the	 project	 and	 $200-300	million	 in	 the	 next	 17	 to	 40	years,	depending	on	the	amount	of	oil	transported,	transit	fees	and	operations	services	payments.	 There	 have	 been	 some	 ongoing	 discussions	 regarding	 Turkey’s	 non-purchasing	agreement	with	the	BTC	and	financial	losses	for	the	country’s	economy.	The	crude	oil	delivered	 through	 the	Kirkuk-Ceyhan	pipeline	 is	occasionally	supplied	 to	 the	Turkish	market.	Both	the	BTC	and	the	Kirkuk-Ceyhan	oil	pipelines	are	important	for	the	oil	 supply	 security	 of	 external	 countries	 rather	 than	 Turkey’s	 own	 energy	 supply	security	(IEA,	2016).	Turkey	 aims	 towards	 an	 uninterrupted	 and	 dependable	 gas	 and	 oil	 flow	 from	Caspian	Basin	and	Middle	East	resources	to	Turkey	and	Europe	via	Turkish	territory.	In	2015	Turkey	 imported	 503	 billion	 bpd	 of	 crude	 oil	 and	 some	242	 billion	 bpd	 refined	products.	Regarding	crude	oil	import	sources,	Iraq	amounted	the	biggest	supply	source	with	29%	of	the	total.	The	other	important	supplier	countries	were	Russia	(18%),	Iran	(14%),	 India	 (8%)	 and	 Saudi	 Arabia	 (6.5%).	 The	 imported	 crude	 oil	 pipelines	 are	delivered	 to	 the	 refineries	by	 tankers	and	pipelines.	Turkey	has	many	major	oil	ports,	which	are	oriented	mostly	towards	oil	products,	particularly	diesel	oil:	Antalya,	Mersin-Ataş,	Trabzon,	Hopa,	 Izmir-Aliağa,	Gemlik,	Tekirdağ,	 Izmit,	 Iskenderun,	Zonguldak,	and	Istanbul.	Among	these,	the	Samsun,	Mersin-	Ataş,	Izmir-Aliağa,	Izmit	and	Istanbul	ports	also	have	the	capacity	to	unload	other	petroleum	products,	such	as	jet	fuel	and	gasoline	
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(IEA,	 2013).	 TÜPRAS	 is	 Turkey’s	 sole	 oil	 refiner,	 operating	 four	 refineries,	 located	 in	Izmit,	 Izmir	Kirikkale	and	Batman,	with	a	 total	annual	crude	oil	processing	capacity	of	28.1	 million	 tonnes.	 While	 Izmit	 and	 Izmir	 refineries	 import	 crude	 oil	 by	 tankers,	Kirikkale	and	Batman	refineries	deliver	crude	oil	by	pipelines.	Izmit	and	Izmir	refineries	each	 have	 an	 annual	 processing	 capacity	 of	 11	 million	 tonnes	 crude	 oil.	 Kirikkale	Refinery	 has	 the	 capacity	 for	 5	 million	 tonnes	 crude	 oil	 processing	 per	 year,	 and	 its	crude	 oil	 supply	 is	 delivered	 via	 Ceyhan	 Terminal	 of	 BOTAS	 and	 Ceyhan-Kirikkale	Pipeline.	Batman	Refinery,	as	the	first	founded	refinery	of	Turkey,	processes	1.1	million	tonnes	crude	oil	annually	(TÜPRAS,	2018).	Turkey	 is	 a	 significant	 energy	 corridor	 bringing	 oil	 exports	 from	 energy-rich	Eurasian	 and	 Middle	 East	 countries	 to	 energy-deficient	 Europe	 and	 other	 global	markets.	Concerning	its	geopolitical	position,	Turkey	is	one	of	the	safest	routes	for	the	direct	 transmission	 of	 energy	 fuels	 via	 pipelines.	 The	 country’s	 ambition	 to	 become	 a	key	 energy	 and	 trade	 hub	 dates	 back	 to	 1990s.	 The	 idea	 is	 to	 increase	 the	interdependency	 between	 countries	 and	 to	 maintain	 stability.	 In	 this	 respect,	 major	pipeline	 projects,	 realised	 and	 proposed,	 will	 contribute	 to	 Europe's	 energy	 supply	security	 and	will	 also	 enhance	Turkey's	 role	 as	 a	 reliable	 transit	 country	 on	 the	East-West	as	well	as	North-South	energy	axis	(MFA,	2017).	
3.1.2.	 Political	Conflicts	and	Turkey-Cyprus-Israel	Energy	Triangle		 The	 Eastern	 Mediterranean	 region	 is	 the	 gateway	 to	 the	 Middle	 East,	 the	Mediterranean,	 the	 Aegean,	 the	 Black	 Sea,	 the	 Red	 Sea	 and	 the	 Atlantic	 Ocean.	 The	region	 is	 a	 gateway	 for	Africa	 to	 the	 aforementioned	 seas.	 The	 estimations	 show	 that	47%	of	world’s	proven	oil	reserves	and	43%	of	world’s	proven	natural	gas	is	located	in	the	Eastern	Mediterranean.	Due	to	these	facts,	Cyprus,	with	its	strategic	location	and	its	status	 as	 one	 of	 Turkey’s	most	 sensitive	 political	 issues,	 is	 also	 a	 strategically	 crucial	land	for	the	United	Kingdom,	Russia,	China,	Israel,	the	United	States,	the	European	Union	and,	of	course,	for	Greece	(Pamir,	2018).		
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Map	2.	World	trade	transit	routes	via	Mediterranean	Sea	
	
Data	source:	(Pamir,	2018).	Almost	30%	of	world	trade	transits	travel	via	the	Mediterranean	basin	(Map	2).	Approximately	 4,000	 cargo	 and	 commercial	 vessels	 travel	 through	 the	Mediterranean	on	a	daily	basis,	with	40,000	Russian	vessels	alone	passing	through	the	Turkish	Straits	annually.	The	geopolitical	landscape	of	Mediterranean,	particularly	Cyprus,	is	crucial	as	it	is	also	close	to	the	Suez	Canal,	which	is	one	of	only	three	gateways	to	oil	and	natural	gas	 reserves	 and	 the	 Mediterranean	 itself.	 The	 island	 is	 also	 home	 to	 the	 American	tracking	and	early	response	station,	as	well	as	an	intervention	point	both	for	the	United	Kingdom	and	the	USA	(Pamir,	2018).	According	 to	 the	 estimations	 of	 the	 U.S.	 Geological	 Survey,	 about	 438	 million	barrels	 of	 oil	 are	 as	 yet	 undiscovered	 in	 the	 southern	 onshore	 part	 of	 Turkey,	 near	Cyprus	(USGS,	2012).	Despite	the	ambiguity	surrounding	whether	these	resources	will	be	economically	viable	to	develop,	in	2012	Turkish	Petroleum	began	drilling	for	oil	and	gas	 onshore,	 at	 3,000	 meters	 deep,	 near	 the	 town	 of	 Trikomo.	 They	 did	 this	 in	collaboration	 with	 the	 Turkish	 Republic	 of	 Northern	 Cyprus	 government	 (BBC	 News,	2012).	 This	 initiative	 from	 Turkey	 created	 some	 geopolitical	 tangles	 in	 the	 area.	 The	Republic	 of	 Cyprus	 protested	 against	 Turkey	 and	 the	 Turkish-Cypriot	 leadership,	claiming	their	drilling	was	illegal	and	in	contravention	of	United	Nations	resolutions	on	the	 island	 and	 violation	 of	 the	 sovereignty,	 independence	 and	 territorial	 integrity	 of	Cyprus	 (BBC	 News,	 2012).	 In	 response	 to	 this	 argument	 of	 the	 Republic	 of	 Cyprus,	Turkey	propounded	 that	no	government	has	 the	 right	 to	negotiate	over	 the	 territorial	waters	of	Cyprus,	until	the	territorial	situation	of	the	island	is	clarified.	
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This	 problematic	 issue	 with	 Cyprus	 stemmed	 from	 the	 division	 of	 the	 Cyprus	Island	between	the	Greek	Cypriots	 in	the	South	and	the	Turkish	Cypriots	 in	the	North,	which	 took	 place	 following	 a	 1974-military	 coup	 that	 resulted	 in	 Turkey’s	 military	intervention	as	 a	peacekeeping	measure.	 Since	 the	 "Treaty	of	Guarantee"	 in	1960,	 the	United	 Kingdom,	 Greece,	 and	 Turkey	 are	 the	 three	 postcolonial	 guarantor	 powers	 of	Cyprus.	 Officially,	 Turkey	 does	 not	 recognise	 the	 Republic	 of	 Cyprus	 and	 entitles	 the	country	 as	 "Greek	 Cypriot	 Administration	 of	 Southern	 Cyprus."	 Furthermore,	 Turkey	and	Northern	Cyprus	have	no	diplomatic	relations	with	the	Republic	of	Cyprus.	Turkey	also	refuses	to	open	its	port	and	airports	to	the	Republic	of	Cyprus,	claiming	that	the	EU	has	fallen	short	of	its	commitment	to	trade	with	Northern	Cyprus	(Gotev,	2016).	The	main	issues	on	which	Turkey	and	Greece	disagree	are	the:	"re-sharing	of	the	island's	 soil	 to	 Turkish	 and	 Greek	 sides,	 the	 guarantor	 system	 and	 property	 issues"	(Daily	 Sabah,	 2017).	 According	 to	 Mustafa	 Akinci,	 President	 of	 Northern	 Cyprus,	 the	"requests	 from	 the	 Turkish	 side	 are	 clear:	 an	 egalitarian	 solution	 is	 the	 only	 possible	option,	 with	 a	 two-sided	 federal	 system"	 (Daily	 Sabah,	 2017).	 A	 referendum	 on	 the	Annan	Plan	in	2004	saw	the	majority	of	Turkish	Cypriots	back	reunification,	while	more	than	 three-quarters	 of	 Greek	 Cypriots	 rejected	 it.	 A	 possible	 reunification	 of	 Cyprus	remains	improbable.	In	 the	 second	 half	 of	 2012,	 the	Modiin	 Energy	 and	 Adira	 Energy	 Corporations	announced	 that	 they	 had	discovered	232.2	million	 barrels	 of	 oil	 and	 1.8	 trillion	 cubic	feet	 of	 natural	 gas	 at	 their	 offshore	 Gabrielle	 and	 Yitzhak	 Licenses,	 which	 are	 24	kilometres	 northwest	 of	 Tel	 Aviv	 (Oster,	 2012).	More	 than	 a	 year	 later,	 after	 Turkish	Petroleum	 had	 started	 its	 drilling	 activities,	 Italian	 Eni	 signed	 exploration	 and	production-sharing	 contracts,	 in	 partnership	 with	 South	 Korean	 company	 Kogas,	 for	three	deep-water	blocks	in	offshore	Cyprus.	The	contract	included	blocks	2,	3	and	9	in	the	Cypriot	deep	offshore	portion	of	the	Levantine	basin,	which	encompasses	an	area	of	around	 12,530	 km2.	 In	 September	 2014,	 ‘Saipem	 10000'	 drillship	 began	 its	 drilling	activities	 in	 the	 Cypriot	 waters,	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	 joint	 Eni/Kogas	 venture	 (Offshore	Energy	Today,	2014).	Turkey	does	not	lean	toward	to	any	oil	or	gas	company	that	works	with	Cyprus	for	 exploring	 activities.	 Therefore,	 the	 Turkish	 government	 strongly	 protested	 the	energy	 exploration	 of	 the	 Republic	 of	 Cyprus	 in	 the	Mediterranean,	 claiming	 that	 the	company’s	 drilling	 activities	 in	 the	 Turkish-Northern	 Cyprus	 area	 were	 illegal.	Accordingly,	in	March	2013,	Turkey	decided	to	suspend	its	energy	projects	with	Italian	
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energy	group	Eni	due	to	the	company's	involvement	in	oil	and	gas	exploration	activities	in	 the	 coast	 of	 southern	 Cyprus.	 Furthermore,	 the	 Turkish	 government	 declared	 that	companies	could	be	precluded	from	future	Turkish	energy	 investments	 if	 they	became	involved	in	Greek	Cypriot	energy	exploration	work	(Hürriyet	Daily	News,	2013).	In	the	latter	half	of	2013,	Turkey's	Barbaros	Hayrettin	Paşa	seismic	vessel,	which	had	been	drilling	oil	 and	gas	exploration	 tests	off	 the	 coast	of	 the	Mersin-Iskenderun-Antalya	region	in	the	eastern	Mediterranean,	wanted	to	enter	‘exclusive	economic	zones’	of	the	Republic	of	Cyprus,	in	order	to	continue	its	exploration	activities	(Hürriyet	Daily	News,	 2013).	 Greek	 Cypriot	 authorities	 declared	 the	 exploration	 activity	 of	 Turkey	 as	the	"most	serious	escalation	of	a	dispute	that	has	long	simmered	since	the	declaration	of	a	 breakaway	 Turkish	 Cypriot	 state	 in	 north	 Cyprus	 in	 1983"	 (Kambas,	 2014).	 The	European	Parliament	also	condemned	the	actions	taken	by	the	Turkey,	called	on	Turkey	to	 remove	 the	 vessels	 operating	 in	 Cyprus'	 exclusive	 economic	 zone	 and	 to	 stop	 its	"provocative	 actions"	 and	 "threats"	 against	 the	 Republic	 of	 Cyprus	 (European	Parliament,	 2014).	 The	 Northern	 Cyprus	 government	 described	 the	 European	Parliament's	 resolution	 as	 unrealistic	 and	 called	 on	 the	 Greek	 Cypriot	 government	 to	"cease	 blame-games	 and	 return	 to	 the	 negotiation	 table	 so	 that	 a	 lasting	 and	comprehensive	 settlement	 to	 the	 Cyprus	 problem	 can	 be	 found	 at	 once"	 (Offshore	Energy	Today,	2015).	Currently,	a	total	of	2,000	bcm	offshore	gas	have	been	discovered	in	the	exclusive	economic	zones	of	Cyprus,	Israel,	and	Egypt.	In	comparison,	the	annual	consumption	of	natural	gas	in	the	EU	was	426	bcm	in	2015.	In	this	case,	the	discovered	reserves	in	the	exclusive	economic	zones	need	to	be	enough	to	meet	the	annual	energy	requirements	of	the	EU.	In	the	Cypriot	exclusive	economic	zones,	there	is	already	a	significant	discovery,	the	 "Aphrodite"	 field	 (Gotev,	2016).	 In	2015,	 the	Eni/Kogas	 joint	 venture	drilling	 ship	located	 gas	 in	 the	 Zohr	 prospect	 in	 Egyptian	waters.	 It	 is	 recorded	 as	 the	 largest	 gas	discovery	ever	made	in	the	Mediterranean.	The	location	of	Zohr	is	about	six	km	from	the	boundaries	of	Cyprus'	block	11	and	about	90	km	from	the	Aphrodite	reservoir	in	block	12	(Offshore,	2016).	A	 possible	 resolution	 for	 the	 Turkish-Cypriot	 energy	 conflict	made	 headway	 in	the	 beginning	 of	 2014.	 The	 Turkish-	 and	 Greek-Cypriot	 leaders	 met	 to	 relaunch	negotiations	 to	 end	 the	 island's	 division,	 after	 a	 nearly	 two-year	 break.	 According	 to	experts,	changing	dynamics	in	the	region,	created	by	the	island's	undrilled	offshore	gas	and	 oil	 riches	 and	 a	 huge	 natural	 gas	 basin	 found	 in	 waters	 of	 Israel,	 triggered	 this	
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breakthrough	 (Charalambous,	 2014).	 According	 to	 the	 U.S.	 Geological	 Survey	estimations,	 Israel	 and	 Cyprus	 discovered	 an	 estimated	 3,450	 bcm	 gas	 reserve	 in	 the	Levant	 Basin,	which	was	worth	 around	 US700	 billion	 dollars	 and	 could	meet	 the	 gas	supply	needs	 of	 the	 entire	world	 for	 a	 year	 (EurActiv.com	with	Reuters	 2016).	Assoc.	Prof.	Dr.	Hubert	Faustmann	from	the	Nicosia	University	argued	that	"Turkey	and	Israel's	energy	 cooperation	 has	 triggered	 an	 American	 intervention	 and	 forced	 both	 sides	 to	agree	 on	 a	 joint	 statement	 leading	 to	 a	 resumption	 of	 talks	 (…)	 Israel	 is	 looking	 to	diversify	 by	 gas	 pipeline	 through	 the	 sea	 of	 Cyprus	 and	Turkey	 and	 invest	 in	 an	 LNG	plant	on	the	island,	but	Israel	will	not	give	its	gas	to	Cyprus	unless	there	is	a	solution"	(Charalambous,	2014).	The	discovery	of	new	natural	gas	and	oil	reserves	in	the	Eastern	Mediterranean	 brought	 a	 new	 catalyst	 for	 harmonisation,	 peace	 and	 possible	cooperation	in	the	region.	Turkey	and	Israel	have	had	volatile	relations	both	 in	political	and	energy	terms	over	 the	 years.	 Both	 countries	 centre	 upon	 the	 discovery	 of	 enormous	 reserves	 of	natural	gas,	worth	hundreds	of	billions	of	dollars,	under	the	waters	of	Israel	and	Cyprus.	To	utilise	these	reserves,	Israel	requires	the	cooperation	of	Turkey	(EURACTIV.com	with	Reuters,	2016).	On	top	of	high	drilling	costs,	another	fundamental	concern	for	Israel	has	been	to	find	a	route	for	gas	delivery	to	potential	customers.	 Jordan,	which	has	a	peace	treaty	with	Israel,	was	an	option,	as	they	were	long-term	buyers	of	Israeli	gas.	A	possible	gas	 delivery	 route	 through	 Lebanon	 and	 Syria,	 both	 neighbouring	 countries	 of	 Israel,	was	 inconceivable,	due	 to	 the	 conflict	between	 the	 countries.	 Instead	of	 these,	Turkey	and	Egypt,	both	having	a	big	market,	with	80	million	and	93	million	people	respectively,	ultimately	 fit	 much	 better	 as	 potential	 long-term	 consumers	 (EURACTIV.com	 with	Reuters,	2016).	Historically,	Italian	Eni	found	one	of	the	world's	largest	natural	gas	fields	off	the	coast	of	Egypt,	resulting	in	Egyptian	President	Abdel	Fattah	al-Sisi	declaring	that	Egypt	would	focus	on	developing	its	energy	resources.	Consequently,	the	Turkish	route	became	a	more	convenient	and	reasonable	option	for	Israel,	leading	to	Turkey	playing	a	significant	 connection	hub	 role	 between	East	 and	West,	Asia,	Middle	East	 and	Europe	(EURACTIV.com	with	Reuters,	2016).	Diversifying	energy	imports	and	energy	supply	routes	is	one	of	the	major	targets	and	energy	strategies	of	Turkey.	Turkey	imports	almost	60%	of	its	gas	–around	27	bcm	gas	annually-	from	Russia.	Due	to	the	country's	high	dependency	on	Russian	gas,	Israeli	gas	could	be	an	alternative	to	decrease	natural	gas	import	dependency	on	one	supplier.	Major	energy	companies	of	Turkey,	such	as	Zorlu	Enerji	and	a	consortium	of	Turcas	and	
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Enerjisa	 have	 already	 begun	 negotiations	 with	 Israel	 over	 gas	 prices	 and	 potential	pipeline	routes.	The	companies	stated	that	there	is	a	potential	of	around	30	bcm	of	gas	annually	in	Levantan	Basin,	of	which	Turkey	could	buy	8-10	bcm	per	year.	This	amount	of	gas	delivery	would	support	Turkey	to	reduce	almost	37%	of	its	gas	dependency	from	Russia.	The	estimations	show	that	there	are	significant	amounts	of	gas	in	the	territorial	waters	of	the	Republic	of	Cyprus	(EURACTIV.com	with	Reuters,	2016).	If	Israel	intends	to	 use	 the	 Turkish	 route,	 at	 least	 a	 part	 of	 the	 planned	 pipeline	 would	 have	 to	 pass	through	Cypriot	territorial	waters	first.		
3.2.	 Natural	Gas		 According	 to	 the	 International	 Energy	 Statistics	 of	 the	 EIA	 and	 Oil	 and	 Gas	Journal,	over	the	past	20	years	the	world's	proved	natural	gas	reserves	have	grown	by	about	40%	to	a	total	of	196.8	tcm	as	of	January	1,	2016	(EIA,	2016).	Furthermore,	during	the	 same	 period,	 proven	 reserves	 in	 the	 non-OECD	 region	 as	 a	whole	 have	 grown	 by	43%	(54.1	tcm),	while	proven	reserves	in	the	OECD	region	increased	by	21%	(2.9	tcm).	As	a	 result,	 the	 share	of	world	proven	natural	 gas	 reserves	 located	 in	OECD	countries	has	declined	from	10%	to	9%	over	the	past	20	years	(EIA,	2016).	When	considering	the	top	ten	countries,	holding	the	largest	natural	gas	reserves	in	the	world,	Russia	is	holding	the	biggest	share	of	the	global	reserves	with	24.2%	(47.8	tcm)	 followed	 by	 Iran	with	 17.1%	 (33.8	 tcm),	 Qatar	with	 12.6%	 (25.1	 tcm),	 U.S.	with	4.8%	(9.5	 tcm),	Saudi	Arabia	with	4.1%	(8.2	 tcm),	Turkmenistan	with	3.8%	(7.5	 tcm),	the	 United	 Arab	 Emirates	with	 3%	 (6.1	 tcm),	 Venezuela	with	 2.8%	 (5.5	 tcm),	 Nigeria	with	2.5%	(5.1	tcm),	and	Algeria	with	2.2%	(4.5	tcm)	(EIA	2015a).	Azerbaijan	does	not	rank	 among	 the	 top	 20	 countries.	 Under	 these	 circumstances,	 it	 is	 unlikely	 that	Azerbaijan	will	be	a	reliable	gas	supplier	to	Europe	in	the	future.	It	is,	however,	expected	that	 Azerbaijan's	 future	 in	 natural	 gas	 production	will	 come	 from	 the	 Shah	Deniz	 gas	field.	 Industry	analysts	assert	 that	Shah	Deniz	 is	one	of	 the	world's	 largest	natural	gas	field	discoveries	 in	 the	 last	20	years	and	 therefore	 can	meet	Europe's	 energy	demand	(EURACTIV.com,	2012).	Natural	 gas	 has	 been	 one	 of	 Turkey's	 most	 strategically	 important	 industrial	sectors,	 due	 to	 its	 direct	 and	 indirect	 impact	 on	 economic	 development	 and	 growth	(Rzayeva,	 2014).	 In	 Turkey,	 the	 first	 natural	 gas	 reserve	 was	 discovered	 in	 the	Hamitabat	 and	 Kumrular	 areas	 by	 the	 TP	 and	 was	 used	 for	 the	 first	 time	 in	 the	
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Pinarhisar	 Cement	 Factory	 in	 1976.	 Due	 to	 the	 rapid	 population	 growth,	 the	wave	 of	industrialisation,	 and	 the	 search	 for	 a	 solution	 to	 the	 substantial	 air	 pollution,	Turkey	decided	to	 increase	 its	share	of	natural	gas,	as	an	alternative	energy	resource.	For	this	purpose,	Turkey	and	the	Union	of	Soviet	Socialist	Republics	(USSR)	signed	an	agreement	for	the	first	import	of	natural	gas	in	1984.	In	1986,	BOTAS	(Turkey)	signed	a	natural	gas	purchase-sale	agreement	with	Soyuzgaz	Export	(USSR)	lasting	25	years,	with	a	plateau	value	of	6	bcm	(EPDK,	2016).	In	pursuit	of	 this	purchase	and	sale	agreement	with	Russia,	 construction	of	 the	842km	 long	 Russia-Turkey	 natural	 gas	 pipeline	 began	 in	 October	 1986.	 The	 pipeline	entered	Turkey	 in	Malkoclar,	on	Turkey-Bulgaria	border,	 reached	Hamitabat	and	 then	followed	the	route	of	Ambarli,	 Istanbul,	Izmit,	Bursa,	Eskisehir,	 finally	reaching	Ankara	in	 August	 1988	 (EPDK,	 2015).	 As	 the	 first	 natural	 gas	 discovery	 and	 generation	 only	happened	 in	 1987,	 from	 the	 year	 1976,	 as	 the	 first	 natural	 gas	 import	 took	 place,	 a	limited	amount	of	747	mcum	gas	for	generation	and	consumption	was	achieved	(EPDK,	2015).	Natural	gas	was	used	by	the	residential	and	commercial	sectors	for	the	first	time	in	Ankara	in	October	1988,	Istanbul	in	January	1992,	Bursa	in	December	1992,	Izmit	in	September	1996	and	in	Eskisehir	only	a	month	later	in	October	1996	(EPDK,	2015).	In	2001	 "Natural	Gas	Market	Law	No.	4646"	entered	 into	 force	 to	 liberalise	and	create	a	transparent	 and	 competitive	 natural	 gas	 market	 and	 to	 replace	 the	 previously	monopolistic	structure	of	the	market.	The	law	and	its	accompanying	regulations	brought	significant	 liberalisation	 targets	 to	 the	Turkish	natural	 gas	market	 over	 the	preceding	decade.	Nevertheless,	 the	 government's	position	 and	 long-standing	 aspirations	 for	 the	liberalisation	of	the	market	were	not	in	accord	with	that	of	BOTAS.	Most	of	these	targets	were	still	remaining	unmet	and	the	ineffective	domestic	gas	regulation	was	still	existent.	The	following	is	an	overview	of	the	biggest	obstacles,	preventing	Turkey	from	becoming	a	sustainable	gas	hub	in	the	global	energy	arena:	- There	is	still	a	lack	of	competition	in	the	natural	gas	market.	- BOTAS,	as	a	dominant	market	player,	has	a	monopoly	over	the	gas	transmission	network.	- The	Natural	Gas	Market	Law	intended	at	limiting	gas	imports	of	BOTAS	from	80%	to	20%	of	total	consumption	by	the	end	of	2009.	Nevertheless,	on	May	2013,	the	Law	 was	 revised	 and	 changed	 to	 a	 50%	 reduction	 of	 BOTAS'	 imports	 by	 an	unspecified	 date	 (The	 revised	 version	 of	 the	 Law	 has	 not	 yet	 approved	 by	 the	
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National	Parliament	of	Turkey).	In	2015,	BOTAS	still	managed	almost	75%	of	all	gas	imports	and	80%	of	domestic	gas	sales.	- BOTAS	 subsidises	 domestic	 natural	 gas	 prices	 between	 15-20%	because	 of	 the	high	price	of	imported	gas,	especially	from	Iran	(whose	price	is	the	highest).	The	Turkish	 government	 reimburses	 BOTAS	 through	 state	 subsidies.	 The	enforcement	 of	 the	 cost-based	pricing	 system	and	unbundling	BOTAS	 into	 four	different	corporate	bodies	(import,	transmission,	storage,	sales)	would	provide	a	competitive	market	for	the	private	players,	but	BOTAS	resists	implementing	this	system.	 As	 a	 result,	 both	 the	 state	 and	 BOTAS	 itself	 suffer	 financially	 from	 the	contractually	 binding	 oil	 indexation	 of	 the	 gas	 price	 formula	 in	 the	 contracts	(Rzayeva,	2014).	- It	 is	 a	 vital	 element	 for	 the	 countries	 like	 Turkey,	 which	 highly	 depends	 on	natural	gas	imports,	to	have	a	storage	capacity	equivalent	at	least	between	20%	to	 30%	 of	 consumption.	 Nevertheless,	 Turkey	 has	 a	 severe	 shortage	 of	 gas	storage	 facilities,	 which	 equate	 to	 only	 6%	 of	 consumption.	 Having	 limited	storage	capacity	is	a	significant	obstacle	in	establishing	supply	security.	- None	of	the	sectors	(industry,	household,	power	generation)	are	capable	of	using	an	alternative	product	other	than	gas	by	any	possible	gas	disruption.		
3.2.1.	 The	Proportion	of	Natural	Gas	Imports	in	Turkey’s	Energy	Dependency		 Turkey	imports	almost	99%	of	the	natural	gas	it	consumes.	Regarding	natural	gas	demand	 growth,	 Turkey	 has	 ranked	 second	 to	 China	 in	 the	 last	 decade.	 Since	 2005,	Turkey’s	 natural	 gas	 net	 imports	 have	 grown	 by	 almost	 80%,	 driven	 by	 higher	 gas	consumption	 in	 the	 residential	 sector,	 following	 large-scale	 gasification,	 rising	 private	investments	in	gas-fired	power	plants	and	growing	consumption	in	the	industry	sector	(IEA,	2016).	Domestic	natural	 gas	production	experienced	a	 sharp	decline	 since	2008,	from	1.0	bcm	 to	0.4	bcm	 in	2015,	 representing	 less	 than	1%	of	domestic	 gas	demand	(see	Figure	3)	
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Figure	3.	Turkey’s	indigenous	natural	gas	production	and	natural	gas	imports	(in	bcm)	and	the	share	of	domestic	production	in	total	gas	supply	
	
Data	source:	Own	illustration	based	on	the	data	from	(Turkish	Petroleum,	2016).		 According	to	the	estimations	of	BOTAS,	Turkey's	gas	demand	will	almost	double	to	81	bcm	by	2030	from	47.2	bcm	in	2015	(MFA,	2017).	The	first	and	main	driver	of	this	rapid	 growth	 will	 be	 gas-fired	 electricity	 generation,	 where	 demand,	 according	 to	BOTAS'	forecasts,	will	most	likely	grow	up	to	45	bcm	per	year	by	2030	(Rzayeva,	2014).	The	natural	gas	demand	is	very	high,	despite	the	government's	energy	target	to	reduce	the	share	of	natural	gas	in	the	electricity	generation	sector	from	the	current	45%	to	30%	or	below	and	their	aims	to	replace	it	with	domestically-produced	coal,	lignite,	renewable	energy	and	nuclear	(Rzayeva,	2014).	The	second	driver	is	the	household	sector,	where	estimated	demand	will	 grow	 from	9.3	bcm	 in	2014	 to	22.7	bcm	 in	2030.	The	primary	driver	is	the	industrial	sector,	where	estimated	demand	will	rise	from	12.4	bcm	in	2014	to	14.2	bcm	in	2030	(EPDK,	2015).	Based	on	the	2014	data	of	the	EPDK,	the	energy	conversion	sector	was	the	largest	consumer	of	natural	gas	in	Turkey,	amounting	23.4	bcm	and	representing	about	48%	of	the	country's	total	gas	consumption.	This	sector	includes	electricity,	heat,	auto	producer	heat	 and/or	electric	power	plants.	The	 industry	and	 residential	 sector	 consumed	12.4	bcm	and	9.3	bcm	natural	 gas,	which	 represented	25%	and	19%,	 respectively.	 Service,	transportation,	 and	 other	 areas	 consumed	 only	 small	 amounts	 of	 natural	 gas	 (EPDK,	2015).	The	substantial	natural	gas	demand	growth	in	the	residential	sector	occurred	as	a	 result	 of	 the	 gasification	 of	 the	 south-eastern	 part	 of	 the	 country	 and	 the	 vast	
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construction	 of	 new	 housing	 and	 apartment	 blocks.	 The	 gas	 distribution	 system	 in	Turkey	covers	all	provinces,	except	for	Artvin	in	the	north-east	and	Şirnak	and	Hakkari	in	 the	south-eastern	part	of	Turkey.	For	 these	areas,	 it	 is	asserted	 that	 the	 investment	would	 not	 be	 economically	 feasible.	 The	 construction	 work	 for	 the	 gas	 transmission	lines	to	Tunceli,	a	province	in	the	eastern	part	of	Turkey,	is	currently	underway.		
Table	2.	Natural	gas	import	agreements	of	Turkey	
Agreement	 	Date	of	signature	 Date	of	gas	delivery	 Duration	(years)	 Quantity	(bcm3/year)	 Date	of	termination	Russia	(Westward)	 Feb	1986	 Jun	1987	 25	 6	 2011	(*)	Algeria	(LNG)		 Apr	1988	 Aug	1994	 20	 4	 2014	(**)	Nigeria	(LNG)	 Nov	1995	 Nov	1999	 22	 1.2	 2021	Iran	 Aug	1996	 Dec	2001	 25	 10	 2026	Russia		(Blue	Stream)	 Dec	1997	 Feb	2003	 25	 16	 2028	Russia	(Westward)	 Feb	1998	 Mar	1998	 23	 8	 2021	Turkmenistan	 May	1999	 -	 30	 16	 -	Azerbaijan	 Mar	2001	 Jul	2007	 15	 6.6	 2022		(*)	The	contract	has	terminated	at	the	end	of	December	2011.	(**)	Turkey	renewed	its	LNG	agreement	with	Algeria	in	2014.	The	new	contract	will	run	for	10	years	and	Turkey	will	import	4.4	bcm	of	LNG	annually	from	Algeria.	
Data	source:	Own	illustration	based	on	the	data	from	(EPDK,	2015).		 In	2015	Turkey	 imported	 in	 total	approximately	48,4	bcm	natural	gas	 from	the		above	indicated	(Table	2)	supplier	countries.	40.8	bcm	natural	gas	of	this	total	amount	came	through	the	pipelines.	The	major	natural	gas	suppliers	as	follows:	55%	(26.8	bcm)	came	from	Russia,	followed	by	Iran	with	16%	(7.8	bcm),	and	Azerbaijan	with	13%	(6.2	bcm)	(see	Table	3).	Due	to	insufficient	storage	capacity,	a	heavy	dependency	on	regular	natural	gas	by	the	business	sector	and	supply	chain	diversification	strategy	(Kilic	2016),	Turkey	 also	 imported	 a	 total	 of	 7.6	 bcm	LNG.	More	 than	half	 of	 the	LNG	 imports	 (3.9	bcm)	came	from	Algeria.	The	rest	of	 the	LNG	imports	were	supplied	by	Qatar	with	1.7	bcm	and	Nigeria	with	1.2	bcm.	
	
	
	
		 59	
Table	3.	Distribution	of	Turkey’s	gas	imports	resources	between	2005	and	2015	(bcm)	
Countries	
-	
Years	
Russia	 Iran	 Azerbaijan	 Algeria	(LNG)	 Nigeria	(LNG)	 Others	(Spot	LNG)	 Total	2005	 17.5	 4.2	 0	 3.8	 1.0	 0	 26.5	2006	 19.3	 5.6	 0	 4.1	 1.1	 0.1	 30.2	2007	 22.8	 6.0	 1.2	 4.2	 1.4	 0.2	 35.8	2008		 23.2	 4.1	 4.6	 4.1	 1.0	 0.3	 37.3	2009	 19.5	 5.2	 5.0	 4.5	 0.9	 0.7	 35.8	2010	 17.6	 7.7	 4.5	 3.9	 1.2	 3.1	 38.0	2011	 25.4	 8.2	 3.8	 4.1	 1.2	 1.1	 43.8	2012	 26.5	 8.2	 3.3	 4.1	 1.3	 2.5	 45.9	2013	 26.2	 8.7	 4.2	 3.9	 1.3	 0.9	 45.2	2014	 27.0	 8.9	 6.0	 4.2	 1.4	 1.7	 49.2	2015	 26.8	 7.8	 6.2	 3.9	 1.2	 2.5	 48.4	
Data	source:	Own	illustration	based	on	the	data	from	(EPDK,	2016).		 After	Germany,	Turkey	 is	 the	 second	 largest	 consumer	of	Russian	gas	 and	paid	Gazprom	 $10	 billion	 in	 2014	 (Clemente,	 2016).	 For	 Turkey,	 a	 reduction	 in	 external	imports	would	signify	less	dependence	on	one	supplier	country	and	one	supply	route,	as	well	as	less	current	account	deficit.	Turkey	needs	to	coordinate	its	energy	imports,	gain	more	negotiation	powers	over	Russia	and	ensure	more	protection	against	any	possible	delivery	disruptions.	Due	to	the	tense	regional	political	situations	and	disputes	with	the	Iraqi	Central	Government,	 Turkey	did	not	 see	 the	Kurdistan	Regional	Government's	 gas	 as	 a	 viable	option	until	recently.	Nevertheless,	the	country	seeks	to	diversify	its	natural	gas	imports,	particularly	 following	 the	breakdown	of	 ties	with	Russia	 and	now	maintains	 a	 cordial	relationship	with	 its	south-eastern	neighbour,	 the	Kurdistan	Region,	 for	a	possible	gas	delivery	 agreement.	 An	 interdependent	 energy	 relationship	 between	 the	 Kurdistan	Region	and	Turkey	may	help	Turkey	to	abandon	its	strong	opposition	against	the	self-determination	 of	 Iraq's	 Kurds,	 in	 their	 drive	 to	 achieve	 independence	 and	 statehood	(Iddon,	2016).	The	Kurdistan	Region	may	hold	around	5.6	 tcm	of	natural	gas	reserves,	around	3%	 of	 the	 world's	 total	 reserves.	 The	 exploration	 activities	 are	 continuing,	 and	 the	expectation	 is	 that	more	gas	reserves	will	be	 located.	By	 the	year	2019	or	2020,	 large	
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volumes	 of	 gas	 are	 expected	 to	 flow	 through	 a	 Kurdistan	 Regional	 export	 pipeline	 to	Turkey,	at	the	Fish	Khabur	border	(Kurdistan	Regional	Government,	2013).	While	the	talks	concerning	a	possible	natural	gas	agreement	between	Turkey	and	the	 Kurdistan	 Regional	 Government	 go	 on,	 the	 Group	 of	 Communities	 in	 Kurdistan	(KCK)	 announced	 their	 strong	 opposition	 to	 any	 agreement	 which	 would	 bolster	Turkey's	economy.	The	KCK	is	an	organisation	founded	by	the	PKK	to	put	into	practice	the	 political	 ideology	 of	 jailed	 instigator	 Abdullah	 Öcalan.	 Under	 these	 circumstances,	pipeline	 construction	would	 be	 under	 the	 constant	 threat	 of	 sabotage,	 which	 has	 the	potential	not	only	 to	generate	devastating	results	 in	various	aspects	of	 the	region,	but	also	to	claim	lives.	An	agreement	between	Turkey	and	Kurdistan	on	hydrocarbon	resources	would	also	assist	the	Kurdish	Regional	Government	in	overcoming	the	economic	crisis	which	it	has	 suffered	 over	 the	 past	 years.	 Similar	 to	 other	 hydrocarbon-rich	 countries,	 the	Kurdish	Regional	Government	also	depends	mainly	on	hydrocarbon	revenues	to	create	stability	 and	 security	 within	 the	 country,	 since	 this,	 high	 dependency	 prevents	 the	country's	ability	to	diversify	in	other	sectors.	
3.2.2.	 Transmission	and	Pricing	System	of	Natural	Gas	in	Turkey		Based	 on	 the	 Natural	 Gas	 Market	 Law	 No.	 4646,	 private	 companies	 are	authorised	to	invest	in	and	build	their	transmission	and	distribution	lines.	Nevertheless,	currently	all	the	transmission	lines	are	owned	by	the	state	pipeline	company	BOTAS	and	no	other	companies	have	applied	for	a	license	to	build	a	pipeline.	In	Turkey,	BOTAS	is	responsible	for	the	operation	of	the	transmission	of	natural	gas	countrywide.	The	length	of	natural	gas	transmission	and	distribution	lines	reached	over	118,000km	in	2015	 from	4,510km	in	2002.	12,964km	of	 this	structure	 is	natural	gas	 transmission	 line	 (MENR,	2015).	The	 country	has,	 in	 total,	 nine	 entry	points:	 four	through	international	pipelines,	two	LNG	terminals,	two	national	production	areas	and	one	 storage	 facility	 (International	 Energy	Agency	 2013).	 BOTAS	natural	 gas	 transport	system	has	nine	main	entry	and	exit	points	(EPDK,	2016):	1) from	Azerbaijan	through	Türkgözü,	2) from	Iran	through	Dogubeyazit-Gürbulak	3) from	Russia	through	Malkoclar	(Balkan)	4) from	Russia	through	Durusu	(Blue	Stream),	5) through	LNG	terminals	at	Marmara	Ereglisi	
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6) through	LNG	terminals	at	Egegas	Aliaga,	7) from	the	Turkish	Petroleum	underground	store	at	Silivri/Degirmenköy,	8) from	 two	 production	 sites	 in	 Turkey:	 Turkish	 Petroleum	 Akcakoca	 Cayagzi	Production	and,	9) TEMI	Edirne	Production	In	2015,	approximately	50.2	bcm	of	natural	gas	entered	Turkey	from	these	main	access	points.	84.2%	of	these	natural	gas	entries	were	distributed	by	BOTAS,	and	15.8%	was	carried	out	by	other	private	import	and	wholesale	companies.	49.9	bcm	of	this	total	natural	 gas	 delivery	 was	 domestically	 consumed	 through	 the	 transmission	 network	(EPDK,	2016).	A	total	of	14	gas	basins	can	be	found	in	Turkey.	The	largest	of	these	is	Marmara	Kuzey,	 an	 offshore	 field	 in	 the	 Sea	 of	 Marmara	 in	 the	 Thrace-Gallipoli	 Basin.	Predominantly,	 three	 companies	 carry	 out	 the	 gas	 production:	 Turkish	 Petroleum,	 BP	P.L.C.,	and	Shell.	Some	natural	gas	fields	have	been	brought	onstream	in	the	Black	Sea;	including,	 the	 Akçakoca,	 East	 Ayazlı,	 Akkaya	 and	 Ayazlı	 fields.	 The	 largest	 supply	 for	Turkey's	natural	gas	demand	came	from	Russia	via	the	Blue	Stream	pipeline.	Moreover,	a	remarkable	volume	of	gas	is	distributed	to	the	larger	populated	cities	like	Istanbul	and	the	Marmara	region	via	the	Bulgaria-Turkey	line.	By	the	end	of	2015,	Turkey	imported	733	mcf	gas	via	the	Tabriz-Dogubayazit	pipeline.	Up	until	now,	Turkey's	high	domestic	natural	gas	prices	and	ever-growing	energy	demands	have	aroused	 the	 interest	of	 foreign	 investors.	 	By	 international	comparison,	despite	 the	 price	 increases	 each	 year,	 natural	 gas	 prices,	 for	 both	 the	 industrial	 and	household	customers	in	Turkey,	tend	to	be	lower	than	many	other	countries	in	Europe	(see	Figure	4	and	Figure	5).	
Figure	4.	Natural	gas	prices	and	tax	components	for	household	consumers	in	Turkey	and	EU	member	states	in	2016	(EUR/kwh)	
	
Data	source:	Own	illustration	based	on	the	data	from	(eurostat,	2017).	
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Figure	5.	Natural	gas	prices	and	tax	components	for	industrial	consumers	in	Turkey	and	EU	member	states	in	2016	(EUR/kwh)	
	
Data	source:	Own	illustration	based	on	the	data	from	(eurostat,	2017).		 In	2016,	the	natural	gas	for	industrial	consumers	in	Turkey,	in	relation	to	the	EU-28,	 had	 the	 lowest	 cost,	 with	 an	 average	 of	 96.9	 kurus	 ($0.30)	 per	 cubic	 meters.		Turkey’s	household	customers,	after	Hungary	and	Romania,	also	paid	the	smallest	price	for	natural	gas	consumption	in	the	EU,	with	an	average	of	1.2	Turkish	Lira	($.40)	per	m3	(see	Figure	6).		
Figure	6.	Natural	gas	prices	in	Turkey	for	households	and	industry	between	2012-2016	
	
Data	source:	Own	illustration	based	on	the	data	from	(TUIK,	2016).		
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For	 a	 country	 like	 Turkey	 with	 scant	 natural	 gas	 sources,	 it	 is	 important	 to	control	 the	market	 by	 setting	 a	 pricing	 strategy.	 Therefore,	 the	market	 opening	 is	 in	force	 for	wholesale,	 but	 does	not	 apply	 to	 the	household	 and	 larger	 retail	 consumers.	The	 natural	 gas	 prices	 for	 households	 are	 set	 by	 the	 government,	 which	 gives	 the	government	 crucial	 leverage	 to	 govern	 the	 market,	 without	 a	 direct	 involvement	(Rzayeva,	2014).	Households	 still	benefit	 from	very	 low	prices,	 given	 that	distribution	companies	are	obliged	to	provide	 the	cheapest	offer,	subsequently	making	no	margins	(IEA,	2016).	Each	year,	EPDK	determines	the	threshold	to	enable	all	consumers	to	freely	choose	their	supplier.	Wholesale	prices	are	determined	by	the	sellers	and	buyers	in	the	market,	 and	not	by	 the	EPDK.	Retail	prices	vary	according	 to	 the	 retail	 group	and	 the	distribution	 regions	 (IEA,	 2016).	 The	 government	 has	 also	 leverage	 in	 the	 industry,	particularly	 in	 the	 power	 generation	 sector,	 through	 its	 subsidy	 activities	 (Rzayeva,	2014).	Generally,	power	generation	and	prices	are	the	main	determinants	of	natural	gas	demand	 growth	 or	 decline	 in	 Turkey's	 energy	 profile.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 BOTAS	 sells	natural	gas,	at	subsidised	prices,	to	companies	for	power	generation;	On	the	other	hand,	the	 government	 subsidises	 natural	 gas	 for	 households	 which	 makes	 it	 extremely	burdensome,	 as	 both	 sides	 buy	 natural	 gas	 for	 a	 high	 price	 and	 sell	 it	 for	 low	 prices	(Rzayeva,	 2014).	 Therefore,	 in	 case	 of	 high	 prices,	 if	 the	 proposed	 plant	 is	 installed,	Turkey	will	 try	 to	meet	 the	demand	mainly	with	domestically	produced	hard	coal	and	lignite	and	driving	towards	nuclear	in	the	future.	Nevertheless,	even	the	full	utilisation	of	 coal	 and	 lignite	 resources	 for	 power	 generation	 are	 not	 enough	 to	meet	 the	 rising	energy	demands	of	Turkey.	 Instead,	 the	renewables	have	abundant	potential	 to	bridge	the	energy	gap.	Furthermore,	in	the	case	of	a	global	decline	in	gas	prices,	Turkey	would	have	the	edge	to	reduce	its	single	supplier	dependence,	build	a	competitive	gas	market,	and	further	implement	its	plans	to	operate	as	a	regional	gas	hub.	
3.2.3.	 Natural	Gas	Pipeline	Network	in	Turkey		 Turkey	produces	only	a	small	amount	of	natural	gas.	 In	2015,	Turkey	produced	398.7	mcum	natural	gas,	 from	240	gas	wells	 in	78	production	areas,	while	consuming	around	 47.5	 bcm	 natural	 gas	 (MENR,	 2015).	 Therefore,	 in	 order	 to	 function	 as	 a	 gas	transit	country,	adequate	amounts	of	gas	need	to	be	pumped	from	gas	supplier	countries	to	 Turkey,	 both	 to	 meet	 country’s	 domestic	 energy	 demand	 and	 to	 provide	 gas	transportation	 via	 pipelines	 to	 Europe.	 Primarily	 during	 the	 heating	 season	 months	
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(from	 November	 until	 March),	 Turkey’s	 natural	 gas	 demand	 is	 quite	 high.	 Moreover,	Turkey	has	faced	several	supply	disruptions	and	power	cuts	due	to	terrorist	attacks	on	pipelines,	 in	 critical	 regions	 like	 East-	 and	 South-eastern	 of	 Turkey.	 The	 PKK	 has	threatened	 the	 security	 of	 pipelines	 and	 the	 entire	 Turkish	 territory	 for	 over	 thirty	years.	 The	 Tabriz-Dogubayazit	 Pipeline	 and	 Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum	 Pipeline	 have	previously	been	hit	by	the	Kurdish	rebel	militants	by	a	series	of	explosions	(Table	4).	
Table	4.	Turkey’s	currently	available	natural	gas	import	pipelines	and	capacities	
Pipeline	 Origin	 Operated	by	 Approximate	
Capacity	(in	mcf)	Blue	Stream	 Russia	 Gazprom	 1,550	South	 Caucasus	 (Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum)	 Azerbaijan	 South	Caucasus	Pipeline	Consortium		 820	Tabriz-Doğubayazıt	 Iran	 BOTAS	 1,930	Bulgaria-Turkey	 Bulgaria	 Gazprom	 2,000		 Apart	from	the	above	illustrated	pipelines,	Turkey,	as	a	significant	transit	country	in	the	region,	also	participates	in	other	international	pipeline	projects:		
• Arab	Gas	Pipeline	Project,	which	is	intended	to	transport	Egyptian	gas	to	Turkey	and	Europe	via	Jordan,	Lebanon,	and	Syria.		
• Turkmenistan-Turkey-Europe	 Natural	 Gas	 Pipeline	 Project,	 which	 aims	 to	transport	total	amount	of	30	bcm	Turkmen	gas	to	Turkey	(16	bcm)	and	Europe	(14	bcm)	(IEA,	2013).	
• Iraq-Turkey	 Natural	 Gas	 Pipeline	 Project,	 which	 is	 in	 the	 planning	 stage	 to	 be	constructed	 in	 parallel	 to	 the	 existing	 Kirkuk-Ceyhan	 Crude	 Oil	 Pipeline	 (IEA,	2013).	
3.2.3.1.	 South	Caucasus	Pipeline		Since	the	discovery	of	the	Shah	Deniz	gas	field	in	1999,	over	40	bcm	of	gas	have	been	supplied	to	Azerbaijani,	Georgian	and	Turkish	consumers.	Shah	Deniz	is	one	of	the	world's	largest	gas-condensate	fields,	holding	over	1	trillion	m3	of	gas.	This	gas	field	can	produce	 around	 10	 bcm	 of	 gas	 annually	 and	 approximately	 50,000	 barrels	 a	 day	 of	condensate	 (BP	Georgia,	 2017).	 The	 operations	 of	 Shah	Deniz	 Phase	 I	 began	 in	 2006,	suppling	gas	for	the	South	Caucasus	(also	known	as	Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum)	Natural	Gas	Pipeline.	
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The	 South	 Caucasus	 is	 a	 692	 km-long	 pipeline,	 which	 has	 been	 designed	 to	transport	natural	gas	from	the	Shah	Deniz	Phase	I	gas	field	in	the	Azerbaijani	sector	of	the	 Caspian	 Sea,	 via	 Georgia,	 to	 Turkey	 (MFA,	 2017).	 The	 South	 Caucasus	 Pipeline	Company,	a	consortium	of	seven	national	and	international	energy	companies,	owns	the	pipeline.	The	companies	of	the	consortium	include	BP	P.L.C.	(United	Kingdom,	also	the	technical	operator)	with	a	25.5%	share,	Statoil	(Norway,	also	the	commercial	operator)	with	a	25.5%	share,	SOCAR	(Azerbaijan)	with	a	10%	share,	Lukoil	(Russia)	with	a	10%	share,	NICO	(Switzerland)	with	a	10%	share,	Total	 (France)	with	a	10%	share	and	TP	(Turkey)	with	a	9%	share	(Hydrocarbons	Technology,	2016).	Since	2007,	6.6	bcm	of	gas	has	been	shipped	to	Turkey	annually,	through	the	Shah	Deniz	Phase	I	project.	At	 full	 capacity,	 after	 the	 newly	 planned	 stages	 of	 development,	 it	 is	 envisaged	that	the	pipeline	will	export	up	to	25	bcm	of	gas	annually.	The	expanded	South	Caucasus	Pipeline	 system	will	 tie	 into	 the	Trans-Anatolian	Natural	Gas	Pipeline	 (TANAP)	 at	 the	Eastern	 Turkey	 border,	 which	 will	 connect	 with	 the	 Trans	 Adriatic	 Pipeline	 at	 the	Western	Turkey	border,	some	1,900	kilometres	away	(BP	Georgia,	2017).		
3.2.3.2.	 Trans-Anatolian	Natural	Gas	Pipeline	(TANAP)	and	the	Caspian	
Dispute		All	 pipelines,	 which	 transport	 Caspian	 gas	 to	 Europe,	 need	 to	 pass	 through	Turkish	territory.	With	this	in	mind,	Turkey	aims	to	offer	a	safe,	consistent	and	reliable	transit	system.	TANAP	is	perceived	as	the	backbone	of	the	Southern	Gas	Corridor,	which,	in	 the	 medium	 term,	 is	 expected	 to	 transport	 Shah	 Deniz	 II	 gas	 to	 Europe	 (Rzayeva,	2014).	 A	 concrete	 step	 was	 made	 on	 June	 26,	 2012,	 in	 Istanbul,	 Turkey,	 as	 the	Azerbaijani	 and	 Turkish	 governments	 signed	 the	 "Intergovernmental	 Agreement"	 and	the	 "Host	 Government	 Agreement"	 to	 implement	 the	 TANAP,	which	was	 proposed	 to	create	 a	 stable	 and	 secure	 route	 for	 gas	 transport,	 across	 Turkey,	 to	 the	 border	with	Greece.	 The	 ground-breaking	 ceremony	 of	 the	 TANAP	 project	was	 held	 on	March	 17,	2015,	 in	Kars,	Turkey.	The	TANAP	project	 is	part	of	 a	program	of	gas	development	 in	Azerbaijan	and	gas	transmission	from	Azerbaijan	through	Georgia,	Turkey,	Greece	and	Albania	to	Italy.	Turkey	is	the	host	country	of	this	project,	which	is	the	first	realisation	of	the	Southern	Gas	Corridor	(Nyman,	et	al.,	2016).	The	term	Southern	Gas	Corridor	is	used	to	describe	infrastructure	projects	aimed	at	 improving	 the	 security	 and	 diversity	 of	 the	 energy	 supply	 of	 the	 EU,	 by	 bringing	natural	gas	 from	the	Caspian	region	 to	Europe	(Nyman,	et	al.,	2016).	TANAP	Dogalgaz	
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Iletim	 A.S.	 (TANAP	 Natural	 Gas	 Pipeline	 Company),	 is	 a	 company	 established	 under	Turkish	 company	 law,	 to	 implement	 the	 TANAP	 project	 and	 own	 and	 operate	 the	pipeline	system	upon	project	completion	(Nyman,	et	al.,	2016).	The	TANAP	project	can	be	 propounded	 as	 a	 rather	 plausible	 alternative,	 in	 economic	 terms,	 to	 the	 partially	eliminated	 EU	 flagship	 project	 Nabucco.	 TANAP	 is	 managed	 and	 operated	 by	 a	consortium	 of	 energy	 companies,	 along	with	 SOCAR	 (Azerbaijani	 State	 Oil	 Company),	which	 holds	 a	 58%	 share	 in	 the	 principal	 company.	 The	 other	 shareholders	 of	 the	TANAP	project	 are:	BOTAS	with	30%	and	BP	P.L.C.	with	12%	(MFA,	2017).	There	are	two	 alternatives	 to	 be	 considered	 with	 this	 project:	 The	 possibility	 of	 upgrading	 the	current	 BOTAS	 pipeline	 network	 and/or	 construction	 of	 a	 new	 standalone	 pipeline	across	Turkey,	 to	 facilitate	shipping	of	Azerbaijan's	natural	gas	 from	the	Shah	Deniz	 II	field.	 The	Shah	Deniz	gas	field	is	operated	by	the	BP	P.L.C.,	which	has	a	share	of	28.8%.	TP	has	 the	 second	 largest	 share	 in	Shah	Deniz	Field	with	19%.	The	other	 co-ventures	and	their	shares	are	as	follows:	SOCAR	(Azerbaijan)	16.7%,	Petronas	(Malaysia)	15.5%,	Lukoil	(Russia)	10%	and	NICO	(Iran)	10%	(MFA,	2017).	The	first	substantial	amount	of	gas	delivered	via	a	route	from	Azerbaijan	to	Eskisehir,	Turkey	and	from	there	to	Europe	through	 TANAP,	 is	 expected	 in	 June	 2018	 –	 with	 2	 bcm,	 initially.	 Saltuk	 Düzyol,	 the	General	 Director	 of	 TANAP	 in	 Turkey,	 has	 claimed	 that	 this	 volume	will	 reach	 6	 bcm	over	three	years.	The	sale	of	gas	in	Turkey	will	be	carried	out	by	BOTAS.	The	 upstream	 project	 Shah	 Deniz	 Phase	 II	 is	 expected	 to	 provide	 16	 bcm	 per	annum	gas	 to	millions	 of	 consumers	 in	 Georgia,	 Turkey,	 Greece,	 Bulgaria,	 and	 Italy.	 6	bcm	per	annum	gas	will	be	sold	to	Turkey	and	the	remaining	10	bcm	per	annum	gas	will	be	supplied	to	Europe.	The	 initial	capacity	of	16	bcm	of	gas	per	annum	(first	stage),	 is	expected	 to	 expand	 to	24	bcm	per	 annum	by	2023	 (second	 stage)	 and	 to	31	bcm	per	annum	 by	 2026	 (third	 stage).	 This	 will	 take	 place	 upon	 construction	 of	 the	 required	additional	 compressor	 stations	 (TANAP	 Dogalgaz	 Iletim	 A.S.,	 2016).	 The	 estimated	initial	 investment	 cost	 of	 the	 1,850	 kilometres-long-pipeline	 will	 be	 $11.2	 billion	(Abbasova,	2016).	TANAP	will	start	from	the	Turkish	border	with	Georgia,	beginning	in	the	Turkish	village	 of	Türkgözü,	 in	 the	Posof	 district	 of	Ardahan.	 It	will	 run	 through	20	provinces	(from	 east	 to	 west):	 Kars,	 Erzurum,	 Erzincan,	 Bayburt,	 Gümüshane,	 Giresun,	 Sivas,	Yozgat,	 Kirsehir,	 Kirikkale,	 Ankara,	 Eskisehir,	 Bilecik,	 Kütahya,	 Bursa,	 Balikesir,	Canakkale,	 Tekirdag,	 Edirne	 and	will	 end	 at	 the	 Greek	 border	 in	 the	 Ipsala	 district	 of	
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Edirne.	From	this	point,	 the	Trans	Adriatic	Pipeline	will	connect	 the	natural	gas	to	the	European	 gas	 markets	 (Nyman,	 et	 al.,	 2016).	 The	 pipeline	 will	 be	 able	 to	 transport	approximately	 73%	 of	 annual	 Turkish	 natural	 gas	 consumption.	 This	 amount	 of	 gas	exceeds	 the	annual	 imports	 from	Russia	and	will	 affect	Russia's	 future	market	 shares,	not	 only	 in	 Turkey,	 but	 also	 in	 its	 traditional	 European	market	 (Rzayeva	 2014).	 The	pipeline's	capacity	will	be	30	bcm	per	year.	Azerbaijan	expects	to	double	its	current	gas	production	to	50-65	bcm	annually,	between	2025	and	2030	(Rzayeva,	2014).	The	political	advantages	of	TANAP	for	Turkey	are	certainly	quite	important.	The	project	 may	 contribute	 significantly	 to	 growing	 political	 leverage	 of	 Turkey	 in	 the	broader	 context	 of	 Europe,	 the	 Black	 Sea,	 the	 Caspian	 Sea,	 the	 Middle	 East	 and	Mediterranean	 regions,	 by	 enhancing	 the	 country's	 strategic	 position	 as	 a	 reliable	partner	and	an	 important	 transit	 country	 (Rzayeva,	2014).	Turkey	will	 thus	realise	 its	long-term	strategic	goal,	to	become	a	major	energy	hub	between	Eastern	suppliers,	rich	with	hydrocarbon	sources	and	European	markets,	in	need	of	energy	imports.	Moreover,	the	Turkish	and	Azerbaijani	governments	have	decided	that	the	TANAP	project	will	be	managed	under	the	Turkish	Law.	This	ordinance	gives	Turkey	the	additional	benefit	of	not	only	controlling	the	legal	processes,	but	also	managing	financial	issues.	Thereby,	all	the	revenues	of	 the	TANAP	project	will	be	regulated	by	Turkish	 law,	 including	various	taxes,	duties	and	other	payments	(Rzayeva,	2014).		There	are,	however,	different	arguments	as	 to	whether	 the	operation	of	TANAP	will	 allow	 Turkey	 to	 diversify	 away	 from	 Russian	 gas	 and	 import	 cheaper	 gas	 from	Azerbaijan.	On	the	one	side,	TANAP	is	very	much	welcomed	and	supported	by	the	EU.	Through	the	TANAP	project,	Turkey	gains	not	only	economic	gains	from	transit	fees,	but	also	political	 leverage	over	 its	partners	 in	Brussels	and	Baku.	On	 the	other	 side,	 some	Turkish	observers	argue	 that	due	 to	high	 transmission	 tariffs,	 the	gas	 through	TANAP	will	 be	more	expensive	 than	Russian	gas.	Moreover,	 it	 remains	unclear	whether	 there	will	be	sufficient	gas	for	both	the	TANAP	and,	eventually,	for	the	planned	Southern	Gas	Corridor	from	Shah	Deniz	field.	In	 the	 light	 of	 these	 uncertainties,	 Azerbaijan	 has	 taken	 the	 initiative	 to	 begin	negotiations	with	Turkmenistan,	to	allow	Turkmenistan	to	supply	gas	to	TANAP,	in	the	second	phase.	According	 to	 the	estimations,	between	10	bcm	and	30	bcm	of	Turkmen	gas	 could	 reach	 Azerbaijan	 annually,	 through	 the	 Trans-Caspian	 Pipeline,	 if	Turkmenistan	agrees	to	a	long-term	agreement	with	European	customers.	Up	until	now,	
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Turkmenistan	 has	 preferred	 to	 sell	 its	 gas	 at	 its	 border,	 and,	 so	 far,	 not	 ventured	downstream	(Shaban,	2016).	More	crucially,	 there	are	still	disputes	about	the	 legal	status	of	 the	Caspian	Sea,	which	must	 be	determined	before	 the	 construction	 of	 any	pipeline	 infrastructure.	 For	much	of	the	twentieth	century,	the	Caspian	Sea	was	the	exclusive	domain	of	Iran	and	the	Union	 of	 Soviet	 Socialist	 Republics,	with	 the	 latter	 enjoying	 naval	 dominance	 (Janusz,	2005).	 With	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 Soviet	 Union,	 the	 geopolitical	 situation	 in	 the	 region	changed	significantly.	Instead	of	two,	there	are	now	five	littoral	states,	which	share	the	natural	 heritage	 of	 the	 Caspian	 Sea:	Kazakhstan	 (30.8%),	 Turkmenistan	 (16.8%),	 Iran	(18.7%),	 Azerbaijan	 (15.2%)	 and	 Russia	 (18.5%).	 For	 the	 last	 25	 years,	 Russia	 has	simply	blocked	negotiations	to	define	the	legal	status	of	the	Caspian	and,	 in	one	sense,	hampered	 any	 pipeline	 developments	 between	 Europe	 and	 the	 littoral	 states	 of	 the	Caspian.	The	 Caspian	 Sea	 is	 rich	 with	 vast	 amounts	 of	 oil	 and	 gas	 reserves,	 along	 with	important	transportation	routes	connecting	Europe	and	Central	Asia.	 In	this	sense,	the	Caspian	has	the	potential	to	supply	the	world	energy	market.	Nevertheless,	the	dispute	over	 the	 legal	 regime	 of	 the	 Caspian	 Sea,	 raises	 many	 problems	 in	 the	 fields	 of	international	law	(law	of	treaties,	the	law	of	the	sea,	environmental	law)	(Janusz,	2005).	The	legal	status	of	the	Caspian	Sea	largely	depends	on	whether	the	Caspian	Sea	is	a	‘lake'	or	 ‘sea'	 regarding	 both	 geography	 and	 law	 (Siradze	 and	 Suleimanov	 2013).	 If	 the	Caspian	is	classified	as	a	‘sea,'	according	to	the	United	Nations	Convention	on	the	Law	of	the	Sea	provisions,	each	 littoral	state	would	have	a	 ‘territorial	sea',	with	a	breadth	not	exceeding	 twelve	 miles,	 an	 exclusive	 economic	 zone	 not	 exceeding	 200	 miles	 and	 a	continental	shelf	(Janusz,	2005).	If	the	Caspian	is	considered	as	a	‘lake,'	then	the	seabed	will	be	divided	evenly	between	all	 littoral	states.	Under	 this	scenario,	 the	crucial	 issue	being	 that	 all	 countries	 would	 have	 to	 agree	 before	 a	 pipeline	 could	 be	 constructed	across	 the	 Caspian	 (Coffey,	 2015).	 Recognising	 the	 Caspian	 as	 an	 (international)	 lake	also	requires	 the	use	of	 the	waters	 to	be	regulated	by	 the	 international	agreements	of	border	states,	which	determine	the	lines	of	state	borders,	rights	of	navigation	and	terms	of	 use	 of	waters	 for	 non-navigational	 purposes	 (Janusz,	 2005).	 Each	 littoral	 state	 has	different	claims	regarding	the	demarcation	of	the	Caspian	seabed.	Iran,	with	the	shortest	Caspian	 coastline,	 considers	 the	 Caspian	 to	 be	 a	 lake	 and	 demands	 to	 divide	 up	 the	Caspian's	resources	equally	five	ways	(Fitzpatrick,	2014).	The	three	former	Soviet	states	–Azerbaijan,	 Turkmenistan,	 and	 Kazakhstan-	 consider	 the	 Caspian	 to	 be	 a	 sea	 and,	
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therefore,	 claim	 to	 divide	 the	 Caspian	 seabed	 along	 existing	 national	 borders	 (Coffey,	2015).	On	the	other	hand,	Russia's	position	on	the	Caspian	seabed	ownership,	 is	more	complicated.	 Russia	 wants	 to	 remain	 strong	 in	 the	 area,	 in	 order	 to	 prevent	 other	members	 from	 superseding	 it.	 Different	 ministries	 are	 pursuing	 different	 policies	concerning	 the	 Caspian	 dispute.	 The	 Russian	 Ministry	 of	 Foreign	 Affairs	 considers	Caspian	to	be	a	lake,	believing	that	it	will	preserve	Russia's	dominant	geopolitical	role	in	the	region.	On	the	other	hand,	the	fuel	and	power	ministries	and	the	oil	and	gas	 lobby	consider	 the	 Caspian	 to	 be	 a	 sea,	 asserting	 that	 would	 create	more	 opportunities	 for	Russian	companies	to	compete	for	more	lucrative	contracts	(Coffey,	2015).	Through	 its	 cooperation	and	close	diplomatic	 relations	with	Azerbaijan,	Turkey	aims	 to	 become	 a	 critical	 gateway	 for	 energy	 corridors	 between	 east	 and	 west,	 by	offering	diversification	of	routes	and	supplies	to	Europe,	which	will	contribute	to	both	the	 EU	 and	 Turkey’s	 energy	 security	 policies.	 In	 order	 to	 accomplish	 its	 target,	 the	conflict	over	the	disputed	offshore	energy	fields	in	the	Caspian	Sea	must	be	resolved,	in	order	to	achieve	an	unhindered	flow	of	gas	and	oil.	
3.2.3.3.	 Trans	Adriatic	Pipeline		The	 Trans	 Adriatic	 Pipeline	 is	 the	 European	 leg	 of	 the	 Southern	 Gas	 Corridor,	which	aims	 to	 connect	 the	EU	market	 to	new	gas	 sources.	The	pipeline	 is	designed	 to	bring	 gas	 from	 Caspian	 region	 and	 potentially	 the	 Middle	 East,	 to	 the	 EU,	 thereby	contributing	 to	 the	 further	 diversification	 of	 the	European	 energy	 supply	 sources	 and	routes.	On	June	2013,	the	Shah	Deniz	Consortium	announced	the	implementation	of	the	Trans	Adriatic	Pipeline,	instead	of	the	Nabucco	West	project.	With	a	capacity	of	10	bcm	of	gas	per	annum,	the	pipeline	will	 transport	gas	 from	the	Shah	Deniz	Phase	II	 field	 in	Azerbaijan	 to	 the	 EU	 market,	 as	 of	 2020.	 Connecting	 with	 the	 TANAP	 at	 the	 Greek-Turkish	border,	the	Trans	Adriatic	Pipeline	will	cross	Northern	Greece,	Albania	and	the	Adriatic	Sea	before	coming	ashore	in	Southern	Italy,	to	connect	with	the	Italian	natural	gas	network.	The	builder	and	operator	of	the	Trans	Adriatic	Pipeline	is	a	 joint	venture	consortium,	 including	 several	 energy	 companies:	 BP	 P.L.C.	 (United	 Kingdom,	 20%),	SOCAR	 (Azerbaijan,	 20%),	 Snam	 (Italy,	 20%),	 Fluxys	 (Belgium,	 19%),	 Enagás	 (Spain,	16%)	and	Axpo	(Switzerland,	5%)	(Trans	Adriatic	Pipeline,	2016).			
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3.2.3.4.	 The	Southern	Gas	Corridor		
The	Southern	Corridor,	a	term	used	by	the	European	Commission,	was	planned	to	contribute	to	energy	diversification	by	opening	up	access	to	vast	new	gas	supplies	from	the	Caspian	and	 the	Middle	East,	whilst	also	bringing	an	end	 to	Russian	dominance	 in	Central	 and	 South-Eastern	 Europe,	 which	 has	 been	 disproportionately	 dependent	 on	Gazprom	(Loskot-Strachota,	et	al.,	2013).	Azerbaijan,	 Turkey	 and	 the	 EU	 are	 promoting,	 as	 partners,	 the	 development	 of	the	Southern	Gas	Corridor	and	cooperating	to	implement	the	TANAP	project	(Nyman,	et	al.,	 2016).	 The	 significance	 of	 the	 project	 was	 already	 stated	 in	 the	 European	Commission's	 2008	 Second	 Strategic	 Energy	 Review	 –	 An	 EU	 Energy	 Security	 and	
Solidarity	Action	Plan:	"A	southern	gas	corridor	must	be	developed	for	the	supply	of	gas	from	Caspian	and	Middle	Eastern	sources,	which	could	potentially	supply	a	significant	part	of	the	EU's	future	needs.	This	is	one	of	the	EU's	highest	energy	security	priorities"	(Nyman,	et	al.,	2016).	Turkey	 has	 been	 a	 candidate	 country	 to	 the	 EU	 since	 the	 Helsinki	 Summit	 in	1999.	The	negotiations	have	since	continued,	from	October	2005	(Nyman,	et	al.,	2016).	According	to	the	data	of	the	Turkish	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs,	in	the	accession	process,	13	chapters	("4-Free	Movement	of	Capital",	"6-Company	Law",	"7-Intellectual	Property	Law",	 "10-Information	 Society	 and	 Media",	 "12-Food	 Safety,	 Veterinary	 and	Phytosanitary	 Policy",	 "16-Taxation",	 "18-Statistics",	 "20-Enterprise	 and	 Industrial	Policy",	"21-Trans-European	Networks",	"25-Science	and	Research",	"27-Environment",	"28-Consumer	 and	 Health	 Protection",	 "32-Financial	 Control")	 have	 been	 opened	 to	negotiations	 so	 far,	 while	 one	 of	 them	 ("25-Science	 and	 Research")	 has	 been	provisionally	 closed.	 The	 negotiations	 on	 eight	 chapters	 cannot	 be	 opened	 at	 present	("1-Free	 Movement	 of	 Goods",	 "3-Right	 of	 Establishment	 and	 Freedom	 to	 Provide	Services",	 "9-Financial	 Services",	 "11-Agriculture	 and	 Rural	 Development",	 "13-Fisheries",	"14-Transport	Policy",	"29-Customs	Union"	and	"30-External	Relations"),	as	a	result	 of	 the	 decision	 of	 the	 European	 Council	 on	 December	 2006.	 According	 to	 this	declaration,	no	chapters	can	be	provisionally	closed	because	Turkey	does	not	undertake	its	 obligations	 stemming	 from	 the	 Additional	 Protocol	 to	 Ankara	 Agreement	 in	 its	entirety	(Turkey's	position	concerning	Greek	Cypriot	Administration)	(MFA,	2016).	The	European	Commission,	in	its	Enlargement	Strategy	published	on	12	October	2011,	 proposed	 to	 develop	 a	 "Positive	 Agenda"	 between	 Turkey	 and	 the	 EU.	 The	
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Commission	mentioned	a	broad	range	of	areas	as	the	main	elements	of	the	Agenda,	such	as	 "intensified	 dialogue	 and	 cooperation	 on	 political	 reforms",	 "visas",	 "mobility	 and	migration",	 "energy",	 "fight	 against	 terrorism",	 "further	 participation	 of	 Turkey	 in	Community	 programs",	 "town	 twinning",	 "trade	 and	 the	 Customs	 Union"	 and	"supporting	 efforts	 to	 align	 with	 the	 acquis,	 including	 on	 chapters	 where	 accession	negotiations	cannot	be	opened	for	the	time	being".	Turkey	has	accepted	the	proposal	on	the	 condition	 that	 it	 serves	 as	 a	 supportive	 and	 complementary	 tool	 for	 negotiation	process	with	the	EU	(MFA,	2016).	Although	 the	 energy	 chapter	 has	 not	 been	opened	 for	 negotiations,	 energy	 is	 a	topic	of	key	interest	in	Turkey-EU	relations	and	enhanced	cooperation	is	an	integral	part	of	the	Turkey-EU	agenda	(Nyman,	et	al.,	2016).	 In	Turkey,	a	range	of	reform	measures	helped	attract	private	sector	capital,	to	meet	the	rapid	growth	in	energy	demand.	These	actions	 include	electricity,	 gas,	 renewable	energy	and	energy	efficiency	 legislation,	 the	establishment	of	an	energy	sector	regulatory	authority	(EPDK),	energy	price	reform,	the	creation	 of	 a	 functional	 electricity	market	 and	 large-scale	 introduction	 of	 natural	 gas,	restructuring	 of	 state-owned	 energy	 enterprises	 and	 large-scale	 private	 sector	participation	 through	 privatisation,	 including	 the	 entire	 power	 distribution	 and	 new	investment	with	over	30,000	megawatts	of	electricity	generation	capacity	(Nyman,	et	al.,	2016).	Nevertheless,	due	to	its	heavy	dependence	on	hydrocarbon	imports,	the	country	appears	to	be	heading	towards	a	macroeconomic	bottleneck	soon.		Turkey	 supports	 all	 the	 Southern	 Gas	 Corridor	 projects	 passing	 through	 the	Turkish	 territory	 (MFA,	 2017).	 A	 total	 investment	 of	 approximately	 $45	 billion	 and	3,500-kilometer-long	 Southern	 Gas	 Corridor	 crosses	 seven	 countries,	 involves	 more	than	a	dozen	major	energy	companies	and	comprises	several	separate	energy	projects.	The	components	of	the	Southern	Gas	Corridor	are	(Trans	Adriatic	Pipeline,	2016):	
• The	Shah	Deniz	2	development;	drilling	wells	and	producing	gas	offshore	in	the	Caspian	Sea.	
• The	expansion	of	the	natural	gas	processing	plant	at	the	Sangachal	Terminal	on	the	Caspian	coast	of	Azerbaijan.	
• Three	 pipeline	 projects:	 South	 Caucasus	 Pipeline	 in	Azerbaijan/Georgia,	 Trans-Anatolian	Pipeline	in	Turkey	and	Trans	Adriatic	Pipeline	in	Greece,	Albania,	and	Italy.	
• The	expansion	of	the	Italian	gas	transmission	network.	
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• The	possibilities	for	further	connection	to	gas	networks	in	South-eastern,	Central	and	Western	Europe.	The	 current	 cost	 of	 Southern	 Gas	 Corridor,	 including	 upstream	 work	 on	 Shah	Deniz	 Phase	 II,	 is	 now	 estimated	 at	 around	 $40	 billion,	 including	 $9.3	 billion	 for	 the	Trans-Anatolian	Gas	Pipeline,	$6	billion	for	the	Trans	Adriatic	pipeline	and	$23.8	billion	for	developing	Shah	Deniz	Phase	II,	as	well	as	the	expansion	of	the	South	Caucasus	line	(Shaban,	2016).	
3.2.3.5.	 Turkey-Greece-Italy	Interconnector		The	 overall	 Interconnector	 system	 is	 comprised	 of	 the	 Turkey-Greece	Interconnector	and	Greece-Italy	Interconnector	onshore	and	offshore	(Socor,	2016).	The	project	includes	three	segments:	expansion	of	the	Turkish	national	grid	for	transmitting	natural	gas	to	Italy	and	Turkey,	building	a	pipeline	between	Turkey	and	Greece	and	the	building	 of	 a	 further	 pipeline	 between	 Greece	 and	 Italy	 (Hydrocarbons	 Technology	2015a).	The	296km	 long	Turkey-Greece	 Interconnector	 (Karacabey-Komotini)	 section,	became	 operational	 in	 2007.	 The	 annual	 capacity	 of	 the	 pipeline	 is	 11.5	 bcm.	 The	investment	cost	of	 the	pipeline	was	165	million	euros	 for	 the	Turkish	and	118	million	euros	for	the	Greek	section	(Hydrocarbons	Technology,	2016).	The	 construction	 of	 the	 807km	 long	 proposed	 Interconnector	 Greece-Italy	segment,	will	take	place	in	two	sections:	207km	underwater	crossing	the	Ionian	Sea	and	600km	ground	section	 (Hydrocarbons	Technology	2015a).	The	207km	section,	known	as	 the	 Poseidon	 pipeline,	 requires	 an	 estimated	 investment	 of	 500	million	 euros.	 The	600km	 section,	 also	 known	 as	 IGI	 Onshore,	 is	 an	 onshore	 pipeline	 and	 was	 built	 by	DESFA	(Hydrocarbons	Technology,	2016).	The	 Interconnector	 Greece-Bulgaria	 bypass	 line	will	 be	 181km	 long	 (150km	 in	Bulgaria	and	31km	in	Greece)	and	will	connect	the	Greek	gas	network	in	Komotini	with	the	Bulgarian	gas	network.	This	pipeline	project	and	the	Trans-Adriatic	Pipeline	(which	also	transports	natural	gas	from	the	Caspian	Sea,	from	Greece-Albania-Adriatic	Sea-Italy	and	further	to	Western	Europe),	have	the	potential	to	turn	Greece	into	an	energy	hub	in	southern	Europe	(Reuters,	2016).	
3.2.3.6.	 TurkStream	Natural	Gas	Pipeline		 Turkey	 and	 Russia	 are	 interdependent,	 particularly	 in	 economic	 and	 energy	terms.	Russia,	as	Turkey's	 largest	 trading	partner,	 supplies	more	 than	half	of	Turkey's	
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natural	gas	consumption	and	one-fifth	of	its	domestic	oil	needs.	The	share	of	natural	gas	in	 electricity	 generation	 is	 48%,	 which	 is	 a	 clear	 indication	 of	 the	 country's	 high	dependency	on	natural	 gas,	 to	 generate	 electricity.	 70%	of	Turkey's	 gas	 imports	 from	Russia	 come	 through	 the	 Trans-Balkan	 pipeline,	 which	 travels	 via	 Ukraine,	 through	Moldova,	Romania,	and	Bulgaria	(Gurbanov,	2015).	In	winter	alone,	Turkey	imports	48	mcum	 through	 Blue	 Stream	 and	 42	mcum	 natural	 gas	 from	Russia	 daily,	 through	 the	West	Stream.	 In	 the	 case	of	 an	energy	crisis	between	both	countries,	Turkey	does	not	have	 the	 manoeuvrability	 to	 diversify	 its	 energy	 sources	 in	 a	 short	 time	 and	 receive	adequate	 amounts	 of	 gas	 from	 other	 suppliers,	 compared	 to	 Blue	 Stream	 and	 West	Stream	 pipeline.	 Furthermore,	 the	 country	 is	 still	 very	 much	 behind	 on	 meeting	 its	energy	deficit	with	renewable	energy	sources,	despite	its	great	potential,	particularly	in	wind,	 hydropower	 and	 geothermal	 energy.	 Turkey’s	 heavy	 dependence	 on	 Russian	energy	 obligates	 the	 country	 to	 play	 this	 energy	 game	 by	 Russian	 rules.	 Turkey	 has	many	bilateral	 trade	and	 infrastructure	deals	with	Russia,	which	would	be	affected	by	any	 conflict,	 including	 the	 proposed	 construction	 of	 TurkStream	 pipeline	 and	 Akkuyu	nuclear	power	plant	projects.	Considering	the	energy	targets	of	the	Energy	Ministry	of	Turkey,	 gaining	energy	 independence	 is	of	 greatest	 importance.	 In	order	 to	 reach	 this	target,	the	country	is	planning	to	operate	a	nuclear	powerplant,	which,	nevertheless,	will	be	built	by	Russia.	Turkey	 is	 thereby	opening	a	new	energy	dependency	 chapter	with	the	 same	 country.	 Ultimately,	 Turkey’s	 energy	 policies	 do	 not	 seem	 parallel	 with	 its	primary	 targets.	 The	 policies	 are	 ensuring	 further	 energy	 dependency	 and	 that	engenders	the	strange	irony	that:	Turkey	needs	Russia,	to	gain	its	energy	independence	from	Russia.	Nabucco	has	emerged	as	the	key	project	of	the	East-West	energy	corridor,	in	the	supply	of	energy	to	Europe	from	the	Caucasus	and	to	give	the	Middle	East	a	gas	hub	in	Austria,	via	Turkey,	Bulgaria,	and	Romania,	South	Stream.	Simultaneously,	a	Russian-led	project	 to	 side-line	 Nabucco	 and	 compete	 with	 the	 construction	 of	 an	 alternative	pipeline	to	Europe,	has	also	emerged.	The	construction	of	Nabucco	was	expected	to	start	in	2013,	with	 the	 first	gas	scheduled	 to	 flow	 in	2017.	 It	was	planned	 that	 the	pipeline	would	 carry	 31	 bcm	 gas	 per	 year	 (Gotev,	 2015).	Nevertheless,	 the	Nabucco	 project	 is	suspended	and	now	only	three	smaller	projects	are	available,	to	compete	for	the	supply	right	to	the	EU,	through	the	Turkish-EU	border	(Gotev,	2015):	
• Nabucco	West	–	via	Bulgaria	and	Romania	to	Austria	
• South	East	Europe	Pipeline	–	via	Bulgaria	and	Romania	to	Hungary	
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• Trans-Adriatic	Pipeline	–	via	Greece	to	Italy	Initially,	South	Stream	was	planned	to	start	from	the	Russian	coasts	of	the	Black	Sea,	 travel	 through	 Ukrainian	 waters	 in	 the	 Black	 Sea	 to	 Bulgaria,	 Serbia,	 Hungary,	Bosnia	 and	 Herzegovina,	 Croatia,	 Austria	 and	 Italy,	 pumping	 63	 bcm	 of	 gas	 annually.	However,	 due	 to	 political	 conflicts	 in	 Ukraine,	 Russia	 agreed	with	 Turkey	 to	 re-route	South	Stream	through	Turkish	seashores	(Gurbanov,	2015).	On	1st	December	2014,	the	Presidents	of	Russia	and	Turkey,	Vladimir	Putin	and	Recep	 Tayyip	 Erdogan,	 met	 in	 Turkey,	 where	 Putin	 announced	 significant	 issues	 like	"the	 suspension	 of	 South	 Stream	 pipeline",	 "increasing	 gas	 supply	 for	 Turkey",	"expansion	of	Blue	Stream	pipeline's	capacity"	and	"6%	gas	discount	for	Turkey".	On	the	same	 day,	 Turkish	 BOTAS	 and	 Russian	 Gazprom,	 signed	 a	 memorandum	 of	understanding,	to	construct	a	new,	offshore	natural	gas	pipeline	across	the	Black	Sea	to	Turkey,	 named	 "TurkStream."	A	 year	 later,	 Greece	 joined	 this	 joint	 enterprise,	 for	 the	construction	 of	 a	 pipeline	 across	 Greek	 territory.	 As	 planned,	 the	 offshore	 part	 of	 the	pipeline	will	 cross	 the	Black	seabed.	The	 length	of	 the	offshore	section	will	be	around	910km	(Gazprom	Export,	2017).	The	new	gas	route	also	means	a	third	gas	link	between	Turkey	and	Russia,	which	increases	the	gas	dependence	of	Turkey	from	58%	to	70%.	The	pipeline	will	surface	on	the	 shore	 of	 the	 European	 part	 of	 Turkey,	 near	 Kiyiköy,	 with	 a	 gas	 delivery	 point	 at	Lüleburgaz,	 for	 the	Turkish	 customers	 and	 as	 the	 distribution	 point	 for	 the	 European	customers	at	Ipsala,	the	border	crossing	between	Turkey	and	Greece	(Map	3)	(Gazprom	Export,	2017).	
Map	3.	The	planned	route	of	the	TurkStream	Pipeline		
	
Data	source:	Russia	Business	Today	2018.	
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The	length	of	the	Turkish	onshore	section	will	be	180km.	The	annual	capacity	of	the	 pipeline	 will	 be	 63	 bcm.	 About	 16	 bcm	 gas	 will	 be	 supplied	 to	 Turkey,	 and	 the	remaining	47	bcm	gas	is	contemplated	for	the	new	gas	hub,	designed	to	be	constructed	on	 the	 Turkish-Greek	 border,	 which	 will	 then	 be	 further	 transported	 to	 Europe	(Gurbanov,	2015).	In	 reality,	 a	 memorandum	 of	 understanding	 is	 non-binding	 for	 both	 parties,	meaning	many	negotiations	are	needed	to	realise	 the	TurkStream	project.	The	experts	hold	 different	 opinions	 concerning	 Turkey's	 pipeline	 agreement	 with	 Russia.	 Erdal	Tanas	Karagöl,	an	Economist	from	the	SETA	Foundation	and	a	presumptive	nominee	of	parliament	from	the	AKP,	sees	the	pipeline	project	as	a	positive	decision.	He	discusses	that	 Turkey's	 efforts	 regarding	 new	 energy	 pipelines,	 have	 now	 come	 into	 fruition.	Moreover,	he	 interprets	the	placing	of	Turkey	at	the	centre	of	energy	pipelines,	makes	Ankara	an	important	agent	in	the	decision-making	process	concerning	energy	subjects.	On	the	other	side,	Cüneyt	Kazokoglu,	an	energy	market	expert,	assumes	that	natural	gas	and	 nuclear	 power	 agreements	 with	 Russia	 will	 only	 increase	 Turkey’s	 energy	dependence	on	Russia.	He	explains:	"Between	2003	and	2013	our	natural	gas	imports	from	Russia	are	doubled:	13	
bcm	natural	gas	we	imported	in	2003,	had	increased	to	27	bcm	in	2013.	Now	
with	 Turkey	 Stream,	 our	 energy	 dependency	 on	 Russia	 will	 even	 multiply.	
Therefore,	Russia	has	the	word	and	power	again	on	the	pipeline	politics,	not	
the	Turkey".		The	construction	of	Akkuyu	Nuclear	Power	Plant	in	Turkey	will	be	carried	out	in	collaboration	 with	 Russian	 Rosatom.	 Through	 this	 nuclear	 partnership,	 Russia	 hands	over	the	operational	control	of	the	power	plant,	as	well	as	the	selling	price	of	nuclear-powered	 electricity	 on	 the	 market.	 Besides	 this,	 Russian	 employees	 will	 work	 in	 the	engineering	 department	 of	 this	 nuclear	 power	 plant.	 The	 necessary	materials	 for	 the	power	plant	will	also	come	through	the	imports	from	Russia.	Ultimately,	Turkey	will	be	dependent	on	Russia	both	in	natural	gas	and	nuclear	energy.	Consequently,	Turkey,	by	putting	all	eggs	in	one	basket,	will	possess	no	space	to	bargain	over	 import	prices.	The	 current	data	 from	EPDK	shows	 that	Turkey	 imported	49.2	bcm	of	natural	 gas	 in	2015.	Russia	has	 the	highest	 share	of	54.7%	(26.9	bcm)	 in	Turkey's	gas	imports	(Anonym,	2015).	To	diminish	the	amount	of	natural	gas	imports,	it	is	 essential	 for	Turkey	 to	modernise	 its	 energy	 infrastructure	 and	diversify	 its	 import	supplies	 as	 much	 as	 possible.	 Diversification	 of	 gas	 imports	 will	 help	 the	 country	 to	
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decrease	the	focus	of	its	energy	dependence	being	placed	solely	on	one	country.	It	will	also	reduce	risks	in	the	case	of	gas	disputes	between	the	supplier	countries,	such	as	the	frequent	gas	conflicts	between	Russia	and	Ukraine.	Ensuring	supply	security	is	one	of	the	fundamental	elements	required	to	achieve	a	sustainable	economic	growth.	 In	 this	regard,	 transportation	of	natural	gas	 to	Europe	via	 Turkey,	 with	 the	 TurkeyStream	 pipeline,	 will	 be	 one	 of	 the	 key	 determinants	 of	providing	 energy	 supply	 security.	 Moreover,	 AKP	 has	 maintained	 its	 "axis	 expansion	policy"	since	2002,	by	improving	its	trade	relations	and	partnerships	with	Russia	in	the	energy	field	(BBC,	2014).	From	the	very	beginning,	South	Stream	was	a	project	based	on	politics	and	not	economic	 rationale.	 The	 project	 was	 terminated	 due	 to	 the	 EU's	 opposition	 to	 the	pipeline,	 which	 it	 did	 not	 comply	with	 the	 "Third	 Energy	 Package".	 The	 third	 energy	package	 of	 the	 EU	 endeavours	 to	 introduce	more	 competition	 by	 breaking	 up	 energy	monopolies.	 In	 essence,	 this	means	 that	 the	 supplying	 company	 cannot	 also	 own	 the	pipeline.	The	pipeline	must	be	held	by	a	 third-party	 in	order	 to	 foster	competition	–	a	requirement	that	neither	Gazprom	nor	the	consortium	members	appreciated	(Dempsey,	2014).	From	a	 legal	point	of	view,	since	neither	Russia	nor	Turkey	 is	a	member	of	 the	EU,	 they	 are	 therefore	 not	 bound	 by	 Third	 Energy	 Package	 rules,	 which	 makes	 the	eventual	construction	of	TurkStream	much	easier	(Gurbanov,	2015).	
3.2.3.7.	 Turkey	–	Qatar	Pipeline		The	 construction	of	 a	proposed	Turkey-Qatar	Pipeline	essentially	dates	back	 to	the	 end	 of	 1990s,	 as	 the	 "Greater	 Middle	 East	 Initiative"	 took	 shape.	 Prior	 to	 the	September	11,	2001	terror	attacks	and	the	U.S.	invasion	and	occupation	of	Iraq	in	March	2003,	 some	 of	 the	 neo-conservatives	 in	 the	 George	W.	 Bush	 Administration	 declared	that	 the	 U.S.	 policy	 of	 appeasement	 of	 authoritarian	 regimes	 in	 the	 Middle	 East	 had	failed	 and	 that	 the	 US	 must	 move	 quickly	 to	 remove	 those	 regimes	 and	 establish	democracy	across	the	region	(Girdner,	2005).	Nevertheless,	 there	 is	a	 lot	of	scepticism	surrounding	whether	the	Iraq	war	was	launched	upon	the	rationale	of	the	establishment	of	democracy	or	not.	The	Middle	East	has	moved	towards	more	uncertainty	in	the	wake	of	Iraq	War	and	the	Arab	world	remains	further	than	ever	from	democratic	norms	and	governance.	In	the	aftermath	of	September	11	events	and	the	2003	Iraq	war,	the	U.S.	and	the	EU	have	come	to	define	terrorism	as	a	common	and	global	security	threat.	In	early	2004,	
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the	 Bush	 Administration	 launched	 the	 Greater	 Middle	 East	 Initiative,	 as	 "a	 forward	strategy	 of	 freedom	 in	 the	 Middle	 East".	 However,	 the	 idea	 of	 Greater	 Middle	 East	Initiative,	developed	by	the	US	State	Department,	was	to	be	another	tool	of	 imperialist	control	which	could	be	used	to	secure	the	resources,	labour	and	markets	of	the	region,	to	beef	up	US	global	hegemony	and	secure	corporate	profits	 in	 the	area.	Theoretically,	simultaneously	ending	any	incentives	for	terrorism	(Girdner,	2005).	As	 a	 result	 of	 raising	 objections	 from	 Europe,	 especially	 from	 the	 French	government	 and	 under	 pressure	 of	 Arab	 countries	 like	 Egypt	 and	 Saudi	 Arabia,	 the	initiative	 was	 laid	 aside	 in	 2008.	 The	 initiative,	 which	 has	 once	 again,	 recently	 re-emerged,	includes	roughly	three	major	components:	1) Swift	regime	changes:	Restructuring	the	economic	and	political	geography	of	the	region	 and	 integrating	 it	 into	 the	 world	 economy	 as	 investment	 and	 cheap	labour,	which	accordingly	restores	US	hegemony.	2) Energy	Security:	The	Middle	East	produces	nearly	36.7%	of	the	global	crude	oil	and	 15.7%	 of	world	 natural	 gas.	 The	 region	 includes	 four	 of	 the	 top	 eight	 oil-producing	countries	in	the	world.	U.S.,	China,	Japan,	India	and	four	EU	countries	(Germany,	 Italy,	France,	Netherlands)	 import	almost	60%	of	 the	 total	 crude	oil	production	 from	 these	 countries.	 Regarding	 natural	 gas,	 Qatar	 is	 the	 only	country,	which	 exports	 natural	 gas	 from	 the	 region.	 The	 share	 of	 Qatar’s	 total	worldwide	natural	gas	export	is	14%	(Russia	has	21.4%	share	in	comparison	to	Qatar).	 Five	 EU	 member	 countries	 (Germany,	 Italy,	 Slovakia,	 United	 Kingdom,	France)	alone	import	30%	of	global	natural	gas	production.	Access	to	oil	and	gas	sources	in	the	Middle	East,	has	become	essential	for	China,	the	U.S.	and	Europe,	as	 the	 region	 offers	 alternative	 energy	 routes	 and	 thus	 plays	 a	 major	 role	 in	reducing	European	dependence	on	Russian	gas.		3) The	 security	 of	 Israel:	 Although	 the	 first	 component	 of	 the	 initiative	 ended	 in	failure,	it	served	Israeli	interests,	enhancing	their	safety.	In	 2009,	 Qatar	 brought	 the	 "Turkey-Qatar	 Pipeline"	 project	 to	 the	 table,	which	proposed	the	construction	of	a	$10	billion,	1,500km	natural	gas	pipeline	starting	in	the	Iranian-Qatari	 South	 Pars/North	Dome	 Gas-Condensate	 field	 and	 travelling	 to	 Europe	via	 Saudi	Arabia,	 Jordan	 and	 Syria	 and	Turkey.	 Through	 the	 immense	pressure	 of	 the	U.S.	and	Qatar's	powerful	 lobbies	 in	main	European	countries,	 the	pipeline	project,	 led	by	 Qatar	 Petroleum,	 awakened	 the	 interest	 of	 several	 European	 companies	 (Escobar,	2015).	
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In	 this	 pipeline	 project,	 Turkey	 plays	 the	 role	 of	 being	 a	 key	 energy	 crossroad,	which	corresponds	with	Ankara's	aim	to	set	Turkey	as	the	major	energy	transfer	line	for	the	whole	 of	 the	EU.	Moreover,	 if	 the	project	was	 realised,	 it	 could	diminish	Europe's	dependence	 on	 Russian	 and	 Iranian	 gas	 resources	 and	 thereby	 Russia's	 strategic	advantage	over	 the	EU.	Nevertheless,	Syrian	President	Bashar	al-Assad	refused	to	give	permission	for	the	pipeline	to	go	through	his	territory	and	announced	that	he	would	not	allow	the	pipeline	to	run	through	Syria	in	order	"to	protect	the	interests	of	their	Russian	ally"	 (Kennedy,	 2016).	 According	 to	 Foreign	 Affairs,	 Russia	 put	 intense	 pressure	 on	Assad	 to	 reject	 the	pipeline,	 to	 safeguard	 its	 own	business	 and	prevent	 its	position	 in	European	 gas	 markets	 being	 undermined	 (Orenstein,	 et	 al.,	 2015).	 It	 is	 important	 to	keep	in	mind	that	the	proposed	pipeline	route	of	Qatar	is	not	obliged	to	pass	through	the	territories	of	Turkey	and	Syria.	It	could	also	easily	cross	Saudi	Arabia,	the	Red	Sea,	Egypt	and	reach	the	Eastern	Mediterranean	(Escobar,	2015).	On	this	matter,	in	the	Daily	Star	Robert	F.	Kennedy	Jr.	wrote,	"…that	the	moment	Assad	 rejected	 the	 Qatari	 pipeline,	 Saudi,	 Israel	 and	 the	 US	 military	 and	 intelligence	planners	 quickly	 arrived	 at	 the	 consensus	 that	 fomenting	 a	 Sunni	 uprising	 in	 Syria	 to	overthrow	 the	 uncooperative	 Bashar	 al-Assad	 was	 a	 feasible	 path	 to	 achieving	 the	shared	 objective	 of	 completing	 the	 Qatar/Turkey	 gas	 link"	 (Jamal,	 2016).	 General	Wesley	Clark,	former	European	Supreme	Allied	Commander	of	the	North	Atlantic	Treaty	Organisation,	stated	in	a	2007	interview	with	Amy	Goodman	on	"Democracy	Now",	that	soon	after	the	9/11	events,	he	had	received	a	memo	from	the	office	of	US	Secretary	of	Defence	Donald	Rumsfeld:	"This	is	a	memo	that	describes	how	we're	going	to	take	out	seven	countries	in	five	years,	starting	with	Iraq,	and	then	Syria,	Lebanon,	Libya,	Somalia,	Sudan	 and,	 finishing	 off,	 Iran"	 (Clark,	 2007).	 Within	 the	 so-called	 ‘endgame	 regime	changes	 program',	 Syria	 was	 the	 next	 country	 planned,	 after	 Iraq.	 There	 is	 a	 similar	assumption	 in	 some	quarters	 that	 the	AKP	decided	 to	 join	 the	 "swift	 regime	 changes"	project,	 after	 Turkey's	 attempts	 failed	 to	 persuade	 Bashar	 al-Assad	 to	 give	 the	 green	light	for	the	pipeline.	In	the	meantime,	Iran,	which	shares	the	world's	richest	gas	repository	–	the	South	Pars/North	Dome	–	with	Qatar,	decided	to	lodge	its	$10	billion	rival	pipeline	project	the	Iran-Iraq-Syria	 Pipeline	 (Islamic	 Pipeline),	 to	 pump	 Iranian	 gas	 to	 Europe	 via	 Iraq,	Syrian	 ports	 such	 as	 Latakia	 and	 under	 the	 Mediterranean	 Sea.	 The	 official	 contract	between	Iran,	Iraq,	and	Syria	was	signed	in	July	2011,	when	the	tragedies	and	civil	war	already	had	begun	in	Syria.	
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Until	 then,	 Syria	 was	 geo-strategically	 ignored	 as,	 compared	 to	 the	 Gulf	Cooperation	Council	Petrodollar	Club,	it	did	not	possess	much	oil	and	gas.	The	insiders,	however,	had	already	recognised	the	significance	of	Syria	as	a	regional	energy	corridor	(Escobar,	2015).	Since	the	discovery	of	vast	amounts	of	offshore	oil	and	gas	potential,	its	importance	has	grown.	It	 is	 clear	 that	 most	 of	 the	 foreign	 belligerents	 in	 the	 war	 in	 Syria	 are	 gas-exporting	 countries,	with	 interests	 in	 one	 of	 the	 two	 competing	pipeline	 projects	 that	seek	 to	 cross	 Syrian	 territory,	 to	 deliver	 either	 Qatari	 or	 Iranian	 gas	 to	 Europe	(Orenstein,	et	al.,	2015).	Because	Russia	has	a	vital	interest	in	controlling	gas	supplies	to	Europe,	where	Gazprom	sells	80%	of	its	gas,	the	dual	pipelines	would	be	a	disaster	for	the	 ‘Kremlin.'	 These	 new	 proposed	 pipelines	 from	 Qatar	 and	 Iran	 could	 take	 away	market	 share	 from	 Russia	 and	 bring	 the	 prices	 down,	 below	 what	 the	 Russian	 state	budget	needs	to	survive	(Orenstein,	et	al.,	2015).	Iran	is	an	energy	giant	in	the	region,	with	the	world's	largest	reserves	of	gas	and	fourth	 largest	 reserve	of	 oil.	Nonetheless,	 its	 economy	was	heavily	hit	 by	dramatic	 oil	price	decline	since	mid-2014	and	nuclear-related	sanctions	by	 the	U.S.	and	 the	EU.	On	14th	July	2015,	a	group	of	EU	and	non-EU	countries	(China,	France,	Germany,	Russia,	the	United	Kingdom	and	the	U.S.,	with	the	EU)	reached	an	agreement	with	Iran	on	the	Joint	Comprehensive	Plan	of	Action	(JCPOA).	The	Joint	Comprehensive	Plan	of	Action	dictates	limitations	to	Iran's	nuclear	program	as	well	as	increased	monitoring	and	transparency,	in	 exchange	 for	 the	 relief	 of	 existing	 international	 sanctions,	 including	 on	 trade.	 In	response	to	the	Joint	Comprehensive	Plan	of	Action	and	following	confirmation	from	the	International	Agency	for	Atomic	Energy,	which	stated	that	Iran	had	fulfilled	its	nuclear	obligations	 under	 JCPOA,	 all	 EU	 economic	 and	 financial	 sanctions	 taken	 in	 connection	with	the	Iranian	nuclear	program	were	lifted	in	January	2016	(EC,	2018).	The	current	U.S.	administration	supports	the	‘Turkey-Qatar	pipeline',	"as	a	way	to	balance	Iran"	and	at	the	same	time	"diversify	Europe's	gas	supplies	away	from	Russia"	(Orenstein,	 et	 al.,	 2015).	 The	 Qatar/Turkey	 pipeline	 would	 have	 given	 the	 Sunni	Kingdoms	of	 the	Persian	Gulf	 absolute	 domination	 of	 the	world’s	 natural	 gas	markets	and	strengthen	Qatar,	America's	closest	ally	in	the	Arab	world.	Qatar	hosts	two	massive	American	 military	 bases	 and	 the	 U.S.	 Central	 Command's	 Mid-East	 headquarters	(Kennedy,	2016).	TurkStream	and	 Iran-Iraq-Syria	Pipeline	projects,	 are	known	as	 the	major	 rival	projects	 to	 the	 proposed	 Qatar	 pipeline	 project.	 As	 AKP-Turkey's	 Syria	 policy	 has	
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reached	a	strategic	impasse,	the	country	launched	a	dual	reconciliation	with	Israel	and	Russia	 and	 made	 friendly	 overtures	 to	 Turkey's	 long-lasting	 regional	 rival,	 Iran.	According	 to	 Ergin	 Yildizoglu,	 a	 journalist	 from	 the	 Turkish,	 left-oriented,	 daily	newspaper	 Cumhuriyet,	 Turkey's	 burgeoning	 alliance	with	Russia,	 especially	 after	 the	July	 15-16	 coup	 d'état	 attempt	 in	 Turkey,	 was	 eventually	 rebuffed	 by	 the	 US	 and	 EU	(Yildizoglu	 2016).	 Turkey’s	 efforts	 to	 reconcile	with	Russia	was	 actually	more	 for	 the	benefit	 of	Russia,	 as	Russia	 stands	 to	 benefit	 from	Turkey’s	membership	 of	 the	North	Atlantic	Treaty	Organisation	membership	and	alignment	with	the	US,	making	it	appear	as	though	the	U.S.	is	the	‘lone	irrational	outlier’	in	Syria.	On	August	24th	2016,	Turkey	launched	its	largest	military	cross-border	operation,	called	‘Euphrates	Shield',	in	the	Syrian	Civil	War.	As	the	former	Turkish	Prime	Minister,	Binali	 Yildirim	 stated,	 the	main	desire	of	 this	military	 intervention	was	 to	 cleanse	 the	Turkish	border	 from	the	 IS	and	other	militants,	 thereby	defending	Turkey's	 territorial	integrity.	Yildirim	further	declared,	“Turkey	is	also	defending	Syria's	territorial	integrity.	The	aim	of	these	terrorist	organisations	is	to	form	a	state	in	these	countries.	They	will	never	succeed"	(Tattersall	and	Pamuk	2016).	However,	there	is	a	widespread	consensus	that	 Turkey	 entered	 Syria	 only	 under	 the	 pretence	 of	 ‘the	 fight	 against	 the	 IS’	 (Dicle	2016).	 Additionally,	 according	 to	 Reuters'	 report,	 an	 alliance	 of	 23	 Kurdish	 parties	 in	Syria	declared,	 in	 a	 joint	 statement,	 that	 they	 accuse	Ankara	of	 trying	 to	occupy	Syria	under	the	pretence	of	fighting	terrorism	(Tattersall	and	Pamuk	2016).	In	2016,	Turkey	experienced	many	deadly	bomb	attacks	blamed	on	the	radical	Islamists	and	Kurdish	terrorist	groups,	particularly	the	PKK	(Kurdish	Workers	Party)	and	YPG	(Yekîneyên	Parastina	Gel).	Due	to	this,	Turkey’s	main	concern	is	the	threat	that	Kurdish	militants	in	Syria	will	seize	a	swath	of	border	territory	and	instigate	Kurdish	insurgents	on	its	soil.	Therefore,	Turkey	refuses	to	tolerate	an	autonomous	Kurdish	zone	on	their	southern	frontier	(Map	4).	
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Map	4.	The	South-eastern	border	of	Turkey	(June	2018)	
	
Data	source:	(IHS	Conflict	Monitor,	2018).		 Given	these	circumstances,	on	20th	January	2018,	Turkey	launched	a	cross-border	military	operation	“Olive	Branch”,	targeting	the	Kurdish-majority	district	of	Afrin	in	the	Aleppo	province,	northwest	Syria.	Afrin	is	controlled	by	the	YPG,	which	has	strong	ties	with	the	PKK.	For	Turkey,	the	elimination	of	Kurdish	autonomist	ambitions	in	northern	Syria,	both	in	Afrin	and	further	east,	between	the	border	towns	of	Kobanê	and	Hasakah,	is	an	extension	of	its	campaign	against	the	PKK	(Seckin,	2018).	The	potential	conflicts	in	Turkey’s	 Olive	 Branch	 Operation	 are	 between	 Turkey,	 Russia	 and	 the	 USA.	 As	 all	airspace	 of	 Syria	 is	 controlled	 by	 Russia,	 Turkey	 needs	 to	 have	 acquired	 tacit	acquiescence	 from	Russia	prior	 to	 the	operation	 (Seckin,	2018).	Russia’s	acquiescence	will	likely	drive	a	deeper	wedge	between	the	two	NATO	allies,	USA	and	Turkey,	in	light	of	 the	 latter’s	 support	 for	 the	 YPG,	 under	 the	 Syrian	 Democratic	 Forces,	 which	 is	 the	USA’s	key	Syrian	proxy	(Seckin,	2018).	Moreover,	facing	the	threat	of	being	pervaded	by	Turkey	and	 its	Free	Syrian	Army	allies,	Russia	calculates	 that	 the	YPG	will	be	a	better	option	to	return	Afrin	to	the	Syrian	government	(Seckin,	2018).	
3.2.4.	 The	Contribution	of	Liquefied	Natural	Gas		With	 the	 purpose	 of	 diversifying	 natural	 gas	 resources,	 increased	 security	 and	flexibility	of	gas	supply,	Turkey	imports	LNG	mainly	from	Algeria,	Nigeria,	and	Qatar	(to	some	 extent	 also	 from	 Egypt).	 BOTAS	 has	 conducted	 and	 imported	 LNG	 from	Algeria	since	 1994	 and	 from	 Nigeria	 since	 1999.	 Turkey	 currently	 has	 two	 LNG	 storage	terminals:	Marmara	Ereglisi	LNG	Import	Terminal	and	Izmir	Aliaga	Terminal.	
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Turkey	has	suffered	greatly	from	supply	deficits	in	the	past;	as	a	consequence	of	the	 reductions	 in	 the	 natural	 gas	 supply	 via	 the	Western	 Line,	 during	 the	 gas	 dispute	between	Russia	 and	Ukraine	 in	 2006	 and	 2009,	 cutbacks	 in	 natural	 gas	 exports	 from	Iran	during	the	winter	due	to	technical	problems	and	Iran's	policy	to	compensate	own	domestic	consumption,	as	well	as	the	lack	of	sufficient	storage	capacity	in	Turkey	itself	(EPDK,	2016).	In	 2015,	 94.8%	 of	 total	 natural	 gas	 imports	 were	 distributed	 from	 countries	through	 pipeline	 agreements,	 or	 as	 LNG	within	 the	 scope	 of	 long-term	 import	 license	agreements.	The	remaining	5.2%	of	gas	was	imported	from	other	countries	as	spot	LNG	(EPDK,	2016).	Turkey's	overall	LNG	(spot	and	long-term)	import	in	2015	was	7.6	bcm.	453.4	 mcum	 of	 LNG	 was	 consumed	 directly	 by	 the	 consumers,	 without	 using	 the	national	transmission	network	(EPDK,	2016).	This	amount	represents	1.1%	LNG	of	total	national	natural	gas	consumption.	5.1	bcm,	around	67.1%	of	total	LNG	imports	(having	long-term	 import	 agreements	 of	 BOTAS)	 came	 from	 Algeria,	 while	 the	 remaining	 1.9	bcm,	 around	 32.9%	 LNG,	 came	 from	 Nigeria.	 The	 remaining	 amount	 of	 LNG	 was	imported	 as	 spot	 from	 seven	 countries.	 Within	 these	 countries,	 Qatar	 represents	 the	biggest	share	in	terms	of	spot	LNG	imports	with	68.5%,	followed	by	Nigeria	with	7.3%,	Norway	with	7.2%,	Trinidad	and	Tobago	with	6.7%,	France	with	3.6%,	Spain	with	3.4%	and	Belgium	with	3.3%	(EPDK,	2016).	According	to	Article	5	of	the	"Natural	Gas	Market	Law,"	Law	No.	4646,	to	enable	private	 companies	 to	 import	 gas	 as	 LNG	 or	 via	 pipeline,	 BOTAS	 cannot	 sign	 a	 new	contract	 with	 countries	 where	 it	 already	 has	 a	 contract.	 Nevertheless,	 based	 on	 the	"Amendment	of	the	Electricity	Market	Law	and	other	Laws",	Law	No.	5784,	introduced	on	July	9th	2008,	BOTAS	has	the	right	to	enter	into	a	new	contract	for	LNG	imports	and	other	private	companies	are	allowed	to	import	spot	LNG	(EPDK,	2016).	BOTAS	owns	 the	Marmara	Ereglisi	 LNG	 Import	Terminal,	which	 is	utilised	as	 a	base	 load	 plant	 and	when	 necessary,	 a	means	 of	 peak	 shaving	 for	 the	 gas	 purchased	during	 LNG	 import	 operations.	 The	 company	 currently	 has	 two	 buying	 and	 selling	contracts	signed	with	Algeria	for	4.4	bcm	gas	per	annum	and	Nigeria	for	1.3	bcm	gas	per	annum,	with	a	total	capacity	of	5.7	bcm	gas	per	annum	(BOTAS,	2014).	BOTAS	operated	234	 facilities	 and	 reached	 approximately	 40	 bcm	 of	 natural	 gas	 sales	 in	 2014	 by	presenting	 the	natural	 gas	 into	Turkish	market.	 The	Marmara	Ereglisi	 Terminal	 has	 a	685,000	cubic	meters	per	hour	gas	send-out	capacity	and	 three	storage	 tanks	 (85,000	
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m3	capacity	for	each).	Installation	of	a	new	160,000	m3	storage	rank	in	the	Terminal	is	planned	(BOTAS,	2014).	Egegaz	 operates	 the	 Aliaga	 LNG	 Terminal,	 with	 a	 daily	 capacity	 of	 16.4	mcum	(International	Energy	Agency	2013).	At	the	end	of	the	year	2014,	around	1.6	mcum	spot	LNG	 was	 imported	 from	 international	 spot	 LNG	 market,	 through	 the	 private	 LNG	Terminal	in	Izmir	Aliaga	(BOTAS,	2014).	Due	to	the	insufficient	development	of	LNG	infrastructure,	Marmara	Ereglisi	and	Aliaga	 LNG	 terminals	 are	 not	 able	 to	 fulfil	 Turkey's	 gas	 deficit.	 LNG	 development	 is	chronically	 limited	 due	 to	 subsidies	 and	 weak	market	 competition,	 which	 is,	 in	 turn,	related	to	the	rooted	regulatory	advantages	that	BOTAS	has	accumulated	over	the	years.	So	long	as	the	storage	capacity	is	not	expanded,	Turkey's	natural	gas	policy	will	cave	into	Russia's	rigid	gas	pipeline	contracts.	Considering	the	demand	forecast,	Turkey	may	face	supply	shortages	within	the	next	years	and	also	may	not	be	able	to	meet	peak	demand	during	winter	days	 if	 the	 imported	volume	of	 spot	LNG	 is	 reduced	by	price	pressures	and	 limited	 regasification	 capacity,	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 LNG	 import	 and	 storage	capacity	has	not	yet	been	expanded	(Rzayeva,	2014).		
3.2.5.	 Underground	Natural	Gas	Storage	Capacity	of	Turkey	
	 Turkey	is	only	able	to	meet	less	than	1%	of	its	natural	gas	demand	with	domestic	production.	The	remaining	substantial	amount	of	natural	gas	comes	 from	imports.	For	this	 reason,	 potential	 constraints	 to	 gas	 imports	 or	 gas	 disputes	 with	 the	 exporting	countries	pose	a	significant	threat	to	Turkey's	energy	and	supply	security	(Nyman,	et	al.,	2016).	 Hence,	 underground	 natural	 gas	 storage	 projects	 are	 crucial	 for	 Turkey	 to	regulate	 its	 seasonal,	 daily	 and	 hourly	 needs.	 However,	 insufficiency	 in	 natural	 gas	storage	areas	and	network	capacity	adversely	affect	not	only	the	flow	of	gas,	but	also	the	trading	of	gas	by	its	prospective	competitors	(Nyman,	et	al.,	2016).	Therefore,	technical	and	 economic	 compliance	 of	 new	 storage	 investments	 are	 crucial.	 The	 Natural	 Gas	Market	Law	No.	4646	Article	4,	requires	"to	store	an	amount	corresponding	to	10%	of	the	natural	gas	to	be	imported	every	year,	in	the	national	territory	for	five	years"	(Laws	Turkey,	2001).	Regarding	 the	 natural	 gas	 storage	 capacities	 worldwide,	 the	 estimated	 global	storage	 capacity	 is	 over	383	bcm.	Based	on	 the	2013	data	 of	BOTAS,	 the	USA	has	 the	most	gas	storage	sites	and	huge	capacity	 for	underground	storage,	 followed	by	Russia	(Table	5).		
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Table	5.	Underground	natural	gas	storage	capacities	of	countries	
Countries	 Storage	sites	 Storage	capacity	(bcm)	USA	 442	 127.2	Russia	 28	 97.6	Ukraine	 13	 32.1	Germany	 51	 20.4	Canada	 49	 14.8	Italy	 10	 14.9	France	 16	 12.7	
Turkey	 1	 2.6	Others	 67	 60.7	Total	 677	 383	
Data	source:	(Nyman,	et	al.,	2016).		Total	storage	capacity	in	the	EU	is	approximately	108	bcm.	France,	Germany,	and	Italy	 hold	 approximately	 one-third	 of	 their	 annual	 requirement	 in	 stock.	 In	 many	countries	in	Europe,	the	gas	storage	facilities	constitute	between	20%	and	30%	of	their	annual	 gas	 consumption	 (Nyman,	 et	 al.,	 2016).	 Ukraine,	 with	 49%,	 has	 the	 largest	storage	 capacity	 of	 national	 demand,	 followed	 by	 Italy	 (30%),	 Russia	 (27%),	 the	 USA	and	Germany	with	 almost	 20%	 respectively.	 Turkey	 barely	 has	 a	 total	 capacity	 of	 2.6	bcm	natural	gas	storage	in	Silivri,	constituting	only	5%	of	the	annual	gas	consumption,	which	is	not	able	to	cover	demand	spikes.	The	shortages	in	the	gas	market	and	infrastructure	not	only	prevent	Turkey	from	achieving	gas	supply	security	at	a	reasonable	price,	but	also	threaten	supply	security	of	electricity,	as	natural	gas-fired	power	generation	accounts	for	between	40%	and	50%	of	the	total	electricity	generation	(Nyman,	et	al.,	2016).	Turkey's	very	limited	underground	storage	capacity	creates	additional	problems	for	BOTAS	whenever	it	cannot	take	all	the	contracted	 volume	during	 the	 summer	 and	May,	when	 there	 is	 the	 lowest	 demand.	 It	therefore	has	to	pay	‘take	or	pay'	penalties	(Rzayeva,	2014).	For	managing	the	seasonal	imbalances	 of	 supply	 and	 demand	 and	 to	 avoid	 the	 adverse	 consequences	 of	 supply	interruptions,	 it	 is	 mandatory	 to	 increase	 storage	 and	 daily	 withdrawal	 capacities.	Currently,	 Turkey	 has	 one	 natural	 gas	 storage	 facility	 in	 operation	 and	 one	 in	 the	construction	phase.	
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3.2.5.1.	 Silivri	Natural	Gas	Storage	Facility		 The	 Silivri	 Natural	 Gas	 Storage	 Facility	 is	 the	 first	 and	 the	 only	 active	underground	storage	facility	in	a	gas	field.	It	was	converted	into	an	underground	storage	by	 Turkish	 Petroleum	 in	 2007,	 to	 compensate	 the	 seasonal	 differences	 in	 natural	 gas	consumption.	In	this	manner,	natural	gas	can	be	kept	in	storage	tanks	when	demand	is	weak	 and	 reproduced	 when	 the	 need	 is	 high.	 It	 is	 then	 possible	 to	 meet	 short-term,	excessive	 gas	 demand	 during	 winter,	 or	 extreme	 need	 to	 produce	 electricity	 during	summer.	Total	storage	capacity	of	the	Silivri	facility	is	2.6	bcm	(about	5%	of	demand)	at	two	depleted	gas	fields.	The	first	is	the	Kuzey	Marmara	(North	Marmara)	Field,	located	in	the	Marmara	Sea	and	has	a	depth	of	1,200	meters.	The	second	one	is	the	Değirmenköy	Field,	with	 a	depth	of	 1,100	meters	 (Turkish	Petroleum,	2016).	About	2.1	bcm	of	 this	total	 storage	 capacity	 is	 allocated	 to	 BOTAS,	while	 some	 561	 bcm	 capacity	 is	 open	 to	private	 firms	(IEA,	2013).	The	reproduction	capacity	of	 the	Silivri	Storage	Facility	was	increased	 from	 14	 mcum	 per	 day	 in	 2007,	 to	 25	 mcum	 per	 day	 in	 2014.	 Turkish	Petroleum	has	planned	to	further	production	capacity	increase	to	50	mcum	per	day	and	has	 agreed	 to	 increase	 the	 total	 storage	 capacity	 up	 to	 2.8	 bcm	 (Rzayeva,	 2014).	Moreover,	Turkish	Petroleum	plans	 to	 increase	 the	 total	capacity	 to	4.3	bcm,	 the	daily	withdrawal	capacity	 to	75	mcum	and	 injection	capacity	 to	40	mcum	per	day,	after	 the	completion	of	the	Degirmenköy	and	Surroundings	Natural	Gas	Storage	Project	(Phase	II)	and	the	Kuzey	Marmara	Natural	Gas	Project	(Phase	III)	(Turkish	Petroleum,	2017).	
3.2.5.2.	 Tuz	Gölü	Underground	Natural	Gas	Storage	Facility			 Tuz	Gölü	Underground	Natural	Gas	Storage	Project,	which	is	located	about	40	km	south	 of	 Tuz	 Gölü	 (Salt	 Lake),	 in	 the	 Sultanhani	 locality	 of	 Aksaray	 Province,	 aims	 to	meet	energy	demand	by	storing	and	using	natural	gas	underground	(BOTAS,	2015).	The	construction	activities	of	this	project	remain	under	the	ownership	of	BOTAS.	The	aim	of	the	project	is	to	utilise	salt	domes	under	the	Tuz	Gölü	(IEA,	2013),	as	the	salt	reservoirs	are	 technically	 the	most	economical	model	 for	storage	 facilities.	The	salt	 layers,	which	start	 from	600-700m	underground,	will	 burrow	approximately	1,100-1,500m	deep	by	pumping	fresh	water	(BOTAS	2014).	The	water	required	for	dissolution	will	be	supplied	by	Hirfanli	Dam,	with	a	120km	long	pipeline	(BOTAS,	2014).	 In	this	way,	the	Salt	Lake	natural	 gas	 storage	 project	 ensures	 the	 storage	 of	 8%	 of	 current	 natural	 gas	consumption.	
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Once	the	second	largest	lake	in	Turkey	and	having	the	official	protection	status	of	Special	Environmental	Protection	Area	 since	2000,	Tuz	Gölü	and	 its	 satellite	wetlands	(Kulu,	Terkesan	and	Bolluk	Lakes,	Esmekaya	Marshes)	face	the	threat	of	drying	up	as	a	result	of	the	dominant	water	policies.	In	addition	to	the	impacts	of	climate	change,	illegal	well	drillings	for	irrigated	agriculture	activities	(especially	sugar	beet	farming),	reduced	the	 surface	 area	 of	 Tuz	Gölü	 by	 60%	between	1987-2005.	 Each	 year	well	 drillings	 go	deeper	and	cause	the	reduction	of	underground	water,	which	naturally	feeds	the	basin.	Moreover,	 the	 soil	 in	 the	 region	 becomes	 arid,	 salinized	 and	 uncontrollable	desertification	loss	of	landscape/aesthetic	degradation	in	the	area	occurs	(Basak,	2014).	The	 biodiversity	 loss,	 groundwater	 pollution	 and	 depletion,	 reduced	ecological/hydrological	 connectivity	 and	 crop	 damage	 (partially	 food	 insecurity)	problems	are	already	very	visible	in	the	field.	Within	the	scope	of	the	Tuz	Gölü	Natural	Gas	Storage	Project,	the	plan	is	to	reach	a	capacity	of	500	mcum	through	the	completion	of	the	first	phase,	and	1	bcm	working	gas	 capacity	 with	 the	 conclusion	 of	 the	 second	 phase.	 When	 the	 project	 is	 fully	accomplished,	a	maximum	of	40	mcum	of	natural	gas	will	be	able	to	be	distributed	to	the	Turkish	natural	gas	network	every	day	(MENR,	2016).	According	 to	 the	 Turkish	 Ministry	 of	 Public	 Works	 and	 Settlement	 "Seismic	Zoning	Map	of	Turkey,"	the	Tuz	Gölü	Gas	Storage	Project	routes	are	included	in	the	1st,	2nd,	 3rd,	 4th	 and	5th-degree	 earthquake	 zones.	However,	 the	 city	 of	Aksaray,	where	 the	construction	work	continues,	has	not	been	 the	epicentre	of	an	earthquake	 in	 the	past,	due	 to	 its	 geographical	 and	 seismotectonic	 position	 (BOTAS,	 2013).	 Until	 now,	 the	average	 magnitude	 of	 earthquakes	 recorded	 in	 the	 province	 of	 Aksaray	 and	surroundings	 are	 approximately	 5.2.	 All	 in	 all,	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 ‘environmental	impacts	 assessment'	 report,	 the	 construction	 of	 the	 storage	 facility	 has	 started	 in	 the	remotest	point	from	the	active	fault	line	in	Aksaray.	The	threat	of	a	potential	earthquake	in	the	region	and	possible	hazards	are	,	however,	far	from	impossible.	Energy	 imports	 are	 one	 of	 the	 heaviest	 burdens	 of	 Turkey's	 growth	 and	weak	economy.	 The	 primary	 reason	 for	 the	 country's	 high	 budget	 deficit	 lays	 upon	 its	 high	dependency	on	fossil	fuel	imports.	The	 appreciable	 increase	 in	 energy	 prices	 in	 Europe	 has	 generated	 a	 slight	decrease	in	demand	for	gas.	Instead,	the	use	of	renewables	has	increased	to	narrow	the	energy	gap.	One-quarter	of	all	energy	consumed	in	the	EU	is	gas	and	58%	of	this	gas	is	imported.	42%	of	this	gas	comes	alone	from	Russia,	and	around	80%	of	EU	gas	imports	
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pass	through	Ukraine.	The	EU	member	states	 feared	that	a	new	gas	supply	disruption,	similar	 to	 the	2006	and	2009	Russia-Ukraine	gas	disputes,	might	rise	again	due	to	 the	Crimea	 crisis.	During	 this	 time	 the	 gas	 routes	 of	many	Western	Balkan	 countries,	 like	Bosnia	 and	 Herzegovina,	 Croatia,	 Republic	 of	 Macedonia	 and	 Serbia	 were	 disrupted.	Some	energy	experts	claimed	that	the	actual	winner	of	this	gas	dispute	was	Turkey,	as	the	EU	would	likely	seek	alternative	gas	routes	and	Turkey	would	benefit	from	being	a	transit	 country.	 Europe	 hoped	 to	 benefit	 from	 Turkey's	 geographically	 advantageous	position,	 to	 be	 a	 bridge	 for	 the	 transportation	 of	 Caspian	 gas	 to	 Europe,	 as	 a	 shield	against	Russia's	drastic	energy	strategies.	This	assumption	reflects	the	truth,	that	the	EU	indeed,	after	the	crisis,	recognised	the	vulnerability	of	its	energy	security	and	therefore	launched	several	projects	like	diversifying	natural	gas	import	routes	and	increasing	the	share	of	LNG	in	the	total	gas	supply.	Considering	the	energy	scenarios,	Ankara’s	ambition	is	to	make	Turkey	the	major	energy	crossroad	for	the	whole	EU:	i. as	a	transit	hub	for	gas	from	Iran,	Central	Asia	and,	Russia,		ii. as	a	hub	for	major	gas	discoveries	in	the	Eastern	Mediterranean,		iii. and	 as	 a	 hub	 for	 gas	 imported	 from	 the	 Kurdistan	 Regional	 Government	 in	northern	Iraq	(Escobar,	2015).		Turkey,	at	the	crossroads	of	Asia	and	Europe,	may	have	the	best	chance	to	act	as	a	reliable	transit	country,	ensuring	uninterrupted	gas	flow	from	Caspian	basin	to	Europe.	In	order	to	function	as	a	gas	hub,	Turkey	needs	to	be	able	to	import	sufficient	amounts	of	gas	 both	 to	meet	 its	 own	 energy	 demand	 and	 any	 re-export	 commitments,	 providing	adequate	 gas	 via	 its	 pipeline	 capacity	 across	 the	 country.	 The	 country’s	 increasing	energy	needs	are	jeopardising	its	surplus	capacity	to	transport	enough	gas	from	Middle	East	and	Caspian	to	Europe.	Therefore,	the	development	of	energy	efficient	technologies	and	an	 increase	 in	 the	share	of	renewable	energy	sources	 in	 its	 total	energy	supply,	 is	fundamental	for	the	energy	security	of	both	Turkey	and	Europe.	
3.3.	 Coal	
3.3.1.	 Hard	Coal			 In	contrast	to	its	scant	oil	and	gas	reserves,	Turkey	has	large	amounts	of	lignite	and	some	hard	coal.	According	to	the	latest	statistics	from	the	EIA,	Turkey	has	9,592		million	tons	of	recoverable	coal	reserves.	Anthracite	and	bituminous	(also	called	recoverable	hard	coal)	constitute	for,	with	355	million	tons,	only	a	small	part	of	the	total	
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reserves.	The	major	part	of	the	total	reserves	consist	of	the	sub-bituminous	and	recoverable	lignite,	holding	9,237	million	tonnes	(EIA,	2017).	Coal’s	share,	including	lignite,	in	Turkey’s	primary	energy	supply,	decreased	from	24%	in	1970	to	13%	in	2014	(Ersoy,	2016).	Since	2013,	the	production	of	coal	has	considerably	decreased,	although	it	saw	a	slight	increase	in	2014.	In	2015,	Turkey’s	saleable	coal	production	reached	61.9	million	tonnes	which	is	comprised	of	58.7	million	tonnes	lignite,	2	million	tonnes	hard	coal	and	0.8	million	tonnes	asphaltite	(Table	6).	
Table	6.	Coal	production	in	Turkey	(unit:	ton)	Ore	 Producer	 2012	 2013	 2014	 2015	 2016	Asphaltite	 	 649,830	 648,953	 336,852	 837,112	 1,475,101	Bitum.	Shale	 TKI	 394,277	 149,828	 259,508	 288,185	 372,028	Coal	 EÜAS	 24,297,709	 16,011,459	 18,987,907	 10,855,125	 13,267,974		 TKI	 36,815,592	 23,257,009	 22,854,114	 12,432,171	 24,330,886		 Other	public	sector	 	 11,245,055	 1,063,927	 399,816	 213,501		 Private	sector	 16,900,893	 12,810,342	 23,301,062	 35,043,058	 39,718,241		 Total	 78,014,194	 63,323,865	 66,207,011	 58,730,170	 77,530,602	Hard	coal	 TTK	 and	Royalty	Holders	 3,235,299	 2,789,338	 1,916,833	 2,074,049	 1,496,223	Grand	total	 82,293,600	 66,911,984	 68,720,204	 61,929,516	 80,873,954	
Data	source:	Own	illustration	based	on	the	data	from	(MENR,	2017).		 Coal	consumption	in	Turkey	has	increased	each	year	between	2002-2015,	except	in	 2013.	 In	 2015,	 Turkey's	 total	 coal	 consumption	 reached	 97.2	 million	 tonnes.	 31.8	million	 tonnes	of	 this	came	 from	domestic	and	 imported	hard	coal,	and	 the	remaining	65.4	million	tonnes	were	lignite	and	asphaltite.	In	2015,	Turkey's	domestic	coal	supply	was	16.8	mtoe,	of	which	lignite	made	up	15.3	mtoe,	hard	coal	1.1	mtoe,	and	asphaltite	counted	for	0.4	mtoe.	The	largest	share	of	the	hard	coal	supply	in	2015,	around	44.6%,	was	utilised	for	generating	electricity,	while	17.8%	was	used	for	heating	purposes.	Coal	imports	totalled	19.4	mtoe,	of	which	19.2	mtoe	was	anthracite,	and	0.2	mtoe	was	coke.	In	the	same	year,	the	annual	increase	in	domestic	coal	supply	was	15.1%,	with	imported	coal	supply	totalling	12.8%.	In	2015,	the	total	installed	coal-fired	power	plant	capacity	increased	by	722	MW,	compared	to	previous	years,	reaching	15,493	MW	and	representing	21.2%	of	 the	total	installed	 power	 of	 Turkey.	 Domestic	 coal	 constituted,	 with	 its	 9,428	 MW	 installed	capacity,	 12.9%	of	 total	 installed	 capacity,	whereas	 imported	 coal,	with	 its	 6,064	MW	
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installed	capacity,	represented	8.3%	of	the	country's	total	installed	capacity.	The	share	of	electricity	generation	from	hard	coal	in	total	energy	production	of	Turkey	is	gradually	increasing.	72.1	twh	(27.8%)	of	Turkey's	259.7	twh	gross	power	generation,	came	from	hard	 coal	 (15.2%)	and	 lignite	 (12.5%).	 In	 total,	 by	 the	end	of	2015	 there	were	 thirty-eight	hard	coal-	and	 lignite-fired	power	plants	 in	Turkey,	with	an	 installed	capacity	of	approximately	15,200	MW	(20.6%	of	 total	capacity).	The	majority	of	 the	power	plants	are	 lignite-fired	 plants,	 using	 domestic	 lignite	with	 an	 installed	 capacity	 of	 8,700	MW	(11.8%)	and	hard	coal-fired	power	plant	with	an	installed	capacity	of	6,500	MW	(8.8%).	The	primary	plants	are	the	Zonguldak-Eren	coal-fired	power	plant	at	the	port	of	Black	Sea,	with	an	installed	capacity	of	2,790	MW	and	both	Afsin-Elbistan	A	and	B,	which	are	lignite	power	plants,	located	in	the	southeast	of	Turkey	with	a	total	installed	capacity	of	2,795	MW.	Around	70	new	coal	power	plants	 are	 in	planning	 for	 construction,	 in	 line	with	the	country's	2023	energy	vision.	The	 largest	hard	coal	deposits	of	Turkey	are	 located	 in	 the	Zonguldak	basin	on	the	Black-Sea	coast	in	North-western	Turkey,	which	has	a	total	of	1.3	billion	tons	of	hard	coal	 reserves	 and	 the	 electricity	 generation	 potential	 of	 11	 billion	 kwh	 per	 annum.	Currently,	only	21%	of	this	potential	has	been	achieved	(MENR,	2017).	The	production	of	 hard	 coal,	which	 has	 shown	 a	 downward	 trend	 since	 the	 1980s,	 diminished	 to	 1.9	million	 tonnes	 in	2004.	From	this	date	on,	 the	saleable	hard	coal	production	has	been	remobilised	and	has	reached	2.3	million	tonnes	in	2012.	From	2012,	production	of	hard	coal	gradually	decreased	to	1.9	million	tonnes	in	2013,	1.8	million	tonnes	in	2014	and,	finally,	 to	 1.4	 million	 tonnes	 in	 2015.	 One	 particular	 reason	 for	 this	 reduction	 is	 the	geological	structure	of	 the	basin,	which	makes	mining	difficult	due	to	the	steep	seams,	which	 are	 disturbed	 by	 frequent	 faults	 and	 contain	 a	 large	 amount	 of	 methane	 (IEA,	2016).	The	contribution	of	 ‘Zonguldak	Basin'	 in	meeting	the	energy	demand	of	Turkey	has	declined	to	7-8%	in	2015	(TKI,	2015).	Over	 90%	 of	 total	 coal	 production	 is	 run	 by	 three	 state-owned	 enterprises:	Turkish	Coal	Enterprises	 (TKI),	Electricity	Generation	Company	(Elektrik	Üretim	A.Ş.	 -	EÜAŞ)	 and	Turkish	Hard	Coal	Enterprises	 (TTK).	The	 state-owned	TTK	has	 a	de	 facto	monopoly	on	the	production,	processing,	and	distribution	of	hard	coal,	though	there	are	no	legal	restrictions	on	private	sector	involvement.	To	 meet	 its	 increasing	 energy	 demand,	 Turkey	 has	 been	 importing	 hard	 coal	since	the	1980s	primarily	from	Russia,	Columbia,	the	U.S.,	South	Africa	and	Australia.	In	2015,	a	total	of	33	million	tonnes	of	 imported	was	imported	from	these	five	countries,	
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plus	Canada.	The	largest	amount	of	coal	was	imported	from	Columbia	with	11.4	million	tonnes,	followed	by	Russia	with	11.3	million	tonnes	per	year.	South	Africa	with	5	million	tonnes,	Australia	with	2.8	million	tonnes,	the	U.S.	with	2	million	tonnes	and	Canada	with	500,000	tonnes	supplied	the	remainder	(TKI,	2015).	Increasing	 coal	 imports	 puts	 a	 high	 burden	 on	 the	 country's	 budget.	 The	 coal	import	bills	 of	Turkey	exceeded	$1	billion	 for	 the	 first	 time	 in	2004	and	 continued	 to	increase	annually	to	a	total	of	$4.6	billion	in	2012.	Due	to	the	decline	in	coal	prices	in	the	international	markets,	the	import	bills	of	Turkey	were	also	decreased	to	$3.5	billion	in	2013,	$3.2	billion	in	2014	and	$3	billion	by	the	end	of	2015.	Another	 significant	 coal	mine	 is	 located	 in	 Soma,	 a	 town	and	district	 of	Manisa	Province	 in	the	Aegean	region	of	Turkey.	 It	 is	 the	region's	biggest	 facility	and	supplies	jobs	 to	 around	 6,000	 employees.	 This	 former	 state-run	mine	was	 leased	 to	 a	 private	company	 in	 2005,	 ‘Soma	 Holding,'	 however,	 Turkish	 Coal	 Enterprises,	 a	 government	conglomerate,	 still	 retained	 ownership.	 The	 holding	 took	 over	 the	 coal	 mine,	 which	contains	 18	million	 tonnes	 of	 coal	 reserves,	 from	 the	Turkish	 Coal	 Enterprises	 in	 line	with	 the	 "rödovans	 system."	 Rödovans	 comes	 originally	 from	 the	 French	 word	"redevance"	and	means	royalty.	The	Rödovans	system	was	first	introduced	in	Turkey	in	the	 1980s	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 preventing	 the	 continuation	 of	 illegal	 and	 unlicensed	mining.	Soma	Holding	tripled	production	to	what	had	initially	been	deemed	possible.	By	May	2014,	the	company	was	able	to	extract	a	massive	15	million	tons	of	coal,	three	years	ahead	of	 schedule	 (Munyar,	 2012).	Nevertheless,	while	 Soma	Holdings	 enforced	 rapid	expansion	 of	 the	 mine	 underground,	 it	 failed	 to	 increase	 and	 maintain	 the	 mine's	ventilation	systems	–		vital	to	providing	clean	air	to	miners	(Guguen,	2015).	On	13	May	2014,	a	massive	explosion	at	the	pit	ensued,	approximately	2km	below	the	surface.	After	this	explosion,	 the	 inadequate	ventilation	system	failed	to	pump	the	poisonous	carbon	monoxide	 out	 of	 the	 mine	 creating	 a	 death	 chamber	 for	 the	 miners	 (Guguen,	 2015).	According	 to	 the	 official	 numbers	 and	 expert	 report,	 301	 miners	 lost	 their	 lives	 to	carbon	monoxide	poisoning.	A	further	study	by	the	Turkish	Association	of	Chambers	of	Engineers	and	Architects	stated:	"The	reason	for	the	carnage	(at	Soma)	is	privatisation,	marketisation	and	the	outsourcing	policies	over	the	past	12	years	in	the	mining	sector	and	also	in	the	area	of	health	and	safety”	(Guguen,	2015).	The	 tragedy	at	Soma	 is	 the	worst-ever	mining	disaster	 in	 the	country's	history.	There	 have	 been	 strong	 assertions	 that,	 due	 to	 the	 rödovans	 system,	 the	 company	
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glossed	over	certain	mandatory	work	safety	measures,	to	retrench	the	costs	and	thereby	endangered	hundreds	of	mining	workers'	lives.	The	workers	were	not	educated	enough	on	security	rules,	the	number	of	rescue	chambers	in	the	mine	was	insufficient	and	not	all	the	workers	had	an	oxygen	mask	in	tow.	Another	mining	disaster	came	in	October	when	18	 miners	 were	 trapped	 and	 died	 in	 a	 mine	 in	 the	 Central	 Anatolian	 province	 of	Karaman's	Ermenek	district,	after	water	flooded	into	their	shaft	from	a	nearby	disused	mine.	 The	mining	 disaster	 in	 Soma	 was	 evidently	 the	 result	 of	 privatisation	 and	 the	negligence	of	both	the	government	and	the	mining	company.	We	can	identify	here,	that	as	 long	 as	 the	mining	 corporations’	 pursuit	 of	 profit	 takes	precedence	over	 the	 safety	and	 well-being	 of	 miners,	 safety	 and	 fairness	 of	 working	 conditions,	 ultimately	 –	 the	lives	of	the	workers,	remain	under	the	threat	of	the	capitalist	system.	Following	these	two	mining	disasters	 in	Soma	and	Ermenek,	 the	country	 finally	approved	 ratification	 of	 the	 International	 Labour	Organisation	 (ILO)'s	 Convention	No.	176	 on	 Health	 and	 Safety	 in	 Mining.	 The	 victory	 for	 Turkish	 miners	 in	 approving	ratification	 of	 ILO's	 Convention	 No.	 176,	 came	 after	 years	 of	 campaigning	 led	 by	IndustriALL	with	its	Turkish	mining	affiliates	Maden-Is	(Mineworkers'	Union)	and	Tes-Is	(Energy,	Gas	and	Water	Workers'	Union),	along	with	the	support	from	labour	unions	around	 the	 world	 (Construction,	 Forestry,	 Mining	 and	 European	 Union/Australia,	National	 Union	 of	 Mineworkers/South	 Africa,	 United	 Steelworkers/US,	Rosugleprof/Russia,	 and	 IG	 Bergbau,	 Chemie,	 Energy,	 Germany).	 After	 the	 Soma	disaster,	60	mines	closed	down	due	to	economic	and	safety	reasons,	as	the	government	promptly	increased	the	frequency	and	diligence	of	its	inspections	(Guguen,	2015).	Turkey's	mine	 fatality	 track	 record	 is	 a	 dreary	 one.	 According	 to	 International	Labour	Organisation	figures,	Turkey	ranks	first	in	Europe	and	third	in	the	world	for	fatal	work	accidents.	The	ILO	says	18	out	of	100,000	insured	labourers	die	every	year	in	work	accidents,	seven	times	greater	than	the	EU	average	of	2.5.	More	than	10%	of	workplace	accidents	in	Turkey	happen	in	mines	(Senerdem,	2014).	Turkey's	privatisation	drive	in	the	 1980s,	 has	 been	 the	 predominant	 driver	 of	 the	 worsening	 of	 health	 and	 safety	standards	 for	 the	 miners.	 According	 to	 the	 2013	 numbers	 of	 Turkey's	 Statistical	Institute,	the	highest	rate	of	work-related	health	problems	in	the	last	12	months,	was	in	the	mining	and	quarrying	sector,	 standing	at	5.5%.	Since	2000,	 there	have	been	1,308	fatal	accidents	in	the	mining	industry	and	1,500	deaths	in	Turkish	mines.	The	employees	of	the	Soma	mining	company	stressed	that	the	safety	standards	and	working	conditions	
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deteriorated	 after	 the	 privatisation.	 The	 Global	 Methane	 Initiative,	 an	 international	partnership	aiming	to	reduce	global	methane	emissions	(Senerdem,	2014),	argued	in	its	2013	 report	 that	 "uncertainty	 in	 privatisation	 policies,	 allocation	 of	 insufficient	resources	 and	 absence	 of	 legislation	 in	methane	 control	 in	 coal	mines	 and	 release	 to	atmosphere"	 are	 the	main	 challenges	 for	 the	mining	 industry	 in	 Turkey	 (Sagir,	 et	 al.,	2013).	Moreover,	unions	in	Turkey	face	a	constant	struggle.	Turkish	metalworkers	have	recently	 been	 banned	 from	 striking	 and	 union	 busting	 is	 common	 practice	 (Guguen,	2015).	 In	 its	 2014	 report,	Human	Rights	Watch	 criticised	 the	Turkish	 government	 for	being	 "increasingly	 autocratic."	 A	 report	 by	 the	 rights	 organisation	 said:	 "In	 office	 for	three	 terms	 since	2002,	 and	enjoying	a	 strong	parliamentary	majority,	 the	 ruling	AKP	has	 demonstrated	 a	 growing	 intolerance	 of	 political	 opposition,	 public	 protest,	 and	critical	media"	(Guguen,	2015).	
3.3.2.	 Lignite	(brown	coal)		 Lignite	 is	Turkey's	other	 crucial	domestic	 energy	 resource.	 Lignite	deposits	 are	spread	across	the	country	with	proven	reserves	of	15.6	billion	tonnes.	Nevertheless,	the	thermal	values	of	Turkish	lignite	are	mainly	very	low	(TKI,	2015).	After	 the	 oil	 crisis	 in	 the	 1970s	 and	 as	 a	 result	 of	 investments	 in	 lignite	enterprises,	lignite	production	increased	from	14.5	million	tonnes	in	1980	to	42	million	tonnes	 in	1986,	principally	 to	meet	 the	demand	of	 lignite-fired	power	plants	 installed	during	this	period.	Production	reached	a	peak	of	76.2	million	tonnes	in	2008	and	then	started	to	diminish	(Ersoy,	2016).	In	2014,	62.6	million	tonnes	of	lignite	was	produced,	which	ranked	Turkey	as	the	fifth	largest	lignite	producer	country	in	the	world.	In	2014,	the	amount	of	lignite	production	decreased	to	42	million	tonnes,	as	a	consequence	of	the	closure	of	mines,	due	to	the	tragic	mine	accidents	and	high	operating	costs(Ersoy,	2016).	The	total	 lignite	reserve	of	the	Electricity	Generation	Company	(Elektrik	Üretim	A.Ş.	–	EÜAŞ)	is	7.8	billion	tonnes	and	the	total	lignite	in	Afşin-Elbistan	basin	is	4.8	billion	tonnes.	 The	 biggest	 lignite	 deposits	 (around	 40%)	 are	 located	 at	 the	 Afşin	 –	 Elbistan	basin	of	South-eastern	Anatolia.	In	2011,	a	landslide	occurred	at	the	Çöllolar	Coal	Field	near	 the	 Afşin-Elbistan	 thermal	 power	 plant,	 during	 which	 eleven	mine	 workers	 lost	their	 lives.	The	second	 largest	 lignite	basin	 is	 in	Soma	 in	 the	Aegean	region	of	Turkey.	Other	significant	deposits	are	located	in	the	Tunçbilek,	Denizli-Civril,	Seyitömer,	Bursa,	Can,	Muğla,	 Beypazarı,	 Sivas	 and	Konya-Karapınar	 basins.	 In	 January	2013,	 the	MENR	announced	that	Turkey’s	Mineral	Research	and	Exploration	General	Directorate	(MTA)	
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had	 discovered	 1.8	 billion	 tonnes	 of	 lignite	 reserves	 in	 Konya's	 Karapınar	neighbourhood.	 That	 amount	 of	 reserve	 is	 enough	 to	 fuel	 a	 thermal	 power	 station	generating	5,000	MW	of	electricity	 for	30	 to	40	years,	 in	a	Central	Anatolian	province	(Anatolia	News	Agency,	2013).	During	2013-2015,	a	total	of	ten	thermal	power	plants,	with	 an	 installed	 capacity	 of	 5.7	 GW,	 were	 privatised	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 new	Electricity	Market	Law	(IEA,	2016).	
3.3.3.	 Asphaltite		 Asphaltite	 is	 a	 solid	petroleum	 fuel	with	 a	high	 softening	point,	which	 contains	high	 amounts	 of	 sulphur	 and	 volatile	 substances.	 Its	melting	 point	 is	 between	 200°C-315°C.	 Asphaltic	 materials	 are	 usually	 formed	 by	 the	 migration	 of	 petroleum	 and	solidification	in	cracks	during	tectonic	movements	(Kavak,	et	al.,	2010	S.	59).	As	far	as	is	known,	the	world’s	asphaltite	reserves	are	very	limited.	The	known	reserves	are	located	in	China,	Spain,	Cuba	and	Argentina.	Asphaltite	 is	 the	 natural	 origin	 of	 oil	 and	 oil	 residues.	 It	 is	 composed	 of	hydrocarbons	 and	 polar	 compounds,	 associated	 with	 valuable	 elements	 such	 as	cadmium,	 as	well	 as	 expensive	 retrievable	 elements	 like	molybdenum,	 vanadium,	 and	nickel.	The	calorific	value	of	Asphaltite	varies	between	5,500	and	5,800	kcal/kg,	which	is	higher	than	that	of	brown	coal,	but	lower	than	that	of	hard	coal.	The	 MTA	 has	 explored	 over	 79,969	 million	 tonnes	 of	 asphaltite	 reserves	 in	different	 fields	 of	 Turkey.	 Turkish	 asphaltite	 contains	 high	 amounts	 of	 petroleum	and	therefore	can	be	used	as	solid	fuel,	after	the	extraction	of	oil.	Turkey	does	not	hold	a	vast	amount	 of	 asphaltite	 reserves.	 The	 total	 known	 reserve	 is	 81	million	 tonnes,	 and	 45	million	tonnes	thereof	 is	visible.	The	asphaltite	 in	Sirnak	contains	high	amounts	of	ash	and	sulphur	and	their	calorific	value	is	high	(Kavak,	et	al.,	2010	S.	59).	Since	asphaltite	has	 always	 been	 used	 for	 heating	 purposes	 by	 the	 local	 community	 in	 the	 East-	 and	Southeast	Anatolian	regions,	it	was	not	possible	to	derive	these	trace	elements.	Asphaltite	mining	 is	 crucial	 for	 the	Southeast	 region	of	Turkey	and	particularly	for	 Sirnak.	 The	 asphaltite	 veins	were	 formed	 in	 South-eastern	 Anatolia	 as	 a	 result	 of	compressive	 tectonics,	 where	 fractures	 developed	 longitudinally	 and	were	 filled	 with	liquid/semi-solid	asphaltic	matter	towards	the	surface.	The	twelve	significant	asphaltite	formations	 within	 and	 around	 the	 Sirnak	 region	 are:	 Avgamasya,	 Milli,	 Anılmış-Karatepe,	 Seridahli,	 Nivekara,	 Ispindoruk,	 Segürük,	 Harbul	 (Aksu),	 Silip,	 Üçkardeşler,	Rutkekurat	 and	 Uludere	 Ortabag-Ortasu	 (Kavak,	 et	 al.,	 2010	 S.	 59).	 Utilisation	 of	 the	
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locally	 produced	 asphaltite	 will	 make	 a	 significant	 contribution	 towards	 meeting	Turkey's	 increasing	 electricity	 supply	 requirements	 and	 sustainable	 reduction	 of	 the	current	 budget	 deficit.	 For	 that	 purpose,	 a	 135	MW	 single-unit	 Sirnak-Silopi	 Thermal	Power	 Plant	 was	 built,	 which	 uses	 the	 asphaltite	 of	 Sirnak	 as	 a	 fuel	 source.	 The	remaining	 two	 units,	 with	 135	 MW	 for	 each	 total	 installed	 capacity,	 are	 under	construction.	The	power	plant	will	generate	972	million	kwh	electrical	energy	annually.	Fluidised	bed	boiler	technology	used	at	the	power	plant	is	designed	to	exploit	asphaltite	reserves	 in	 an	 environmentally	 friendly	 and	 efficient	 way.	 The	 facility	 will	 promote	regional	 industrial	 development	 and	 provide	 employment	 opportunities	 for	 the	residents	 of	 Sirnak	 and	 the	 surrounding	 areas.	 Moreover,	 it	 is	 also	 used	 in	 the	production	 of	 dyes,	 polishes,	 auto	 tires,	 electricity	 isolation,	 battery	 protectors,	expanded	 rubber,	 floor	 tiles,	 water-resistant	 cables	 and	 the	 like.	 Additionally,	 the	asphaltite	has	also	recently	become	important	as	a	synthetic	petroleum	source.		Due	to	its	combustible	sulphur	content,	asphaltite	creates	serious	environmental	pollution	problems	if	burned	without	any	physical	cleaning	procedures.	The	asphaltites,	inholding	dominant	carbonate	minerals	(calcite	and	dolomite),	produce	carbon	dioxide	from	the	breakdown	of	carbonate	minerals,	when	burned	(Kavak,	et	al.,	2010	S.	60).	In	order	 to	 prevent	 such	 hazardous	 impacts,	 research	 and	 developments	 in	 the	 fields	 of	coal	washing,	pyrolysis	and	gasification	and	the	production	of	coal	liquids	and	gaseous	fuels,	can	be	options	for	municipal	authorities	to	prioritise.		
3.3.4.	 Fuel	Production	from	Biomass	and	Coal	(TRIJEN)		 In	 order	 to	 prevent	 the	 hazardous	 environmental	 impacts	 of	 coal	 production	technologies,	 municipal	 authorities	 in	 these	 fields	 and	 regions	 need	 to	 validate	 the	feasibility	of	the	production	of	clean	coal	fuels,	such	as	coal	liquids	and	gases.	Injecting,	storing	and	monitoring	power	station	stack	gases	and	carbon	dioxide	in	the	subsurface	(geologic	storage),	as	an	approach	to	mitigate	atmospheric	emissions	of	carbon	dioxide,	should	also	be	considered	(Tosun,	2014	S.	14).	With	the	purpose	of	implementing	clean	coal	technologies,	the	"Fuel	Production	from	Biomass	and	Coal	(TRIJEN)	Project"	went	into	effect	on	June	15th	2009,	under	the	primary	 supervision	 of	 TÜBITAK	 Marmara	 Research	 Centre	 and	 Turkish	 Coal	Enterprises.	 A	 pilot	 scale	 system,	 with	 250	 kg/hours	 fuel	 feeding	 and	 1.1	megawatts	thermal	 capacity,	was	 built	 in	 the	 Soma-Cenkyeri	 operation	 area.	 The	 purpose	 of	 this	project	was	to	develop	the	technology	required	to	produce	a	more	affordable,	efficient	
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and	clean	liquid	fuel	from	the	widespread	and	national	coal	and	biomass	resources.	This	would	aid	in	Turkey's	sustainable	development	and	energy	security	and	was	distributed	to	centralised	poly-generation	plants,	to	demonstrate	the	outcomes	in	a	pilot	scale.		Clean	 coal	 technologies	 are	 critical	 for	 Turkey	 to	 produce	 energy	 efficient	 and	environmentally	 friendly	clean	fuels,	 to	reduce	the	dependency	on	 imported	oil	and	to	provide	fuel	diversity.	Within	this	frame,	the	objectives	of	this	project	were	to	establish	the	 necessary	 know-how	 on	 the	 design,	 construction,	 installation	 and	 operation	 of	 a	pioneering	plant.	In	this	project,	for	the	production	of	liquid	fuel	from	coal	and	biomass	blends,	the	initial	aim	was	to	achieve	the	design,	manufacture,	installation	and	test	activities	on	the	laboratory	 scale	 systems	 and	 subsystems	 and	 thereafter,	 to	 once	 more	 carry	 out	 the	design,	 manufacture,	 installation	 and	 test	 activities	 on	 a	 pilot	 scale	 system	 with	 250	kg/hours	 fuel	 feeding	 capacity	 and	 its	 subsystems	 –	 according	 to	 the	 data	 and	experiences	obtained	from	the	initial	laboratory	studies	performed.	In	 the	 first	 stage	of	project	activities,	numerical	 and	experimental	 research	and	development	studies	at	the	laboratory	scale	level	were	conducted	in	the	following	areas:	
- Coal	and	biomass	gasification	technologies.	
- Gas	clean-up	technologies.	- Gas	conditioning	technologies.	- Carbon	dioxide	capture	technologies.	- Developing	 an	 iron-based	 catalyst	 for	 syngas	 conversion	 to	 liquid	 fuels	 and	related	reactor	technologies.	In	 light	of	 the	data	and	gains	obtained	from	the	 laboratory-scale	studies,	a	pilot	scale	system	was	built.	Within	the	pilot	scale	system,	technology	development	activities	were	performed	on	the	following	topics	and	all	outcomes	were	demonstrated	in	a	pilot-scale	integrated	system:	- Production	of	raw	synthesis	gas	via	gasification.	- Removal	of	contaminants	from	produced	syngas.	- Carbon	 dioxide	 capture	 in	 order	 to	 increase	 the	 efficiency	 of	 liquid	 fuel	production	process.	- Development	of	catalyst	 for	 liquid	 fuel	production	and	production	of	 liquid	 fuel	from	conditioned	and	cleaned	syngas.	- Heat	 generation/recovery	 at	 the	 stage	 of	 liquid	 fuel	 production	 in	 order	 to	increase	the	system	efficiency.	
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During	 this	period,	 fuel	 feeding,	 gasification,	 gas	 clean-up,	 gas	 conditioning	and	separation,	 liquid	 fuel	 production	 and	 heat	 generation	 systems	 were	 integrated	 as	 a	whole.	 On	 August	 28th	 2015,	 a	 first	 experiment	 was	 carried	 out	 to	 obtain	 a	 40%	hydrogen-containing	synthesis	gas.	Experiments	with	regard	to	the	production	of	liquid	fuel	are	still	in	progress.	In	the	future,	implementation	of	a	thermal	plant	with	120-130	megawatts	thermal	capacity	is	planned	(Akgün,	2016).	Turkey's	persisting	energy	target	is	the	full	utilisation	of	coal	and	lignite	reserves	which	would	 diminish	 dependency	 on	 external	 energy	 imports.	 Government	 policy	 in	Turkey	 (for	 example;	 incentives	 to	 invest	 in	 thermal	 power	 plants,	 revocation	 of	environmental	 penalties,	 lack	 of	 a	 particular	 climate	 target)	 encourages	 mines	 	 to	produce	 as	much	 coal	 as	 possible	 at	 the	 lowest	 possible	 price,	 regardless	 of	 the	 risks	regarding	 working	 conditions.	 The	 government	 has	 a	 vast	 number	 of	 thermal	 power	plant	projects	to	turn	the	country	into	a	coal	"paradise"	by	2023.	Nevertheless,	 Turkey's	 ‘high-carbon	 policy'	 has	 been	 increasing	 fossil	 fuel	dependency,	as	well	as	energy	import	dependency.	Climate	change	is	not	the	amount	of	coal,	 but	 the	 emission	 amount	 depending	 on	 the	 energy	 it	 provides.	 When	 the	 unit	amount	 of	 coal	 possessing	 a	 low	 thermal	 value	 is	 burnt,	 it	 provides	 little	 energy	 and	hence	emits	a	 low	emission,	 if	 the	coal	has	a	high	 thermal	value,	more	carbon	dioxide	emission	 occurs.	 Therefore,	 the	 corresponding	 thermal	 and	 emission	 values	 to	 the	aforementioned	 amounts	 of	 coal	will	 be	 used	during	 the	 climate	 change	dimension	of	this	study.	
3.4.	 Energy	Generation	and	Energy	Supply	in	Turkey		 According	 to	 the	 estimations,	Turkey's	 total	primary	energy	demand	will	 reach	218	mtoe	by	2023,	 from	the	current	 level	of	125	mtoe.	The	final	electricity	demand	of	Turkey	is	expected	to	reach	418	twh	in	2023,	from	the	2015	total	of	264	twh.	The	share	of	energy	sources	in	total	electricity	generation	between	1973	and	2015	is	illustrated	in	Figure	 10.	 According	 to	 the	 figure,	 natural	 gas	 was	 included	 in	 the	 total	 electricity	generation	after	the	 liberalisation	activities	of	the	1980s,	which	represents	the	highest	share	 up	 until	 the	 end	 of	 2015.	 Other	 energy	 sources	 with	 a	 high	 share	 of	 the	 total	electricity	 generation	 are	 coal	 and	 hydro.	 The	 share	 of	 renewable	 energy	 sources	increased	 over	 the	 years	 after	 2006,	 nevertheless,	 this	 still	 represents	 just	 a	 small	amount	of	the	total	electricity	generation	(Figure	7).	
		 97	
Figure	7.	The	share	of	energy	resources	in	total	electricity	generation		
	
Data	source:	(MENR,	2015).		As	 a	 result	 of	 economic	 growth,	 the	 average	 annual	 electricity	 consumption	growth	 has	 been	 around	 5.5%	 for	 many	 years.	 In	 2015,	 Turkey's	 electricity	 demand	increased	 by	 2.6%	 compared	 to	 previous	 year.	 Electricity	 consumption	 has	 nearly	doubled	and	reached	to	263.8	twh	in	2015,	from	132.6	twh	in	2002.	Industry	sector	with	46.2%,	had	 the	 largest	 share	 in	 total	 electricity	 consumption,	 followed	by	 commercial	and	 public	 services	 (30.1%),	 residential	 sector	 (22.3%),	 transport	 (0.4%)	 and	 energy	sector	(0.03%)	(IEA,	2016).	Electricity	production,	on	the	other,	hand	has	also	almost	doubled,	reaching	261.7	twh	by	the	end	of	2015,	compared	to	129.4	twh	in	2002.	37.9%	of	this	total	electricity	generation	is	provided	from	natural	gas,	29.1%	from	coal,	25.6%	from	hydropower,	6.5%	from	renewables	(4.4%	from	the	wind,	1.3%	from	geothermal,	0.6%	from	biofuels	and	waste,	0.2%	from	solar	energy)	and	0.9%	from	liquid	fuels.										
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Table	7.	Installed	generating	capacity	by	fuel	between	2007-2014	(in	MW)	
Turkey	 2008	 2009	 2010	 2011	 2012	 2013	 2014	
Total	capacity	 41,818	 44,761	 49,524	 52,911	 57,059	 64,007	 69,520	Combustible	fuels	 27,595	 29,339	 32,279	 33,931	 35,027	 38,612	 41,572	Coal	 10,191	 10,590	 11,950	 12,550	 12,576	 12,606	 14,814	Fuel	oil	 1,819	 1,699	 1,593	 1,300	 1,285	 616	 595	Natural	gas	 10,657	 11,825	 13,303	 13,144	 14,116	 17,170	 18,724	Multi-fuel-fired	 4,868	 5,138	 5,325	 6,811	 6,881	 	8,021	 7,370	Other	combustible	fuels	 60	 87	 108	 126	 169	 199	 249	Hydro	 13,829	 14,553	 15,831	 17,137	 19,609	 22,289	 23,643	Geothermal	 30	 77	 94	 114	 162	 311	 405	Solar	photovoltaic	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 40	Wind	 364	 792	 1,320	 1,729	 2,261	 2,759	 3,630	Other	(fuel	cells)	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 36	 50	
Data	source:	(IEA,	2016).		Since	Turkey	has	no	nuclear	power	plant,	 the	renewable	energies	comprise	 the	third	pillar	 in	power	generation,	which	are	mainly	supplied	by	 the	hydropower	plants	(Table	7).	By	the	end	of	2014,	total	installed	electric	capacity	had	increased	to	69.5	GW	from	 41.8	 GW	 in	 2008.	 Hydropower	 contributed	 33.9%	 of	 this	 installed	 capacity,	followed	by	the	natural	gas	with	26.9%,	coal	with	21.3%	and	renewable	energy	sources	with	39.9%	(Figure	8).	
Figure	8.	The	share	of	energy	sources	in	Turkey’s	electricity	mix	in	2015	
	
Data	source:	Own	illustration	based	on	the	data	from	(IEA,	2016).		
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The	number	of	electric	power	generation	plants	increased	to	1.481	by	the	end	of	2015,	 from	300	 in	2002.	560	plants	 generated	electricity	 from	hydropower,	244	 from	natural	 gas,	 122	 from	wind,	 80	 from	 biomass	 and	 waste,	 36	 from	multi-fuel	 sources	(liquid	and	natural	gas),	34	plants	from	coal,	21	from	geothermal,	11	from	nominal	fuel	oil,	one	from	diesel	and	ultimately	one	plant	from	asphaltite.	Additionally,	there	are	369	unlicensed	 power	 plants	 operating	 in	 the	 market	 since	 2010.	 The	 principles	 and	conditions	 of	 unlicensed	 power	 generation	 have	 been	 regulated	 by	 the	 “By-Law	 on	Unlicensed	 Electricity	 Generation	 in	 the	 Electricity	 Market”	 (Elektrik	 Piyasasinda	
Lisanssiz	Elektrik	Üretimine	Iliskin	Yönetmelik),	which	 came	 into	 force	on	December	3rd	2010.	 The	 main	 purpose	 of	 this	 legislation	 was	 to	 facilitate	 the	 entrance	 of	 smaller	power	 plants	 to	 the	 electricity	 market,	 provide	 electrical	 energy	 for	 consumers	 and	reduce	 the	 loss	 in	 electrical	 energy	 (Gozen,	 2015).	 Accordingly,	 every	 person	 or	 legal	entity	 (like	universities,	 building	 complexes,	 shopping	 centres),	which	 is	 an	 electricity	subscriber,	may	establish	a	power	plant	without	obtaining	 license	 from	 the	EPDK	and	sell	the	surplus	energy	to	the	grid/licensed	distribution	companies.		The	total	installed	capacity	of	renewable	energy	sources	increased	two	and	a	half	times	and	reached	31.2	GW	by	the	end	of	2015,	 from	12.2	GW	in	2002.	The	electricity	generation	from	renewables	reached	82	twh	by	the	end	of	2015,	with	a	142%	increase	from	34	 twh	 in	2002.	 Installed	capacity	of	wind	energy	was	173	 times	higher	 in	2014	than	 in	 2004	 while	 geothermal	 power	 was	 27	 times	 higher	 (IEA,	 2016).	 Biofuel	 and	waste	 use	 increased	 tenfold,	 while	 solar	 power	 was	 first	 introduced	 in	 2013.	 Solar	power	is	still	at	a	low	level,	but	its	shares	have	been	increasing	since	2013	(IEA,	2016).	In	comparison	to	other	IEA	member	countries,	Turkey’s	share	of	fossil	fuels	in	electricity	generation	was	the	9th	highest	in	2015.	The	geothermal	share	ranked	3rd	highest	behind	New	Zealand	and	Italy.	The	share	of	hydropower	became	the	7th	highest	with	a	record	production	in	2015	(IEA,	2016).	
3.5.	 Electricity Networks of Turkey 
3.5.1.	 Electricity	Transmission			The	energy	 forecasts	of	 the	MENR	show	that	 the	electricity	demands	of	Turkey	will	 reach	416	 twh	 in	2023.	To	meet	 these	growing	electricity	demands,	 the	 length	of	transmission	line	extended	to	57,076km	in	2015,	 from	44,544km	in	2002.	In	the	same	year,	 the	 electricity	 distribution	 line	 reached	 over	 1,100,000km,	 from	 812,399km	 in	2002	 (MENR,	 2015).	 The	 transmission	 grid	 consists	 of	 a	 combination	 of	 high-voltage	
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lines	of	400	kV	and	150	kV	and	a	few	lines	of	66	kV	(Table	8).	The	transmission	network	is	a	state-owned	monopoly	since	2011,	under	the	ownership	and	operation	of	the	TEIAS.	
Table	8.	Turkey’s	transmission	network	by	the	end	of	2015	Base	voltage	level	of		transmission	lines	 Number	of	substations	 Length	of	transmission	lines	(in	km)	400	kV	 100	 19,071	220	kV	 1	 84.5	154	kV	 589	 37,449	66	kV	 11	 140	154	and	400	kV	and	underground	(380+154+66	kV)	cables	 0	 331.7	
Total	 701	 57,076	
Data	source:	Own	illustration	based	on	the	data	from	Turkish	Electricity	Transmission	Company	-	TETC	2015.		 The	transmission	tariff	and	transmission	connection	tariff	have	been	regulated	by	EPDK,	in	line	with	the	Electricity	Market	Law	No.	6446	and	the	Tenth	Development	Plan	(2014-18).	 Accordingly,	 the	 transmission	 tariff	 prepared	 by	 TEIAS	 consists	 of	 use	 of	transmission	system	price,	transmission	system	operating	price,	market	operating	price	and	the	principles	and	procedures	relating	to	the	implementation	of	the	tariff.	Based	on	No.	5398-1	of	the	EPDK	Board	decision	and	its	annexes,	there	are	14	regional	tariffs	for	generation,	 14	 regional	 tariffs	 for	 load	 and	 a	 unique	 tariff	 for	 system	 operation.	 The	import	is	considered	as	generation	while	the	export	is	considered	as	load	(EPDK	2015a;	IEA	2016).		
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Figure	9.	The	regional	use	of	transmission	system	tariffs	for	production	and	
consumption	(TL/MW-Year)	
	
Data	source:	Own	illustration	based	on	the	data	from	(EPDK,	2017)		 According	to	Figure	9,	the	use	of	transmission	system	tariffs	for	consumption	is	high	 in	 all	 regions	 except	 13	 and	14,	which	 consist	 of	Aegean	 and	 Southern	Marmara	regions,	where	the	production	activities	are	denser	than	the	consumption.	In	region	12,	the	 tariffs	 for	 consumption	 and	 production	 are	 almost	 the	 same,	 which	 is	 used	 for	import	 and	 export	 activities.	 In	 regions	 1,	 2,	 3	 and	 4	we	 see	 a	 huge	 gap	 between	 the	production	and	consumption	tariffs,	where	the	consumption	tariffs	are	very	high.	These	regions	consist	of	North-eastern,	Eastern	and	South-eastern	geographical	regions	where	the	consumption	activities	are	denser	than	the	production.	The	transmission	system	operating	tariff	has	been	determined	for	the	year	2015	as	 599.8	 Turkish	 Lira/MW.	 The	 system	 operating	 tariff	 is	 determined	 each	 year	 for	production	 and	 consumption	 in	 all	 regions,	 according	 to	 the	 needs	 for	 systems	operation.	The	Turkish	transmission	network	has	cross-border	connections	to	the	electricity	grids	 of	 all	 neighbouring	 countries,	 from	 which	 it	 exports	 and	 imports	 electricity.	Nevertheless,	 the	 capacity	 and	 trade	 volumes	 of	 these	 interconnections	 are	 rather	limited,	with	550	MW	from	Bulgaria	and	Greece	to	Turkey	and	400	MW	from	Turkey	to	Europe	 via	 these	 countries.	 Moreover,	 the	 Turkish	 grid	 system	 is	 still	 not	 set	 up	 for	synchronous	operations	with	all	other	countries	(Map	5).	
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Map	5.	Electricity	Interconnections	of	Turkey	
	
Data	source:	(Erten,	2015)		 Turkey	 has	 synchronous	 connections	 with	 Georgia,	 Armenia,	 Azerbaijan-Nahcivan,	 Iran,	 Iraq	 and	 Syria.	 There	 are	 two	 interconnection	 lines	 to	 Georgia	 at	 220	kilovolts	 and	 one	 to	 Armenia,	 which	 is	 not	 in	 operation.	 The	 interconnection	 lines	between	Turkey-Syria	and	Turkey-Iraq	were	completed	and	Turkey	exported	electricity	to	 Syria	 until	 October	 2012	 and	 to	 Iraq	 until	 June	 2015	 (IEA	 2016).	 Turkey	 has	 two	interconnection	 lines	with	 Iran.	 One	 of	which,	 Khoy-Baskale,	 is	 400	 kilovolts	 and	 has	been	operating	since	the	beginning	of	2015.	At	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 year	 2016	 Turkey	 finalised	 its	 technical	 and	administrative	 preparation	 to	 work	 with	 the	 ENTSO-E	 and	 synchronised	 its	 power	system	 with	 the	 Continental	 Europe	 Power	 System.	 The	 TEIAS	 became	 the	 associate	member,	 as	well	 as	 the	 first	 observer	 of	 the	 ENTSO-E	 since	 its	 creation	 in	 2009.	 The	parallel	 operation	 of	 the	 Turkish	 electricity	 system	 with	 the	 ENTSO-E	 has	 led	 to	 a	decrease	 of	 primary	 frequency	 control	 reserve,	 a	 more	 stable	 frequency,	 greater	harmonisation	of	the	international	grid	codes	in	line	with	EU	practices	and	access	to	the	EU	internal	energy	market	(IEA	2016).	In	 the	 past,	 electricity	 imports	 and	 exports	 were	 traded	 through	intergovernmental	agreements	and	bilateral	contracts	between	state-owned	electricity	utilities.	Since	2003	EPDK	 is	 the	responsible	authority	 for	approving	supplier	 licenses,	including	for	import	and	export	of	electricity,	subject	to	available	capacity	(TEIAS)	and	the	approval	of	the	MENR	(IEA,	2016).		
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Figure	10.	Net	electricity	of	imports	to	and	exports	from	Turkey	
	
Data	source:	Own	illustration	based	on	the	data	from	(TEIAS,	2016).		 In	2015,	Turkey’s	cross-border	electricity	net	imports	ranked	around	4.4	twh	or	2.1%	of	the	total	electricity	supply	of	the	country	(see	Figure	10)	(IEA,	2016).	Over	the	past	decade,	both	imports	and	exports	have	grown,	around	66.7%	of	total	imports	came	from	Bulgaria	in	2014	and	the	remainder	from	Iran	(28,3%),	Georgia	(3.7%),	Azerbaijan	(1.3%)	 and	 Greece	 (0.05%).	 Electricity	 is	 predominantly	 exported	 to	 Greece	 (70.8%)	and	to	Iraq	(29.1%)	(IEA,	2016).	
3.5.2.	 Electricity	Distribution	and	Retail	Sale		The	 Turkish	 distribution	 sector	 has	 experienced	 various	 structural	 changes	throughout	 history.	 Since	 the	 enactment	 of	 the	 Electricity	 Market	 Law	 No.	 4628	 and	through	 to	 2004,	 TEDAS	was	 structured	 as	 seven	 subsidiaries	 and	 foundations	 in	 the	provinces,	 not	 included	 in	 the	 subsidiaries	 (EPDK,	 2017).	 After	 2004,	with	 the	 aim	 of	establishing	 free	 market	 conditions	 and	 a	 competitive	 market	 environment	 in	 the	electricity	distribution	sector,	TEDAS	privatised	publicly	owned	electricity	distribution	companies.	The	Electric	Power	Sector	Reform	and	Privatisation	Strategy	Document	were	declared	and	the	Turkish	distribution	network	was	divided	into	21	regional	monopoly	electricity	distribution	areas	(see	Map	6).	
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Map	6.	Electricity	distribution	regions	of	Turkey	
	
Data	source:	(EPDK,	2017).		 The	“transfer	of	operating	rights”	was	the	preferred	privatisation	method	within	the	 framework	 of	 No.	 4046	 “Implementation	 of	 Privatisation	 Law”.	 According	 to	 this	method,	while	the	property	of	the	distribution	of	assets	remained	with	TEDAS,	all	shares	of	the	distribution	companies	were	sold	as	a	whole,	depending	on	the	operating	rights	(EPDK,	2017).	The	electricity	distribution	sector	of	Turkey	is	fully	liberalised	after	legal	unbundling	in	2013	(IEA,	2016).	With	respect	to	privatisation	in	the	liberalised	market,	one	of	the	major	targets	of	all	distribution	companies	is	to	reduce	losses	and	theft	rate.	Up	until	now,	a	significant	reduction	has	been	achieved	at	the	loss	and	theft	ratio.	While	the	ratio	for	distribution	across	 Turkey	was	 20.9%	 in	 2002,	 it	 was	 reduced	 to	 14.8%.	 In	 2009,	 the	 same	 ratio	increased	to	17.7%,	but	again	achieved	a	reduction	by	the	end	of	2014	to	12%	(EPDK,	2015).	As	 indicated	 in	 the	 Figure	 11,	 the	 highest	 loss	 &	 theft	 ratio	 belongs	 to	 Dicle	(72.5%),	Vangölü	(59.7%)	and	Aras	(26.6%)	provinces	in	the	South-eastern	region.	All	other	distribution	companies	in	the	remaining	regions	remain	under	the	average	loss	&	theft	ratio	of	Turkey.		
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Figure	11.	Loss	&	theft	ratios	of	the	distribution	companies	in	2015	(in%)	
	
Data	source:	Own	illustration	based	on	the	data	from	(EPDK,	2015).		 There	 is	 a	 high	need	 for	 investment	 in	 the	 distribution	networks,	 including	 for	metering	 and	 communication	 infrastructure,	 which	would	 put	 pressure	 on	 tariffs.	 Up	until	 now,	 distribution	 tariffs	 are	 regulated	 by	 the	 EPDK,	 but	 the	MENR	monitors	 the	investment	in	distribution,	which	limits	the	independence	of	the	EPDK.		
4. PERCEPTION AND ASSESSMENT OF THE DIFFERENT ENERGY 
SOURCES 
4.1.	 Global	Views	and	Perceptions	of	Nuclear	Energy	
	 The	 projections	 for	 new	 nuclear	 power	 plant	 constructions	 have	 dwindled	 in	most	of	the	western	European	countries	since	nuclear	accident	in	Fukushima.	However,	some	Eastern	European	and	Far	Eastern	countries	are	planning	to	put	their	construction	plans	 into	 effect.	 Although	 several	 nuclear	 power	 plant	 projects	 have	 been	 proposed,	due	 to	 the	 economic	 and	 regulatory	 constraints,	 Turkey	 has	 so	 far	 failed	 to	 build	 a	nuclear	reactor.	In	the	nuclear	energy	sector,	many	technology	providers	or	reactor	vendors	are	state-owned	 enterprises,	 such	 as	 in	 Russia,	 Korea	 and	 France.	 This	 means,	 a	 clear	political	and	economic	relationship	is	very	likely	to	develop	between	the	country	which	is	providing	technology	and	the	country	planning	for	new	nuclear	energy.	The	primary	strategy	 of	 these	 state-owned	 companies	 is	 to	 offer	 lower	 prices,	 to	 gain	 political	
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leverage	 through	 the	 establishment	 of	 an	 international	 nuclear	 energy	 company	(Heffron,	et	al.,	2014).	The	first	nuclear	reactor	produced	electricity	in	1951	in	the	USA,	followed	by	the	United	 Kingdom	 (1953),	 Russia	 (1954),	 France	 (1956)	 and	 Germany	 (1961).	 The	 oil	crisis	 in	 the	early	1970s	 incited	 the	construction	of	nuclear	power	plants.	The	world’s	economic	 slowdown,	 which	 began	 a	 decade	 later,	 prompted	 the	 decline	 in	 fossil	 fuel	prices	and	 led	to	a	reduction	 in	the	growth	of	nuclear	energy	demand.	The	Three	Mile	Island	 nuclear	 accident	 in	 the	 USA	 on	 March	 28th	 1979,	 and	 Chernobyl	 disaster	 in	Ukraine	on	April	26th	1986,	raised	mistrust	against	the	safety	and	reliability	of	nuclear	power	 plants	 across	 the	 world.	 Apart	 from	 the	 appalling	 social	 and	 environmental	results	of	Chernobyl,	the	disaster	had	long-term	health	effects,	with	over	6,000	thyroid	cancer	cases	and	4,000-25,000	deaths	as	a	result	of	radiation	exposure.	On	 March	 11th	 2011,	 a	 massive	 earthquake	 occurred,	 measuring	 8.9	 on	 the	Richter	scale,	which	generated	a	15-metre	tsunami	that	crashed	the	eastern	coastline	of	Japan.	This	enormous	tsunami	disabled	the	power	supply	and	led	to	the	cooling	of	three	Fukushima	 Daiichi	 reactors,	 causing	 a	 simultaneous	 nuclear	 disaster	 (World	 Nuclear	Association,	2018).	The	multiple	barriers	that	were	engineered	to	keep	radiation	away	from	the	environment	and	people	failed	(Greenpeace	International,	2012).	 In	 less	than	24	 hours,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 lack	 of	 cooling	 at	 the	 first	 Fukushima	 reactor,	 a	 major	hydrogen	explosion	blew	apart	the	last	remaining	barrier	between	massive	amounts	of	radiation	and	the	open	air	(Greenpeace	International,	2012).	Even	now,	more	than	a	few	years	 after	 the	 release	 of	 massive	 amounts	 of	 radiation	 from	 the	 nuclear	 accident,	hundreds	of	thousands	of	people	incur	the	long-term	radioactive	pollution.	The	cost	of	the	disaster	is	estimated	to	be	around	$50-$80	billion.	Chernobyl	and	Fukushima	prove	once	again,	that	there	is	always	the	risk	–	either	through	human	failure,	technical	error	or	 a	 natural	 disaster	 –	 that	 a	 nuclear	 catastrophe	 may	 occur.	 As	 these	 risks	 are	predominantly	unpredictable,	we	may	not	debate	"nuclear	safety"	in	the	21st	Century.	According	 to	 the	World	 Nuclear	 Association's	 2018	 numbers,	most	 of	Western	European	(Belgium,	France,	Germany,	Netherlands,	Switzerland),	Scandinavia	(Sweden)	and	 some	Southern	European	 countries	 (Italy,	 Spain)	have	no	 future	projects	 to	build	new	nuclear	reactors	or	to	enlarge	the	existing	ones	(World	Nuclear	Association,	2018).	After	the	nuclear	disaster	at	 the	Fukushima	Daiichi	plant	 in	 Japan,	Germany	adopted	a	policy	of	phasing	out	nuclear	 energy	by	2022	and	ensuring	 that	80%	of	 the	 country's	electricity	supply	comes	from	clean	energy	by	2050.	Japan	has	concluded	to	review	their	
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available	and	planned	nuclear	power	reactors.	Russia	has	also	decided	 to	review	their	newly	installed	nuclear	power	reactors	and	safety	measures,	though	they	will	continue	to	build	new	reactors	regardless	of	the	potential	threat.	France	has	committed	to	abide	by	 the	decisions	 taken	by	 the	EU	regarding	nuclear	power	 reactors	and	guarantees	 to	increase	 the	 share	 of	 renewable	 energy	 sources	 in	 the	 total	 energy	 consumption	 (see	Figure	12).	South	 Korea	 demonstrates	 to	 improve	 safety	 measures	 and	 further	 nuclear	power	generation	from	the	existing	and	planned	reactors.	Although	many	European	and	some	 of	 the	 Far	 Eastern	 countries	 retreat	 from	 new	 nuclear	 reactor	 constructions,	countries	 like	 the	USA,	United	Kingdom	and	Turkey	 are	 planning	 to	 build	 new	power	plants.	 The	United	Kingdom	already	has	 16	 reactors,	 generating	 18%	of	 its	 electricity	and	plans	 to	 install	an	additional	eight	new	reactors	by	2025.	The	USA,	as	 the	world's	largest	nuclear	energy	producer,	accounting	more	than	20%	of	global	nuclear	electricity	generation,	 plans	 to	 install	 14	 new	 units.	 Turkey	 plans	 to	 construct	 3	 nuclear	 power	plants	 that	 each	 generates	 1,200	 MW	 electricity	 by	 the	 year	 2023.	 (World	 Nuclear	Association,	2018).	
Figure	12.	Share	of	nuclear	energy	in	total	electricity	production	of	countries	in	2016	
 
Data	source:	(World	Nuclear	Association,	2018).		
0.43.63.9
14.115.917.4
18.620.320.4
30.231.533.8
34.336.138.5
39.7 53.456.9
76.318.4
18.7
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90Japan
NetherlandsMexicoGermany
CanadaUnited	KingdomRussia
SpainUnited	StatesCzech	Republic
Republic	of	KoreaFinlandSweden
SwitzerlandBelgiumSlovenia
HungarySlovak	RepublicFrance
OECDNEA
		 108	
According	 to	 Figure	 12	 France,	with	 76.3%,	 has	 the	 biggest	 share	 of	 electricity	generation	 from	 nuclear	 power	 plants	 in	 its	 total	 energy	 generation;	 more	 than	 four	times	higher	than	the	OECD	and	NEA	average.	The	Eastern	European	countries	such	as	Slovak	Republic	 and	Hungary	 have	 quite	 a	 high	 share	 of	 nuclear	 energy	 in	 their	 total	power	 generation.	 Japan	 has	 a	 very	 small	 share	 with	 0.4%	 energy	 generation	 from	nuclear	power	reactors,	followed	by	Netherlands	with	3.6%	and	Mexico	3.9%.	Turkey	is	not	in	the	list,	as	the	proposed	nuclear	power	plants	are	either	under	construction	or	in	a	pending	process,	which	will	be	clarified	in	the	next	subchapter	in	detail.	
4.2.	 The	Future	Prospects	of	Turkey	in	the	field	of	Nuclear	Energy	
	 Turkey's	 proposal	 to	 build	 a	 nuclear	 power	 plant	 dates	 back	 to	 the	 1950s.	Accordingly,	 in	 1956,	 the	 General	 Secretariat	 of	 Atomic	 Energy	 Commission	 was	established	by	law	No.	6821,	as	an	organisation	affiliated	with	the	Prime	Ministry.	A	year	later,	Turkey	became	a	member	of	 the	 International	Atomic	Energy	Agency.	Following	its	 membership,	 ‘TR-1’	 research	 reactor	 with	 a	 300	 MWe	 installed	 capacity	 was	constructed	and	became	operational	in	1962.	In	1967-68,	“Decree	on	Radiation	Health”	and	“Regulation	on	Radiation	Health”	entered	into	force.	In	1970	a	feasibility	study	took	place	 regarding	 a	 300	MWe	 power	 plant.	 In	 1973	 the	 electricity	 authority	 decided	 to	build	 an	 80	MWe	 demonstration	 plant,	 but	 it	 did	 not	 occur.	 Afterwards,	 in	 1976,	 the	Akkuyu	site	on	the	Eastern	Mediterranean	coast	near	the	port	of	Mersin	was	licensed	for	a	nuclear	plant.	There	were	many	attempts	to	build	several	plants,	however,	all	of	them	failed	 due	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 financial	 guarantee	 from	 the	 government	 (World	 Nuclear	Association,	 2018).	 In	 1982	 the	 Turkish	 Atomic	 Energy	 Authority	 entered	 into	 force,	which	 is	 responsible	 for	determining	 the	basis	 of	 national	 policy,	 plans	 and	programs	regarding	 the	 utilisation	 of	 nuclear	 energy	 for	 the	 benefit	 of	 the	 State	 and	 to	 submit	them	 to	 the	 Prime	 Minister	 for	 approval.	 Until	 2007	 many	 attempts	 regarding	construction	of	a	nuclear	power	plant	failed	due	to	economic	circumstances.	In	2007	a	new	 law	concerning	 “Construction	and	Operation	of	Nuclear	Power	Plants	and	Energy	Sale”	was	approved	by	the	parliament	and	the	President.	The	law	provided	TAEK	to	set	the	criteria	for	building	plants	and	for	TETAS	to	buy	all	the	generated	power	under	15-year	contracts.	Under	this	law,	the	public	institutions	were	permitted	to	build	the	plants,	if	other	tenders	were	unsatisfactory.	The	law	also	addressed	a	waste	management	and	decommissioning,	 providing	 for	 a	 National	 Radioactive	 Waste	 Account	 (Ulusal	
Radyoaktif	Atik	Hesabi	–	URAH)	 and	 a	 Decommissioning	 Account	 (Isletmeden	Cikarma	
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Hesabi	 –	 ICH),	 into	 which	 generators	 would	 progressively	 pay	 $0.15	 c/kwh	 (World	Nuclear	Association,	2018).	
Map	7.	The	location	of	planned	Nuclear	Power	Plants	in	Turkey	
	
Data	source:	(World	Nuclear	Association,	2018).		 Since	then,	three	nuclear	power	plants	are	now	planned	for	construction	(Map	7):	Akkuyu,	 Sinop	 and	 Igneada	 which	 are	 located	 in	 the	 Mediterranean,	 Black	 Sea	 and	Marmara	 regions	 of	 Turkey,	 respectively.	 Akkuyu	 will	 eventually	 be	 the	 first	 plant,	which	 introduces	nuclear	 energy	 to	Turkey,	 as	 the	 construction	of	 this	power	plant	 is	expected	 to	begin	 soon.	The	 feasibility	 studies	 for	 Sinop	are	 continuing.	The	plans	 for	Igneada	 were	 confirmed	 in	 2015,	 with	 the	 nuclear	 reactor	 technology	 coming	 from	China	(Table	9).	
Table	9.	Planned	Nuclear	Power	Reactors	of	Turkey	
Name	 MWe	 Construction	date	 Operation	date	Akkuyu	1	 1,200	 2018	 2023	Akkuyu	2	 1,200	 2019	 2023	Akkuyu	3	 1,200	 2020	 2024	Akkuyu	4	 1,200	 2021	 2025	Sinop	1	 1,150	 	 2024/2025?	Sinop	2	 1,150	 	 2025/2026?	Sinop	3	 1,150	 	 	Sinop	4	 1,150	 	 	Igneada	1-4	 2x1,250	2x1,400	 	 	
Data	source:	(World	Nuclear	Association,	2018).		 For	 the	 legislation	 and	 regulation	 of	 a	 nuclear	 program,	 there	 are	 also	overarching	 legislative	 frameworks,	 set	 by	 international	 codes	 of	 conduct	 and	regulations	that	Turkey	has	to	act	upon.	These	international	codes	and	regulations	are	categorised,	 in	 a	 broad	 sense,	 under	 the	 ‘United	 Nations’	 and	 the	 ‘International	
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Atomic	 Energy	 Agency’	 (Ozbek,	 et	 al.,	 2016).	 The	 framework	 for	 nuclear	 transport	security	 in	 seas	 is	 combined	with	 the	 ‘International	Ship	and	Port	Facility	Security	
Code’.	 Moreover,	 the	 Turkish	 authority	 is	 responsible	 for	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	‘International	Maritime	Dangerous	Goods	Code’,	which	includes,	on	top	of	the	‘Safety	of	 Life	 at	 Sea’,	 the	 authorisation	and	 special	 transportation	of	 radioactive	materials	 in	coordination	with	Turkish	Atomic	Energy	Authority.	
4.2.1.	 Akkuyu	Nuclear	Power	Plant	Project		 The	Turkish	Electricity	Trade	&	Contract	Corporation	(TETAS)	called	for	tenders	in	March	2008,	inviting	bids	for	the	first	nuclear	power	plant	at	Akkuyu,	near	the	port	of	Mersin	on	the	eastern	Mediterranean	coast.	In	the	event,	only	one	bid	was	received	from	14	 interested	parties,	 this	being	 from	Atomstroyexport,	 in	conjunction	with	 Inter	RAO	(both	 from	Russia)	and	Park	Teknik	 (Turkey),	 for	an	AES-2006	power	plant	with	 four	1200	MWe	reactors	(World	Nuclear	Association,	2018).	On	May	12th	2010	Russian	and	Turkish	heads	of	state	and	signed	an	intergovernmental	agreement	for	Rosatom,	called	"Agreement	on	Cooperation	in	Relation	to	the	Construction	and	Operation	of	a	Nuclear	Power	Plant	at	the	Akkuyu	Site	in	the	Republic	of	Turkey".	The	Akkuyu	power	plant	will	be	 the	 first	 project	 internationally	 designed	 in	 the	 ‘Build-Operate-Own’	 model	 of	financing.	According	to	this	agreement,	the	Russian	energy	company	Rosatom	will	build	and	operate	a	four-reactor	nuclear	power	plant,	targeting	a	fully	operational	plant	by	the	100-year	 anniversary	 of	 the	Republic	 of	 Turkey	 in	 2023.	According	 to	 the	 agreement,	Rosatom	will	build,	own	and	operate	the	Akkuyu	Nuclear	Power	Plant,	which	will	have	four	 1,200	 MWe	 AES-2006	 units	 and	 constitute	 for	 a	 US$20	 billion	 project	 (World	Nuclear	Association,	2018).	TETAS	guarantees	to	purchase	50%	of	the	total	production	for	fifteen	years,	at	an	average	price	of	$12.3	cents/kwh	for	(Bal,	2015).	After	15	years,	when	 the	 plant	 is	 expected	 to	 be	 paid	 off,	 the	 project	 company	 will	 pay	 20%	 of	 the	profits	to	the	Turkish	government	(World	Nuclear	Association,	2018).	The	first	of	 four	reactors	are	expected	 to	begin	 to	operate	 in	2023.	Each	year	one	additional	 reactor	 is	planned	to	be	added	to	operation,	until	approximately	2025,	with	a	total	site	capacity	of	4,800	 MWe.	 The	 power	 plant	 has	 been	 estimated	 to	 meet	 16%	 of	 Turkey’s	 energy	demands.	Consequently,	the	Russian	energy	giants	Gazprom	and	Rosatom	will	dominate	around	74%	of	Turkey’s	energy	market.	There	 is	 a	 high	 possibility,	 that	 there	will	 be	 delays	 on	 the	 construction	 of	 the	Akkuyu	nuclear	facility,	due	to	some	licensing	obstacles.	In	2013	Rosatom	applied	to	the	
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Ministry	 of	 Environment	 and	 Urban	 Planning	 of	 the	 Republic	 of	 Turkey	 to	 start	 the	
Environmental	 Impact	 Assessment	 (ÇED)	 report.	 The	 report	 is	 a	 pre-requisite	 for	 the	evaluation	of	the	viability	of	the	project,	which	comprises	the	issues	like	determination	of	 the	 environmental	 conditions	 and	 potential	 ecological	 consequences	 of	 the	 nuclear	power	plant	in	the	region	(Bal,	2015).	The	ÇED	Report	of	Rosatom	was	rejected	by	the	Ministry	 of	 Environment	 and	 Urban	 Planning	 due	 to	 the	 uncertainty	 and	 lack	 of	information	 regarding	 the	 storage	 of	 nuclear	 waste.	 After	 a	 very	 short	 time	 of	 the	rejection,	the	report	was	approved	by	the	Ministry	of	Environment	an	Urban	Planning,	although	the	report	neither	provided	a	credible	assessment	nor	drew	a	critical	attention	to	 the	 potential	 risks	 of	 the	 power	 plant.	 Moreover,	 the	 government	 downplayed	 the	seismic	 risks	 of	 the	 project,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 Akkuyu	 is	 located	 in	 a	 seismically	unstable	 area.	 Some	of	Turkey's	highly	 regarded	earthquake	experts	 are	demanding	a	halt	to	the	construction	of	this	nuclear	plant	until	geodetic	research	is	completed	in	the	area.	 If	 an	earthquake	occurs,	 it	may	cause	a	 catastrophic	nuclear	accident	 in	Akkuyu,	which	could	have	destructive	consequences	not	only	for	Turkey,	but	for	the	165	million	people	in	the	Eastern	Mediterranean.	There	 are	 strong	 protests	 from	 environmental	 organisations	 against	 the	construction	 of	 this	 nuclear	 plant,	 claiming	 irremediable	 environmental	 and	 health	concerns.	 One	 of	 the	 most	 active	 opponents	 of	 the	 Akkuyu	 nuclear	 power	 plant,	 the	President	 of	 ‘Mersin’s	 Environment	 and	 Nature	 Association’	 (Mersin	 Cevre	 ve	 Doga	
Dernegi)	Sabahat	Aslan	and	the	President	of	the	Chamber	of	Medical	Doctors	of	Mersin	
(Mersin	Tabipler	Odasi)	Dr.	Ful	Ugurhan,	pointed	out	that	the	major	risk	of	construction	of	 the	plant,	 is	 the	 close	 range	of	 the	Ecemis	fault	line.	 In	addition	 to	Ecemis,	there	are	four	 other	 fault	 lines	which	 have	 historically	 influenced	 the	 seismic	 conditions	 of	 the	region:	 I)	Kibris	 subduction	zone,	 II)	Ölü	Deniz	 fault,	 III)	South	Aegean	subduction	zone,	
and	 IV)	 Eastern	 Anatolian.	 Sabahat	 Aslan	 underlines	 the	 predominant	 gaps	 in	 the	controversial	ÇED	Report	regarding	the	potential	 implications	of	a	possible	earthquake	in	 the	area.	Moreover,	 according	 to	Aslan,	 the	maintenance	of	heat	 removal	under	 the	new	model	of	Russian	power	units	holds	significant	environmental	risks.	The	units	will	consume	approximately	20	billion	litres	of	seawater	per	day	for	the	cooling	system	and	2.5	tonnes	of	chlorine	will	be	processed	on	a	daily	basis,	which	all	in	all	will	contribute	to	a	drastic	climate	change	in	the	region	,	leaving	lasting	negative	impacts	on	agriculture	and	the	ecosystem	(Bal,	2015).	
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Prof.	 Dr.	 Ali	 Cemal	 Gücü	 of	 the	 Marine	 Sciences	 Institute	 in	 the	 Middle	 East	Technical	 University,	 Ankara,	 highlighted	 that	 the	 ÇED	 report	 of	 Akkuyu	 calls	 out	 the	potential	 threats.	 If	 the	 power	 plant	 is	 built,	 it	 will	 cause	 degradation	 of	 the	 marine	ecosystem	 as	 well	 as	 the	 extinction	 of	 fish	 and	 other	 marine	 species	 (Ercan,	 2014).	Moreover,	 the	water	 intake	 and	 sea	 traffic	 of	 the	 plant	will	 pose	 a	 real	 danger	 to	 the	Mediterranean	 Monk	 Seals,	 which	 is	 one	 of	 the	 ten	 most	 endangered	 species	 in	 the	world,	 with	 an	 estimated	 population	 of	 only	 50-100	 on	 the	 entire	 Turkish	 coastline	including	the	Black	Sea,	Aegean	and	the	Mediterranean.		From	the	Russian	point	of	view,	having	the	opportunity	to	construct	and	operate	the	 first	 nuclear	 project	 outside	 its	 borders	 will	 boost	 its	 competitiveness	 in	 the	international	 nuclear	 energy	 arena.	 Turkey,	 by	 employing	 Russia	 to	 build,	 own	 and	operate	 the	 project,	 has	 put	 politics	 over	 legislative	 development	 and	 the	 safety	 and	protection	of	its	citizens	(Heffron,	et	al.,	2014).	Akkuyu	nuclear	project	neither	supports	technology	transfer	nor	reduces	Turkey's	reliance	on	Russian	energy	imports	(Heffron,	et	al.,	2014).	The	Turkish	Government	has	no	shareholder	within	the	Akkuyu	project	company	and	 interacts	only	as	 regulator.	The	project	 company	 is	Russian-owned	and	subject	 to	the	Turkish	Law,	which	 is	open	to	private	partners,	but	 the	public	ownership	 is	out	of	scope.	 Unlike	 the	 Sinop	 power	 plant	 project,	 which	 will	 be	 explained	 in	 the	 next	subchapter,	 the	 technology	 transfer	 issue	 is	 not	 mentioned	 in	 the	 Akkuyu	 project.	Regarding	the	fuel,	waste	management	and	decommissioning,	 it	 is	stated	in	the	Article	12.2-4	of	the	‘Intergovernmental	Agreement’:	“Subject	 to	 separate	 agreement	 that	 may	 be	 agreed	 by	 the	 Parties,	 spent	
nuclear	fuel	of	Russian	origin	may	be	reprocessed	in	Russian	Federation…	The	
Project	 Company	 is	 responsible	 for	 decommissioning	 and	 the	 waste	
management	 of	 the	 nuclear	 power	 plant.	Within	 this	 framework,	 the	 Project	
Company	will	make	the	necessary	payments	to	relevant	funds	stipulated	by	the	
applicable	Turkish	laws	and	regulations”	(Resmi	Gazete,	2010).	Additionally,	the	Akkuyu	Company	is	to	contribute	$0.15	cents/kwh	to	a	special	fund,	to	be	established	for	the	management	of	nuclear	waste.	Based	on	the	Article	12.4,	it	 seems	 like	 Turkey	 will	 not	 be	 faced	 with	 a	 spent	 fuel	 and	 radioactive	 waste	management	problem	in	the	case	of	Akkuyu	plant	(Atiyas,	2015).	Nevertheless,	there	are	some	undisclosed	issues	such	as	where	the	reprocessing	of	spent	fuel	will	take	place	and	what	will	happen	 if	 the	spent	 fuel	 is	reprocessed	 in	Russia.	While	 the	government	has	
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yet	to	fully	articulate	a	spent	fuel	policy,	 it	still	remains	unclear	 if	Turkey	included	the	potential	 costs	 of	waste	management	 into	 its	 nuclear	 power	 related	 financing	models	(Bilezikci	Pekar,	2014).	
4.2.2.	 Sinop	Nuclear	Power	Plant	Project	
	 In	2006,	the	province	of	Sinop,	a	port	city	on	the	Black	Sea	coast,	was	chosen	to	host	 a	 commercial	 nuclear	 power	 plant.	 In	 November	 2007,	 a	 new	 Law	 No.	 5710	 on	"Construction	and	Operation	of	Nuclear	Power	Plants	and	Energy	Sale"	was	approved	by	the	 Turkish	 authorities.	 This	 law	 gave	 a	 declaration	 for	 the	 Turkish	 Atomic	 Energy	Authority	to	set	the	criteria	for	building	and	operating	the	nuclear	power	plants.	Since	February	2008,	preparatory	work	has	been	under	way	at	Sinop	on	the	Black	Sea	coast,	to	 build	 a	 second	 nuclear	 plant,	 along	 with	 a	 €1.7	 billion	 nuclear	 technology	 centre	(World	Nuclear	Association,	2018).	 In	May	2013,	 the	Turkish	government	acceded	the	proposal	 from	a	consortium	led	by	Mitsubishi	Heavy	Industries	(MHI)	and	Areva,	with	involvement	from	Itochu	and	Engie,	which	proposed	four	Atmea1	reactors	with	a	total	capacity	of	about	4,600	MWe.	The	 power	 plant	was	 planned	 to	 be	 constructed	 by	 a	 consortium	of	Mitsubishi	Heavy	 Industries	 and	 the	 Itochu	 Corporation	 from	 Japan,	 together	 with	 Engie	 from	Germany.	EÜAS	intended	to	take	a	35%	stake	in	the	project	company,	with	the	balance	shared	among	Mitsubishi,	Itochu	and	Engie	(World	Nuclear	Association,	2018).	In	2018	Itochu	Corporation	withdrew	from	the	project.	EÜAS	now	 intends	 to	 take	49%	equity.	Engie	will	be	the	operator	based	on	the	build-own-operate	agreement.		The	Sinop	nuclear	power	project	includes	the	construction	and	operation	of	four	Atmea-1	 reactors	with	 a	 total	 capacity	 of	 4,800	MW	electricity.	 The	 estimated	 cost	 of	planned	 5,000-5,600	MWe	 capacity	 Sinop	 nuclear	 plant	will	 be	 between	 $22	 and	 $25	billion	 (World	 Nuclear	 Association,	 2018).	 The	 areas	 of	 cooperation	 between	 Turkey	and	 the	 consortium	 partners	 include	 conducting	 a	 feasibility	 study,	 economic	 impact	assessment	of	the	project,	design,	construction,	operation,	repair	and	decommissioning	of	the	nuclear	power	plant	as	well	as	ensuring	nuclear	safety	and	supply	of	the	nuclear	fuel.	 The	 feasibility	 study	 for	 the	 construction	 of	 the	 first	 Atmea1	 Unit	 was	 due	 for	completion	in	mid-2017,	the	announced	timeline	for	the	construction	to	start	was	2017	and	it	was	planned	to	be	fully	operational	by	2023	(World	Nuclear	Association,	2018).	Nevertheless,	 due	 to	 the	 prolonged	 technical,	 commercial	 and	 feasibility	 studies	 of	
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Mitsubishi	 heavy	 Industry	 in	 the	 area,	 there	 is,	 as	 yet,	 no	 certain	 date	 regarding	 the	beginning	of	the	plant	construction.	Turkey	 has	 a	 considerable	 amount	 of	 ownership	 stake	 in	 the	 company	responsible	 for	 the	 Sinop	 nuclear	 power	 plant.	 Moreover,	 the	 issue	 of	 ‘technology	transfer’	 is	 covered	 in	 the	project	plan	of	 Sinop	power	plant,	which	 includes	a	human	resource	development	plan	in	the	host	country.	Additionally,	 there	are	also	some	risks	associated	 with	 the	 operation	 of	 plant,	 which	 must	 be	 considered.	 The	 major	 risk	 of	Sinop	nuclear	plant	is	that	the	generated	electricity	from	the	plant	will	eventually	be	too	expensive	compared	to	alternative	sources.	Nevertheless,	this	risk	is	almost	eliminated	through	 the	 ‘power	 purchase	 agreement’,	 which	 TETAS	 will	 sign	 with	 the	 project	company,	 committing	 to	 purchase	 100%	of	 the	 project’s	 output,	which	 eliminates	 the	market	risk.	The	purchase	guarantee	significantly	reduces	the	market	risk	for	the	Sinop	project.	Through	the	power	purchase	agreement,	the	EÜAS	consortium	(which	includes	EÜAS	and	other	public	and	private	entities)	will	even	hold	a	49%	share.	Another	important	risk	is	Turkey’s	deficient	policy	regarding	the	management	of	spent	fuel	and	radioactive	waste.	According	to	the	Sinop	Agreement	the	final	disposal	of	the	spent	fuel	and	radioactive	waste	is	the	responsibility	of	Turkey.	As	indicated	in	the	Annex	 No.	 6	 “Final	 disposal	 of	 spent	 fuel	 and	 radioactive	 waste”	 of	 the	 Agreement	between	 Japan	 and	 Turkey	 on	 Co-operation	 for	 the	 development	 of	 nuclear	 power	plants	and	the	nuclear	power	industry	in	the	Republic	of	Turkey:	
“The	 Government	 of	 the	 Republic	 of	 Turkey	 is	 to	 be	 responsible	 for	 the	 final	
disposal	 of	 spent	 fuel	 and	 radioactive	 waste	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 laws	 and	
regulations	 of	 the	 Republic	 of	 Turkey.	 The	 Project	 Company	 is	 to	 pay	 a	
contribution	of	0.15	US	cents/kwh	for	waste	management…”	(MFA	Japan,	2013).	The	International	Atomic	Energy	Agency	defines	the	“spent	fuel”	as	“nuclear	fuel	
removed	from	a	reactor	following	radiation,	which	is	no	longer	usable	in	its	present	form	
because	 of	 depletion	 of	 fissile	 material,	 poison	 build-up	 or	 radiation	 damage”	 (IAEA,	2007).	The	project	company	 is	only	responsible	 for	 the	management	of	 spent	 fuel	and	radioactive	 waste	 until	 they	 are	 transferred	 to	 the	 final	 disposal	 facilities,	 whereby	responsibility	 is	 transferred	 to	Turkish	authorities.	 It	 is	 also	 still	 unclear	how	 the	 fuel	cycle	 set-up	will	 be	 realised	 and	whether	 the	 spent	 fuel	 from	 the	 Sinop	 plant	will	 be	reprocessed.	 Although	 Japan	 has	 a	 full	 fuel	 cycle	 set-up,	 including	 enrichment	 and	reprocessing	of	used	fuel,	most	reprocessing	of	Japan	takes	place	in	the	United	Kingdom	or	France	(Bilezikci	Pekar,	2014).	Whether	Japan	will	provide	a	spent	nuclear	fuel	take	
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back	 provision	 for	 Turkey	 remains	 ambiguous.	 Furthermore,	 Turkey	 is	 also	 yet	 to	determine	any	policy	regarding	spent	fuel	storage.	It	is	still	unclear	if	the	costs	related	to	the	 storage	 of	 spent	 fuel	 and	 the	 eventual	 construction	 of	 an	 underground	 repository	were	 included	 in	 the	Sinop	projections	 (Bilezikci	Pekar,	2014).	Until	2018	no	site	was	specified	 for	where	 the	 power	 plant	would	 be	 built.	 In	 2018	 the	 Turkish	Ministry	 for	Energy	 and	 Natural	 Resources	 confirmed	 the	 Thrace	 region	 had	 become	 the	 definite	choice	to	host	Turkey’s	third	nuclear	power	plant.	
4.2.3.	 Igneada	Nuclear	Power	Plant	Project		 TAEK	has	 identified	 Igneada,	 in	 the	Kirklareli	province	on	 the	Black	Sea,	 as	 the	site	 to	build	a	power	plant	 as	part	of	100	GWe	required	by	2030.	 In	November	2014,	EÜAS	 signed	 an	 agreement	 with	 the	 State	 Nuclear	 Power	 Technology	 Corporation	 of	China	and	Westinghouse,	 to	begin	negotiations	 to	 construct	a	 four-unit	nuclear	power	plant	in	Turkey	(World	Nuclear	Association,	2018).	Similar	 to	 the	 other	 proposed	 nuclear	 plant	 projects,	 there	 are	 also	 certain	concerns	 from	 the	 locals,	 environmentalists	 and	 NGO’s	 regarding	 the	 construction	 of	Igneada	 power	 plant.	 Igneada	 is	 famous	 for	 its	 floodplain	 forests.	 The	 construction	works	will	seriously	threaten	the	pristine	habitat	and	natural	life	in	the	region.	Igneada	has	the	third	greatest	floodplain	forests	in	the	world.	Moreover,	some	258	bird	varieties	of	the	total	453	that	are	found	in	Turkey	are	in	Igneada,	with	670	different	plant	types	and	668	species	of	animals	living	in	the	area	(Celikkan,	2015).		Beyond	the	incomparable	environmental	threats	of	a	possible	plant	construction	in	the	area,	the	metropolis	of	Istanbul	and	the	residents	in	Bulgaria	would	also	hang	by	a	thread.	While	 Istanbul	 is	 located	100km	from	Igneada,	 the	Bulgarian	border	 is	 just	12	km	away.	Yasar	Mersin,	 from	 the	 “Igneada	Nature	Representatives	Group”,	 along	with	the	 locals	 living	 in	 the	 villages	 around	 Igneada,	 propound	 that	 Bulgaria,	 as	 the	neighbouring	country,	must	also	approve	the	construction	of	a	power	plant	so	close	to	its	borders	(Celikkan,	2015).	The	status	of	the	Igneada	power	plant	construction	is	still	pending	and	currently	there	is	neither	a	certain	construction	nor	an	operation	date	proposed.	
4.2.4.	 Turkey’s	Uranium	Reserves	and	Fuel	Cycle		Turkey	has	 limited	uranium	reserves.	The	main	nuclear	deposits	of	Turkey	are	generated	 from	Uranium	und	Thorium.	The	MTA	discovered	a	Temrezli	deposit	 in	 the	
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central	 Anatolian	 region,	 220km	 east	 of	 Ankara,	 in	 the	 early	 1980s.	 Measurement	 of	resources	at	Temrezli	 indicated	a	 total	of	2,351	tonnes	of	Uranium	in	 the	end	of	2013	(World	Nuclear	Association,	2018).	Contrary	to	its	scarce	uranium	deposits,	Turkey	has	a	 vast	 amount	 of	 thorium	 reserves,	 which	 can	 be	 used	 in	 nuclear	 power	 plants	 to	generate	electricity.	According	 to	OECD	and	 International	Atomic	Energy	Agency	data,	Turkey,	holding	a	minimum	of	744,000	tonnes,	which	is	around	11%	of	the	total	global	thorium	reserves,	 has	 the	 second	 largest	 thorium	reserves	worldwide	after	 India.	The	majority	 of	 the	 reserves	 are	 discovered	 in	 Eskisehir-Sivrihisar,	 Isparta-Aksu,	 and	Malatya-Hekimhan	 provinces,	 located	 in	 the	 Northern	 Mediterranean,	 Central-	 and	Eastern	Anatolian	provinces	 (Sultansoy,	et	al.,	2015).	According	 to	 the	Turkish	Energy	Foundation’s	 2015	 report,	 if	 thorium	 technology	 could	 be	 commercialised,	 Turkey	would	 produce	 a	 substantial	 amount	 of	 added	 value	 and	 transform	 that	 into	 exports,	replacing	 fossil	 fuels.	 Compared	 to	 the	 conventional	 nuclear	 facilities,	 thorium	 plants	would	have	considerably	lower	carbon	emissions,	less	radioactive	waste,	and	ultimately	less	 environmental	 damages	 and	 risks	 arising	 from	carbon	emission	 (Sultansoy,	 et	 al.,	2015).	 Nevertheless,	 Turkey’s	 ability	 to	 benefit	 from	 this	 opportunity	 by	 developing	thorium	technology,	is	still	weak	due	to	the	following	identified	challenges	(Sultansoy,	et	al.,	2015):		i. Inaccurate	public	perception	arising	from	the	tabloidisation	of	the	issue.	ii. Heavy	bureaucratic	and	administrative	mechanisms.	iii. The	lack	of	an	effective	national	research	&	development	policy.	
4.2.5.	 Public	Awareness	and	Social	Acceptance		 (Ertör	Akyazi,	et	al.,	2012)	performed	a	face-to-face	survey	in	2012	among	2,422	residents	 from	 urban	 Turkey,	 regarding	 the	 citizens’	 preferences	 on	 nuclear	 and	renewable	energy	sources.	 It	was	the	first	study	in	Turkey	on	energy	preferences.	The	survey	 took	 place	 before	 the	 Fukushima	 nuclear	 accident,	 and	 therefore,	 the	respondents’	answers	are	free	from	the	influence	of	the	events	 in	Fukushima.	Even	so,	one	 of	 the	main	 indications	was	 that	 the	 opposition	 to	 nuclear	 energy	was	 relatively	strong	 –	 only	 a	 small	 number	 of	 respondents	 listed	 nuclear	 energy	 in	 their	 top	 two	choices.	 Supporters	 of	 nuclear	 energy	 were	 mostly	 males	 who,	 despite	 being	knowledgeable	 about	 climate	 change	 and	 engaged	 in	 environmental	 issues,	 were	unconcerned	 about	 the	 issue.	 Nuclear	 opponents	 were	 found	 to	 be	 more	 concerned	
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about	the	environment	and	pessimistic	about	their	future,	many	displaying	a	generally	lower	dependency	on	technology.		Another	face-to-face	survey,	performed	by	the	Kadir	Has	University	in	2016,	with	1,204	 participants	 originating	 from	 different	 regions	 of	 Turkey,	 showed	 that	 the	supporters	of	the	construction	a	nuclear	power	plant	had	actually	increased,	despite	the	Fukushima	 nuclear	 accident.	 The	 numbers	 showed	 that	 32.5%	 of	 respondents	 would	definitely	oppose,	17.1%	would	not	support,	14.2%	remained	neutral,	20.7%	supported	and	 5.9%	definitely	 supported	 the	 construction	 of	 a	 nuclear	 power	 plant,	 in	 the	 local	area	 where	 they	 lived	 (Ediger,	 et	 al.,	 2016).	 The	 survey	 also	 showed	 the	 political	opinions	 of	 the	 respondents,	 compared	 to	 their	 responses	 regarding	 the	 power	 plant	construction	(Figure	13).	
Figure	13.	Characterisation	of	the	political	party	supporters	with	regard	to	the	construction	of	nuclear	power	plant	in	Turkey	
		 		
Data	source:	(Ediger,	et	al.,	2016).		 Based	on	the	above	results,	the	proponents	of	the	AKP	and	MHP	political	parties	are	also	the	supporters	of	nuclear	power	plants.	This	comes	as	no	surprise,	as	the	AKP	is	the	 leading	government	party	 in	Turkey,	 in	alliance	with	MHP.	The	opposition	parties,	CHP	and	HDP,	remain	strongly	opposed	to	nuclear	power	plant	projects.		Further	 survey	 results	 show	 some	 interesting	 discrepancies	 within	 the	responses.	 For	 example,	 23.4%	 of	 people	 support	 the	 construction	 of	 further	 nuclear	power	 plants	 in	 Turkey,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 Akkuyu	 and	 Sinop	 power	 plant	 projects.	28.4%	of	respondents	believe	that	nuclear	energy	will	decrease	the	energy	dependency	in	 Turkey,	 as	 well	 as	 energy	 prices	 within	 the	 country.	 The	 results	 showed	 that	 the	
I would oppose definitely or I would oppose I would either support or oppose
I would support definitely or I would support No idea
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respondents	 who	were	 in	 support	 of	 nuclear	 power	 plants,	 were	 not	 ignorant	 of	 the	serious	dangers	which	the	nuclear	power	plants	pose	for	health,	habitat	and	for	society.	These	 survey	 participants	 simply	 prioritised	 the	 government	 discourse	 regarding	nuclear	energy	security	(Ediger,	et	al.,	2016).		The	 survey	 results,	 from	 a	 holistic	 point	 of	 view,	 show	 us	 that	 the	 people	primarily	 concerned	 by	 Turkey’s	 increasing	 energy	 dependency	 and	 energy	 prices.	Although	 they	 are	 partially	 aware	 of	 the	 environmental,	 health	 and	 security	 risks	 of	nuclear	power	plants,	almost	30%	of	people	still	supported	the	further	construction	of	power	plants	in	their	home	regions.	Nevertheless,	23.1%	of	people	are	still	opposed	to	the	 construction	 of	 further	 power	 plants	 and	 many	 of	 them	 are	 active	 in	 local	 and	national	protests.		
4.3.	 Results	and	Outcomes		 One	 of	 the	 important	 energy	 targets	 of	 the	 Turkish	 government,	 is	 to	 reduce	energy	imports	as	well	as	energy	dependency.	Turkey	has	been	relying	on	Russian	gas	imports,	 like	many	 other	 European	 countries.	 Nevertheless,	 signing	 an	 agreement	 for	the	 construction	 and	 operation	 of	 a	 nuclear	 energy	 plant	 with	 a	 Russian	 company,	stands	 in	 full	 contradiction	 of	 Turkey's	 target	 to	 reduce	 its	 energy	 dependency.	 If	 the	Akkuyu	 project	 goes	 into	 effect,	 Turkey’s	 energy	 reliance	 on	 Russia	 will	 increase	between	 58%	 and	 70%.	 In	 this	 context,	 Turkey	 is	 in	 the	 position	 to	 change	 the	 fuel	source,	but	not	the	supplier.	Even	if	the	Akkuyu	nuclear	power	plant	begins	operation,	because	of	 the	 type	of	 the	 reactor,	 the	 fuel	must	be	produced	 in	Russia	 and	delivered	from	 Russia.	 Ultimately,	 Turkey’s	 dependency	 on	 Russia	 will	 continue	 to	 increase.	Secondly,	construction	of	a	nuclear	power	plant	is	not	solely	enough	for	the	substantial	reduction	of	the	dependency	on	natural	gas.	So	long	as	the	electricity	demands	increase	and	energy	efficiency	measures	remain	unimplemented,	 the	closure	of	existing	natural	gas	pipelines	is	unthinkable.		Turkey’s	ambitions	for	nuclear	energy	to	account	for	5%	of	the	Turkish	electricity	production	by	2023,	have	made	the	country	one	of	the	most	potentially	profitable	and	active	markets	in	the	world.	The	country’s	targets,	as	an	emerging	nuclear	power	state,	also	 influence	 Ankara’s	 position	 to	 transfer	 and	 adopt	 sensitive	 nuclear	 technologies,	including	uranium	enrichment.	The	uranium	enrichment	and	spent	fuel	technologies	are	necessary	 for	 the	 reprocessing	 technologies	 and	 also	 for	 the	 production	 of	 fissile	material	 for	 nuclear	 weapons.	 According	 to	 Sinan	 Ülgen,	 a	 well-known	 scholar	 on	
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Turkey	and	its	relations	with	the	EU,	the	distinction	between	nuclear	energy	ambitions	and	 nuclear	 weapons	 capability	 must	 be	 revealed.	 He	 stated,	 “in	 justifying	 Turkey’s	
policies,	nuclear	policy	 is	 influenced	 strongly	by	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	a	non-nuclear-weapon	
state	 seeking	 to	 develop	 an	 indigenous	 nuclear	 energy	 program”	 (Ulgen,	 2012).	Nonetheless,	as	mentioned,	Turkish	authorities	have	not	announced	any	plans	to	carry	out	uranium	enrichment	or	reprocessing.	They	have,	however,	 left	open	the	possibility	to	make	this	addition	at	a	later	time.	The	 statements	 of	 the	 Turkish	 authorities	 stipulate	 that	 their	 decision-making	process	 regarding	 operating	 a	 nuclear	 power	 plant	 in	 Turkey,	 is	 virtually	 without	interrogation.	 Taner	 Yildiz,	 the	 former	 Minister	 of	 Energy	 and	 Natural	 Resources,	asserted	that	building	nuclear	power	plants	in	Turkey	do	not	cause	risk.	He	supported	this	by	 citing	 that	 "celibacy	is	riskier	than	nuclear",	 referencing	 the	 finding	 that	 the	 life	expectancy	 of	 bachelors	 is	 six	 years	 shorter	 than	 married	 people	 in	 the	 USA	 (Günel,	2011).	In	a	press	conference,	Turkish	President	Recep	Tayyip	Erdoğan	declared	that	the	people	of	Turkey	are	totally	misinformed	about	nuclear	energy.	He	explained:		
“There	is	no	investment	without	risk.	If	so,	then	we	should	not	use	bottled	gas	at	
home,	or	install	a	natural	gas	line	for	the	residencies,	or	no	crude	people	should	
cross	over	the	country”	(Own	translation	from	the	15.03.2011	dated	press	conference	of	the	former	Prime	Minister	Recep	Tayyip	Erdogan).	There	 are	 two	 plausible	 policy	 approaches	 to	 structure	 the	way	 a	 ‘State'	 deals	with	 the	 nuclear	 liability	 issue.	 These	 are	 utilitarian	 policies,	 which	 correspond	 to	‘regulatory	 policies	 designed	 to	 maximise	 general	 welfare'	 and	 rights-based	 policies,	referring	to	‘moral	principles	designed	to	promote	social	justice'	(Heffron,	et	al.,	2014).	The	 “build-own-operate”	 mechanism	 of	 the	 Akkuyu	 nuclear	 power	 plant	 creates	 less	incentives	 for	 the	 Turkish	 government	 and	 does	 not	 address	 Turkey’s	 need	 for	 an	independent	regulatory	body,	with	the	internal	capability	to	observe	Russia’s	actions	on	Turkish	soil.	The	mechanism	gives	the	weight	of	responsibilities	in	transport	safety	and	security	to	the	Russian	side	(Ozbek,	et	al.,	2016).	Greenpeace	 International	 discussed	 in	 a	 2013	 report,	 that	 nuclear	 liability	conventions	 only	 protect	 the	 industry	 –	 this	 includes	 operators,	 suppliers	 as	 well	 as	investors	–	but	not	the	people	and	victims.	According	to	this	report,	the	core	problems	of	nuclear	liability	are	as	follows	(Froggatt,	2013):	
Ø The	international	liability	conventions	are	contradicting.			
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Ø The	operator	of	a	nuclear	power	plant	is	solely	responsible	for	the	damages.	The	nuclear	suppliers	are	exempted	from	paying	any	penalties.	
Ø The	 total	 amount	of	 compensation	as	a	 result	of	 a	potential	nuclear	accident	 is	much	lower	than	the	actual	cost	of	a	nuclear	accident.	
Ø The	description	of	a	nuclear	damage	is	not	alone	enough	to	address	all	 types	of	damages	caused	by	a	nuclear	disaster.	Regarding	 the	 nuclear	 liability	 issue,	 a	 utilitarian	 approach	 would	 view	 the	matter	with	a	result-oriented	perspective:	The	operation	of	a	nuclear	power	plant	comes	with	 significant	 risks,	 such	 as	 threats	 to	 public	 health,	 civil	 liability	 issues	 raised	 by	individuals	affected	by	nuclear-related	accidents.	But	the	risks	may	be	preponderated	by	the	potential	benefits	to	the	nation's	economic	status	(Heffron,	et	al.,	2014).	The	policy	approach	 of	 Turkey	 can	 be	 perceived	 as	 utilitarian,	 as	 Turkey	 "has	 put	 politics	 over	legislative	 development	 and	 the	 safety	 and	 protection	 of	 its	 citizens	 in	 the	 event	 of	 a	nuclear	energy	accident"	(Heffron,	et	al.,	2014).	Even	though	the	serious	environmental	and	public	health	risks	exist,	 if	Turkey	still	aims	to	build	and	operate	nuclear	reactors	within	 the	 country,	 a	 significant	 amount	 of	 legislative	 reforms	 must	 firstly	 be	implemented.	Furthermore,	the	safety	and	protection	of	the	citizens	must	be	prioritised	(Heffron,	et	al.,	2014).	Turkey	 is	 substantially	 rich	 in	 renewable	 energy	 resources.	 Nevertheless,	 by	giving	that	massive	sum	to	the	nuclear	industry,	the	Turkish	government	is	setting	up	a	barrier	to	a	clean,	safe	and	sustainable	future	(McKeating,	2013).	Turkey	possesses	one	of	 the	best	 renewable	 energy	potentials	 in	Europe,	with	 sufficient	 capacity	 to	prevent	the	need	 for	nuclear	power.	Nevertheless,	 the	Ministry	of	Energy	 insists	upon	nuclear	energy,	 in	 spite	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 "380	billion	kwh	electricity	 can	be	 generated	by	 solar	photovoltaic"	 or	 having	 a	 "48	 GW	 wind	 installed	 capacity	 will	 have	 no	 feasibility	question	(today	the	installed	capacity	for	wind	power	plant	is	around	2	GW)"	(Gürbüz,	2016).	The	fact	is,	that	renewable	energy	sources	are	much	more	feasible	for	technology	transfer	 as	well	 as	 to	 provide	more	 employment	 opportunities	 than	 a	 nuclear	 power	plant.	 In	 conclusion,	 the	 lack	of	 a	 sustainable	domestic	 nuclear	 infrastructure,	 unclear	planning	 regarding	 the	 management	 of	 spent	 fuel	 and	 radioactive	 waste,	 potential	environmental	 risks	 and	 the	 continuation	 of	 non-transparent	 statements,	 are	 the	counter	arguments	for	the	facilitation	of	the	planned	nuclear	power	projects.	The	 question	 remains,	 whether	 the	 Turkish	 government	 will	 continue	 with	construction	 plans,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 its	 modernist	 and	 growth-seeking	 ambitions,	 or	
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whether	they	will	consider	the	high	environmental	costs,	that	nuclear	power	plants	may	bring	about.	Up	until	2015,	 the	 local	 and	national	 activists,	 environmental	 groups	and	NGOs	 had	 managed	 to	 stop	 proposed	 nuclear	 power	 plant	 projects.	 Nevertheless,	 in	spite	of	the	Fukushima	disaster,	the	Turkish	government	have	completely	ignored	these	opponents	 and	 pushed	 ahead	 with	 power	 plant	 construction.	 Another	 problem	 in	Turkey	 is	 the	 lack	 of	 public	 participation	 in	 the	 decision-making	 processes	 of	 such	important	 projects,	 which	 have	 the	 possibility	 to	 directly	 impact	 citizens’	 lives.	 The	societal	engagement	and	 the	participation	of	civil	 society,	NGOs	and	citizens	 is	vital	 to	counter	the	determination	of	the	authorities.	
5.	 NON-CONVENTIONAL	(RENEWABLE)	ENERGY	SOURCES		 The	aim	of	this	chapter	is	to	contextualise	renewable	energy	in	Turkey,	including	the	 role	 and	 potential	 of	 renewable	 energy	 sources	 in	 Turkey’s	 climate	 strategy.	Furthermore,	 the	 renewable	 energy	 policies,	 legislations	 and	 contribution	 of	 specific	renewable	energy	sources	 to	Turkish	power	generation	will	be	analysed.	Additionally,	the	 environmental	 impacts	 and	 the	 social	 acceptance	 and	 public	 perception	 of	 each	renewable	energy	source	will	be	addressed.	The	utilisation	of	renewable	energy	resources	has	become	inevitable	worldwide.	This	is	not	only	because	of	the	peak	oil	and	termination	of	fossil	fuel	era,	but	also	due	to	the	unprecedented	pressure	of	human	dominated	activities	on	the	planet.	The	Earth	 is	being	 battered	 by	 humanity	 from	 every	 direction:	 The	 extinction	 of	 species,	 rising	greenhouse	gas	emissions,	ocean	acidification,	chemical	pollution,	 land	use	change	and	rising	 freshwater	 consumption.	 With	 regard	 to	 these	 serious	 planetary	 changes,	 the	governments	 and	 global	 organisations	 have	 started	 to	 develop	 renewable	 energy	policies	 and	 implement	 various	 support	 mechanisms,	 obligations	 and	 incentives	 to	implement	 the	 energy	 transition	 from	 fossil	 to	 post-fossil	 energy	 era.	 The	 most	commonly	used	renewable	energy	policies	are	as	 follows	(Arioglu	Akan,	et	al.,	2015	S.	16379–407):	
a)	Capital	 subsidy:	 The	 subsidy	 covers	 a	 share	 of	 the	 upfront	 capital	 cost	 of	 an	 asset	(such	as	solar	water	heater).	
b)	Feed-in	premium:	Producers	sell	generated	electricity	from	renewable	energy	sources	at	market	 prices	 and	 a	 premium	 is	 added	 to	 the	market	 price	 to	 compensate	 for	 the	higher	costs	and	financial	risks	of	the	production	from	renewables.	
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c)	Feed-in	tariff:	A	minimum	price	per	unit	is	guaranteed	over	a	fixed	time	period	when	electricity	can	be	sold	and	fed	into	the	network.		
d)	Fiscal	 incentive:	An	 economic	 incentive,	 which	 provides	 individuals,	 households	 or	companies	 with	 capital	 subsidy,	 grants	 or	 rebate,	 as	 well	 as	 reductions,	 value	 added	taxes	or	other	taxes.	
e)	Investment	tax	credit:	 Allows	 investments	 in	 renewable	 energy	 to	 be	 either	 fully	 or	partially	deducted	from	the	tax	obligations.	
f)	Mandate/obligation:	A	measure	that	requires	consumers,	suppliers	and	generators	to	meet	a	minimum	target	for	renewable	energy,	such	as	a	percentage	of	total	supply.	
g)	Production	tax	credit:	A	measure	providing	the	investor	or	owner	of	a	facility	with	an	annual	tax	credit	based	on	the	amount	of	generated	renewable	energy	by	that	facility.	
h)	Renewable	energy	certificate:	A	certificate	awarded	 for	 the	generation	of	one	unit	of	renewable	energy	(1	MW	hour	of	electricity).		
i)	Renewable	energy	target:	A	goal	 set	by	a	government	 to	achieve	a	 certain	amount	of	renewable	energy	in	the	future.	
j)	Renewable	portfolio	standard:	 This	 represents	 an	 obligation	 set	 by	 a	 government	 on	companies	or	consumers	to	provide	or	use	a	predetermined	minimum	renewable	share	of	installed	capacity	or	of	electricity.	As	 for	 Turkey,	 renewable	 energy	 target,	 feed-in	 tariff	 and	 biofuels	
obligation/mandate	have	been	used	as	regulatory	policies	and	targets	(Arioglu	Akan,	et	al.,	 2015	 S.	 16379–407).	 As	 a	member	 of	 the	 OECD	 and	 candidate	 country	 of	 the	 EU,	Turkey	is	one	of	the	developing	countries	with	a	substantial	potential	for	wide	range	of	renewable	energy	sources.	The	country	has	one	of	the	highest	hydropower,	geothermal,	solar	 and	wind	 energy	potentials	 among	 the	EU	member	 states.	Nevertheless,	 current	energy	policies	of	Turkey	are	jeopardising	the	development	and	utilisation	of	renewable	energy	sources	in	a	sustainable	and	efficient	way.	The	country	is	strongly	dependent	on	fossil	 energy	 imports.	 By	 the	 end	 of	 2015,	 renewables	 contributed	 15.7	 mtoe	 of	country’s	 total	 energy	 production,	 which	 represents	 12.1%	 of	 total	 energy	 supply	 of	Turkey,	which	came	from	hydro	(4.4%),	geothermal	(3.7%),	biofuels	and	waste	(2.5%),	wind	 (0.8%)	 and	 solar	 (0.7%).	 The	 electricity	 production	 from	 renewable	 energy	sources	reached	83.8	twh,	which	represented	32.2%	of	total	electricity	generation	(IEA	2016).	 The	 remaining	 energy	 supply	 was	 came	 from	 the	 fossil	 energy	 imports,	predominantly	natural	gas	imports	from	Russia.	Moreover,	Turkey’s	energy	demand	has	been	 increasing	rapidly	over	 the	 last	decades,	which	has	had	a	negative	 impact	on	the	
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country’s	 economy	as	a	 result	of	high	amount	of	 fossil	 energy	 imports.	The	 inefficient	and	high	use	of	fossil	fuels	creates	air	pollution	and	raises	the	greenhouse	gas	emissions	of	Turkey.		
5.1.	 Renewable	Energy	Legislation	and	Regulations	in	Turkey	
	 Based	on	the	previously	stated	energy	situation	of	Turkey,	energy	efficiency	has	become	a	crucial	issue	in	the	energy	agenda	of	the	Turkish	MENR.	Therefore,	on	April	5th	2001,	 the	Turkish	Government	ratified	 the	Energy	Charter	Treaty	and	 the	Protocol	on	Energy	 Efficiency	 and	 Related	 Environmental	 Aspects,	 as	 well	 as	 committing	 to	formulate	 and	 implement	 policies	 for	 improving	 energy	 efficiency	 and	 reducing	 the	negative	environmental	impacts	of	the	energy	cycle.	Turkey’s	energy	efficiency	policy	is	guided	 by	 the	 ‘Energy	 Efficiency	 Law	No.	 5627’,	 which	 came	 into	 force	 in	 2007.	 This	specific	 Law	has	 set	 “the	 legal	 framework	 for	 energy	 efficiency	 and	 prevention	 of	 the	wasteful	use	of	energy	 in	order	 to	 reduce	 the	burden	of	energy	costs	on	 the	economy	and	 protect	 the	 environment”	 (MFA,	 2017).	 To	 establish	 a	 road	 map	 for	 the	implementation,	 the	MENR	 prepared	 an	 ‘Energy	 Efficiency	 Strategy’,	 approved	 by	 the	High	 Planning	 Council	 on	 February	 20th	 2012.	 The	 main	 goals	 of	 this	 strategy	 are	highlighted	as:	A	reduction	of	energy	density	by	20%	per	GDP	until	2023,	energy	losses	in	 industry	 and	 service	 sectors,	 decreasing	 energy	 demand	 and	 carbon	 emissions	 of	buildings,	providing	30%	of	total	electricity	production	from	renewable	energy,	efficient	use	 of	 energy	 in	 the	 public	 sector,	 strengthening	 of	 institutional	 structures,	 capacities	and	 cooperation,	 employing	 advanced	 technologies,	 increasing	 awareness-raising	activities	and	creating	alternate	 financing	sources	 than	public	sources	 (EC,	2016).	 It	 is	mandatory	 to	 coordinate	 ‘Energy	 Efficiency’	 measures	 throughout	 the	 country	 and	between	 the	 relevant	 public	 and	 private	 institutions	 in	 order	 to	 accomplish	 a	 strong	institutional	capacity	in	the	sector.	Currently,	 Turkey	 produces	 20%	 of	 its	 total	 electricity	 supply	 from	 renewable	energy	 sources	 and	 plans	 to	 increase	 this	 rate	 to	 30%	 by	 2023	 (MFA,	 2012).	 The	country’s	 intended	 nationally	 determined	 contribution,	 adopted	 in	 September	 2015	ahead	of	the	Paris	COP21	Conference,	contains	decisive	targets	of	16	GW	for	wind	and	10	GW	 for	 solar	 in	2030.	The	wind	 target	 is	 below	 the	 intentions	 set	 out	 in	 the	2009	Strategy	(20	GW)	and	the	solar	target	is	much	lower	than	the	solar	potentials	in	Turkey	(IEA,	2016).	
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Turkey	has	also	made	concrete	steps	regarding	the	increase	of	energy	efficiency.	Through	 Turkey’s	 Council	 of	 Ministers	 Decree,	 Number	 2014/6058	 (published	 in	 the	
Official	Gazette	on	May	09,	2014	with	number	28995),	 several	 amendments	 have	 been	made	to	the	implementation	of	the	current	investment	incentive	system,	also	relating	to	the	 energy	 efficiency	 issue.	 According	 to	 this	 decree:	 “investments	 aimed	 at	 energy	efficiency	 i)	 which	 are	 realised	 in	 existing	 manufacturing	 industry	 plants	 having	 a	minimum	500	tons	equivalent	petroleum	energy	consumption	and	provide	a	minimum	20%	power	savings	per	unit,	and	ii)	the	investment	return	of	which	is	a	maximum	of	5	years”	 (Pekin	 &	 Pekin,	 2016)	 will	 be	 benefited	 from	 the	 incentives.	 According	 to	 the	European	 Commission’s	 2003	 and	 2005	 projects	 (which	 were	 designed	 for	 Turkey’s	Accession	Partnership	programs),	 respectively	 titled	 “Improvement	of	Energy	Efficiency	
in	Turkey”	 and	 “Increasing	Public	Awareness	on	Energy	Efficiency	in	Buildings”,	 a	person	in	 Turkey	 is	 consuming	 two	 or	 three	 times	 more	 energy	 (per	 m2)	 for	 heating,	 than	people	in	countries	such	as	Germany	or	France.	This	situation	poses	both	financial	and	environmental	 challenges.	 Currently,	 there	 are	 ongoing	 discussions	 in	 the	 Energy	Commission	of	the	National	Assembly	of	Turkey	regarding	a	new	Draft	Energy	Efficiency	Law	and	an	amendment	to	National	Purchasing	Law.	In	2005,	Turkey	has	adopted	the	basic	legal	framework	for	the	renewable	energy	(Law	 on	 Utilisation	 of	 Renewable	 Energy	 Sources	 for	 the	 Purpose	 of	 Generating	Electrical	 Energy	 No.	 5346,	 YEKA	 Law	 (in	 Turkish:	 Yenilenebilir	Enerji	Kaynak	Alani),	which	supported	hydro,	wind,	solar,	geothermal,	biomass,	biogas	(including	landfill	gas)	and	wave,	current	and	 tidal	energy.	As	 indicated	 in	 the	Turkey	Review	2016	report	of	the	IEA,	“the	Law	provided	for	the	choice	between	direct	sales	of	renewable	electricity	into	the	spot	market	versus	a	general	feed-in	tariff,	and	included	supplier	obligations	to	purchase	 renewable	 electricity,	 priority	 connection,	 and	 exemptions	 from	 license	obligations	 for	small	generators	(0.5	MW),	as	well	as	reduced	fees	 for	 land	acquisition	and	project	preparation”	(IEA,	2016).	In	 2011,	 Turkey	 enacted	 its	 very	 first	 Renewable	 Energy	 Support	 Mechanism	(Yenilenebilir	Enerji	Kaynaklari	Destekleme	Mekanizmasi	 -	YEKDEM).	The	goal	of	 this	mechanism	was	to	increase	and	diversify	the	use	of	renewable	energy	sources	without	interrupting	 free	market	 conditions.	 Furthermore,	 a	 gradual	 reduction	 in	 greenhouse	gas	 emissions,	 efficient	 waste	 utilisation,	 better	 environmental	 protection	 and	development	of	 the	necessary	manufacturing	 sectors	 are	 targeted	 (Arioglu	Akan	et	 al.	2015).	 Concordantly,	 the	 power	 plants,	 which	 have	 been	 in	 operation	 since	May	 18th	
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2005,	 or	 that	will	 come	 into	 operation	 before	December	 31st	 2015,	will	 be	 eligible	 to	receive	 the	 following	 feed-in-tariffs	 for	 the	 first	 ten	 years	 of	 their	 operation.	 The	new	law	 also	 brought	 some	 incentives,	 such	 as	 licensing,	 land	 appropriation	 and	 purchase	guarantee	through	a	constant	feed-in	tariff	(Arioglu	Akan	et	al.	2015).	In	 December	 2004,	 Turkish	 government	 presented	 the	 National	 Renewable	
Energy	Action	Plan	for	the	period	2013-2023,	in	line	with	the	methodology	of	the	EU	Renewable	 Energy	 Directive	 2009/28/EC.	 Based	 on	 this	 directive,	 the	 National	Renewable	 Energy	 Action	 Plan	 asserts	 that	 “Turkey	 had	 a	 13.5%	 share	 of	 renewable	energy	 in	 gross	 final	 consumption	 in	 2013	 and	 needs	 to	 reach	 20.5%	 by	 2023”	 (IEA,	2016).	Other	 targets,	 regarding	 the	utilisation	of	 renewable	energy	sources,	 set	by	 the	Action	Plan,	are	listed	as	follows	(IEA	2016):	
Ø Lifting	up	installed	power	to	120,000	MW	
Ø Full	utilisation	of	all	economically	feasible	hydropower	potential	for	generating	electricity	to	reach	34,000	MW	
Ø Increase	installed	power	generation	capacity	of	wind	up	to	20,000	MW.	
Ø Expansion	 the	 use	 of	 solar	 power	 in	 electricity	 generation	 to	 utilise	 Turkey’s	abundant	potential	to	reach	3,000	MW	
Ø Utilisation	all	of	600	MW	of	geothermal	electricity	potential	in	Turkey	
Ø Implementation	of	support	mechanisms	for	biomass	use	of	1,000	MW	
Ø Achieving	a	10%	share	of	renewable	energy	use	in	the	transport	sector.	
Ø Extending	the	length	of	transmission	lines	to	60,717	km	
Ø Extending	the	use	of	smart	grids	
Ø Reaching	a	power	distribution	unit	capacity	of	158,460	MVA	
Ø Raising	the	natural	gas	storage	capacity	to	5	bcm		 In	 January	 2015,	 Turkish	Ministry	 of	 Energy	 and	Natural	 Resources	 released	 a	2015-2019	Strategic	Plan.	The	adopted	Strategic	Plan	for	the	period	2015-2019,	targets	the	expansion	of	renewable	energy	sources	to	30%	of	total	energy	production	by	2030.	To	 reach	 the	 designated	 2023	 energy	 targets	 set	 by	 the	 Turkish	 MENR,	 appropriate	support	 and	 incentive	 mechanisms	 must	 be	 formed	 within	 Turkey's	 New	 Law	 on	Renewable	Energy	Sources:	1)	Feed-in	Tariff	Mechanism,	2)	Unlicensed	Generation,	and	3)	Local	Content	Support.	1)	 Feed-in	 Tariff	 Mechanism:	 To	 use	 its	 renewable	 potential	 and	 support	 the	contribution	 of	 renewables	 in	 total	 electricity	 generation,	 Turkey	 enacted	 the	
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“Amendment	 Law	 to	 Utilisation	 of	 Renewable	 Energy	 Resources	 for	 the	 Purpose	 of	Generating	Electrical	Energy	No.	6094”	 in	2011	 (IEA,	2016).	The	 law	provides	 feed-in	tariffs	 to	 renewable	 energy	 producers	 for	 a	 maximum	 term	 of	 10	 years	 from	 their	operation	date.	Each	year	the	investor	may	choose	between	the	feed-in	tariff	and	direct	sales	 in	 the	 power	 market.	 In	 this	 context,	 feed-in	 prices	 for	 hydroelectric	 and	 wind	power-based	generation	 facilities	 are	 fixed	up	 to	US$7.3	per	kwh,	 geothermal	 energy-based	generation	facility	to	US$10.5	per	kwh,	biomass	energy-based	(including	 landfill	gas)	and	solar	energy-based	generation	facilities	to	US$13.3	per	kwh	(Table	10).	Adding	local	content	to	the	project	will	bring	an	additional	US$23-92	per	MWh	per	project	for	five	 years.	 Furthermore,	 there	 is	 a	 spot	market,	 which	 can	 function	 as	 an	 alternative	sales	point	for	renewable	energy	generators	(Energy	Charter	Secretariat	2014).	
Table	10.	Feed-in	Tariff	Mechanism	in	Turkey	
Type	of	power	plant	facility	 Feed-in	tariff		($/kwh)	 Maximum	local	production	premium	($/kwh)	 Maximum	possible	tariff	($/kwh)	Hydroelectric		 7.3	 2.3	 9.6	Wind		 7.3	 3.7	 11	Geothermal		 10.5	 2.7	 13.2	Biomass	(including	landfill)	 13.3	 5.6	 18.9	Solar	photovoltaic	 13.3	 6.7	 19.5	Concentrating	solar		 13.3	 9.2	 22.5	
Data	source:	Own	illustration	based	on	the	data	from	(pwc,	2012).		 2)	Unlicensed	Generation:	Real	and	legal	entities	which	are	generating	electricity	from	renewable	energy-based	production	facilities	with	a	maximum	installed	capacity	of	1	 MW,	 can	 benefit	 from	 the	 above	 scheduled	 feed-in	 prices	 in	 the	 case	 that	 they	supplement	surplus	electricity	back	into	the	distribution	system.	Within	this	framework,	distribution	companies,	having	electrical	retail	sales	licenses,	must	purchase	this	energy	within	the	context	of	Renewable	Energy	Support	Mechanism	(Kaplan,	2015).	3)	Local	Content	Support:	This	support	is	considered	as	an	extra	bonus	and	shall	be	added	to	the	feed-in	tariff	of	relevant	renewable	energy	resources	to	encourage	the	utilisation	 of	 renewables.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 usage	 of	 local	 mechanical	 or	 electronic	equipment	 in	 generation	 facilities,	 commissioned	 before	 31st	 December	 2020	 and	subject	 to	 the	 Renewable	Energy	Source	Support	Mechanism,	 a	 local	 equipment	 bonus	
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shall	 be	 added	 to	 the	 feed-in	 tariff,	 relevant	 to	 this	 renewable	 energy	 source	 (Kaplan,	2015).	4)	 Biofuels	 Obligation/Mandate:	Within	 this	 policy,	 the	 designated	 parties	 are	required	to	meet	a	minimum	target	for	renewable	energy	such	as	a	percentage	of	total	supply,	or	the	stated	amount	of	capacity.	Additionally,	quotas	and	mandates	may	include	obligations,	 which	 require	 the	 installation	 of	 renewable	 heat	 or	 power	 technologies,	renewable	 purchase	 mandates	 and	 requirements	 for	 blending	 biofuels	 into	transportation	fuel	(pwc,	2012).	In	regard	 to	 the	support	and	 incentive	mechanism,	 the	 last	by-law	modification	was	 published	 by	 the	MENR	 in	 the	Official	 Gazette	No	28755	 on	 September	 4th	 2013.	Within	 this	 regulation,	 the	 procedures	 and	 principles	 have	 been	 rearranged,	 which	relate	to	determining,	documenting	and	the	auditing	of	additional	prices	for	components	and	 integrative	parts,	where	 the	manufacturing	process	 takes	place	domestically.	This	regulation	 features	 additional	 support	 for	 companies	 with	 facilities	 that	 use	 locally	produced	 equipment/components	 for	 a	 maximum	 possible	 tariff	 for	 each	 renewable	energy	 source.	 Furthermore,	 through	 this	 by-law	 modification,	 many	 domestic	 and	foreign	 investors	 will	 be	 able	 to	 establish	 equipment	 production	 facilities	 in	 Turkey.	Hence,	in	the	foreseeable	future,	Turkey	may	become	the	largest	supplier	of	renewable	equipment	and	spare	parts	in	the	region.	Given	Turkey’s	high	fossil	fuel	imports,	the	main	energy	policy	for	securing	long-term	 energy	 independency,	 is	 the	 efficient	 use	 of	 the	 country’s	 indigenous	 sources,	particularly	 the	 renewable	 energy	 potential.	 Although	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 country’s	adopted	National	Energy	Strategic	Plan	and	the	2023	targets	for	the	100th	anniversary	of	the	 Republic	 of	 Turkey	 highlights	 the	 promotion	 of	 renewable	 sources,	 one	 of	 the	biggest	 problems	 hindering	 widespread	 use	 of	 renewables	 in	 Turkey	 is	 the	 lack	 of	 a	coherent	national	energy	policy	plan,	in	which	the	specific	place	and	role	of	renewable	energy	sources	 is	well	defined.	As	previously	clarified,	Turkey’s	wind	and	hydropower	potential	is	considerably	high.	Nevertheless,	specific	policies	for	each	renewable	energy	source	is	missing.	The	estimations	propound	that,	in	the	next	decade,	between	22.5	twh	and	 45.0	 twh	 of	 electricity	must	 be	 generated	 from	 renewable	 energy	 sources	 (other	than	 hydropower),	 to	 fill	 the	 energy	 demand	 gap	 (Melikoglu,	 2013).	 In	 line	with	 this	projection,	implementation	of	a	stronger	policy	is	needed,	to	support	the	deployment	of	solar,	geothermal	heat	and	biofuels	for	transport	in	a	sustainable	and	cost-effective	way	(Arioglu	 Akan,	 et	 al.,	 2015).	 Moreover,	 investing	 in	 the	 advanced	 renewable	 energy	
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technologies	 paves	 the	 way	 both	 for	 utilising	 renewable	 energy	 potential	 more	efficiently	and	providing	employment	opportunities	for	citizens.	The	significance	of	the	participation	of	single	renewable	energy	sources	to	the	total	electricity	generation	will	be	analysed	 in	 the	next	 subchapters,	 associated	with	 their	environmental	 impacts	and	social	acceptance	issues.	
5.2.	 Wind	Power		 Wind	 energy	 is	 obtained	 from	 differences	 in	 solar	 heat	 at	 Earth's	 surface	locations.	Around	2%	of	solar	energy	is	converted	into	wind	power,	which	means,	 in	a	manner	of	speaking,	so	long	as	solar	energy	is	available	in	the	world,	there	will	be	wind	as	 well.	 Wind	 power	 is	 formed	 naturally	 in	 the	 atmosphere,	 does	 not	 cause	environmental	pollution	and	represents	a	plausible	solution	to	Turkey’s	energy	security	and	 external	 energy	 dependency	 problems.	 Wind	 energy	 is	 domestic,	 independent,	natural	 and	 infinite.	 The	 power	 generation	 from	 wind	 does	 not	 cause	 acid	 rain	 or	atmospheric	 heating,	 carbon	 dioxide	 emission	 and	 does	 not	 harm	 nature	 or	 human	health.	It	provides	fossil	fuel	savings	and	has	no	radioactive	effect.	In	global	terms,	wind	energy	gained	particular	importance,	after	the	first	oil	crisis	in	1973.	Before	the	1970s,	it	was	possible	to	obtain	cheaper	oil	supplies.	Following	the	first	 oil	 crisis,	 a	 conference	 was	 held	 in	 Denmark	 in	 1990,	 where	 issues	 like	 the	utilisation	of	wind	 turbines,	were	 addressed.	Wind	 turbines	 convert	wind	 energy	 into	mechanical	energy	and	then	turn	it	into	electrical	power	(Ilkilic,	et	al.,	2011).	During	this	period,	many	studies	related	 to	 the	development	of	wind	 turbines	were	carried	out	 in	Germany	 and	 many	 technical	 operations	 were	 conducted	 in	 wind	 generators	 in	Switzerland,	Austria,	and	Italy.		
5.2.1.	 The	Contribution	of	Wind	Power	to	Global	and	Turkey’s	Energy	Supply		 According	 to	 the	 2017	 data	 of	 the	 Global	 Wind	 Energy	 Council,	 the	 global	installed	wind	power	 capacity	had	 reached	486,749	MW	by	 the	 end	of	 2016,	 growing	from	23,900	MW	in	2001.	Based	on	the	same	data,	China	again	became	lead	the	world's	wind	energy	production	with	168,690	MW	total	installed	capacity	(34.7%	global	share),	followed	by	 the	U.S.	with	82,184	MW	(16.9%	global	 share)	 and	Germany	with	50,018	MW	(10.3%	global	share)	(GWEC,	2017).	In	the	same	year,	Europe	installed	12,491	MW	of	gross	additional	wind	capacity.	With	a	 total	 installed	capacity	of	153,729	MW,	wind	energy	has	 overtaken	 coal	 as	 the	 second	 largest	 form	of	 power	 generation	 in	Europe.	
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Germany	 maintained,	 with	 50,018	 MW,	 the	 largest	 installed	 wind	 power	 capacity,	followed	by	Spain	with	23,074	MW,	 the	United	Kingdom	with	14,543	MW	and	France	with	12,066	MW.	With	1,387	MW	new	wind	power	 installed	 capacity,	Turkey	broke	a	record	and	has	overtaken	the	Netherlands	(0.9	GW),	Poland	(0.6	GW),	Ireland	(0.4	GW)	and	 Portugal	 (0.2	 GW).	 Total	 installed	 wind	 power	 capacity	 in	 Turkey	 gradually	expanded	from	146	MW	in	2007	to	6,081	MW	by	the	end	of	2016	(Figure	14)	(GWEC,	2017).	
Figure	14.	Cumulative	Installations	for	Wind	Power	Plants	in	Turkey	(in	MW)	
	
Data	source:	Own	illustration	based	on	the	data	from	(TWEA,	2017).		 Due	 to	 its	 geographic	 position,	 Turkey	 is	 under	 the	 influence	 of	 different	 air	masses,	 which	 give	 rise	 to	 potential	 wind	 energy	 generation	 possibilities	 in	 different	areas.	 Northern	 winds	 over	 the	 Balkan	 Peninsula	 and	 Black	 Sea	 provide	 strong	airstreams	 during	 the	winter	 period	 (Gencer,	 et	 al.,	 2009)	 Along	 the	 Black	 Sea	 coast,	locations	with	 flat	hinterland	coasts	are	 the	most	 suitable	 locations	 for	wind	 turbines.	Most	of	 the	Black	Sea	coast	 is	 composed	of	 sudden	hills,	 escarpments	and	cliffs	 in	 the	hinterland	 that	 prevent	 the	 potential	 placement	 of	 turbines	 (Durak,	 et	 al.,	 2002).	 (see	Map	8).		
	
	
	
	
146 363 791
1,329 1,805 2,312
2,958 3,762
4,718
6,081
01.000
2.0003.000
4.0005.000
6.0007.000
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
		 130	
	
Map	8.	Annual	Wind	Energy	Potential	–	Wind	Energy	Speed	Atlas	
				
Data	source:	(YEGM,	2018).		 Turkey	 has	 an	 enormous	 potential	 to	 produce	 electricity	 from	 wind	 energy.	According	to	Ilkilic	and	Nursoy,	in	Europe	Turkey	has	the	biggest	wind	energy	potential,	with	the	capacity	to	fill	its	entire	energy	consumption	appetite	(Ilkilic,	et	al.,	2010	S.	450-459).	 Kurban	 and	 Hocaoglu	 reports	 that	 Turkey’s	 theoretically	 available	 annual	potential	to	be	88,000	MW,	of	which	10,000	MW	is	economically	feasible	(Kurban,	et	al.,	2009	 S.	 19-28).	 The	 statistical	 data	 released	 by	 the	 TWEA	 points	 out	 that	 the	 wind	energy	 potential	 of	 Turkey	 is	 primarily	 focused	 in	 the	 Aegean,	 Marmara	 and	Mediterranean	regions	 from	higher	 to	 lower,	 respectively.	This	 report	also	shows	 that	the	majority	of	installed	wind	power	plants	are	located	in	the	west	of	Turkey:	2,376	MW	(39%	 of	 the	 total	 capacity)	 in	 the	 Aegean	 region	 and	 2,105	 MW	 (34%	 of	 the	 total	capacity)	in	the	Marmara	region.	Other	areas	with	a	share	of	installed	wind	power	plants	are	Mediterranean	with	 888	MW	 (14%	 of	 total	 capacity),	 Central	 Anatolian	with	 534	MW	 (8%	of	 total	 capacity),	 Black	 Sea	with	 172	MW	 (2%	of	 total	 capacity)	 and	 finally	South-eastern	 Anatolian	 region	 with	 less	 than	 27	 MW	 (0,4%	 of	 the	 total	 capacity)	(Figure	15).		
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Figure	15.	Operational	Wind	Power	Plants	According	to	Regions	
	
Data	source:	Own	illustration	based	on	the	data	from	(TWEA,	2017).	Balikesir,	 Izmir	 and	 Manisa,	 cities	 situated	 respectively	 in	 the	 Marmara	 and	Aegean	 coasts,	 are	 alone	 responsible	 for	 55%	 of	 the	 country's	wind	 energy	 potential.	Among	 them,	 the	 Strait	 of	 Canakkale,	which	 connects	 the	Marmara	 Sea	 to	 the	Aegean	Sea,	has	a	significant	role,	possessing	a	high	wind	energy	potential	(Figure	16).	
Figure	16.	Operational	Wind	Power	Plants	According	to	Cities	
	
Data	source:	(TWEA,	2017)	Despite	 having	 enormous	 wind	 power	 potential,	 Turkey	 still	 lags	 far	 behind	developed	countries	when	 it	 comes	 to	generating	wind	energy	when	compared	 to	 the	
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global	wind	energy	leaders:	China	and	the	USA.	Furthermore,	according	to	Tolga	Bilgin,	President	 of	 the	 Wind	 Power	 and	 Hydropower	 Plants	 Businessmen's	 Association	(RESSIAD),	Turkey	has	 a	disadvantage	of	not	having	 a	 suitable	 turbine	manufacturing	industry:	 "Countries	like	Germany,	China	and	India	promote	their	wind	tribune	industries	
and	exports.	Turkey's	all-installed	power's	gain	flies	abroad	(to	other	countries)	because	it	
does	not	have	this	industry"	(Hürriyet	Daily	News,	2013).		In	Turkey,	the	highest	annual	average	wind	speed	values	of	5.8	m/second	at	10	m	height,	 are	 found	 in	Bandirma,	a	district	of	Balikesir	 (Ilkilic,	 et	al.,	2011).	Canakkale	 is	the	second	province	with	the	most	wind	energy	potential,	having	an	annual	mean	wind	speed	over	7	m/second	at	50	m	height.	Electric	generation	from	wind	energy	began	in	Turkey	 in	 the	 21st	 century.	 The	 first	 Turkish	wind	 turbine	was	 built	 in	 Çeşme,	 at	 the	Golden	Dolphin	Hotel	in	1985,	with	a	total	installed	capacity	of	1.5	MW.	There	have	been	other	 unsuccessful	 attempts	 between	 1986	 to	 1996	 (Oner,	 et	 al.,	 2016	 S.	 117).	 The	development	of	modern	Turkish	wind	power	engineering	first	started	in	Alacati,	Izmir	in	1998,	with	three	Enercon	E-40	wind	turbines,	which	had	a	 total	power	capacity	of	1.5	MW.	The	first	"Build-Operate-Transfer"	model	power	plant	in	Turkey	was	established	as	a	wind	energy	power	plant,	which	began	operation	 in	Alacati,	Cesme	 in	1998	with	12	turbines	 and	 a	 total	 installed	 capacity	 of	 7.2	MW	 (Ilkilic,	 et	 al.,	 2011).	 The	 third	wind	farm,	 with	 17	 turbines	 and	 a	 total	 power	 capacity	 of	 10.2	 MW,	 was	 constructed	 in	Bozburun.	 The	 private	 sector	 has	 submitted	 numerous	 applications	 for	 licensing	 new	wind	power	plants	(Oner,	et	al.,	2016	S.	117).	Total	installed	capacity	had	reached	18.9	MW	and	the	MENR	had	evaluated	72	new	projects	totalling	about	2,000	MW	in	the	early	2000s	 (Demirbas,	 2006).	 After	 a	 commissioning	 of	 30	 MW	 capacity,	 the	 capacity	 of	Bandirma	wind	power	plant	has	reached	 to	50.1	MW	(Ozgür,	2008).	Nevertheless,	 the	wind	market	did	not	achieve	a	significant	growth	until	the	law	for	the	use	of	renewable	energy	 sources	 in	 electricity	 production	 (Law	 No:	 5346)	 was	 ratified	 in	 2005,	 which	included	a	series	of	policy	reforms.	Despite	the	law,	by	the	year	2007,	Turkey	was	quite	unsuccessful	 in	 making	 use	 of	 its	 rich	 potential.	 In	 the	 following	 years,	 continuously	growing,	the	total	installed	capacity	reached	to	791	MW	in	2009	and	7,012	MW	by	the	year	2018.	If	this	trend	continues,	the	share	of	wind	energy	for	generating	electricity	is	expected	 to	 be	 around	 4%	 by	 the	 year	 2025,	 which	 is	 still	 far	 below	 the	 country’s	immense	wind	energy	potential.		
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Table	11.	Top	Ten	Wind	Power	Plants	in	Turkey	(Capacity-wise)	
Plant	Name	 Licensed	Capacity	(MW)	 Location	Soma	 264	 Manisa	Geycek	 168	 Kirsehir	Balikesir	 143	 Balikesir	Gökcedag	 135	 Osmaniye	Bergama	 120	 Izmir	Karaburun	 120	 Izmir	Dinar	 115	 Afyon	Samli	 113	 Balikesir	Tokat	 94	 Tokat	Catalca	 93	 Istanbul		Source:	(TWEA,	2018).	
5.2.2.		Soma	Wind	Farm			 The	Soma	Wind	Power	Plant	is	the	largest	wind	farm	in	Turkey,	which	currently	operates	169	turbines,	with	a	total	installed	capacity	of	240.1	MW	in	the	Soma	and	Kirkagac	districts	of	the	Province	of	Balikesir.	Soma	contributes	to	a	local	sustainable	development	by	creating	jobs	in	Turkey	and	the	surrounding	region,	while	procuring	available	services	like	subcontractors	and	equipment	manufacturing.	On-site	operations	also	increase	knowledge	regarding	the	local	development	of	replicable	technology	to	assist	in	the	transfer	of	similar	projects	to	proximal	regions	in	Turkey	(Sustainable,	2019).	Soma	Phase	I,	with	88	turbines	and	a	total	capacity	of	79	MW,	began	generating	electricity	in	2009.	Phase	II	(31	turbines,	61	MW)	came	online	in	2012.	Soma	III	(50	turbines,	100	MW)	followed	in	2015.		Phase	IV	is	now	being	built	and	will	add	12	turbines	and	48	MW	of	capacity,	for	a	total	of	181	turbines	and	288	MW.	Soma	wind	farm	avoids	about	167,000	metric	tons	of	CO2	equivalents	(Cloverly,	2019).		Soma	is	the	only	wind	farm	in	Turkey,	which	feeds	electricity	into	grid	at	380	kV.	Therefore,	despite	the	growing	numbers	of	installed	capacity	of	wind	power	plants,	it	makes	only	a	slight	contribution	of	wind	power	generation	to	Turkey’s	total	electricity	production.	
5.2.3.	 The	Environmental	Impacts		 Despite	being	a	renewable	and	environmental-friendly	energy	source,	 there	are	some	general	 environmental	 impacts	of	wind	power	plants.	 Some	wildlife	 researchers	and	 biologists	 assume	 that	 wind	 turbines	 in	 particular	 have	 an	 adverse	 impact	 on	
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wildlife,	especially	on	birds	and	bats.	The	birds	and	bats	die	 from	collisions	with	wind	turbines	due	to	the	changes	in	air	pressure	caused	by	the	spinning	turbines,	as	well	as	from	habitat	disruption.		Noise	 and	 visual	 impacts	 are	 the	 two	 most	 significant	 public	 health	 and	community	 concerns	 associated	 with	 wind	 turbines.	 Most	 of	 the	 sound	 generated	 by	wind	turbines	occurs	due	to	the	movement	of	turbine	blades	through	the	air.	In	addition	to	 this	aerodynamic	sound,	 there	 is	also	a	mechanical	 sound	emitted	 from	the	 turbine	(Union	of	Concerned	Scientists,	2013).	Since	 the	 turbines	 themselves	occupy	approximately	2%	of	 the	area,	most	 land	area	 can	 be	 used	 for	 farming	 purposes	 such	 as	 vegetables,	 nursery	 stock	 and	 cattle,	without	the	use	of	heavy	equipment	between	the	turbines	(Evrendilek,	et	al.,	2003).	As	an	environmentally	friendly	form	of	energy,	there	are	no	global	warming	emissions	associated	with	operating	wind	turbines.	The	only	warming	emissions	associated	with	a	wind	 turbine’s	 life	 cycle	 are	 materials	 production	 and	 transportation,	 on-site	construction	 and	 assembly,	 operation	 and	 maintenance,	 decommissioning	 and	dismantlement	(Union	of	Concerned	Scientists,	2013).	
5.2.3.	 Public	Awareness	and	Social	Acceptance	
	 Based	on	the	outcomes	from	a	face-to-face	survey	of	2,422	residents	from	urban	Turkey	 (Ertör	 Akyazi,	 et	 al.,	 2012),	 almost	 two-thirds	 of	 respondents	 support	 the	investment	of	wind	power	plants	in	the	city	where	they	are	living.	Only	a	small	minority	opposes	 the	 further	 investment	 to	 wind	 power.	 Nevertheless,	 there	 has	 been	 local	resistance	 to	 wind	 farms	 in	 several	 places,	 which	 has	 often	 been	 associated	 with	environment-related	 problems	 of	 renewables	 –	 such	 as	 noise,	 visual	 pollution,	 and	potential	 harm	 to	 migrating	 birds,	 as	 mentioned	 in	 the	 previous	 subchapter.	 In	 such	cases,	 resistance	 to	specific	wind	 farm	projects	has	often	been	understood	 in	 terms	of	“not-in-my-backyard”	 attitudes	 (Ertör	 Akyazi,	 et	 al.,	 2012).	 However,	 recent	 studies	demonstrate	 that	 there	 is	 not	 enough	 relevant	 empirical	 evidence	 to	 explain	 these	attitudes.	Therefore,	it	is	not	possible	to	attribute	the	oppositions	to	a	single	reason.	Another	survey	from	(Ediger,	et	al.,	2016)	justifies	the	above	highlighted	survey	outcomes.	57.3%	of	1,204	respondents	support	the	construction	of	wind	power	plants	in	the	 area	 they	 are	 living.	 Furthermore,	 39.5%	 of	 respondents	 think	 renewable	 energy	sources	 such	 as	 wind,	 solar,	 geothermal	 must	 be	 used	 for	 the	 electricity	 generation,	despite	 the	 fact	 that	energy	 transition	 from	 fossil	 fuels	 to	 renewable	sources	will	be	a	
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more	 expensive	 option.	 The	 social	 acceptance	 of	 wind	 energy	 as	 well	 as	 renewable	energy	in	general,	increased	in	2017	compared	to	2016.	Figure	17	shows	the	respondents’	opinions,	regarding	which	type	of	energy	will	be	the	most	important	in	the	world	and	in	Turkey.	
Figure	17.	Which	type	of	energy	will	be	the	most	important	one	in	the	world	and	in	Turkey	in	the	future?		
In	the	world		 	 	 	 	 	 	 In	Turkey	
Data	source:	(Ediger,	et	al.,	2016).		
5.2.4.		Results	and	Outcomes		There	are	some	obstacles	to	operating	wind	power	plants	in	Turkey:	I. The	feed-in	tariff	had	been	limited	to	the	first	ten	years	of	operation.	Therefore,	Turkey	 must	 put	 in	 place	 new	 feed-in	 tariffs	 and	 incentives.	 Currently,	 wind	power	plants	in	Turkey	benefit	from	state	incentives.	For	instance,	if	the	55%	of	the	materials	 used	 for	 plant	 construction	 is	 local,	 the	 state	 increases	 purchase	guarantee	 by	 30%,	 i.e.	 from	 10	 years	 to	 13	 years.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 new	legislative	 revision	 is	 still	 not	 sufficient	 to	 encourage	 the	 utilisation	 and	installation	of	new	power	plants.		II. General	 Electric,	 one	 of	 the	world's	 leading	 energy	 companies,	 has	 been	 in	 the	process	 of	 building	 local	 wind	 turbines	 in	 Turkey.	 Doğa	 Derneği,	 a	 non-governmental	organisation	active	in	Turkey,	points	out	to	the	potential	threat	of	building	 wind	 farms	 and	 photovoltaic	 facilities	 in	 areas	 inhabited	 by	 Eastern	Imperial	 Eagles.	 The	 remaining	 35	 breeding	 pairs	 of	 Imperial	 Eagles	 are	
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documented	 in	 the	 Thrace	 region,	 and	 four	 pairs	 inhabit	 Istanbul	 where	 the	rising	wind	turbines	can	make	the	habitat	unsuitable	for	breeding,	hunting,	and	dispersal	(Doga	Dernegi	2014).	III. Wind-generated	power,	similar	to	solar	or	hydropower,	is	variable	in	nature.	By	wind-generated	power	resources,	the	amount	of	electricity	produced	at	any	given	point	 in	 time,	 by	 a	 given	 plant,	 will	 depend	 on	 wind	 speeds,	 air	 density	 and	turbine	characteristics.	To	avoid	voltage	 fluctuations,	 some	necessary	measures	associated	 with	 the	 grid	 circuit	 connection	 must	 be	 determined.	 Accordingly,	wind	power,	which	will	be	connected	to	the	network,	cannot	exceed	5%	of	short-circuit	 power	 of	 the	 network.	 In	 Turkey,	 there	 is	 an	 assumed	 constant	 circuit	angle	rate,	as	a	consequence	of	technical	calculations	which	is	valid	for	the	whole	country.	Nevertheless,	in	practice,	this	rate	may	vary	from	region	to	region.	It	is,	therefore,	 significant	 to	 review	 the	 connection	 criteria	 and	 rate	 of	 the	 power	plants	to	actualise	more	wind	energy	projects.	IV. Constrained	or	lack	of	transmission	capacity	is	one	of	the	significant	barriers	to	the	development	of	wind	power	plants	in	Turkey,	since	the	most	favourable	areas	for	wind	power	are	typically	located	far	from	load	centres.	The	transmission	lines	to	 those	 specific	 areas	 would	 have	 to	 be	 planned	 to	 deliver	 power	 from	 all	potential	wind	power	plants	to	achieve	the	goal	of	installing	20,000	MW	of	wind	power	 plants	 by	 2023.	 This	 requires	 substantial	 upfront	 investment	 in	transmission	 capacity,	 which	 private	 project	 developers	 would	 be	 reluctant	 to	finance,	placing	the	burden	on	public	financing.	Turkey	has	a	 significant	potential	 for	wind	power	development	with	 its	 coastal	length	of	7,200km	and	high	average	annual	wind	velocities,	creating	the	potential	for	the	efficient	utilisation	of	 the	Mediterranean	shores,	Aegean	Sea	 coast	areas	and	northern	and	western	parts	of	the	Marmara	Sea	coast	(Arioglu	Akan,	et	al.,	2015).	Concerning	the	environmental	 impacts	 of	 wind	 power	 plants,	 the	 global	 warming	 potential	 of	 wind	power	 is	 88%	 lower	 than	 for	 geothermal	 electricity	 and	 11%	 lower	 than	 large	hydropower.	To	 reach	 its	 2023	 target	 of	 20,000	 MW	 wind	 power	 plants,	 a	 total	 installed	capacity	of	nearly	16,000	MW	or	(2,000	MW	annually)	wind	power	must	be	constructed	and	 integrated	 to	 the	 grid	 between	 2015-2023.	 According	 to	 the	 International	Renewable	 Energy	 Agency’s	 2015	 report	 on	 ‘renewable	 power	 generation	 costs’,	 the	capital	 investment	 for	 wind	 energy	 turbines	 varied	 from	 US$1,127/kwh	 to	
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US$1,376/kwh	in	2014,	in	developed	countries.	Ultimately,	the	calculations	show	us,	in	order	 to	 fulfil	 its	 energy	 goals,	 Turkey	must	 spend	 between	 $18.0	 billion	 and	 $22.70	billion	in	the	next	eight	years	for	the	construction	of	wind	power	plants	(IRENA,	2015).	In	addition	to	that,	the	wind	turbines	have	a	limited	lifetime,	varying	between	20	and	25	years.		
5.3.	 Hydroelectrical	Power		Water	and	energy	are	intrinsically	interrelated	and	connected:	We	need	energy	to	extract,	 transport	and	distribute	clean	and	 fresh	water	and	we	need	water	 to	produce	clean	energy.	This	kind	of	relationship	between	water	and	energy	was	labelled	“water-energy	 nexus”	 in	 1994	 by	 Peter	 H.	 Gleick,	 an	 American	 scientist	 working	 on	environmental	issues.	Due	to	the	rising	concerns	regarding	the	sustainable	use	of	fresh	water	 sources,	 Gleick	 historically	 drew	 the	 attention	 of	 scholars,	 to	 the	 physical	 and	environmental	 constraints	 in	humankind’s	 use	of	 hydro	 sources,	which	 in	 the	present	day	are	beginning	to	manifest	(Gleick,	1994	S.	267).	The	conceptualisations	of	the	water-energy	 nexus	 are	 limited	 by	 understandings	 of	 resource	 or	 commodity	 orientations,	scarcity	 or	 efficiency	 driven	 views	 and	 resource	 supply-demand	 relations	 in	 technical	terms	 (Eren,	 2018	 S.	 22).	 In	 addition	 to	 its	 technical	 peculiarities,	 the	 water-energy	nexus	is	inherently	under	the	influence	of	social,	political	and	economic	powers.	Hydropower	 is	 considered	 as	 a	 clean,	 renewable	 energy	 source,	 as	 it	 uses	 the	Earth's	 water	 cycle	 to	 generate	 electricity.	 Around	 one	 third	 of	 the	 solar	 radiation	reaching	the	Earth	is	responsible	for	the	running	of	hydrologic	cycle	(Ozis,	et	al.,	2008).	Therefore,	 the	 cycle	 is	 a	 never-ending	 system,	 so	 long	 as	 the	 Sun	 exists.	 The	manipulation	of	water	sources	by	human	beings	dates	back	to	dawn	of	civilisation	-	even	outside	 the	 realm	 of	 energy	 generation	 purposes	 -	 as	 the	Mesopotamians	 built	 dams,	irrigation	canals	and	town	water	supply	systems	at	least	8,000	years	ago,	from	3,000	BC	in	 Jordan	(Erdogdu,	2011	S.	690).	The	vertical	water	wheel	was	created	 in	 the	Middle	East	during	the	first	century	of	BC	identified	by	the	earliest	textual	reference	by	Greek	geographer	 Strabo	 (Jones,	 1924),	 describing	 a	 water	 mill	 in	 the	 new	 palace	 of	Mithridatus	 VII	 Eupator,	 King	 of	 Pontus	 at	 Cabeira	 (Niksar,	north	 of	 Turkey)	 (Viollet,	2017	 S.	 571).	Romans	knew	about	waterwheels,	 nevertheless,	 did	not	 extensively	use	them	until	the	fourteenth	century.	The	initial	purposes	were	graining	wheat	into	flour,	sawing	wood,	powering	textile	mills	and	later	operating	manufacturing	plants	(Gulliver,	et	 al.,	 1991	 S.	 1.2).	 At	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Middle	 Ages	 and	 at	 the	 eve	 of	 the	 Industrial	
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Revolution,	 the	 water	 wheels	 were	 the	 support	 to	 many	 economical	 pre-industrial	activities	such	as	fulling	paper	mills,	treading	cane	for	sugar	processing,	moving	bellows	and	water	hammers	for	metallurgy	(forges)	(Viollet,	2017	S.	570).	During	the	nineteenth	century,	 hydropower	 became,	 for	 the	 first	 time,	 a	 source	 for	 electricity	 generation.	Although	 some	 forms	of	hydroelectric	 turbine	development	date	back	 to	1750,	Benoit	Fourneyron,	a	French	engineer,	is	credited	with	his	contributions	to	the	development	of	the	first	modern	turbine	in	1833	(Gulliver,	et	al.,	1991	S.	1.2).	Today,	 the	 most	 significant	 share	 of	 new	 hydropower	 is	 held	 by	 China,	 which	accounts	 for	 around	one-half	 of	 the	world	 hydropower	 capacity.	Other	 countries	with	substantial	additions	in	2015	were	Brazil,	Turkey,	India,	Vietnam,	Malaysia,	Canada	and	Colombia.	 In	 Turkey,	 hydropower	 is	 the	 most	 developed	 renewable	 energy	 source	among	the	installed	renewable	energies.	This	 is	predominantly	due	to	the	fact	that	the	country	 has	 the	 geographical	 advantage	 of	 suitable	water	 resources,	 located	 in	 seven	regions.	Additionally,	Turkey	has	historically	been	host	to	several	different	civilisations	and	 these	 civilisations	 were	 engaged	 in	 various	 hydro-works.	 With	 respect	 to	 this	background,	 next	 sub-chapter	 aims	 to	 analyse	 the	 historical	 development	 of	 water	works,	the	current	status	of	electricity	generation	from	hydro	resources,	as	well	as	the	environmental	and	societal	impacts	of	hydropower	plants	in	Turkey.	
5.3.1.	 Hydraulic	Works	in	Turkey		 Regarding	 the	 history	 of	water	works,	 Turkey	 –	 particularly	 ancient	 Anatolia	 –	can	 be	 identified	 as	 one	 of	 the	most	 important	 locations	 in	 the	world.	 As	 Turkey	 has	historically	hosted	many	civilisations,	there	are	remains	of	dams,	irrigation	canals,	water	collection	and	water	power	structures,	dating	back	over	the	last	4000	years.	The	oldest	hydraulic	works	in	Turkey,	such	as	dams,	irrigation	canals	and	water	collection	 structures,	 date	 back	 to	 the	 second	 Millennium	 BC,	 the	 Hittite	 period	 in	Central	Anatolia.	During	 the	Urartu	period	 in	Eastern	Anatolia,	 in	 the	 first	half	of	 the	first	 Millennium	 BC,	 several	 small	 dams,	 water	 supply	 and	 irrigation	 canals	 were	constructed.	 Following	 this,	 the	 number	 of	 water	 and	 hydropower	 structures	substantially	 increased	during	 the	Hellenistic,	Roman	and	Byzantine	periods,	 in	 the	second	half	of	the	first	Millennium	BC	and	the	first	half	of	the	first	Millennium	AD.	This	period	 witnessed	 the	 construction	 of	 long-distance	 water	 supply	 schemes,	 multiple	water	 conveyance	 systems,	 water	 distribution	 and	 wastewater	 collection	 systems,	tunnel-like	 twin	 structures	 covering	 water	 courses,	 tunnels,	 river	 diversion	 systems,	
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dams,	 water	 mills	 and	 even	 hydro-powered	 stone	 saws	 in	 Western	 and	 Southern	Turkey.	 The	 longest	 water	 conveyance	 systems	 and	 aqueducts	 of	 ancient	 times	 were	built	during	the	 late	Roman	Empire	and	Byzantines,	 for	the	capital	city	Constantinople	(Istanbul),	which	were	later	used	by	several	ottoman	water	conveyance	systems.	During	the	Seljukide	period,	like	the	previous	periods,	dams,	irrigation	canals,	watermills	and	hydropower	 structures	were	built,	 between	 the	11th	 and	14th	 centuries	 in	Central	 and	Eastern	Anatolia.	One	of	the	most	interesting	cases	is	the	Seljukide	Haburman	masonry	bridge,	 which	 is	 the	 most	 ancient	 water	 power	 scheme	 in	 Anatolia	 and	 is	 still	 in	operation	 (Ozis,	 2015	 S.	 564).	Moreover,	 the	 famous	 Abo-I	 Iz	 Al-Jazari,	 whose	 names	were,	 afterwards,	 given	 to	 the	 town	 “Cizre”	 in	 South-eastern	 Anatolia	 of	 Turkey,	designed	 ingenious	 hydromechanical	 devices,	 which	 are	 predecessors	 of	 present-day	hydraulic	instruments	(Angelakis,	et	al.,	2016).	During	 the	 Ottoman	 Empire	 era,	 water	 supply	 and	 conveyance	 schemes	 with	several	 aqueducts	 and	 tunnel	 sections,	 water	 distribution	 and	 wastewater	 collection	systems	as	well	 as	 river	diversion	 systems,	 gained	acceleration	 thanks	 to	 the	multiple	works	 of	 the	 famous	 engineer	 and	 architect	 Sinan	 (known	 in	 Turkey	 as	 Mimar	(architect)	Sinan	or	Koca	(the	greatest)	Sinan).	During	the	 final	years	of	 the	Empire,	 in	1902,	the	first	electricity	was	generated	at	the	Tarsus	hydroelectric	scheme	(see	chapter	4.1.1.),	which	utilised	the	elevation	difference	of	the	Berdan	River	at	Tarsus	falls	in	the	Mediterranean	part	of	Turkey	(Ozis,	2015	S.	569).	In	Turkey	the	hydroelectricity	infrastructure	connects	the	national	context	of	the	water-energy	nexus	to	its	local	context,	as	they	are	planned,	developed	and	approved	on	the	national	 level,	run	by	the	private	companies	or	the	state,	and	operated	in	the	river	valleys	on	the	local	level	(Eren,	2018	S.	23).		
5.3.2.	 The	Current	Status	of	Electricity	Generation	from	Hydro	Resources		 From	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	Republic	 of	 Turkey	 in	 1923,	 until	 the	 liberalisation	period	 in	 1980,	 the	 main	 target	 of	 the	 Turkish	 policy	 makers	 was	 to	 develop	 the	utilisation	 of	 primary	 domestic	 energy	 sources,	 such	 as	 hydro	 and	 coal,	 to	 meet	 the	energy	 demand.	 In	 1930,	 the	 government	 tried	 to	 increase	 electricity	 production	through	the	operation	of	hydropower	plants.	Except	some	efforts	for	hydropower,	there	were	no	considerable	development	in	renewable	energy	sources,	including	wind,	solar,	biomass	or	biofuel.	While	the	installed	capacity	of	the	hydroelectric	power	plant	was	3.2	MW	in	1932,	 it	had	 increased	nearly	100	folds	by	1959	(TEIAS,	2012).	The	1980	coup	
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was	a	milestone	 in	 the	political	economic	path	 toward	 liberalisation	and	privatisation,	which	 had	 a	 dramatic	 impact	 on	 the	 social,	 economic	 and	 political	 dynamics	 of	 the	country	 (Eren,	 2018	 S.	 23).	 Following	 the	 1980	 liberal	 period,	 some	 legal	 regulations	were	adopted	 to	 reduce	 the	public	 share	 in	 the	economy	and	attract	potential	private	investors	 to	 the	 market.	 By	 the	 end	 of	 the	 1990s,	 it	 was	 determined	 that	 the	 quasi-privatisation	policies	were	not	functional	and	even	rapidly	damaged	the	fiscal	situation.	Turkey	made	a	concrete	step	 to	establish	a	competitive	electricity	market	 through	the	adoption	 of	 Electricity	 Market	 Law	 in	 2001,	 to	 promote	 private	 participation	 and	improve	 the	 efficiency	 in	 electricity	 supply.	 As	 the	AKP	 came	 to	 power	 in	 2002,	 state	policies	exhibited	an	obvious	inclination	toward	liberalisation	(Eren,	2018	S.	23).	Since	the	 AKP	 came	 to	 power	 in	 2002,	 the	 state	 has	made	 a	 series	 of	 changes	 to	 open	 the	electricity	 sector	 to	 private	 investors	 for	 capital	 accumulation	 and	 to	 attract	 private	companies	to	the	hydroelectricity	sector	(Eren,	2018	S.	24).	Between	2011-2015	alone,	a	total	of	50	hydroelectric	power	plants,	with	a	total	installed	capacity	of	168.5	GW,	were	privatised	 through	 the	 amendment	 of	 the	 new	 electricity	 law	 (IEA,	 2016).	 The	 state	approved	 multiple	 projects	 along	 one	 single	 river,	 completely	 and	 continuously	interrupting	 the	 natural	 hydrological	 flow	 (Eren,	 2018	 S.	 24).	 Hydroelectricity	production	 has	 become	 an	 attractive	 business	 option	 for	 the	 profit-seeking	entrepreneurs	 and	 companies	 with	 or	 without	 sectoral	 experience.	 This	 hydro-boom	(Eren,	2018	S.	24)	and	rapid	hydroelectricity	development	programme	have,	therefore,	had	 immense	 adverse	 effects	 on	 the	 livelihoods	 of	 the	 local	 people,	 fish	 species,	biodiversity	and	environment.		The	 gross	 theoretically	 viable	 hydroelectric	 potential	 and	 technically	 viable	potential	of	Turkey	are	the	highest	in	Europe,	with	433	billion	kwh	and	216	billion	kwh,	respectively.	 The	 economically	 feasible	 potential,	 however,	 is	 only	 140	 billion	 kwh	(Inlawco	law	offices,	2017).	The	cost-effective	hydroelectric	potential	of	Turkey	is	16%	of	Europe's	 economically	 feasible	hydroelectric	 potential.	Nevertheless,	 in	 comparison	to	the	other	countries	possessing	hydropower	possibilities	in	Europe,	Turkey	uses	only	a	 small	 amount	 of	 its	 hydropower	potential.	 By	 the	 end	of	 2015,	 hydro	 accounted	 for	25.8%	 of	 total	 electricity	 generation	 of	 Turkey.	 The	 total	 hydropower	 installed	electricity	 generating	 capacity,	 increased	 in	Turkey	by	 2.2	GW	 reaching	23.6	GW.	The	heavy	 fluctuations	 in	 rainfall	 affected	 the	 hydropower	 production.	 Following	 a	 dry	period	and	sharp	drop	out	in	2014,	production	bounded	back	in	2015,	by	nearly	66%,	to	66.9	twh	(REN21,	2016).		
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As	 stated	 in	 the	 2023	 energy	 goals	 of	 the	 Turkish	 MENR,	 the	 installed	hydropower	 capacity	 is	 aimed	 to	 reach	 36	GW	until	 2023.	 Referring	 to	 IRENA’s	 2015	“Renewable	 Power	 Generation	 Costs”	 report,	 the	 total	 installed	 cost	 for	 large-scale	hydropower	plants,	typically	varies	between	$1,000	kwh	and	$3,500	kwh.	Nevertheless,	it	 is	also	possible	 to	 find	projects	with	different	costs	outside	 this	 range.	For	 instance,	installing	 hydropower	 capacity	 at	 an	 existing	 dam	 that	 was	 built	 for	 other	 purposes	(such	as	flood	control	or	water	provision),	may	have	less	costs	than	given	range,	around	$450	 kwh.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 projects	 at	 remote	 sites,	 located	 far	 from	 existing	transmission	 networks	 and	without	 sufficient	 local	 infrastructure,	 can	 cost	more	 than	$3,500	kwh	due	to	higher	logistical	and	grid	connection	costs	(IRENA,	2015).	Since	there	is	 no	 certain	 information	 regarding	 the	 exact	 locations	 for	 the	 new	 hydropower	investments,	it	is	not	possible	to	determine	in	which	range	of	the	calculation	costs	these	hydropower	plants	will	belong.	Therefore,	using	the	lowest	and	highest	values	of	$450	kwh	and	$3,500	kwh,	can	provide	more	coherent	results.	As	indicated	before,	Turkey’s	installed	 hydropower	 capacity	 ranks	 23,643	 MW	 in	 2015.	 Accordingly,	 the	 country	needs	 to	 add	 12,357	MW	 hydropower	 installations	 to	 reach	 its	 target.	 Therefore,	 the	calculations	show	that	Turkey	needs	to	spend	between	$5.5	billion	and	$43.2	in	the	next	eight	years	for	the	construction	of	hydropower	plants.		These	 calculations	 show	 the	 necessity	 for	 huge	 amounts	 of	 investments	 to	support	the	installation	of	new	hydropower	plants.	For	the	investors	and	developers	of	hydropower	 plants,	 Turkey	 has	 always	 been	 an	 attractive	 choice	 due	 to	 the	 low-cost	labour	force	and	large	portfolio	of	civil	and	mechanical	engineers	working	in	the	field	of	hydropower.	Furthermore,	all	 the	civil	works	construction	materials	and	goods	can	be	provided	 from	 the	 province	 where	 the	 project	 is	 being	 developed,	 which	 decreases	shipping	costs	during	the	construction	phase	(Appleyard,	et	al.,	2014).	Nonetheless,	the	uncertainties	regarding	the	location	and	the	investment	plans	of	proposed	hydropower	plants	still	need	to	be	clarified.		
5.3.3.	 The	Contribution	of	Major	Hydroelectric	Power	to	Turkey’s	Energy	Supply		The	 characteristic	 features	 of	 Turkey's	 geographic	 location	 make	 the	 country	unique	 in	 the	 region.	 The	 total	 length	 of	 its	 land	 borders	 and	 coastline	 is	 10,765km.	2,949km	from	this	total	represent	 land	borders	while	7,816km	indicate	coastline	(DSI,	2006).	The	average	altitude	(1,132m)	of	Turkey	is	higher	than	that	of	Asia	(1,050m)	and	three	 and	 a	 half	 times	 greater	 than	 that	 of	 Europe	 (330m)(DSI,	 2006).	 Turkey	 has	
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around	120	natural	lakes.	The	Lake	Van	with	a	surface	area	of	3,712km2	and	an	altitude	of	1,646m	from	sea	 level,	 is	 the	 largest	and	deepest	 in	the	country.	The	Salt	Lake	(Tuz	Gölü)	in	central	Anatolia,	follows	the	Lake	Van	as	the	second	place	with	a	height	of	925m	from	sea	level	and	a	surface	area	of	1,500km2	(DSI,	2006).		According	 to	 the	 data	 of	 Turkey’s	 General	 Directorate	 of	 State	 for	 Hydraulic	Works	(DSI),	by	the	end	of	2015,	 the	number	of	hydroelectric	plants	had	risen	to	562,	which	were	located	in	70	provinces	and	held	a	total	installed	capacity	of	26	GW.	12	GW	of	 this	 total	 amount	was	 constructed	and	developed	by	 the	State	 for	Hydraulic	Works	(DSI,	2015).	The	 largest	reservoirs,	regarding	their	surface	areas,	are	 the	Atatürk	Dam	with	817km2,	Keban	Dam	with	675km2,	Karakaya	Dam	with	268km2,	Hirfanlı	Dam	with	263km2,	Altınkaya	Dam	with	118km2	and	Kurtboğazı	Dam	with	6	km2	(DSI,	2006).	The	water	 collected	 in	 these	 dams,	 is	 principally	 used	 for	 irrigation	 facilities,	 domestic	consumption	 and	 to	 generate	 hydroelectric	 power.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 high	 number	 of	natural	 lakes,	 Turkey	 has	 many	 streams	 and	 rivers.	 The	 freshwater	 reserves	 of	 the	country	have	been	divided	into	25	river	basins,	whereas	more	than	95%	of	the	country's	hydropower	potential	is	distributed	into	14	river	basins	(Melikoglu,	2013	S.	505).	Some	of	 the	major	 rivers,	with	 considerable	 lengths	 are:	 Kızılırmak	with	 1,355km	 (empties	into	 the	 Black	 Sea),	 Euphrates	 (Fırat	 Nehri)	 which	 travels	 to	 the	 Syrian	 border	 with	1,263km,	Aras	travelling	to	the	Armenian	border	with	548km,	Tigris	(Dicle	Nehri)	with	523km	(empties	into	the	Persian	Gulf),	Yeşilırmak	with	519km	(empties	into	the	Black	Sea)	and	Ceyhan	with	509km	(empties	into	the	Mediterranean	Sea)	(DSI,	2006).		Regarding	 the	 rivers	 and	 streams,	 the	 total	 economically	 feasible	 hydropower	potential	of	Turkey's	major	river	basins	account	for	129.5	twh	per	year.	The	Black	Sea	region,	 with	 its	 steep	 and	 rocky	 mountains	 which	 extend	 along	 the	 coastline,	 has	 a	significant	hydropower	potential	(Melikoglu,	2013	S.	505).	The	most	significant	streams,	regarding	 their	 annual	 economic	 potential,	 are	 Euphrates	 (Firat)	 (37.8	 twh),	 Tigris	(Dicle)	 (16.5	 twh),	 Eastern	 Black	 Sea	 Basin	 (13.1	 twh),	 Coruh	 (10	 twh),	 Seyhan	 (6.9	twh),	 East	 Mediterranean	 Basin	 (6.7	 twh)	 and	 Kizilirmak	 (6.4	 twh)	 (Kücükali	 2008).	Euphrates-Tigris	(Fırat-Dicle)	with	their	184,918	km2	drainage	area	and	elevation	range	between	500-5,000m,	are	estimated	to	hold	30%	of	the	country's	hydropower	potential	(Melikoglu,	 2013).	 Around	 90%	 of	 the	 Euphrates’	 flow	 and	 46%	 of	 the	 Tigris’	 flow	originates	 in	Turkey.	 For	 this	 reason,	 the	 South-eastern	Anatolian	Project	 (Güneydogu	
Anadolu	Projesi	–	GAP)	 is	one	of	the	most	 important	hydropower	projects	 in	Turkey,	 in	
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order	 to	meet	 local	 energy	needs.	This	will	 be	 further	discussed	 in	 the	 following	 sub-chapter.	
5.3.4.	 The	Role	of	the	South-eastern	Anatolian	Project	(GAP)		The	GAP	plays	a	significant	role	in	meeting	the	local	energy	requirements,	as	well	as	in	the	sustainable	development	of	Turkey’s	agricultural	and	rural	sector.	GAP	is	one	of	the	largest	power	generation,	irrigation,	and	regional	development	projects	of	its	kind	in	the	world,	 covering	 3	million	 h	 of	 agricultural	 land.	 This	 agricultural	 area	 represents	over	 10%	 of	 the	 cultivable	 land	 in	 Turkey.	 The	 GAP	 consists	 of	 22	 dams	 and	 19	hydroelectric	power	plants,	with	a	total	generation	capacity	of	around	27	billion	kwh	of	electricity	per	year	and	irrigation	networks	for	an	area	of	approximately	1.8	million	h.	The	existence	of	the	dams	is	essential,	not	only	for	irrigation	and	hydropower,	but	also	for	the	domestic	water	supply	in	the	major	cities	(Yüksel,	2015).	At	the	very	outset,	the	GAP	Regional	Plan,	dating	back	to	1977,	was	perceived	as	a	program	to	develop	water	and	 land	 resources	 in	 the	 region.	The	 idea	of	utilising	water	 resources	 in	Turkey	 first	emerged	during	 the	 time	of	Atatürk,	 the	 founder	of	 the	Turkish	Republic.	 Initial	 steps	were	 also	 taken	 in	 1936,	with	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 Administration	 for	 Electricity	Studies	upon	the	order	of	Atatürk.	The	Administration	for	Electricity	Studies	started	its	reconnaissance	 work	 on	 the	 ‘Keban	 Project’,	 to	 produce	 energy	 from	 the	 water	resources,	Euphrates	and	Tigris	basins	(Ministry	of	Development,	2014).	GAP	 is	 a	 multi-sector,	 integrated	 regional	 development	 project,	 aiming	 to	improve	the	living	standards	and	income	levels	of	people	in	the	South-eastern	Anatolian	region	and	to	thereby	eliminate	regional	development	disparities	between	the	east	and	west	 of	 Turkey,	 contributing	 to	 social	 stability,	 economic	 growth	 and	 employment	opportunities	 in	 the	 rural	 sector.	 The	 project	 area	 covers	 nine	 provinces	 in	 the	Euphrates-Tigris	 basins	 and	 Upper	 Mesopotamia:	 Adıyaman,	 Batman,	 Diyarbakır,	Gaziantep,	 Kilis,	 Mardin,	 Siirt,	 Şanlıurfa	 and	 Şırnak	 (Ministry	 of	 Industry	 and	Technology,	2017).	The	Euphrates	and	Tigris	rivers	represent	over	28%	of	the	country’s	river-based	water	 supply	 and	 the	 economically	 irrigable	 areas	 in	 the	 region	make	 up	20%	of	those	for	the	whole	Turkey.	The	 basic	 components	 of	 sustainable	 development	 in	 the	 GAP	 region,	 were	identified	 as	 social,	 agricultural,	 physical,	 spatial	 and	 environmental	 sustainability	 as	well	as	economic	viability	(Yüksel,	2015).	Moreover,	energy	is	a	key	element	of	the	GAP,	as	the	region’s	energy	production	capacity	is	larger	than	its	consumption.	Nevertheless,	
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up	 until	 now,	 the	 energy	 consumption	 of	 the	 region	 is	 much	 above	 its	 production.	Furthermore,	 the	 region	 is	 still	 suffering	 from	 persistent	 problems,	 such	 as	 terrorist	attacks,	unemployment,	shortage	of	qualified	labour,	poor	education	infrastructure,	low	levels	 of	 education,	 insufficient	 health	 infrastructure	 and	 services,	 difficulty	 to	 access	drinking	 water,	 poor	 rural	 infrastructure,	 insufficiency	 of	 industrial	 and	 energy	infrastructure	and	low	levels	of	capital	accumulation	(Ministry	of	Development,	2014).	The	GAP	region	 is	 still	 the	of	 the	 less	developed	regions	 in	Turkey.	Despite	 these	 long	lasting	and	persistent	problems,	10	hydraulic	power	plants	(HPP)	have	been	completed	under	 the	GAP	and	physical	 realisation	 in	energy	 investment	has	 reached	74%	(Table	12).	
Table	12.	Status	of	GAP	Energy	Projects	in	terms	of	Physical	Realisation	in	2014	
Project	 Established	power	(MW)	 Energy	production		(GWh)	 Present	status	of	the	project	 In	operation	since	
EUPHRATES	BASIN	 5.370	 20.216	 	 	Karakaya	Dam	and	HPP*	 1.800	 7.354	 In	operation	 1987	Atatürk	Dam	and	HPP		 2.450	 8.900	 In	operation	 1993	Birecik	Dam	and	HPP	 672	 2.516	 In	operation	 2000	Karkamis	Dam	and	HPP	 180	 652	 In	operation	 1999	Kahta	Dam	and	HPP	 75	 171	 Master	plan	 	Sanliurfa	HPP	 50	 124	 In	operation	 2005	Kocali	Dam	and	HPP	 39	 187	 Master	plan	 	Büyükcay	Dam	and	HPP	 30	 84	 Master	plan	 	Sirimtas	Dam	and	HPP	 26	 87	 U.	construction	 	Fatopasa	HPP	 22	 47	 Master	plan	 	Cagcag	HPP	 14	 42	 In	operation	 1968	Erkenek	 12	 52	 In	operation	 2010	
TIGRIS	BASIN	 2.172	 7.245	 	 	Ilisu	Dam	and	HPP	 1.200	 3.833	 U.	construction	 	Cizre	Dam	and	HPP	 240	 1.208	 Master	plan	 	Batman	Dam	and	HPP	 198	 483	 In	operation	 2003	Silvan	Dam	and	HPP	 150	 623	 U.	construction	 	Dicle	Dam	and	HPP	 110	 296	 In	operation	 1999	Kralkizi	Dam	and	HPP	 94	 146	 In	operation	 1998	Kayser	Dam	and	HPP	 90	 341	 Master	plan	 	Garzan	Dam	and	HPP	 90	 315	 Reconnaissance	 	
TOTAL	 7.542	 27.461	 	 	
Data	source:	(Ministry	of	Development,	2014)		
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As	shown	 in	Table	13	Turkey’s	electricity	generation	 from	hydro	resources	has	increased	during	the	last	two	decades	reaching	59.3	billion	kwh	in	2013.	Hydroelectric	generation	 from	GAP	has	 shown	 fluctuations	 and	 reached	 almost	 the	 same	amount	of	energy	 in	2013	(16.9	billion	kwh)	as	 it	held	 in	1995	(16.1	billion	kwh).	Therefore,	 the	share	of	power	generation	from	GAP	in	Turkey’s	total	electricity	production	from	water	sources	has	gradually	decreased.		
Table	13.	The	Comparison	of	the	Energy	Production	between	Turkey	and	GAP	
Years	 Turkey	Hydraulic	(kwh)	
GAP	
Hydraulic	(kwh)	
GAP/	Turkey	Hydraulic		
(%)	1997	 39,8	 19,4	 48,7	1998	 42,2	 20,1	 47,5	1999	 34,6	 14,8	 42,7	2000	 30,9	 12,1	 39,2	2001	 24,0	 11,5	 47,9	2002	 33,7	 12,4	 36,8	2003	 35,3	 15,3	 43,3	2004	 46,1	 22,4	 48,7	2005	 39,6	 18,7	 47,2	2006	 44,2	 21,4	 48,5	2007	 35,8	 18,2	 51,0	2008	 33,3	 15,6	 47,0	2009	 35,9	 12,1	 33,7	2010	 51,5	 17,5	 34,0	2011	 36,7	 17,3	 44,4	2012	 57,9	 19,2	 33,2	2013	 59,3	 16,9	 28,5	
Data	source	(Ministry	of	Development,	2014).		 This	 table	propounds	 the	 fact	 there	 are	no	 substantial	 developments	 regarding	the	electricity	generation	from	the	GAP,	due	to	not	all	hydropower	plant	projects	being	completed	or	yet	in	operation.	When	all	proposed	projects	are	completed,	it	is	assumed	that	27	billion	kwh	of	electricity	will	be	generated	from	the	GAP	region	annually,	which	alone	 represents	 45%	 of	 the	 total	 economically	 exploitable	 hydroelectric	 potential	 in	Turkey.	
5.3.5.	 The	Environmental	Impacts		Despite	 being	 a	 rather	 clean	 and	 environmentally	 friendly	 energy	 source	regarding	greenhouse	gas	emission	rates,	the	hydroelectric	power	plants	also	have	some	
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adverse	environmental	impacts,	which	need	to	be	considered.	These	negative	effects	will	be	clarified	in	general	terms,	to	also	address	the	Turkey-specific	impacts:	
• Hydropower	 has	 a	 lower	 climate	 impact	 because	 no	 fuels	 are	 burned.	Nevertheless,	when	associated	with	the	construction	of	a	dam,	a	large	amount	of	vegetation	 grows	 along	 the	 riverbed,	 which	 can	 decompose	 in	 the	 lake.	 This	decomposition	causes	reproduction	and	release	of	methane,	a	potent	greenhouse	gas.	
• Though	being	 clean	 and	 efficient,	 hydropower	 requires	 the	use	 of	 dams,	which	can	cause	flooding,	the	altering	of	ecosystems	and	affects	the	wildlife	and	people	that	 depend	 on	 those	 rivers.	 Flooding	 land	 for	 a	 hydroelectric	 dam	 has	 acute	environmental	 drawbacks:	 it	 destroys	 the	 forest,	 wildlife	 habitat,	 agricultural	land	and	scenic	areas.	According	to	(Baskaya,	et	al.,	2011	S.	3286-88),	in	nearly	all	the	plants	under	 construction,	hardly	 any	precautions	are	 taken	 to	prevent	 the	negative	environmental	effects	of	solid	and	liquid	wastes	such	as	glass,	nylon,	tin,	paper,	waste	water	 from	toilets	and	kitchen	sinks	and	 the	oil	used	 in	machines	and	other	equipment.	
• Although	hydropower	has	no	impact	on	air	quality,	construction	and	operation	of	hydropower	dams	may	cause	alteration	of	ecosystem	biogeochemistry,	affecting	natural	 river	 systems,	 fish,	 and	 wildlife	 populations	 and	 emanate	 loss	 of	agriculturally	 productive	 and	 alluvial	 bottomland	 (Melikoglu,	 2013).	Hydroelectric	 dams	 can	 cause	 erosion	 along	 the	 riverbed	 upstream	 and	downstream.	
• The	initial	capital	costs	for	a	hydropower	plant	can	be	relatively	high.	However,	the	 project	 itself	 has	 low	 production	 costs,	 and	 it	 does	 not	 depend	 on	 foreign	capital	 and	 support	 when	 considering	 long-term	 economic	 evaluation	 (Yuksel,	2013).	Despite	 above	 listed	 negative	 effects,	 hydropower	 plants	 are	 predominantly	environmentally	 harmless	 energy	 production	 facilities.	 Hydroelectric	 power	 plants	release	water	back	into	rivers	after	it	passes	through	the	turbines.	Modern	turbines	can	convert	as	much	as	90%	of	the	available	energy	into	electricity,	whereas	the	best	fossil	fuel	 plants	manage	 only	 about	 50%	 (Melikoglu,	 2013).	 This	way	 of	 power	 generation	does	not	pollute	water.	The	plants	do	not	produce	a	substantial	amount	of	solid	waste.	The	 emission	 intensity	 (in	 tonnes	 CO2e/GWh)	 of	 hydroelectric	 plants	 are	substantially	 lower	 when	 compared	 to	 the	 emission	 rates	 of	 natural	 gas-	 and	 coal-
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generated	electricity	(Table	14).	Large	reservoir	hydropower	plants	have	high	biogenic	emissions	of	methane	and	their	global	warming	potential	 is	 two	times	higher	 than	the	small	reservoir	and	run-of-river	plants.	This	is	largely	because	of	the	greenhouse	gases	emitted	by	the	flooded	biomass	and	soil,	dependent	on	the	type	of	plant,	reservoir	size,	water	 depth	 and	 climate	 (Atilgan	 and	 Azapagic	 2016).	 Moreover,	 large	 reservoir	hydropower	 has	 the	 lowest	 depletion	 of	 elements	 and	 fossil	 resources	 as	 well	 as	acidification	(Atilgan	and	Azapagic	2016).	
Table	14.	Summary	of	Lifecycle	GHG	Emission	Intensity	
Technology	 Mean	 Low	 High	tons	CO2e/GWh	Lignite	 1,054	 790	 1,372	Coal	 888	 756	 1,310	Oil	 733	 547	 935	Natural	gas	 499	 362	 891	Solar	PV	 85	 13	 731	Biomass	 45	 10	 101	Nuclear	 29	 2	 130	Hydroelectric	 26	 2	 237	Wind	 26	 6	 124	
Data	Source:	Own	illustration	based	on	the	data	from	(WMA,	2011).		According	to	Figure	18,	coal	 fired	power	plants	have	the	highest	GHG	emission	intensities	 on	 a	 lifecycle	 basis.	 Although	 natural	 gas	 and	 to	 some	 degree	 oil,	 had	noticeably	 lower	 GHG	 emissions,	 biomass,	 nuclear,	 hydroelectric,	 wind	 and	 solar	photovoltaic,	all	have	lifecycle	GHG	emission	intensities	that	are	significantly	lower	than	fossil	 fuel	 based	 generation	 (WMA,	 2011),	 therefore	 they	 remain	 environmentally	friendlier	energy	sources.	
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Figure	18.	Lifecycle	Average	Emissions	Intensity	of	Electricity	Generation	Methods	
	
Data	source:	Own	illustration	based	on	the	data	from	(WMA,	2011).	
5.3.6.	 	The	Legal	Framework		 The	 construction	 of	 hydroelectric	 power	 plants	 in	 Turkey	 is	 regulated	 by	 the	“Regulation	 for	 the	 Issuance	 of	 Water-rights	 Agreements	 in	 order	 to	 Commence	Production	Activities	in	the	Energy	Market”.	This	regulation	sets	the	rules	and	principles	in	 respect	 to	 the	 “Water	 Rights	 Agreement”	 between	 the	 General	 Directorate	 of	 State	Hydraulic	 Works	 and	 the	 legal	 entities,	 which	 are	 operating	 within	 the	 scope	 of	 the	“Electricity	 Market	 Law”,	 for	 the	 issuance	 of	 production	 licenses,	 required	 to	 legally	install	 and	 run	 hydroelectric	 power	 plants	 (Turkish	 Water	 Assembly,	 2011).	 Before	construction	commences,	a	CED	Report	to	the	Ministry	of	Environment	and	Forests	must	be	 provided.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 receiving	 a	 “Positive	 CED”,	 the	 company	 works	 with	 the	General	Directorate	of	Forestry,	General	Directorate	of	National	Real	Estate	Properties	and	 third	 parties,	 on	 issues	 of	 expropriation	 and	 appurtenances.	 After	 architectural,	static,	 infrastructural	 and	 other	 technical	 assessments,	 the	 company	 receives	 a	construction	 permit.	 As	 soon	 as	 the	 construction	 has	 been	 properly	 completed,	 the	company	conducts	the	hydroelectric	power	plant	and	Energy	Transmission	Lines	tests	and	applies	to	TEIAS	for	the	registration.	The	Turkish	MENR	approves	the	applications	for	 hydroelectric	 power	 plants,	 while	 TEIAS	 approves	 the	 applications	 for	 Energy	Transmission	Lines.	After	receiving	successful	approvals	from	both	sides,	the	production	of	 electricity	 begins.	 Consequently,	 the	 legal	 process	 for	 the	 construction	 of	hydroelectric	 power	 plants	 is	 very	 complex	 and	 confusing	 for	 private	 companies.	
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Instead	of	preparing	a	single	strategic	document	to	regulate	the	ways	of	implementation	and	 thus	 simplify	 the	 bureaucratic	 procedures	 for	 the	 private	 investors,	 the	 Turkish	authorities	and	procedures	have	been	distributed	amongst	several	different	institutions	(Turkish	Water	Assembly,	2011).		
5.3.7.	 The	Societal	Impacts	of	Hydropower	Plants		 The	 legal	constraints	and	difficulties	are	not	 the	only	challenges	concerning	 the	construction	of	hydroelectric	power	plants.	There	are	also	serious	violations	regarding	human	rights	and	potential	threats	of	damage	to	flora	and	fauna,	especially	in	the	Black	Sea	 region.	 The	 licenses,	 given	 by	 the	 EPDK	 and	 the	 General	 Directorate	 of	 State	Hydraulic	Works	to	the	private	companies,	are	granted	without	any	assessment	of	social	and	 technical	 problems	 and	 without	 allowing	 the	 impacted	 people	 or	 the	 local	organisations	 a	 say	 regarding	 if	 or	how	 the	projects	 should	 run.	Alone	 in	2011,	EPDK	issued	 production	 licenses	 for	 761	 hydropower	 plants,	 which	 would	 be	 located	 in	national	 parks,	 natural	 parks,	 natural	 reserve	 areas,	 wildlife	 improvement	 zones,	specially	 protected	 environmental	 areas	 and	 natural	 protected	 areas.	 If	 these	 power	plants	 are	 installed,	 freshwater	 ecosystems	 and	 biodiversity	 would	 dramatically	 be	deteriorated.		Based	 on	 the	 Environmental	 Law	 No.	 2872,	 Article	 3	 (a),	 (b)	 and	 (e),	 the	ministries	and	local	authorities	are	obliged	to	create	a	participant	milieu,	that	allows	the	involvement	 of	 chambers,	 unions,	 non-governmental	 organisations	 and	 citizens	 to	govern	their	environmental	rights	(e-Mevzuat,	2006).	Nevertheless,	the	current	system	and	situation	 in	Turkey	do	not	allow	the	 local	people	 to	be	 informed,	 to	avoid	conflict	with	 the	 construction	 of	 the	 projects.	 According	 to	 the	 unofficial	 statements	 from	Turkish	authorities,	 thousands	of	dam	and	hydropower	schemes	are	 in	planning	 to	be	built	on	almost	all	of	 the	main	rivers	 in	Turkey,	 in	 line	with	the	vision	2023	targets	to	meet	 the	 aimed	 energy	 aim	 by	 2023.	 Up	 until	 now,	 there	 is	 no	 certain	 information	concerning	the	location	and	size	of	the	proposed	hydroelectric	power	plants.	Therefore,	it	 is	 not	 possible	 to	 carry	 out	 a	 specific	 environmental	 and	 social	 analysis	 for	 the	potential	impacts	of	the	hydropower	plants.	In	addition,	it	is	known	that	the	local	people	living	 in	 proximity	 of	 any	 dam	 and/or	 hydroelectric	 power	 plant	 project	 areas,	 often	generally	 receive	no	 regular	or	 substantial	 income.	Their	primary	 source	of	 income	 is	concentrated	 on	 farming,	 animal	 breeding	 and	 fishery.	 Hence,	 the	 river	 systems	 are	essential	for	the	survival	of	the	local	people.	Many	of	the	rivers,	particularly	in	the	Black	
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Sea	 region,	 are	under	 threat	of	being	destroyed	due	 to	 currently	 running	or	projected	hydroelectric	power	plants.	 Locals	 in	 the	 areas	with	 the	 support	 of	many	 civil	 society	organisations,	 like	Doga	Dernegi,	are	continually	gathering	to	resist	the	construction	of	these	power	plants.	Some	of	these	demonstrations	have	resulted	in	success	of	the	local	people,	that	the	proposed	projects	were	cancelled	or	postponed.	There	 are	 two	hydroelectric	 projects,	which	 I	would	 like	 to	 discuss	 in	 order	 to	demonstrate	 the	 importance	 of	 public	 acceptance	 in	 the	 water-energy	 nexus	relationship:	
5.3.7.1.	 The	Ikizdere	Valley	Hydroelectric	Project		 The	 Ikizdere	River	Basin	gives	a	unique	opportunity	 to	analyse	hydroelectricity	sector	in	relation	to	the	electricity	sector	for	two	reasons.	First,	 it	has	a	long	history	of	hydroelectricity	 production,	 as	 the	 first	 hydroelectricity	 plant	 was	 constructed	 in	 the	Valley	in	1950.	The	electricity	product	ion	was	started	in	1961	by	the	state.	Second,	the	‘sustainable	 development’,	 which	was	 launched	 in	 2003,	 has	 shaped	 the	 valley	 (Eren,	2018).	 The	 Ikizdere	 Hydroelectric	 Plant	 was	 privatised	 in	 2008	 and	 24	 new	 private	hydroelectricity	 projects	 emerged.	 The	 boom	 of	 emerging	 projects	 has	 mobilised	 the	local	 people,	 both	 collectively	 and	 in	 individual	 ways.	 Local	 opponents	 voiced	 their	opposition	 to	 the	hydroelectric	development	 in	 Ikizdere	 through	press	releases,	 street	protests,	 demonstrations	 including	 blocking	 highway	 traffic,	 occupying	 construction	sites	for	the	planned	hydroelectric	plants	and	opening	court	cases	to	cancel	the	projects	(Eren,	2018).	Under	the	name	of	‘sustainable	development’,	the	state	essentially	has	promoted	small-scale	 hydroelectricity	 plants	 as	 potential	 renewable	 energy	 producers.	 The	program	 was	 based	 upon	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 “run-of-the-river	 technology”	 has	 low	environmental	impact	due	to	its	low	capacity.	Furthermore,	these	sorts	of	power	plants	divert	water,	use	it	to	generate	electricity	and	then	release	it	back	into	the	river,	without	holding.	 Therefore,	 they	 have	 little	 effect	 on	 downstream	 users.	 Nevertheless,	 the	hydroelectric	structure	of	Ikizdere	Valley,	built	 in	1950s	and	early	2000s,	demonstrate	otherwise	(Eren,	2018	S.	25).	According	to	interview	results	and	outcomes	of	the	personal	observations	in	the	study	by	Aysen	Eren,	the	re-construction	of	Ikizdere	Hydroelectric	Plant	was	premised	on	increasing	the	profits	of	state	and	energy	companies.		
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First,	 the	 Ikizdere	Power	Plant,	 in	 the	1950s,	did	not	have	 the	 infrastructure	 to	store	 water.	 After	 privatisation,	 the	 private	 company	 initiated	 a	 revision	 project	 to	construct	 a	 water	 storage	 system,	 claiming	 that	 it	 was	 necessary	 due	 to	 technical	reasons.	Nevertheless,	 the	 local	people	who	worked	for	the	plant	construction	claimed	that	 the	project	actually	aimed	 to	 increase	profits	by	assuring	availability	of	water	 for	electricity	production	at	peak	times,	such	as	in	summer	(Eren,	2018	S.	26).	Second,	 the	water	 storing	 infrastructure	 of	 the	 plant	 takes	 control	 of	 the	 river	flow,	and	even	regulates	it.	The	quasi-dam	of	the	water	storing	system	blocks	the	river	flow,	 stores	 the	 water	 and	 releases	 only	 certain	 amounts	 of	 water,	 defined	 as	 the		‘minimum	water	requirement’	(MWR).	Principally,	each	hydroelectric	plant	is	required	to	 leave	water	 in	 the	 riverbed	after	diverting	 the	 river	 flow	 for	 electricity	production.	Moreover,	 filling	 the	 regulation	pool	 takes	 time	and	varies	 from	season	 to	 season.	For	example,	while	 24.4	m3/s	 average	 stream	 flow,	 filling	 a	 pool	 takes	 1.8	 h,	while	 by	 10	m3/s	average	stream	flow,	it	takes	4.5h.	The	local	people	claimed	that	the	filling	time	can	even	stretch	as	long	as	eight	hours,	also	claiming	that	the	water	is	not	only	stored	during	the	low	flow	months.	Even	in	high-flow	months,	the	hydroelectric	plant	did	not	always	release	the	flow	it	had	diverted	to	produce	electricity	(Eren,	2018	S.	26).	In	 the	 Ikizdere	 Valley	 Hydroelectric	 Plant	 project,	 the	water-energy	 nexus,	 has	been	 transformed	 from	 local	 to	 national	 level.	 The	 aims	 and	 principles	 of	 producing	electricity	were	determined	at	a	national	level.	Turning	the	riverbed	into	artificial	pools	in	 a	 quasi-dam	 form	 to	 store	 water,	 building	 the	 water-intake	 facilities	 to	 block	 the	natural	flow,	installation	of	surge	tanks,	and	constructing	large	sized	pools	are	methods	to	 ensure	 that	 the	 infrastructure	 will	 have	 always	 water	 available	 for	 electricity	generation	 and	 that	 the	 hydroelectricity	 companies	 will	 have	 the	 flexibility	 of	 using	stored	 water	 for	 production,	 at	 specific	 pre-determined	 times	 in	 their	 production	programme	(Eren,	2018	S.	27).	The	 Ikizdere	 Valley	 project	 is	 an	 example,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 national	transformation	 in	 the	 water-energy	 nexus,	 where	 the	 liberalised	 electricity	 market	creates	‘structural	tensions’	in	hydroelectricity	production,	whereby	the	infrastructures	take	 a	 specific	 new	 role	 in	 the	 electricity	 market,	 as	 the	 provider	 of	 a	 determined	amount	of	electricity	on	a	predetermined	time	and	date	(Eren,	2018	S.	27).	Due	to	the	almost	 constant	 low-flow	 in	 the	 river	bed,	 local	people	are	much	concerned	about	 the	future	 of	 river	 and	 their	 livelihoods.	 The	water	 level	 in	 the	 river	 is	 essential	 for	 tea-cultivation,	which	is	the	main	source	of	income	for	the	local	community.	They	hold	the	
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opinion	that	the	tea	gardens	will	be	affected	and,	as	a	consequence,	the	tea	production	will	sharply	drop.	The	disappearance	of	some	fish	species	is	also	observed	as	a	result	of	alteration	 in	 river	 regime	 and	 a	 lower	 level	 of	 water.	 Finally,	 water	 pollution	 in	 the	Ikizdere	River	has	become	more	visible.	The	local	people,	who	live	close	to	sections	with	a	reduced	flow	of	water,	have	started	to	smell	a	foul	odour	coming	from	the	river,	during	summer	months	(Eren,	2018	S.	29).	The	 Ikizdere	 River	 Basin	 project	 is	 also	 a	 good	 example	 to	 compare	 how	 the	hydroelectric	 power	 generation	 system	 was	 before	 the	 liberalisation	 to	 how	 it	 is	currently.	 In	 the	 past,	 when	 the	 river	 flow	 was	 sufficient,	 the	 hydroelectricity	infrastructure	was	the	provider	of	hydroelectricity.	Now,	when	the	market	price	is	high,	hydroelectricity	 infrastructures	 have	 become	 the	 providers	 of	 hydroelectricity	 (Eren,	2018	 S.	 30).	 The	 observations	 also	 show	 that	 the	 ‘sustainable	 development’	hydroelectricity	 programme	 of	 the	 state	 which	 demonstrates	 “take	 water,	 use	 it	 to	generate	electricity,	and	release	 it	back”,	does	not	correspond	with	the	 Ikizdere	Valley	Hydroelectricity	Power	Plant.	
5.3.7.2.	 The	Cide	Regulator	and	Hydroelectric	Power	Plant		 The	“Cide	Regulator	and	Hydroelectric	Power	Plant”	project,	which	was	cancelled	as	a	result	of	major	demonstrations	of	the	local	people,	is	held	up	as	a	success	story.	The	plant	was	proposed	to	be	built	on	the	Kure	Mountains	National	Park	and	buffer	zone	in	Kastamonu,	 a	 city	 in	 the	 Black	 Sea	 region	 of	 Turkey,	 which	 received	 legal	 protection	status	in	2000	due	to	its	extraordinary	natural	landforms	(canyons,	caves,	dolines),	the	natural	 structure	 of	 old-growth	 forests	 (best	 preserved	 Black	 Sea	 Moist	 Temperate	Karstic	 Forest),	 unimpaired	 river	 ecosystems,	 rich	 wildlife	 habitats	 and	 biodiversity	(Kraljevic	 et	 al.	 2013).	 According	 to	 the	 “National	 Parks	 Management	 Plan”,	 any	activities	within	 the	buffer	zone	 that	may	disturb	 the	natural	balance	and	structure	of	the	 rivers,	 forests	 and	 coastal	 zones	 are	 strictly	 forbidden.	 Nevertheless,	 plans	 were	made	 to	 construct	 Cide	Regulator	 and	Hydroelectric	 Power	 Plant	 on	Devrekani	 River,	within	 the	 buffer	 zone,	 in	 the	 National	 Park.	 Devrekani	 River	 has	 a	 length	 of	 147	kilometres.	 The	 estimated	 installed	 capacity	 of	 the	 hydroelectric	 power	 plant	was	 22	megawatts.	 If	 the	 project	 was	 realised,	 the	 entire	 structure,	 quantity,	 and	 quality	 of	Devrekeani	River,	 the	main	 river	 of	 the	Küre	Mountains	National	 Park,	would	 end	 up	with	environmental	deterioration.	The	main	failures	of	this	project	were	as	follows:	
• Building	the	hydropower	dam	on	the	wrong	river.	
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• Overlooking	the	wildlife	and	biodiversity.	
• Mismanagement	of	the	risks	and	environmental	impacts.	
• Failing	to	procure	the	social	license	to	operate.	
5.3.8.	Results	and	Outcomes		 The	 construction	 and	 operation	 of	 hydroelectric	 power	 plants	 have	 not	 only	impact	on	livelihoods	of	local	residents,	they	also	impact	animal	species	living	in	those	areas.	 If	 all	 rivers	 in	 Turkey	 (which	 has	 the	 total	 length	 of	 almost	 10,000	 km)	 were	converted	 to	hydroelectric	power	plants	and	dams,	 there	would	be	 little	 space	 left	 for	the	 normal	 functioning	 of	 natural	 ecosystem.	 According	 to	 the	 2014	 report	 of	 Doga	
Dernegi	and	Birdlife	International,	55%	of	the	319	bird	species	in	Turkey,	have	severely	decreased	 in	 population	 over	 the	 last	 decade	 due	 to	 the	 destruction	 of	 their	 natural	habitats,	 primarily	 resulting	 from	 dam	 and	 hydroelectric	 power	 plant	 constructions	(Turkish	Water	Assembly,	2011).	The	habitat	of	those	extinct	bird	species	were	located	mostly	around	the	Euphrates	and	Tigris	River,	in	the	South-eastern	Anatolian	region	of	Turkey.	 The	 location	 of	 hydroelectric	 power	 plants	 have	 been	 in	 the	 exact	 locations	experiencing	 scarcity	 of	 water	 resources,	 which	 has	 the	 additional	 effect	 of	 trapping	water	at	higher	altitudes,	while	leaving	lower	areas	waterless.	Some	lakes	in	the	basins	even	dried	up	due	to	the	lack	of	water	flow	(Turkish	Water	Assembly,	2011).	Up	 until	 this	 point,	 a	 great	 number	 of	 demonstrations	 from	 locals,	 against	 the	construction	 of	 hydroelectric	 power	 plants	 ended	 negatively,	 often	 with	 the	 local	inhabitants	being	 forced	 to	 leave	 their	homes.	 It	 is	expected	 that	2	million	people	will	eventually	 be	 forced	 from	 their	 homes	 due	 to	 hydroelectric	 power	 plant	 and	 dam	projects	(Turkish	Water	Assembly	2011).	The	 installation	 of	 small-scale	 (run-of-river)	 hydropower	 plants	 can	 be	 more	feasible,	due	to	their	lower	effects	on	climate,	in	comparison	to	large-scale	hydropower	plants.	 Small,	mini	 and	micro-hydro	 plants	 provide	 not	 only	 electricity	 and	water	 for	both	 irrigation	 and	 drinking	 purposes,	 but	 they	 also	 create	 job	 opportunities	 in	 rural	areas	 and	 can	 therefore	 help	 to	 prevent	 disproportional	migration	 to	 the	major	 cities	(Dursun,	et	al.,	2011	S.	1228).		
5.4.	 Geothermal	Power		Geothermal	resources	principally	manifest	around	active	 fault	systems,	volcanic	and	magmatic	units.	According	to	(Elvan,	et	al.,	2013),	geothermal	energy	is	“the	thermal	
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energy	obtained	by	artificial	methods	from	hot	water,	wet	steam	and	dry	steam	generated	
by	heat	accumulated	in	rocks	in	deep	layers	of	earth	and	carried	into	reservoirs	by	fluids	as	
well	as	from	hot,	dry	rocks”.	There	are	four	different	types	of	geological	formations,	from	which	 energy	 can	 be	 extracted:	 hydrothermal,	 geo-pressurised,	 hot,	 dry	 rock	 and	magma.	 The	 energy	 from	 these	 reservoirs	 can	 be	 tapped	 and	 used	 for	 heating	 or	electricity	generation	(Elvan,	et	al.,	2013).	Modern	geothermal	power	plants	are	considered	 to	be	a	 clean	energy	 resource	due	 to	 their	 low	 CO2,	 NO,	 and	 SO	 emissions.	 Low-temperature	 (20°C-70°C)	 fields	 are	used	mostly	 for	 heating	 purposes,	 but	 are	 also	 utilised	 in	 industry	 and	 production	 of	chemicals,	 whereas	 intermediate-temperature	 (70°C-150°C)	 and	 high-temperature	(above	 150°C)	 fields	 are	 used	 for	 electricity	 generation	 and	 for	 integrated	 heating	purposes	(Elvan,	et	al.,	2013).	Electricity	 generation	 from	 geothermal	 resources	 was	 first	 performed	 at	Larderello,	Italy,	in	1904.	Since	then,	it	has	been	predicted	that	the	use	of	fossil	fuels	will	diminish	 in	 our	 century.	 For	 this	 reason,	 geothermal	 energy	 as	 a	 renewable	 energy	resource	has	become	very	attractive	in	Turkey	and	globally,	for	the	replacement	of	fossil	energy	sources.	The	benefit	of	geothermal	energy	is	that	 it	can	be	utilised	directly	and	indirectly.	The	drawback	of	direct	utilisation	is	that	it	can	only	be	used	locally	(Serpen,	et	al.,	2010).	On	the	other	hand,	indirect	use	of	geothermal	energy,	with	its	relatively	low	temperature,	 seems	 inefficient	 in	 comparison	 to	 fossil	 fuel	 fired	 energy	 sources.	Nevertheless,	it	has	an	advantage	of	base-load	power	generation	as	compared	with	the	other	renewables	such	as	the	wind	and	solar	photovoltaic	energy	(Serpen,	et	al.,	2010).	
5.4.1.	 Geothermal	Energy	Situation	in	Turkey		 Based	 on	 the	 2016	 data	 of	 the	World	 Energy	 Council,	 Turkey	 ranks	 as	 the	 3rd	country,	 after	China	and	 the	USA,	 in	 terms	of	geothermal	energy	generation	with	1.28	mtoe	 per	 annum	 (World	 Energy	 Council,	 2016)	 and	 can	 produce	 5%	 of	 its	 electric	energy	consumption	and	30%	of	its	heat	energy	consumption.	In	the	same	year,	Turkey	accounted	 for	half	of	 the	new	global	 capacity	additions,	 followed	by	 the	United	States,	Mexico,	 Kenya,	 Japan	 and	 Germany	 (World	 Energy	 Council,	 2016).	 According	 to	 the	latest	 numbers	 of	 the	 Energy	 Atlas	 in	 November	 2017,	 Turkey’s	 installed	 geothermal	power	 generation	 capacity	 has	 already	 reached	over	 1,000	MW	–	which	has	 been	 the	2023	 goal	 of	 the	 Turkish	 MENR.	 It	 has	 also	 become	 the	 4th	 country	 globally,	 for	 its	
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installed	power	capacity,	followed	by	New	Zealand	with	980	MW	and	Italy	with	944	MW	(World	Energy	Council,	2016).	Nonetheless,	the	country	uses	only	about	4%	of	 its	geothermal	energy	potential	efficiently	and	the	electricity	generation	remains	in	low	levels.	Up	until	now,	around	600	geothermal	prospects	and	more	than	250	geothermal	fields	were	discovered	in	Turkey,	170	of	which	hold	a	temperature	range	of	40–242	°C.	95%	of	these	are	low	to	medium	enthalpy	fields	and	most	are	also	suitable	for	direct-use	applications	(Parlaktuna,	et	al.,	2013).		Turkey	 is	 located	 on	 the	 seismically	 and	 tectonically	 active	 Mediterranean	Earthquake	 Belt	 (Parlaktuna,	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 The	 tectonically	 active	 nature	 of	 Turkey	results	 from	 the	 Alpine-Himalayan	 Mountain	 Belt,	 that	 began	 developing	 after	 the	closing/shrinking	of	 the	Tethys	Ocean,	 in	 the	Late	Mesozoic	Era	 (Serpen,	et	al.,	2010).	High-mountain	chains	were	shaped	along	 the	northern	and	southern	belts	of	Anatolia,	while	 some	 pre-Cambrian-Palaeozoic	 metamorphic	 shields	 (i.e.	 the	 Menderes	 and	Central	Anatolian	Massifs)	remained	at	the	Central	Anatolian	Belt	(Serpen,	et	al.,	2009).	The	westward	movement	of	the	Anatolian	Sub-plate	through	the	northward	push	of	the	Afro-Arabian	Plate,	particularly	 in	South-eastern	Anatolia,	resulted	in	extensive	crustal	stresses	 in	 Eastern	 and	 Central	 Anatolia.	 These	 forces	 led	 to	 the	 development	 of	 vast	volcanic	fields	between	the	Miocene	and	more	recent	periods	(Serpen,	et	al.,	2010).	The	 southern	 section	 of	 Western	 Anatolian	 is	 closer	 to	 the	 subduction	 zone.	Therefore,	the	heat	generated	by	friction	is	easily	transferred	to	shallower	depths	(Map	9).	
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Map	9.	Map	of	major	geothermal	fields	and	neotectonics	plates	(NAFZ:	North	Anatolian	Transform	Fault,	EAFZ:	East	Anatolian	Transform	Fault,	WAGS:	Western	Anatolian	Graben	System)		
	
Data	source:	Modified	from	(Serpen,	et	al.,	2009).		 In	the	northern	section,	the	distance	in	depth	to	the	subduction	slab	is	larger,	so	the	heat	transfer	decreases	from	the	deeper	sections	to	the	surface	(Simsek,	2002).	The	most	 important	geothermal	 fields	discovered	in	the	Aegean	region	 in	Büyük	Menderes	Graben,	are	as	 follows:	Manisa-Alasehir-Köseali	 (287	°C),	Manisa-Salihli-Caferbey	(249	°C),	 Denizli-Kizildere	 (242	 °C),	 Aydin-GermencikÖmerbeyli	 (239	 °C),	 Manisa-Alasehir-Kurudere	 (214	 °C),	 Aydin-Yilmazköy	 (192	 °C),	 Aydin-Pamukören	 (188	 °C),	 Manisa-Alasehir-Kavaklidere	 (188	 °C),	 Manisa-Salihli-Göbekli	 (182	 °C)	 and	 Kütahya-Saphane	(181	°C).	
5.4.2.	 Laws	and	the	Regulatory	Framework		 The	 governing	 body	 in	 Turkey,	 responsible	 for	 the	 development	 of	 geothermal	energy,	 is	 the	MTA.	After	2005,	 the	geothermal	applications	and	electricity	generation	from	 geothermal	 sources	 were	 regulated	 under	 the	 Law	 on	 Utilisation	 of	 Renewable	Energy	Sources	for	the	Purpose	of	Generating	Electrical	Energy	(Law	No	5346,	adopted	in	2005)	and	 the	Law	on	Geothermal	Resources	and	Natural	Mineral	Waters	 (Law	No	5686,	 adopted	 in	 2007),	 along	 with	 the	 Geothermal	 and	 Mineral	 Resources	 Law	Implementation	Regulation	No	26727.	The	Law	No	5346	aims	to	widespread	the	use	of	renewable	 sources	 in	 a	 sustainable,	 economical	 and	 reliable	 manner,	 to	 increase	 the	diversification	of	resources	and	decrease	the	amount	of	CO2	emissions.	Along	with	the	Law	on	Amendments	on	Law	No	5346,	 the	new	Law	No	6094	entered	 into	 force	 in	 in	2010,	in	which	electricity	generation	prices	as	incentives	for	diverse	renewable	energy	
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sources	were	determined.	As	observed	in	Table	15,	geothermal	energy	suppliers	can	sell	their	electricity	at	a	higher	price	of	US	10.5	cents,	higher	than	hydro-	and	wind	energy	suppliers,	but	lower	than	biomass	(including	landfill	gas)	and	solar	power.	
Table	15.	Price	of	electricity	in	Turkey	from	renewable	energy	sources	after	the	provision	of	the	Law	in	2010	and	numbered	6094	
Type	of	production	facility	based	on	renewable	energy	resources	 Prices	Applicable	(USD	cent/kwh)	a.	Hydroelectric	production	facility	 7.3	b.	Wind	power	based	production	facility	 7.3	c.	Geothermal	power	based	production	facility	 10.5	d.	Biomass	based	production	facility	(including	landfill	gas)	 13.3	e.	Solar	power	based	production	facility	 13.3	
Data	Source:	(Resmi	Gazete,	2005).		 The	 laws	 and	 the	 associated	 regulations	 give	 solutions	 to	 the	 problems	concerning	 legislative	 matters	 and	 obligations	 of	 the	 exploration	 and	 production	concession	rights,	as	well	as	 the	technical	responsibility,	control,	and	protection	of	 the	geothermal	 areas	 (Parlaktuna,	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 Under	 Article	 4	 of	 the	 Law	 No	 5686,	ownership	 of	 geothermal	 sources	 belongs	 to	 the	 State,	 rather	 than	 private	 property-owners,	 where	 the	 resources	 are	 located.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 any	 planned	 activity	 in	 the	geothermal	 field,	 Turkish	 citizens	 or	 legal	 entities,	 are	 obliged	 to	 apply	 for	 a	 license	(Kartal,	 2013).	 There	 is	 still	 no	 specific	 law	 on	 geothermal	 energy	 that	 regulates	 the	utilisation	 of	 geothermal	 sources	 of	 the	 country	 in	 their	 full	 potential.	 Moreover,	 the	existing	legislation	must	be	further	developed	in	compliance	with	European	Community	directives.		Despite	 the	 strong	presence	of	 the	State	 in	geothermal	and	other	energy	 fields,	since	the	amendment	of	Law	No	5686,	companies	which	are	distributing	or	producing	geothermal	 resources,	 are	provided	with	 some	specific	 incentives.	Under	Article	26	of	the	Regulation	No	26727,	these	companies	are	regarded	as	an	industrial	enterprise	and	can	be	granted	with	a	geothermal	resource	distribution	or	production	certificate.	These	companies	are	 then	able	 to	apply	 for	particular	 incentives,	 such	as	 reduced	electricity	tariffs	(Kartal,	2013).	
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In	Turkey,	 the	share	of	private	entities	 in	power	generation	has	 increased	 from	32%	in	2002	to	75%	by	the	end	of	2015.	The	private	companies	are	also	predominantly	operating	 the	 geothermal	 power	 plants.	 Since	 the	 public	 sector	 in	 Turkey	 has	diminished	its	share	of	the	power	generation	sector,	the	performance	of	the	privatised	power	plants	has	increased	from	45	to	80%	in	the	same	time	period.	
5.4.3.	 Electricity	Generation	from	Geothermal	Sources		 Based	on	the	2016	data	of	the	Turkish	MENR,	the	geothermal	capacity	of	Turkey	is	31,500	MW.	79%	of	the	areas	with	a	potential	are	situated	in	Western/Aegean	region,	8.5%	 in	Central	Anatolia,	7.5%	 in	 the	Marmara,	4,5%	 in	Eastern	Anatolia	and	0.5%	 in	other	 regions.	 94%	of	 these	 geothermal	 sources	 are	 low	or	medium	heat,	 suitable	 for	direct	 applications	 (heating,	 thermal	 tourism,	 the	 output	 of	 minerals),	 while	 6%	 are	medium/high	 enthalpy	 fields,	 located	 in	 the	 Aegean	 region	 of	 the	 country	 and	convenient	for	indirect	applications,	such	as	electricity	generation.	Based	on	the	official	data	 of	 the	 Turkish	 MENR,	 the	 development	 in	 geothermal	 energy	 application	 and	electricity	generation	can	be	listed	as	follows	(MENR,	2016):	
Ø The	 number	 of	 geothermal	 fields	 suitable	 for	 electricity	 production	 increased	from	16	in	2002,	to	25	in	2016.		
Ø The	number	of	greenhouses,	heated	from	geothermal	energy,	increased	from	500	square	meters	in	2002	to	3,931	m2	in	2016,	with	a	rise	of	686%.	
Ø District	 heating	 from	 geothermal	 energy	 grew	 from	 the	 equivalent	 of	 30,000	residences	 in	 2002,	 to	 the	 equivalent	 of	 114,567	 residences	 in	 2016,	 a	 rise	 of	281%.	
Ø Geothermal	heat	capacity	reached	 from	3,000	MW	to	14,000	MW	by	 the	end	of	2015,	with	a	growth	of	366%.	
Ø Electricity	production	from	geothermal	energy	reached	from	15	MWe	in	2002	to	820	MWe	in	2016,	with	a	rise	of	5,366%.	In	its	planned	2023	targets,	the	Turkish	government	aims	to	generate	1,000%	of	electricity	from	geothermal	power	generation.	With	respect	to	the	above-indicated	data,	there	 is	 a	 substantial	 increase	 in	 Turkey	 both	 in	 geothermal	 applications	 and	 in	electricity	generation	 from	geothermal	power.	As	mentioned,	 the	 latest	data	 shows	us	that	 Turkey	 has	 already	 achieved	 its	 1,000%	 target,	 much	 earlier	 than	 expected.	Nevertheless,	the	future	prospects	show	that	the	growth	in	Turkey’s	energy	demand	will	be	between	6%	and	8%,	adding	50,000	MW	to	the	grid	by	the	year	2020.	Indicating	that	
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the	 electricity	 generation	 from	 geothermal	 sources	 will	 only	 be	 able	 to	 meet	 a	 small	amount	of	Turkey’s	energy	demand,	due	to	its	small	share	in	renewable	sources.	In	this	regard,	it	would	be	a	much	more	feasible	option	to	consider	geothermal	energy	as	a	local	energy	source,	rather	than	an	option	for	countrywide	energy	supply.	The	electricity	generation	from	geothermal	sources	needs	high	temperatures,	such	as	150°C	and	over	(Canka	Kilic,	et	al.,	2013).	The	most	important	geothermal	fields	for	power	generation	can	be	observed	in	Table	16.	There	are	three	significant	geothermal	fields	with	a	high	capacity	of	power	generation:	Denizli-Kizildere	(1,2,3),	Aydin-Germencik	and	Manisa-Alasehir	geothermal	fields.	
Table	16.	Geothermal	fields	with	highest	electricity	generation	in	Turkey	
Field	 City	 Installed	 capacity	
(MWe)	
Operation	 capacity	
(MWe)	
Kizildere	 Denizli-Sarayköy	 15	 15	80	 80	6.85	 6.85	
Hidirbeyli	 Aydin-Germencik	 20	 20	
Bozköy	 24	 24	24	 24	24	 24	
Pamukören	 Aydin-Kuyucak	 61.72	 45.02	
Gümüsköy	 Aydin-Germencik	 13.2	 13.2	
Alasehir	 Manisa-Alasehir	 24	 24	
Salavatli	 Aydin-Sultanhisar	 8	 8	9.5	 9.5	34	 34	
Tuzla	 Canakkale-Ayvacik	 7.5	 7.5	
Gerali	 Denizli-Sarayköy	 23	 	
Total	 	 452.41	
Data	source:	(Canka	Kilic,	et	al.,	2013).		 Alasehir	field,	with	287	°C,	has	the	hottest	geothermal	water	wells	in	Turkey.	The	drilling	 activities	 in	 Manisa-Alasehir	 geothermal	 well	 have	 increased,	 particularly	following	2011.	The	Kizildere	geothermal	field	was	the	first	field	discovered	by	the	MTA	in	1968,	and	was	utilised	for	electricity	production	in	1984,	with	an	installed	capacity	of	20.4	MW	(Parlaktuna,	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 The	 field	 is	 associated	 with	 a	 major	 fault	 line	 along	 the	northern	boundary	of	the	Büyük	Menderes	Graben	(Karamenderesi,	2013).	Until	now,	a	total	 of	 20	 deep	 wells,	 varying	 in	 depth	 from	 370	 to	 1241m	 have	 been	 drilled,	 with	temperatures	 ranging	 from	 170	 to	 212	 °C	 (Varinca,	 2011).	 The	 most	 significant	
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characteristic	 of	 this	 field	 is	 the	 high	 amount	 of	 non-condensable	 gases,	 with	 a	 CO2	content	of	96–99%,	hydrogen	sulphide	content	of	100–200	ppm	and	ammonia	content	of	 72	 ppm	 (Varinca	 2011).	 The	 plant,	 before	 its	 privatisation,	 was	 associated	 with,	among	other	issues,	surface	water	contamination.	Kizildere-I	 Geothermal	 Power	 Plant	 was	 run	 by	 EÜAS,	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	government,	 for	 24	 years.	 In	 2008,	 the	 field	 was	 privatised	 and	 transferred	 to	 Zorlu	Enerji	Company	for	30	years	(Kindap,	et	al.,	2010).	The	company	acquired	the	17.4	MWe	capacity	of	Kizildere-I	geothermal	power	plant	and	expanded	the	plant	in	2013,	with	the	80	MWe	 capacity	 of	 Kizildere-II	 geothermal	 power	 plant.	 In	 2017	 the	 construction	 of	Kizildere-III	geothermal	power	project	was	completed	in	the	same	field,	which	currently	generates	99	MWe.	In	1986,	a	liquid	carbon	dioxide	and	dry	ice	production	process,	with	a	capacity	of	40,000	tonnes	per	year,	was	added	to	the	field.	The	processing	capacity	increased	to	120,000	tonnes	per	year	 in	1999.	 In	addition	to	electricity	and	dry	 ice	production,	 the	field	 has	 been	 used	 for	 greenhouse	 heating	 and	 space	 heating	 (Varinca,	 2011).	 The	Kizildere	geothermal	fluid	is	also	used	for	bleaching	processes	in	the	textile	industry,	as	well	as	in	the	drying	and	washing	of	textile	products.	The	area	is	known	for	its	thermal	springs	 and	 balneology	 centres	with	 health	 and	 spa	 facilities,	which	 offer	 therapeutic	mud	baths	and	thermal	baths,	which	particularly	attract	tourists	to	the	region.	Aydin-Germencik	 geothermal	 field	 is	 the	 second	 most	 economically	 significant	geothermal	field	for	generating	electricity.	The	field	was	discovered	by	the	MTA	and	is	located	in	the	west	of	Büyük	Menderes	Graben,	about	40	km	from	the	Aegean	Sea.	The	MTA	has	drilled	ten	wells	for	exploration,	with	depths	varying	between	285	and	2.398m.	The	temperatures	of	the	first	and	second	aquifers	were	between	203–217	and	216–232	°C.	The	hot	water	can	be	used	by	industry,	in	electricity	generation,	district	heating,	and	in	touristic	as	well	as	balneology	centres	(Varinca,	2011).	In	addition	to	power	generation,	geothermal	energy	is	used	in	various	sectors	as	direct-use	 applications,	 such	 as	 district	 heating	 and	 sometimes	 for	 individual	 space	heating,	domestic	hot	water	supply	and	greenhouse	heating.	
5.4.4.	 Direct-Use	Applications	of	Geothermal	Energy:	District	Heating,	Greenhouse	
Heating,	Hot	Water	and	Balneology	
	 The	direct-use	applications	of	 geothermal	 energy	are	widely	utilised	 in	Turkey,	especially	 in	 the	 Aegean	 region	where	 the	 surface	 temperatures	 range	 between	 25°C	
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and	150°C.	The	application	areas,	which	mainly	centre	upon	industry	and	buildings,	are	listed	 as	 follows:	 heating	 and/or	 cooling	 homes,	 businesses,	 spaces	 and	 greenhouses,	health	care	and	treatment	applications,	thermal	tourism	applications	(hot	springs,	spas,	balneological	uses	of	geothermal	water,	etc.),	fish	farming	(heating	water),	aquaculture	productions,	 farming	 (crops,	 fruit,	 vegetable	 raising	 and	 drying)	 and	 mushroom	production	(Canka	Kilic,	et	al.,	2013).	Other	fields	of	geothermal	application,	where	the	temperatures	 vary	 between	 100°C	 and	 250°C,	 are	 processed	 for	 heat	 supply,	 drying,	chemical	and	mineral	productions	 (CO2,	 fertilizer,	 lithium,	heavy	water,	hydrogen,	and	mineral	water,	etc.)	and	geothermal	heat	pump	applications	(Canka	Kilic,	et	al.,	2013).	Contrary	 to	 the	 world	 trend	 in	 geothermal	 energy,	 utilisation	 of	 heat	 pump	applications—due	 to	 its	 high	 capital	 costs—and	 other	 enhanced	 geothermal	 systems	have	not	achieved	a	remarkable	progress	 in	Turkey.	Only	greenhouse	heating	systems	have	become	popular	in	Turkey,	 in	recent	years.	The	district	heating	projects	have	not	yet	 gained	 the	 same	 acceleration	 as	 greenhouse	 applications,	 mainly	 due	 to	 the	following	reasons	(Serpen,	et	al.,	2010):	
• Currently,	 no	 available	 geothermal	 resource	 has	 been	 discovered	 close	 to	 the	provinces.	
• The	 competition	 between	 the	 geothermal	 and	 natural	 gas	 industry	 is	inconsiderably	low.	
• Some	 of	 the	 geothermal	 district	 heating	 systems	 do	 not	 have	 sufficient	 heat	supply.	
• The	heating	costs	are	relatively	high.	According	to	data	from	the	International	Geothermal	Association,	Turkey’s	total	thermal	installed	capacity	is	2.0	GW	and	the	direct	use	of	geothermal	energy	sources	is	10.2	 GWth	 per	 year	 (IGE,	 2014).	 The	 direct	 use	 applications	 for	 geothermal	 energy	include	district	heating,	greenhouse	heating,	and	thermal	tourism	facilities.	58%	of	the	proven	capacity	(2.7	GWth)	is	utilised	for	geothermal	heating,	which	includes	residence	heating	 (805	 MWth),	 greenhouse	 heating	 (612	 MWth),	 thermal	 facilities	 heating	 (380	MWth),	balneology	 (870	MWth)	and	heat	pump	applications	 (38	MWth)	 (Parlaktuna,	et	al.,	 2013).	 Space	 heating	 is	 the	 predominant	 type	 of	 direct	 utilisation	 of	 geothermal	energy	 in	 Turkey.	 In	 total,	 17	 provinces	 (mainly	 in	 western	 and	 central	 Anatolia)	 in	Turkey,	use	geothermal	fluid	in	residential	heating.	The	first	geothermal	district	heating	system	was	established	in	Gönen	in	1987	(Parlaktuna,	et	al.,	2013).	As	it	is	illustrated	in	Table	4,	Balcova	field	in	Izmir	with	243	MWt	has	the	largest	residential	heating	capacity.		
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There	are	two	significant	geothermal	district	heating	fields	in	Turkey,	with	their	high	 capacity	 of	 heating	 and	 adoption	 of	 new	 technologies.	 The	 first	 is	 the	 Balçova-Narlıdere	district	 heating	 system	 (Table	17).	This	heating	 field	 is	 an	 exception	 among	other	district	heating	systems	in	Turkey,	due	to	its	adoption	of	the	newest	technologies	and	low	operational	costs.	According	to	2013	data,	the	system	could	heat	in	excess	of	the	of	 35,000	 residences.	 The	 second	 is	 the	 Afyon	 district	 heating	 system,	which	 attracts	attention	with	its	innovative	geothermal	projects.	Afyon	has	achieved	becoming	the	first	self-sufficient	 city	 in	 Turkey,	 to	meet	 its	 own	 energy	 needs	 only	 through	 its	 domestic	sources,	 namely	 geothermal	 heating.	 15,000	 residences,	 50	 hotels	 and	 hundreds	 of	greenhouses	 are	 heated	 through	 the	 underground	 geothermal	 heating	 system.	 As	natural	gas	and	coal	are	not	utilised	 for	 the	energy	generation,	 the	city	 is	able	 to	save	210	million	TL	(around	€	45	million)	each	year,	which	is	re-invested	for	new	geothermal	discoveries.	
Table	17.	Important	geothermal	district	heating	systems	for	households	in	Turkey	
Field	 Number	of	
residencies	
Temperature	
(°C)	
Capacity	
(MWt)	
Company	
Balcova-	
Narlidere	
35,000	 140	 243	 Governorship	and	municipality	
Afyon	 15,000	 95	 125.5	 Predominantly	municipality	
Sandikli	 11,000	 75	 119	 Predominantly	municipality	
Simav	 12,000	 125	 92	 Municipality	
Diyadin	 570	 70	 62	 Predominantly	governorship	
Salihli	 7,500	 94	 57	 Municipality	
Edremit	 5,500	 60	 39	 Municipality	and	private	
Kozakli	 3,000	 90	 34	 Predominantly	municipality	
Kizilcahamam	 2,500	 70	 28	 Predominantly	municipality	
Sindirgi	 300	 98	 24	 Municipality	and	private	
Kirsehir	 1,900	 57	 20	 Predominantly	municipality	
Gönen	 3,400	 80	 19	 Predominantly	municipality	
Sarayköy	 2,500	 95	 19	 Predominantly	municipality	
Dikili	 2,000	 125	 19	 Municipality	
Sorgun	 1,500	 80	 19	 Municipality	
Bigadic	 1,500	 96	 7	 Municipality	
Bergama	 450	 70	 3	 Municipality	
Data	source:	(Turkey	Geothermal	Association,	2017)	Afyon	 geothermal	 energy	 investments	 draws	 world-wide	 attention	 with	 their	innovations.	 The	 city	 is	 specialised	 in	 the	 field	 of	 geothermal	 and	 solar	 energy.	 In	addition	 to	 having	 Turkey’s	 second	 largest	 thermal	 heating	 facility,	 around	 15,000	
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residences	are	warmed	by	the	geothermal	district	heating	system	at	a	60%	cheaper	cost	than	 equivalent	 traditional	 heating	 systems	 (e.g.	 natural	 gas).	 This	 is	 equivalent	 to	300,000	tonnes	of	coal	per	year.	In	2013,	the	city	allocated	US$75	million	to	alternative	and	renewable	projects	and	accomplished	12	 inventions	 that	were	 tagged	with	patent	and	 utility	model.	With	 recent	 investments,	 about	 1.5	million	m2	 of	 indoor	 space	 has	been	 heated	 by	 natural	 underground	 water.	 This	 includes	 50	 hotels	 as	 well	 as	residences.	 In	addition,	 the	heating	of	 the	greenhouse	areas	 is	also	done	with	 thermal	systems	(Gecer,	2014).	Besides	district	heating	systems	 for	 residences,	Turkey	also	has	more	 than	350	thermal	resorts,	heated	by	 low	temperature	geothermal	water,	which	offer	balneology	and	 thermal	 tourism	applications.	Afyon-Orucoglu	Thermal	Resort	 facilities	have	been	heated	since	1992	with	geothermal	water	at	48	 °C	 temperature.	 In	addition,	 the	Bolu-Karacasu	 Thermal	 Facility	 has	 been	 partially	 heated	 to	 44	 °C	 since	 2001,	 Rize-Ayder	Cure	Center	at	55	°C,	Hatay-Kumlu	Thermal	Facility	at	37	°C	with	bottom	heating,	Sivas-Hot	 Cermic	Hot	 Springs	 at	 46	 °C	 and	 Samsun-Havza	 Thermal	 Facilities	 are	 heated	 by	geothermal	water	at	54	°C	temperature.	 In	Haymana,	 the	mosque	is	heated	with	45	°C	geothermal	water	(Turkey	Geothermal	Association,	2017).	Heating	 greenhouses	 through	 geothermal	 energy	 has	 become	 very	 fashionable,	especially	in	recent	years.	Major	greenhouse	areas	are	located	in	Western	Anatolia.	The	greenhouse	heating	capacity	in	Turkey	grew	to	almost	3	million	m2	greenhouse	heating	(612	MWth)	in	2015.	As	a	result	of	market	saturation,	the	greenhouse	investments	have	slowed	down	 in	 the	 last	 3	 years.	 Greenhouses	 are	 heated	 1500–2000	h	 per	 year,	 and	their	main	produce	is	tomatoes	and	Californian	peppers	(Serpen,	et	al.,	2010).	The	major	export	 markets	 are	 Russia	 (60%)	 and	 Europe	 (20%).	 10%	 of	 the	 yield	 is	 sold	countrywide.	 The	 major	 greenhouse	 applications	 are	 located	 in	 Dikili-Bergama,	 in	Aegean	 region,	 with	 1,000,000	m2	 and	 in	 Sanliurfa-Karaali	 in	 South-eastern	 Anatolia,	with	474,000	m2.	Geothermal	resources	with	average	and	excess	enthalpy	in	Turkey	have	high	CO2	content.	This	CO2	gas	is	used	to	accelerate	the	growth	of	greenhouse	production	as	well.	Greenhouses	consume	4,000	tons	CO2	per	year	per	hectare.	Therefore,	it	is	essential	to	transmit	 1000–2000	 parts	 per	 million	 of	 CO2	 into	 greenhouse	 atmosphere.	Consequently,	 the	 CO2	 gas	 obtained	 from	 geothermal	 resources	 is	 utilised	 for	greenhouses	(Serpen,	et	al.,	2010).	
		 164	
5.4.5.	 The	Environmental	Impacts		Despite	 being	 an	 environmentally	 friendly	 energy	 source,	 geothermal	 power	facilities	have	some	adverse	impacts	on	water	quality,	air	emissions	and	water	and	land	use.		 In	 geothermal	 power	 plants,	 hot	 water	 pumped	 from	 underground	 reservoirs	predominantly	contains	high	levels	of	sulphur,	salt,	and	other	minerals.	Most	geothermal	plants	 have	 closed-loop	water	 systems,	whereby	 the	 extracted	water	 is	 pumped	 back	into	the	geothermal	reservoir	after	it	has	been	used	for	heat	or	electricity	production.	In	these	systems,	water	is	stored	in	steel	well	casings,	cemented	to	the	surrounding	rock,	which	may	cause	water	contamination.	Geothermal	plants	may	require	between	1,700	and	4,000	gallons	of	water	per	MWh	 for	cooling	and	re-injection	 (Union	of	Concerned	Scientists,	 2014).	 Using	 geothermal	 fluids	 rather	 than	 freshwater,	 which	 is	 typical	world-wide,	reduces	the	plant’s	overall	water	impact.	Regarding	 their	 impact	 on	 the	 volume	 of	 air	 emissions,	 there	 is	 a	 difference	between	 open-	 and	 closed-loop	 geothermal	 power	 systems.	 In	 closed-loop	 systems,	gasses	released	from	the	well	are	injected	back	into	the	ground	after	giving	up	their	heat	(Union	of	Concerned	Scientists,	2014).	Therefore,	 the	air	emissions	remain	 in	minimal	levels.	In	open-loop	systems,	gasses	are	exposed	to	the	atmosphere	after	giving	up	their	heat.	Thus,	 the	gasses	 like	hydrogen	sulphide,	carbon	dioxide,	ammonia,	methane,	and	boron	are	released	into	the	air.	Hydrogen	sulphide,	which	has	a	distinctive	"rotten	egg"	smell,	is	the	most	common	emission	(Kagel,	et	al.,	2007).	As	soon	as	hydrogen	sulphide	is	 released	 in	 the	 atmosphere,	 it	 changes	 into	 sulphur	 dioxide	 (Union	 of	 Concerned	Scientists,	 2014).	 This	 contributes	 to	 the	 formation	 of	 small	 acidic	 particulates,	which	can	 be	 absorbed	 into	 the	 bloodstream	 and	 cause	 heart	 and	 lung	 diseases.	 Sulphur	dioxide	 has	 further	 environmentally	 hazardous	 impacts;	 it	 causes	 acid	 rain,	 which	damages	crops,	forests,	and	soils.	Nevertheless,	the	sulphur	dioxide	emissions	released	from	geothermal	plants	are	approximately	thirty	times	lower	per	MW	hour	than	those	from	coal	plants	(Union	of	Concerned	Scientists,	2014).	Many	 geothermal	 sites	 worldwide	 are	 located	 in	 more	 complex	 and	 sensitive	ecological	 areas.	 The	 removal	 of	water	 from	 geothermal	 reservoirs	 sometimes	 causes	land	 subsidence.	 Many	 geothermal	 facilities	 address	 this	 problem	 by	 re-injecting	wastewater	 back	 into	 geothermal	 reservoirs	 after	 the	water's	 heat	 has	 been	 captured	(Union	of	Concerned	Scientists,	2014).	
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There	is	also	an	evidence	that	hydrothermal	plants	can	lead	to	an	even	stronger	earthquake	frequency.	Enhanced	geothermal	systems	(hot,	dry	rock)	may	also	increase	the	risk	of	small	earthquakes,	the	process	to	pump	water	at	high	pressures	is	to	fracture	underground	hot	rock	reservoirs.	Earthquake	risk	associated	with	enhanced	geothermal	systems	 can	 be	minimized	 by	 siting	 plants	 an	 appropriate	 distance	 away	 from	major	fault	lines	(Union	of	Concerned	Scientists,	2014).		Estimated	 global	 warming	 emissions	 for	 open-loop	 systems	 are	 approximately	0.1	 pounds	 of	 CO2e/kwh	 (Union	 of	 Concerned	 Scientists,	 2014).	 Around	 10%	 of	 air	emissions	are	CO2,	a	small	amount	of	methane	and	a	more	potent	global	warming	gas.	In	closed-loop	systems,	 there	are	no	gas	 releases	 into	 the	atmosphere,	but	 there	are	 still	some	 emissions	 associated	 with	 plant	 construction	 and	 surrounding	 infrastructure	(Union	 of	 Concerned	 Scientists,	 2014).	 Enhanced	 geothermal	 systems	 have	 global	warming	emissions	of	approximately	0.2	pounds	of	CO2e/kwh.	Increasing	 the	 share	of	 geothermal	power	 in	 the	electricity	mix	would	 increase	some	 of	 the	 life	 cycle	 impacts	 such	 as	 acidification	 and	 global	 warming	 potential,	compared	to	increasing	the	share	of	hydropower	and	wind.	Nevertheless,	these	impacts	would	 still	 be	 much	 lower	 than	 providing	 electricity	 from	 fossil	 fuels	 (Atilgan,	 et	 al.,	2016).		In	spite	of	 their	 contribution	 to	 the	 total	electricity	production,	 these	resources	also	have	potentially	negative	environmental	impacts	on	other	natural	resources	such	as	soil	 and	water	 in	 the	basin.	The	resources	contain	harmful	 substances,	 especially	high	concentration	of	boron,	arsenic,	 selenium,	 lead,	cadmium,	hydrogen,	sulphur,	mercury,	ammonia,	 radon,	 carbon	 dioxide	 and	 methane.	 After	 its	 extraction	 from	 Kizildere	geothermal	wells	and	 its	utilisation,	hot	water	 flows	 into	 the	Büyük	Menderes	Stream,	which	engenders	deoxygenation	and	this	threatens	the	aquatic	ecosystem	and	disturbs	the	ecologic	balance.		
5.4.6.	 Public	Awareness	and	Social	Acceptance	of	Geothermal	Energy		 The	 utilisation	 of	 geothermal	 sources	 is	 an	 environmentally	 friendlier	 energy	option	and	has	more	diverse	application	possibilities	than	the	other	renewable	sources.	Moreover,	 it	does	not	depend	on	climate	conditions.	Nevertheless,	 the	waste	produced	by	the	geothermal	facilities	include	toxic	metals.	Geothermal	plants	may	also	smell	and	produce	noise	pollution	during	construction,	the	drilling	of	wells	and	the	escape	of	high-pressure	steam	during	testing.	Therefore,	it	is	imperative	that	the	project	owners	inform	
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the	 local	 residents	 about	 the	 benefits	 and	 potential	 adverse	 effects	 of	 living	 near	 a	geothermal	plant		The	main	 economic	 benefit	 of	 a	 geothermal	 plant	 is	 the	 creation	 of	 short-	 and	long-term	 employment	 opportunities	 for	 the	 local	 residents.	 Furthermore,	 the	 plant	owners	 may	 purchase	 some	 necessary	 materials	 and	 equipment	 from	 local	 sources.	Another	benefit	of	a	geothermal	power	plant	is	providing	district	heating	systems	to	the	close	residents	or	farms.	The	agricultural	crop	production	can	benefit	from	the	heating	system.	Cetiner	 et	 al.	 conducted	 a	 case	 study	 with	 3	 high	 school	 and	 101	 university	students	to	determine	the	social	acceptance	and	perception	of	geothermal	energy	in	the	Big	 Peninsula,	 Canakkale,	 Turkey.	 The	 results	 of	 the	 research	 show	 that	 geothermal	energy	sources	in	the	Big	Peninsula	have	significant	potential	for	different	areas	of	use,	but	the	knowledge	regarding	the	environmental	effects	 is	 insufficient.	73.1%	of	people	were	 of	 the	 opinion	 that	 geothermal	 resources	 are	 a	 form	 of	 energy	 as	well	 as	 are	 a	natural	formation.	71.2	thought	that	geothermal	resources	were	solely	hot	water.	76.9%	shared	the	opinion	that	geothermal	resources	were	unnecessary.	Of	participants,	52.9%	thought	 geothermal	 energy	 was	 used	 for	 tourism,	 71.2%	 thought	 it	 was	 used	 for	treatment	 and	 56.7%	 thought	 it	 was	 used	 for	 central	 heating.	 A	 significant	 part	 of	respondents	 (41.3)	 did	 not	 know	 that	 one	 of	 the	 uses	 of	 geothermal	 energy	 was	agriculture	(Cetiner,	et	al.,	2016).	In	terms	of	environmental	impacts	of	geothermal	energy,	the	survey	participants	did	not	have	a	high	level	of	knowledge.	23%	did	not	know	whether	geothermal	energy	affects	the	environment	positively	or	negatively,	whereas	25%	shared	the	idea	that	they	do	 not	 have	 negative	 effects	 on	 the	 environment.	 A	 high	 majority	 of	 respondents	(75.9%)	shared	the	opinion	that	geothermal	energy	triggers	earthquakes.	Regarding	 the	 promotion	 of	 geothermal	 energy,	 66.4%	 participants	 thought	visual	media	were	effective	and	74%	thought	it	provided	significant	contributions	to	the	local	 and	 cultural	 tourism.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 45.2%	 of	 respondents	 thought	 that	training	 and	 seminars	 to	 promote	 geothermal	 energy	 were	 not	 beneficial.	 74%	 of	participants	agreed	on	the	same	idea	that	geothermal	heating	had	appropriate	costs	and	67.3%	advocated	for	state	grants	to	support	geothermal	energy.	Of	participants	46.7%	thought	 it	 was	 necessary	 for	 the	 state	 to	 support	 geothermal	 energy	 by	 identifying	incentive	 regions.	An	 important	 survey	 result	 showed	 that	universities	were	 the	most	reliable	 source	 of	 information	 about	 geothermal	 energy	 (51.6%),	 whereas	 energy	
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companies	were	 18%,	 local	 government	 17.2%	 and	 state	 information	 sources	 13.1%,	respectively.		
5.4.7.	 Results	and	Outcomes		Geothermal	 energy	 is	 environmentally	 friendly	 due	 to	 its	 contributions	 to	 the	reduction	of	carbon	dioxide.	Moreover,	it	does	not	depend	on	climate	conditions	and	can	address	many	forms	of	energy	needs.	The	efficient	utilisation	of	geothermal	energy	has	environmental	benefits	in	local,	regional	and	even	global	terms.	Geothermal	energy	can	displace	power	generation	 from	 fossil	 fuel-powered	plants	and	hence	help	 to	 improve	local	air	quality,	mitigate	regional	impacts	such	as	acid	rain	and	reduce	greenhouse	gas	emissions	globally.	The	geothermal	facilities	have	neither	huge	piles	of	ash	nor	barrels	of	radioactive	waste.		Turkey	has	an	abundant	potential	of	geothermal,	but	the	systematic	exploration	of	 these	 resources	 is	 has	 not	 yet	 been	 accomplished.	 The	 drilling	 activities	 are	 still	insufficient	 in	 number.	 Heating	 costs	 put	 a	 heavy	 burden	 on	 the	 Turkish	 economy.	District	heating	through	the	geothermal	energy	in	Turkey	is	the	cheapest	way	compared	to	 gas-fired	 combi	 boilers	 (which	 is	 mostly	 preferred	 for	 residential	 heating),	 it	 has	therefore	gained	wide	acceptance	among	consumers.		Despite	having	many	positive	characteristics	as	a	renewable	energy,	utilisation	of	geothermal	 sources	 can	 also	 have	 adverse	 impacts	 on	 the	 environment.	 The	 wastes	produced	 by	 geothermal	 systems	 include	 toxic	 metals.	 Furthermore,	 these	 systems	produce	a	potential	air	pollutant:	hydrogen	sulphide.	However,	this	could	be	processed	and	removed	for	use	in	industry.	Geothermal	plants	also	produce	noise	pollution	during	construction,	through	the	drilling	of	wells	and	the	escape	of	high-pressure	steam	during	testing	 (Erdogdu,	 2009).	 Finally,	 geothermal	 power	 plants	 are	mostly	 located	 in	 high	estate	areas,	where	the	external	appearance	of	the	plant	is	important	to	the	surrounding	community.	 Summarised,	 the	 environmental	 costs	 of	 geothermal	 energy	 seem	 to	 be	minimal	in	comparison	with	fossil	fuel	sources	and	facilities.		Geothermal	power	may	help	Turkey	to	move	towards	a	more	decentralised	form	of	 electricity	 generation,	 where	 the	 installed	 plant	 meets	 the	 necessities	 of	 local	customers,	 avoids	 transmission	 losses	and	 increases	 flexibility	 in	 system	use.	Thereby	the	diversification	of	power	generation	plants	will	be	ensured	which	 in	 turn	 increases	competition	in	electricity	generation.	
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5.5.	 Biomass	energy	
	 This	 chapter	 focuses	 on	 the	 main	 types	 of	 available	 residues	 for	 bioenergy	production	and	 their	 geographical	distribution	 in	Turkey.	The	 chapter	 further	 aims	 to	examine	the	use	of	agricultural	as	well	as	 livestock	residues	to	contribute	to	achieving	the	renewable	energy	targets	of	Turkey.	The	chapter	discovers	the	social	acceptance	and	public	perception	of	the	energy	production	from	biomass	and	the	knowledge	among	the	community	 regarding	 the	 positive	 contribution	 of	 bio-sources	 to	 local	 energy	production.	The	majority	of	the	available	data	is	provided	by	the	Food	and	Agriculture	Organisation	 of	 the	 United	 Nations’	 BEFS	 Assessment	 for	 Turkey,	 as	 well	 as	 own	quantitative	and	qualitative	research	in	the	IZAYDAS	biogas	plant,	which	was	considered	as	a	case	study	within	the	chapter.	
5.5.1.	 Biomass	energy	production	from	crop	and	livestock	residues		 Turkey	is	the	7th	largest	agricultural	producer	in	the	world	and	a	top	producer	as	well	 as	 exporter	 of	 crops	 such	 as	 hazelnuts,	 chestnuts,	 apricots,	 cherries,	 figs,	 olives,	tobacco	and	tea	(OECD,	2011).	Agricultural	exports	are	highly	diversified	and	comprise	more	than	10%	share	in	total	exports	in	2016	(Table	18).	(Ergocun,	2018).		
Table	18.	Agricultural	trade	–	Key	commodities	(2016)		
Rank	 Trade	commodity	 Export	quantity	(t)	 Export	 value	
(1,000	US$)		
Share	 in	 total	 value	
of	exports	
1	 Hazelnuts	 133,755	 1,161,213	 8,1%	
2	 Nuts,	prepared	(exc.	groundnuts)	 97,715	 689,008	 4,8%	
3	 Pastry	 321,315	 648,086	 4,5%	
4	 Raisins	 236,068	 425,953	 2,9%	
5	 Chocolate	 145,077	 402,725	 2,8%	
6	 Tobacco	(unmanufactured)	 50,742	 358,206	 2,5%	
7	 Chicken	meat	 314,695	 351,026	 2,4%	
8	 Apricots,	dry	 78,755	 288,793	 2%	
9	 Figs	dried	 69,683	 249,501	 1,7%	
10	 Tomatoes	 485,963	 239,875	 1,6%	
Data	source:	Own	illustration	based	on	the	data	from	(FAOSTAT,	2016)	and	(WITS,	2016).		
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Despite	being	a	significant	source	for	energy	generation,	the	agricultural	sector	of	the	country	has	a	substantial	contribution	to	the	increase	of	greenhouse	gas	emissions	within	 the	 years.	 As	 seen	 in	 Figure	 21,	 the	 greenhouse	 gas	 emissions	 from	 the	agricultural	sector	started	to	 increase	 in	2011	from	348,88	gg	to	354,88	gg,	surpassed	the	1990	levels	(417,05)	in	2016	(434,49)	and	is	demonstrating	a	tendency	to	increase	over	time	as	a	portion	of	the	total	emission	in	Turkey	(Figure	19)	(FAOSTAT,	2018).			
Figure	19.	Greenhouse	gas	emissions	(CO2	equivalent),	Agriculture	total	
		 Greenhouse	 gas	 emissions	 can	 be	 produced	 from	 agricultural	 activities	 such	 as	production	 and	 processing	 of	 agricultural	 products,	 livestock	 (enteric	 fermentation,	fertiliser	management),	rice	production,	burning	agricultural	wastes	 in	open	areas	and	agricultural	 lands.	 Enteric	 fermentation	 is	 the	 sub-sector	 that	 is	 responsible	 for	 the	majority	of	agricultural	emissions	(Figure	20).	
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Figure	20.	Greenhouse	gas	emissions	by	sector	(CO2	equivalent)	
	Agricultural	activities	predominantly	cause	CH4	and	N2O	emissions.	N2O,	CO	and	NOx	emissions	are	also	released	as	a	result	of	stubble	burning.	In	order	to	diminish	these	gas	 emissions,	 the	 Turkish	 Ministry	 of	 Food,	 Agriculture	 and	 Livestock	 developed	policies,	 strategic	 plans	 and	 some	 projects.	 Furthermore,	 since	 2007	 the	 Turkish	Ministry	has	initiated	giving	a	“Good	Agricultural	Practices	Certificate”	to	the	producers	who	 do	 not	 damage	 environment,	 human	 and	 animal	 health	 and	 ensure	 translucency	and	 sustainability	 in	 agriculture.	 By	 2010,	 4,540	 producers	 in	 48	 provinces	 have	received	 certificates	 covering	 an	 area	 of	 78,174	 ha	 (with	 an	 increase	 of	 1,458%	comparing	to	2007).	Turkey	aims	to	give	certificates	in	81	provinces	by	the	year	2023.	In	 addition	 to	 good	 agricultural	 practices,	 the	 Turkish	 Ministry	 has	 taken	 significant	steps	 to	 implement	 relevant	 measures	 in	 “Environmentally	 Based	 Agricultural	 Land	Protection	Program	(in	Turkish:	CATAK).	The	program	 includes	 innovative	practices	 in	the	field	of	agriculture	such	as	reducing	the	negative	 impacts	of	agriculture	on	climate	change.	 In	 this	 regard,	 a	 pilot	 project	 as	 a	 “best	 practice”	 had	 initially	 performed	between	2006	and	2008	in	Seyfe	Lake	(Kirsehir	-	Central	Anatolia	Region),	Kovada	Lake	(Egirdir/Isparta	 –	 Mediterranean	 Region),	 Eregli	 Reedfield	 (Konya	 –	 Central	 Anatolia	Region	 and	 Sultan	 Reedfield	 (Kayseri	 –	 Central	 Anatolian	 Region).	 These	 areas	 have	been	 defined	 as	 “Wetlands	 of	 International	 Importance”.	 In	 order	 to	 overcome	 the	environmental	problems	in	the	areas,	land	consolidation	activities	were	implemented	by	the	end	of	2008	(UNDP,	2013).		
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In	 this	 context,	 it	 is	 significant	 to	 implement	 an	 efficient	 bioenergy	 policy	coherent	with	Turkey’s	agricultural	situation	and	policies.	The	utilisation	of	briquettes	and	pellets	 can	be	 considered	as	 efficient	 technologies	 that	help	 to	 extract	 the	 energy	potential	contained	in	agricultural	crop	residues	in	a	more	efficient	way,	with	no	specific	chemical	 transformation	 of	 materials	 (FAO,	 2016).	 Briquetting	 and	 pelletising	 by	replacing	 coal	 consumption,	 will	 bring	 the	 country	 to	 closer	 to	 its	 renewable	 energy	goals;	i.e.	increasing	the	share	of	renewable	energy	to	30%	in	total	energy	generation	by	the	year	of	2023.	
5.5.2.	 Bioethanol	and	Biodiesel		 Sugar	beets	are	the	main	source	of	bioethanol	production	in	Turkey,	followed	by	corn	and	wheat.	Bioethanol	 is	produced	from	molasses,	which	is	a	by-product	of	sugar	production	from	sugar	beets	(Atalaysun,	2016).	When	the	sugar	is	extracted	from	beets,	the	alcohol	remaining	in	the	molasses	is	converted	into	ethanol.	The	remaining	molasses	is	 used	 as	 feed	 and	 as	 raw	 material	 for	 the	 pharmaceutical	 industry,	 cosmetic,	construction,	 alcoholic	 beverages	 and	 yeast.	 Annual	 molasses	 production	 in	 Turkey	varies	from	year	to	year	and	is	around	670,000	metric	tonnes.	No	additional	sugar	beets	for	the	purposes	of	future	production	of	bioethanol	are	currently	planned.	The	 2015-2019	 Strategic	 Plan	 of	 the	 Turkish	 Ministry	 of	 Energy	 and	 Natural	Resources	 set	 out	 the	 priority	 to	 work	 more	 closely	 with	 the	 agricultural	 sector	 to	develop	biofuels	(biodiesel	and	bioethanol).	The	preparatory	regulation	for	this	target	of	the	 Ministry	 was	 issued	 by	 the	 EPDK	 2011	 for	 biofuel	 blending,	 which	 was	 set	 as	mandatory	starting	from	2013	for	bioethanol	(2%)	and	biodiesel	(1%),	with	the	target	of	reducing	the	oil	imports.	Since	2016,	the	blending	ratio	for	bioethanol	was	increased	to	3%	(Atalaysun,	2016).		The	annual	fuel	consumption	in	Turkey	in	2015	ranked	as	22	MMT,	of	which	1.9	MMT	was	gasoline	and	20,1	MMT	was	diesel.	Currently	there	are	three	plants	producing	fuel-purpose	bioethanol	with	a	total	production	capacity	of	150	million	litres.	Around	84	million	litres	of	this	amount	are	provided	from	the	Cumra	plant	of	Pankobirlik	in	Konya	province	in	the	Central	Anatolian	of	Turkey.	The	remaining	amount	of	bioethanol	comes	from	two	plants	 in	the	cities	of	Bursa	and	Adana,	where	the	production	utilises	 locally	grown	corn.		The	EPDK	regulation	requires	bio-ethanol	production	to	be	obtained	solely	from	domestically	grown	agricultural	products.	In	2017,	the	blending	ratio	is	expected	to	rise	
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to	5%,	which	will	necessitate	extra	bioethanol	production.	In	this	respect,	Pankobirlik	is	currently	 considering	 a	 new	 factory	 to	 produce	 bioethanol	 from	 corn,	 to	 meet	 the	increased	bioethanol	needs	in	2017	(Atalaysun,	2016).		In	order	to	see	the	production	necessity	of	crops	in	biofuel	production	for	given	mandatory	 blending	 ratios,	 the	 bioethanol	 and	 biodiesel	 quantities	 must	 firstly	 be	calculated.	 In	 the	 table	 below	 these	 figures	 are	 provided,	 based	 on	 the	 amount	 of	consumption	 multiply	 the	 blending	 ratio	 for	 the	 year	 2013,	 2014,	 2017	 and	 by	 a	proposed	participation	to	the	EU	membership	(Table	19).	
Table	19.	Mandatory	Blending	Application	and	Biofuel	Requirement	
Fuel	type	 Consumption	(million	tons	in	2015)	 Blending	ratio	(%)	 Biofuel	quantity	(thousand	tones)	
Gasoline	
1,9	 2	 2013	 38	(bioethanol)	3	 2014	 57	(bioethanol)	5	 2017	 95	(bioethanol)		 10	 EU	Membership	 190	(bioethanol)	
Diesel	
20,1	 1	 2013	 201	(biodiesel)	3	 2014	 603	(biodiesel)	5	 2017	 1,005	(biodiesel)		 10	 EU	Membership	 2,010	(biodiesel)	
Data	source:	Own	 illustration	based	on	the	data	 from	(Atalaysun,	2016)	and	(Bölük,	et	al.,	2013).		 With	respect	to	the	biofuel	quantities	for	each	year,	the	production	necessities	of	certain	crops	for	bioethanol	and	biodiesel	are	calculated	as	shown	in	Table	20.										
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Table	20.	Agricultural	Feedstock	Necessity	of	Mandatory	Blending	
Biofuel	 Biofuel	consumption	quantity	(million	litre)	 Crop	 Harvest	yield	of	biofuel	feedstock	(kilogram	per	litre	biofuel)	
Production	necessity	(1000	tones)	2%	 3%	 5%	 2%	 3%	 5%	
Bioethanol	 38	 57	 95	 Corn	 2.4	 91	 137	 228	Wheat	 2.9	 110	 165	 275	Sugar	beet	 10.5	 399	 598	 997	
Biodiesel	 201*	 603	 1,005	
Rapeseed	 2.2	 442	 1,326	 2,211	Sunflower	 2.5	 502	 1,507	 2,512	Safflower	 3.3	 663	 1,990	 3,316	Soybean	 5.0	 1,005	 3,015	 5,025	*	1%		blending	rate	for	biodiesel	in	2013.	
Data	source:	Own	illustration	based	on	the	data	from	(Atalaysun,	2016)	(Bölük,	et	al.,	2013)		 According	 to	 the	 calculations,	 bioethanol	 production	 from	 sugar	 beets	 seems	more	 feasible	and	sustainable	 for	Turkey.	Currently,	 around	500	 thousand	hectares	of	sugar	beet	production	area	was	sufficient	 to	meet	 the	mandatory	requirement	ratio	of	3%.	However,	concerning	higher	blending	ratio	(5%),	bioethanol	can	only	be	obtained	from	sugar	beets	if	an	additional	land	area	of	around	14.8	thousand	hectare	is	allocated	for	 sugar	 production	 (Bölük,	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 In	 terms	 of	 land	 area	 capacity,	 Turkey	 has	enough	 potential	 to	meet	 the	 required	 blending	 ratio	 of	 EPDK	with	 sugar	 beet-based	bioethanol	for	gasoline.	Up	until	now,	no	extra	production	from	sugar	beet	or	corn	was	needed	to	meet	the	required	threshold	for	bioethanol.	Extra	production	facilities	and	industrial	farming	for	 bioethanol	 may	 cause	 soil	 erosion,	 water	 pollution	 and	 increase	 carbon	 dioxide	emissions	 due	 to	 the	 use	 of	 fossil	 fuels	 in	 biofuels	 crop	 growth	 and	 production.		According	to	Friends	of	the	Earth	International	Organisation’s	fact	sheet,	water	pollution	from	 fertilisers,	 toxic	 herbicides	 and	 pesticides	 increases	 with	 more	 core	 ethanol	production	caused	by	the	corn	farming.	Furthermore,	due	to	massive	land	requirements,	bioethanol	 and	 biofuel	 production	 contribute	 to	 global	 deforestation	 and	 ecosystem	destruction.	 Moreover,	 corn	 as	 one	 of	 the	 most	 prevalent	 crops	 for	 bioethanol	production,	 uses	 large	 amounts	 of	 oil-based	 fertilisers,	which	 release	high	amounts	 of	greenhouse	gas	pollution.	
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Regarding	the	production	of	biodiesel,	the	production	methods	differ	from	those	of	 bioethanol.	 Biodiesel	 is	 obtained	 from	 oilseeds	 and	 since	 the	 subvention	 cut	 offs	through	an	‘agricultural	revolution’	in	2002,	Turkey	became	a	net	importer	of	oilseeds.	All	 the	 seeds,	 necessary	 for	 the	 biodiesel	 production,	 need	 to	 be	 imported,	 which	increases	the	burden	of	import	bills	on	top	the	current	account	deficit	in	Turkey.		Bioenergy	systems	and	biofuels	may	help	to	displace	foreign	petroleum	imports	in	 energy-scarce	 countries,	 as	 well	 as	 sustain	 energy	 security	 and	 prevent	 climate	change.	 Turkey	 has	 an	 installed	 capacity	 of	 more	 than	 1.5	 million	 tonnes	 regarding	biodiesel	plants,	including	34	biodiesel	facilities.	Nevertheless,	these	plants	are	not	fully	utilised	due	to	the	low	oil	seed	self-sufficiency	ratio	and	increasing	trade	account	deficit.	Therefore,	 biodiesel	 production	 based	 on	 oilseeds	 is	 not	 sustainable	 for	 Turkey	 in	economic	 terms.	 In	contrast,	bioethanol	production	 in	Turkey	seems	 to	be	sustainable	and	 can	meet	 the	mandatory	 blending	 ratio	 requirement.	 Bioethanol	 production	 from	sugar	beets	 is	 the	more	rational	choice	over	corn,	due	to	the	sufficient	plantation	area	and	potential	 for	utilisation	of	 the	remaining	molasses	as	 feed	and	as	raw	material	 for	the	 pharmaceutical,	 cosmetic,	 construction,	 alcoholic	 beverages	 and	 yeast	 industries.	Furthermore,	 sugar	 beets	 have	 less	 negative	 environmental	 impacts	 such	 as	 soil	degradation	and	water	pollution	in	comparison	to	corn,	contributing	less	to	greenhouse	gas	emissions.		
5.5.3.	 Energy	production	from	biomass	and	the	legal	framework		 The	 term	 biomass	 (in	 Greek	 language	 bio	 means	 life	 and	 maza	 means	 mass)	refers	 to	 non-fossilised	 and	 biodegradable	 organic	 material	 originating	 from	 plants,	animals,	and	microorganisms.	The	biomass	includes	products,	by-products,	residues	and	waste	from	agriculture,	forestry	and	related	industries	as	well	as	the	non-fossilised	and	biodegradable	 organic	 fractions	 of	 industrial	 and	 municipal	 solid	 wastes	 (Demirbas,	2009).	 It	 also	 includes	 gasses	 and	 liquids	 recovered	 from	 the	 decomposition	 of	 non-fossilised	 and	 biodegradable	 organic	 material	 (Demirbas,	 2009).	 It	 is	 an	 important	renewable	 energy	 source,	 where	 solar	 energy	 is	 stored	 as	 chemical	 energy	 through	photosynthesis	during	the	growth	of	plants	and	trees,	which	can	be	released	via	direct	or	indirect	combustion	(Demirbas,	2009).	According	to	the	estimation	of	the	International	Energy	Agency,	2.7	billion	people	worldwide	 are	 still	 relying	on	 traditional	 biomass	 energy	 source,	 like	polluting	 stoves	and	 fuels	 for	 cooking	 by	 using	mainly	wood,	 other	 biomass	 and	 charcoal	 (IEA,	 2016).	
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Biomass	can	be	generally	used	in	two	forms:	Traditional	biomass	and	modern	biomass	which	are	classified	according	to	the	supply	sector	as	follows:	
• Forestry	 sources:	 Dedicated	 forestry	 (short	 rotation	 plantations	 like	 willow,	poplar)	and	by-products	(wood	products)	
• Agricultural	sources:	Lignocellulosic	energy	crops	(herbaceous	crops),	oil,	sugar	and	starchy	crops,	agricultural	residues	and	livestock	wastes	
• Industrial	sources:	Industrial	residues	
• Waste:	 Dry	 lignocellulosic	 waste	 (residues	 from	 parks	 and	 gardens)	 and	contaminated	waste	(demolition	wood,	organic	fraction	of	municipal	solid	waste,	biodegradable	landfilled	waste,	landfill	gas,	sewage	sludge)	(Isler,	et	al.,	2008)	The	estimated	biomass	potential	of	Turkey	is	4.8	million	tonnes,	which	could	be	obtained	from	forests,	and	over	15.3	million	tonnes	from	agricultural	waste.	In	total,	the	biomass	potential	of	Turkey	is	8.7	mtoe	of	which	49	MW	was	operational	in	2014	(IEA,	2016).	Based	on	the	vision	2023	targets	of	the	Turkish	MENR,	the	government	intends	to	increase	use	of	biomass-based	energy	generation	to	1,000	MW	by	2023.	The	 basic	 legal	 framework	 in	 Turkey	 to	 support	 electricity	 generation	 from	biomass-based	 energy	 and	 biogas,	 was	 adopted	 in	 2005	 as	 Law	 on	 utilisation	 of	
Renewable	 Energy	 in	 Electricity	 Generation	 No.	 5346.	 The	 Law	 provided	 the	 choice	between	 direct	 sales	 of	 renewable	 electricity	 into	 sport	 market	 or	 a	 general	 feed-in-tariff,	 which	 includes	 the	 requirements	 for	 suppliers	 to	 purchase	 their	 renewable	electricity,	 priority	 connection	 and	 exemptions	 for	 small	 generators	 (0.5	 MW)	 from	license	 obligations,	 as	 well	 as	 reduced	 fees	 for	 land	 acquisition	 (IEA,	 2016).	Furthermore,	 the	government	 in	Turkey	promotes	 the	use	of	biomass	over	 fossil	 fuels	and	uses	 the	best	 available	 agricultural	 and	 irrigation	 techniques	 to	 reduce	 emissions	and	 conserve	 natural	 resources	 in	 agriculture	 (Nachmany	 et.	 al.,	 2015).	 The	 adopted	‘Law	on	Soil	Conservation	and	the	Act	on	Grassland	and	Pasture	Conservation’	as	well	as	the	 ‘Action	 Plan	 on	 Drought	 Preparedness	 and	 Combating	 Drought'	 are	 desired	 to	contribute	to	carbon	sequestration	(Nachmany	et.	al.,	2015).	
5.5.3.1.	Energy	production	from	traditional	biomass		 Approximately	 60%	 of	 total	 biomass	 worldwide	 used	 for	 energy	 purposes	 is	traditional	 biomass	 like	 fuel	 wood	 (some	 of	 them	 converted	 to	 charcoal),	 sawdust,	straw,	stalk,	combustible	residues,	wastes	and	animal	dung.	These	are	gathered	by	hand	
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and	mostly	 combusted	 in	 open	 fires	 or	 stoves	 for	 cooking,	 heating	 for	 dwellings	 and	lighting	purposes,	especially	in	the	developing	countries	and	in	rural	areas.		In	Turkey,	non-commercial	energy	forms,	stoves	and	ovens	using	biomass	are	the	main	source	of	energy,	especially	 in	 the	rural	areas	used	both	 for	cooking	and	heating	purposes.	The	second	primarily	used	fuel	 is	coal.	Turkish	traditional	stoves	and	ovens,	which	come	from	multi-cultural	Anatolian	and	Ottoman	Empire	cultures,	are	still	used	today.	 Examples	 for	 the	widely-used	 stoves	 and	 ovens	 are	 dung	 stoves,	 wood	 stoves,	sawdust	 stoves,	kuzine	 stoves,	 rock	 ovens	 and	 tandoor	 ovens	 (Isler,	 et	 al.,	 2008).	 The	wood	stove	is	a	simple	stove	type,	which	is	widely	used	in	the	rural	areas	where	forestry	products	are	abundant	 for	heating	and	cooking	purposes.	The	sawdust	stove	 is	mainly	utilised	 in	 the	 countryside	 for	 cooking	 purposes.	 Sawdust	 is	 obtained	 from	 cutting,	grinding,	 drilling,	 sanding,	 or	 otherwise	pulverizing	wood.	Dung	 stoves	have	 a	 similar	system	with	sawdust	stove,	however	it	utilises	dung	obtained	from	livestock.	The	wood,		sawdust	 and	 the	 dung	 stoves	 all	 have	 detrimental	 impacts	 on	 the	 environment	 and	human	 health.	 Lastly,	 the	 kuzine	 stoves,	 which	 are	 made	 of	 sheet	 iron	 and	 used	 for	heating	and	cooking	purposes,	are	widely	utilised	by	the	households	in	rural	and	urban	areas	(Isler,	et	al.,	2008).	Tandoor	ovens	are	one	of	the	old	and	traditional	ovens	used	in	Turkey	and	used	widely	for	cooking	purposes	in	rural	areas.	Rock	ovens,	called	Şamot	in	the	Ottoman	Empire,	consist	of	 fire-resistant	special	rocks.	They	were	principally	used	for	baking	and	cooking	purposes	(Isler,	et	al.,	2008).	
5.5.3.2.	Energy	Production	from	Modern	Biomass		 Modern	biomass	is	obtained	from	renewable	sources	in	a	sustainable	manner.	As	it	is	indicated	in	the	previous	sub-chapter,	wood	is	used	as	a	major	resource	for	cooking	and	heating	purposes	 in	rural	 regions,	but	 its	use	 for	energy	production	 from	modern	biomass	 is	 rather	 a	 new	 concept	 in	 Turkey.	 In	 order	 to	 obtain	 energy	 from	 modern	biomass,	there	are	different	technologies,	which	are	illustrated	in	Figure	21.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
		 177	
Figure	21.	Biomass	Energy	Conversion	Technologies	
 
a)	Thermo-chemical	Process		In	 the	 thermochemical	 process,	 there	 are	 two	 technologies	 utilised,	which	 are:	
Gasification	technology	and	pyrolysis	technology.	By	using	gasification	technology,	energy	crops,	rice	straw,	bark,	peat,	sawdust,	municipal	solid	waste,	forest	residues,	and	wood	chips	are	the	main	energy	input	for	the	gasification	plants.	Biomass	gasification	means	incomplete	 combustion	of	 biomass	 taking	place	 at	 a	 temperature	of	 about	1,000°C.	 In	this	phase,	four	distinct	processes	occur:	1)	Drying	fuel	2)	pyrolysis	3)	combustion	and	4)	 reduction.	The	composition	of	 the	output	depends	on	 the	 type	of	gasification	agent	adopted.	The	typical	composition	of	released	output	consists	of	85%	syngas,	10%	char,	and	5%	liquid.	The	biggest	advantage	of	this	technology	is	that	electricity	production	by	biomass	 gasification	 is	 highly	 efficient	 and	 has	 low	 environmental	 impacts.	 The	disadvantages	 of	 gasification	 are	 the	 tar	 formations,	 dust	 production,	 operating	 and	maintenance	 costs,	 sensitiveness	 of	 biomass	 collection,	 composition	 and	 preparation,	and	the	obligation	of	gas-cleaning	(Dilucia	La	Perna,	et	al.,	2013).	By	 using	 pyrolysis	 technology,	 energy	 crops,	 wheat	 straw,	 bark,	 peat,	 chicken	litter,	sawdust,	forest	residues	and	wood	chips	are	the	main	energy	input	for	the	plants.	Pyrolysis	 is	 a	 thermochemical	 decomposition	 process	 in	 which	 organic	 material	 is	converted	 into	 a	 carbon-rich	 solid	 and	 volatile	 matter	 by	 heating	 in	 the	 absence	 of	oxygen	 (Dilucia	 La	 Perna,	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 The	 composition	 of	 the	 output	 from	 a	 typical	pyrolysis	process	consists	of	35-45%	bio-oil,	30-40%	biochar,	and	20-30%	syngas.	The	advantages	 of	 pyrolysis	 technology	 are	 that	 it	 enables	 flexible	 fuel	 production,	 power	production	 and	 sequestration	 of	 carbon	 in	 char.	 The	 disadvantages	 of	 this	 technology	
Biomass	
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conversion
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bear	 a	 resemblance	 to	 the	 gasification	 technology.	 In	 addition	 to	 this,	 the	 greatest	disadvantage	 of	 pyrolysis	 technology	 is	 low	 electricity	 generation.	 The	 economic	viability	of	this	technology	also	depends	on	the	biochar	market	(Dilucia	La	Perna,	et	al.,	2013).	
b)	Chemical	Process	–	Anaerobic	Digestion	(Biogas	Technology)		In	the	chemical	process,	crop	residues,	dairy	cattle,	poultry	manure,	pig	manure,	beef	 cattle,	 corn	 silage,	 molasses	 and	 sugar	 beet	 residues	 are	 used	 as	 input	 for	 the	anaerobic	digestion.	This	process	is	the	decomposition	of	organic	matter	by	bacteria	in	the	 absence	 of	 oxygen.	 It	 is	 the	 transformation	 of	 organic	 matter	 into	 biogas	 and	 a	liquefied	 effluent.	 The	 process	 follows	 four	 steps:	 1)	 Hydrolysis	 2)	 acidogenesis	 3)	acetogenesis	 and	 4)	methanogenesis.	 By	 the	 end	 of	 anaerobic	 digestion,	 biogas	 (fuel),	fibre	 (soil	 conditioner)	and	 liquor	 (liquid	 fertiliser)	are	released	as	output.	The	biogas	composition	depends	on	the	type	of	feedstock.	Typical	ranges	of	the	composition	are	55-70%	methane	and	30-45%	carbon	dioxide.	The	advantages	of	biogas	technology	are	the	high	 electricity	 generation,	 reduction	 in	 odour	 levels,	 reduction	 of	 land	 and	 water	pollution.	The	disadvantages	of	this	process	are	the	risks	of	chemical	reaction	inhibition,	feedstock	 collection	 and	 preparation,	 the	 seasonal	 variance	 of	 feedstock	 and	 the	obligation	of	gas-cleaning	(Dilucia	La	Perna,	et	al.,	2013).	
c)	Thermal	Process	–	Combustion		In	 combustion	 technology,	 wood	 chips,	 bark,	 forest	 residues,	 waste	 wood,	 rice	hulls,	 sugar	 cane	 bagasse	 and	 switch	 grass	 are	 used	 as	 input	 to	 the	 process.	 Thermal	combustion	is	the	most	common	way	of	converting	solid	biomass	fuels	into	energy	and	generation	 of	 high-temperature	 heat	 as	 flue	 gasses.	 The	 combustion	 technology	 is	robust;	 biomass	 combustion	 for	 commercial	 and	 district	 heating	 has	 a	 great	 potential	and	can	be	used	for	 large-scale	plants.	The	main	disadvantage	of	 the	technology	 is	 the	low	electricity	generation	(Dilucia	La	Perna,	et	al.,	2013).	The	 investment	 cost	 of	 a	 woody	 biomass-fired	 plant	 is	 between	 1.5	 –	 4	 times	higher	 than	a	conventional	 fossil-fired	plant.	These	high	 initial	capital	costs	stem	from	the	necessity	of	large-scale	caldrons	and	large-scale	facilities	to	produce	and	store	wood	residues.	 Furthermore,	 the	 average	 yield	of	 a	natural	 gas	or	 fuel	 oil	 burning	 engine	 is	around	80%,	whereas	the	yield	of	a	woody	biomass	burning	plant	is	not	expected	to	be	more	 than	 75%.	 According	 to	 the	 calculations	 of	 the	 Turkish	 General	 Directorate	 of	
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Forestry,	 establishing	 a	 woody	 biomass	 power	 plant	 in	 a	 public	 institution	 is	 only	economic	 if	 the	electricity	generation	capacity	of	 the	plant	 is	more	 than	10	MW.	 In	an	industrial	 factory,	 a	 power	 plant	 with	 a	 minimum	 capacity	 of	 2.2	 MW	 would	 be	economical	to	operate.	All	in	all,	sole	electricity	generation	from	biomass	is	not	efficient.	Therefore,	 cogeneration	 (combined	heat	 and	power)	 systems	 can	 be	 preferred,	which	simultaneously	generate	electricity	and	heat.	Under	current	policies,	which	include	settings	regarding	prices,	capital	 investments	and	 tariffs,	 profitable	 conditions	 for	 the	 cogeneration	 of	 heat	 and	 power	 (CHP)	 were	defined.	Nevertheless,	based	on	the	2016	report	of	Food	and	Agriculture	Organisation	of	
the	United	States,	the	actual	price	of	heat	was	not	able	to	be	procured,	due	to	the	lack	of	infrastructure	 for	 large	 heat	 distribution.	 Only	 the	 assessment	 of	 the	 electricity	 from	CHP	was	possible.	According	to	the	analysis,	the	CHP	plants	need	to	operate	using	high	efficiency	 technologies	 and	 utilising	 high-energy	 potential	 feedstock.	 Two	 distinct	bioenergy	pathways	were	implemented	to	analyse	the	electricity	from	CHP	plants:	I. Direct	 residue	 combustion	 in	 CHP	 plants	 (crop	 residues	 –	 groundnut	 husk,	pistachio	shell,	hazelnut	husk,	rice	husk,	maize	cob,	maize	husk	II. Residues	 first	 converted	 into	 biogas	 (animal	manures	 –	 cattle	manure,	 poultry	manure)	and	sunflower	heads	
I.	 Direct	Residue	Combustion	The	Figure	22	shows	the	provinces	with	the	potential	of	energy	value	from	field	crop,	fruit	and	vegetable	residues.	The	official	data	and	map	are	provided	by	the	Turkish	Ministry	 of	 Energy	 and	 Natural	 Resources	 –	 Turkey	 Bioenergy	 Potential	 Atlas.	 The	provinces	with	 the	highest	 amount	 of	 bioenergy	 value	 is	 shown	 in	 red	 and	 again	 in	 a	larger	format	on	the	pie	chart.	It	is	possible	to	see	the	quantitative	energy	value	of	each	province	 on	 the	 illustrated	 interactive	 map	 online	 via	 http://bepa.yegm.gov.tr.	According	to	this	data,	the	provinces	with	the	largest	amount	of	energy	value	from	field	crops	are	almost	evenly	distributed	to	Central,	South	and	West	provinces	in	Turkey	such	as;	Konya	(Central	Anatolia	 -	2.8	mtoe),	 Izmir	(Aegean	-	2	mtoe),	Balikesir	(Marmara	-	1.5	 mtoe),	 Adana	 (Mediterranean	 -	 1.4	 mtoe),	 Sanliurfa	 (South	 Eastern	 -	 1.4	 mtoe),	Samsun	(Black	Sea	-	1.3	mtoe)	Ankara	(Central	Analia	-	1.2	mtoe)	and	Diyarbakir	(South	Eastern	-	1	mtoe).	Due	to	their	low	amount	of	energy	value,	the	residues	from	fruits	and	vegetables	are	not	considered	in	this	analysis.	
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Figure	22.	Electricity	capacity	generation	(MW)	from	field	crop	residues		
	
	
Data	source:	(YEGM,	2018).	
Translation:	Grafik	Analizi	(Graphical	Analysis):	Green	area	=	Energy	 from	 field	crops	84%,	brown	area:	Energy	from	fruits	6%,	pink	area	=	Energy	from	vegetables	10%		 Turkey	 has	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 field	 crops,	 naturally	 with	 different	 potentials	 of	energy	 values.	 Based	 on	 the	 2016	 statistical	 data	 of	 the	 Food	 and	 Agriculture	Organisation	 of	 the	 United	 Nations,	 the	 top	 10	 most	 promising	 field	 crop	 residues	identified	as	potentially	available	and	profitable	are;	hazelnut	shell	and	husk,	groundnut	husk	cotton	stalk,	maize	 cob	and	husk,	pistachio	 shell,	 soybean	husk,	 sunflower	heads	and	rice	husk	(FAO,	2016).	Under	a	set	of	specific	production	conditions	and	feedstock	options,	the	briquetting	and	pelleting	of	these	top	10	crop	residues	could	be	a	promising	option	and	future	solution	to	substitute	charcoal	and	fuelwood	for	heating	and	cooking	purposes.	It	is	fundamental	to	take	into	account	the	minimum	required	energy	potential	and	 the	 price	 ceiling	 for	 both	 briquettes	 and	 pellets	 after	 considering	 the	 region’s	charcoal	and	 fuelwood	consumption,	as	well	as	 to	what	extent	 the	competing	 industry	has	been	established	(FAO,	2016).	In	order	to	assess	the	potential	of	major	crop	residues	for	generating	electricity	through	direct	combustion	in	CHP	plants,	Table	21	is	provided.	
	
		 181	
Table	21.	Energy	potentials	and	collection	cost	for	feedstock	identified	as	available	for	bioenergy	production	
Feedstock	 Energy	potential	(metajoule/kg)	
Feedstock	
($/tons)	Corn	stalk	 16.4	 $276.0	Tobacco	stalk	 16.2	 $201.3	Soybean	stalk	 16.7	 $200.5	Sunflower	stalk	 13.6	 $104.9	Rice	straw	 14.9	 $104.1	Maize	husk	 17.4	 $75.7	Cotton	stalk	 18.1	 $23.6	Corn	cob	 17.7	 $20.9	Rice	husk	 13.5	 $19.0	Almond	shell	 17.0	 $0.0	Groundnut	husk	 18.6	 $0.0	Hazelnut	husk	 17.0	 $0.0	Hazelnut	shell	 19.9	 $0.0	Pistachio	shell	 17.7	 $0.0	Soybean	husk	 15.5	 $0.0	Sunflower	head	 14.5	 $0.0	Data	source:	(FAO,	2016).	Total	electricity	output	of	CHP	systems	depends	on	two	factors:	Energy	potential	of	feedstock	and	amount	of	heat	converted	into	electricity	(FAO,	2016).	With	respect	to	the	profitability	of	crop	residues,	the	most	promising	crops	for	the	electricity	generation	are:	Hazelnut	shell,	groundnut	husk,	cotton	stalk,	corn	cob,	pistachio	shell,	almond	shell,	hazelnut	 husk,	 soybean	 husk,	 sunflower	 head	 and	 rice	 husk.	 Nevertheless,	 in	 Turkey	pistachio	shell	and	almond	shell,	despite	their	promising	profitability,	are	not	available	in	sufficient	quantities	to	supply	minimum	profitable	sizes	due	to	their	energy	potentials	and	cost.	 In	 line	with	 this	aspect,	 the	most	promising	 feedstock	 in	 terms	of	quantities,	energy	potential	and	cost	are	corn	cob	and	corn	husk.	Adana,	Osmaniye,	Sanliurfa	and	Mardin	provinces,	 located	 in	Mediterranean	 and	 South-eastern	Anatolian	 respectively,	along	with	Sakarya	province	which	is	located	in	the	Marmara	region,	would	be	the	best	options	 to	 establish	 large	 plantation	 areas,	 due	 to	 their	 adequate	 agricultural	 surface	areas	(see	Table	22).		
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Table	22.	Potential	electricity	generation	capacities	of	CHP	direct	combustion	system	in	provinces	producing	most	promising	residues	Electricity	Capacity	
Province	name	 Almond	shell	 Corn	cob	 Corn	husk	 Groundnut	husk	 Pistachio	shell	 Rise	husk	 Hazelnut	husk	 Soybean		husk	 Hazelnut	shell	 Total	capacity	province	(MW)	
Adana	 -	 25.8	 7.0	 0.8	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 33.6	
Sanliurfa	 -	 17.2	 4.7	 -	 2.0	 -	 -	 -	 -	 23.9	
Mardin	 -	 14.2	 3.9	 -	 -	 -	 -	 1.0	 -	 19.0	
Sakarya	 -	 10.3	 2.8	 -	 -	 -	 3.7	 -	 1.3	 18.0	
Osmaniye	 -	 10.6	 2.9	 0.6	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 14.1	
Manisa	 -	 9.1	 2.5	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 11.5	
Samsun	 -	 3.0	 0.8	 -	 -	 3.0	 2.9	 -	 1.0	 10.8	
Konya	 -	 8.2	 2.2	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 10.4	
Edirne	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 9.0	 -	 -	 -	 9.0	
Kahramanmara
s	 -	 6.1	 1.7	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 7.8	
Mersin	 -	 5.8	 1.6	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 7.3	
Ordu	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 5.3	 -	 1.8	 7.1	
Izmir	 -	 5.2	 1.4	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 6.6	
Aydin	 -	 5.2	 1.4	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 6.6	
Diyarbakir	 -	 4.5	 1.2	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 5.8	
Hatay	 -	 4.5	 1.2	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 5.7	
Bursa	 -	 4.2	 1.1	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 5.3	
Düzce	 -	 1.0	 -	 -	 -	 -	 2.5	 -	 0.9	 4.4	
Giresun	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 2.9	 -	 1.0	 3.8	
Karaman	 -	 2.8	 0.8	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 3.6	
Gaziantep	 -	 1.3	 -	 -	 2.3	 -	 -	 -	 -	 3.6	
Balikesir	 -	 0.7	 -	 -	 -	 2.7	 -	 -	 -	 3.4	
Trabzon	 -	 0.6	 -	 -	 -	 -	 1.7	 -	 0.6	 2.9	
Canakkale	 -	 0.7	 -	 -	 -	 2.0	 -	 -	 -	 2.7	
Denizli	 -	 2.0	 0.5	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 2.6	
Kirklareli	 -	 1.1	 -	 -	 -	 0.5	 -	 -	 -	 1.6	
Antalya	 -	 1.6	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 1.6	
Corum	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 1.5	 -	 -	 -	 1.5	
Kocaeli	 -	 1.1	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 1.1	
Zonguldak	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 1.0	 -	 -	 1.0	
Amasya	 -	 1.0	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 1.0	
Adiyaman	 -	 0.9	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 0.9	
Siirt	 -	 -	 -	 -	 0.8	 -	 -	 -	 -	 0.8	
Batman	 -	 0.8	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 0.8	
Sinop	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 0.7	 -	 -	 -	 0.7	
Tekirdag	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 0.7	 -	 -	 -	 0.7	
Tokat	 -	 0.6	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 0.6	
Mugla	 -	 0.6	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 0.6	
Igdir	 -	 0.5	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 0.5	
Bartin	 -	 0.5	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 0.5	
Total	Capacity	
Feedstock	
(MW)	
-	 151.7	 37.7	 1.4	 5.1	 20.1	 20.0	 1.0	 6.6	 243,6	
Data	source:	(FAO,	2016).	
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	 Based	 on	 the	 given	 outcomes,	 it	 can	 be	 asserted	 that	 the	 use	 of	 high	 efficiency	technologies	producing	heat	and	electricity	is	fundamental.	Furthermore,	the	crops	with	high-energy	potential	 should	be	chosen	 for	generating	electricity	 in	 the	CHP	plants.	 In	addition	to	this,	locally	produced	electromechanical	and	electrical	equipment	would	be	preferable	due	to	cost	efficiency	and	the	provided	additional	premium	from	the	Turkish	authorities,	which	would	additionally	increase	the	business	profitability	(FAO,	2016).	
5.5.4.	 Biogas	(Methane)		Biomethane	is	methane	sourced	from	renewable	biomass	such	as	organic	waste,	sewage,	agricultural	residues	or	energy	crops.	 It	has	 the	major	constituent	 in	common	with	 natural	 gas:	methane.	 It	 can	 also	 be	 obtained	 from	woody	 biomass	 like	 forestry	residues	through	the	production	of	synthetic	gas	(Strauch,	et	al.,	2013).	Biomethane	makes	 a	 significant	 contribution	 to	 climate	 protection	 and	 carbon	dioxide	 emission	 reduction,	 as	 it	 is	 also	 a	 flexible	 energy	 carrier	 and	 can	 be	 used	 as	electricity,	 heat	 and	 vehicle	 fuel	 (Strauch,	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 It	 also	 meets	 the	 main	 three	principles	by	which	Turkey's	energy	strategy	stands:	security	of	supply,	 sustainability,	and	 competitiveness	 in	 energy	 terms.	A	 legally	binding	biomethane	 target	will	 reduce	Turkey’s	exposure	to	volatile	fossil	fuel	prices.	Hedging	against	such	volatility	is	crucial	as	Turkey's	import	dependence	is	set	to	grow	to	more	than	80%	of	oil	and	gas	by	2035.	Because	 the	 substrates	 for	 biomethane	 production	 are	 homemade	 or	 derived	 from	internal	 processes,	 they	 can	 displace	 fossil	 fuel	 usage	 proportionate	 to	 its	 production	and	 therefore	 enhance	 the	 security	 of	 supply	 (Strauch,	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 Locally-produced	energy	 and	 stimulating	 technological	 innovation	 are	 the	 keys	 to	 develop	 competitive	energy	market	and	to	increase	employment	opportunities	(Strauch,	et	al.,	2013).	Similar	to	natural	gas,	biomethane	can	be	used	for	household	applications	such	as	cooking	and	heating	(Strauch,	et	al.,	2013).	Compared	to	other	renewable	heat	sources,	biomethane	is	one	of	the	more	expensive	fuels.	Nevertheless,	it	offers	to	operate	an	existing	natural	gas	 heating	 system	 with	 green	 energy.	 In	 rural	 households	 of	 Turkey,	 utilisation	 of	biomethane	 for	 cooking	 and	 heating	 purposes	 could	 be	 beneficial	 as	 well	 as	 more	environmentally	friendly	than	direct	combustion	of	biomass.			Biogas	 is	 the	 pre-stage	 of	 biomethane,	 which	 can	 be	 obtained	 from	 almost	 all	kinds	of	wet	organic	matter	with	low	lignocellulose	content,	e.g.	organic	waste,	sewage	sludge	and	manure	by	anaerobic	digestion	(Strauch,	et	al.,	2013).	Anaerobic	digestion	is	
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a	 natural	 process	 where	 bacteria	 acts	 upon	 the	 humid	 organic	 materials	 and	decomposes	them	into	biogas	(Strauch,	et	al.,	2013).	The	obtained	biogas	is	cleaned	of	its	impurities	and	upgraded,	to	increase	the	methane	content	(Strauch,	et	al.,	2013).	Biogas	technology	 is	 used	when	 there	 is	 some	 feedstock	which	 cannot	 be	 directly	 burned	 in	CHP	plants	due	to	their	high	water	contention	or	high	amount	of	ashes	produced	during	combustion.	 In	 these	 cases,	 the	 most	 technically	 appropriate	 solution	 is	 the	 biogas	option,	to	extract	the	energy	potential	contained	in	wet	biomass	(FAO,	2016).		To	assess	the	profitability	zone	for	the	specific	plant	residues	and	animal	manures,	the	realistic	methane	potential	(RMP),	biochemical	methane	potential	(BMP)	and	feedstock	costs	are	considered	and	illustrated	in	Table	22.	According	to	the	table,	tea	waste,	draff,	tomato	 ind.,	 sunflower	 heads,	 molasses	 and	 beet	 press	 cakes	 are	 seen	 as	 the	 most	profitable	sources	to	be	used	in	electricity	production	from	biogas.	The	 landfill	option,	which	seems	less	profitable	than	the	mentioned	feedstock,	 is	the	most	commonly	used	option	 in	 Turkey.	 The	 landfill	 has	 freely	 available	 feedstock	 (municipal	 solid	 wastes,	organic	wastes)	and	they	are	paid	to	dispose	of	the	residues.	Hence,	they	have	additional	credits	which	 the	 other	 feedstock	 do	 not	 have.	Notwithstanding	 this,	 due	 to	 its	 lower	RMP,	landfill	is	not	as	compatible	as	the	other	options	like	beef	press	cake	or	molasses	(FAO,	2016).		Based	on	the	further	assessments	of	the	Food	and	Agriculture	Organisation	of	the	United	 Nations’	 Bioenergy	 and	 Food	 Security	 Assessment,	 when	 the	 larger	 feedstock	options	 are	 considered,	 it	 is	 shown	 that	 the	 traditional	 residues	 like	 sunflower	 heads	and	 animal	 manures	 (such	 as	 cattle	 manure	 and	 poultry	 layer	 collected	 at	slaughterhouses	and	dairy	plants)	give	the	most	promising	biogas	production	numbers	for	 Turkey.	 Regarding	 the	 importance	 of	 dairy,	 poultry	 and	 sunflower	 industries	 in	Turkey,	a	huge	potential	to	utilise	these	biomass	residues	effectively	is	existent.	
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Table	23.	Standard	Biogas	Properties	and	Estimated	Collection	Costs	for	Selected	Biomass	Residues	
	 RMP	 BMP	 Feedstock	cost	($/tons)	
Napier	grass	 70	 274	 50	
Cattle	blood	 62	 400	 14	
Beet	press	cake	 59	 300	 0	
Molasses	 54	 308	 0	
Cattle	stomach	 53	 485	 14	
Poultry	blood	 51	 343	 14	
Typical	straw	 51	 170	 50	
Cattle-ind.	 50	 250	 14	
Catte-farm	 50	 250	 41	
Fruit	pomace	 50	 189	 35	
Tomato	field.	 48	 200	 50	
Tomato	ind.	 48	 200	 0	
Draff	 43	 503	 0	
Poultry	stomach	 39	 350	 14	
Tea	waste	 37	 250	 0	
Landfill	 29	 206	 0	
Buffalo-farm.	 23	 230	 55	
Poultry	layer	 57	 243	 15	
Buffalo-Ind.	 14	 230	 14	
Food	waste	 14	 571	 0	
Milk	whey	 6	 1,000	 14	
Sunflower	heads	 52	 199	 0	
Data	source:	Own	illustration	based	on	the	data	from	(FAO,	2016).			 According	 to	 Table	 24	 Turkish	 provinces	 would	 achieve	 a	 total	 combined	production	capacity	of	768	MW.	243.4	MW	production	is	expected	from	CHP	combustion	plants	for	direct	residues.	Ultimately,	Turkey	will	reach	a	total	capacity	of	at	least	1,011	MW	generated	electricity.	This	amount	will	be	sufficient	to	meet	Turkey’s	energy	target	by	2023	from	biomass	(FAO,	2016).	
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Table	24.	Potential	electricity	generation	capacities	of	CHP	system	in	producing	most	promising	residues		 Electricity	Capacity	(MW)	Province	name	 Biogas	from	sunflower	heads	 Biogas	from	cattle	manure	 Biogas	from	layer	manure	 Total	capacity	province	(MW)	
Konya	 32.5	 34.1	 10.2	 76.8	
Edirne	 39.6	 6.0	 0.2	 45.8	
Tekirdag	 39.1	 5.6	 0.7	 45.4	
Kirklareli	 25.6	 8.3	 0.3	 34.2	
Balikesir	 4.8	 19.3	 5.8	 30.0	
Adana	 18.3	 9.6	 0.7	 28.6	
Ankara	 5.5	 18.1	 3.9	 27.5	
Afyon	 -	 11.5	 11.7	 23.3	
Izmir	 -	 17.7	 4.1	 21.9	
Bursa	 4.3	 10.5	 3.8	 18.7	
Erzurum	 -	 17.4	 0.2	 17.6	
Kayseri	 0.6	 12.7	 3.4	 16.9	
Samsun	 4.8	 9.7	 1.3	 16.0	
Diyarbakir	 -	 14.4	 0.5	 15.1	
Denizli	 6.2	 6.7	 1.6	 14.5	
Kars	 -	 14.3	 0.2	 14.5	
Aksaray	 8.0	 6.2	 0.3	 14.5	
Canakkale	 7.0	 7.1	 0.2	 14.3	
Manisa	 -	 5.7	 8.4	 14.1	
Aydin	 -	 13.4	 0.6	 14.0	
Gaziantep	 -	 12.6	 1.3	 13.9	
Eskisehir	 5.1	 4.8	 1.2	 11.1	
Amasya	 3.6	 5.8	 1.2	 10.7	
Corum	 5.7	 4.6	 -	 10.3	
Mus	 -	 9.6	 0.3	 9.9	
Istanbul	 5.9	 2.8	 0.9	 9.8	
Sivas	 -	 8.4	 0.4	 8.8	
Yozgat	 -	 8.1	 0.6	 8.7	
Tokat	 4.6	 3.7	 0.2	 8.6	
Kastamonu	 -	 8.0	 0.2	 8.2	
Agri	 -	 7.4	 0.1	 7.5	
Kahramanmaras	 2.2	 4.7	 0.3	 7.2	
Kirsehir	 1.2	 5.5	 0.4	 7.1	
Ardahan	 -	 6.8	 0.1	 6.9	
Mugla	 -	 5.6	 0.5	 6.1	
Mersin	 -	 4.1	 1.5	 5.6	
Van	 -	 5.1	 0.3	 5.4	
Burdur	 -	 5.1	 0.2	 5.3	
Igdir	 -	 4.4	 0.1	 4.5	
Hatay	 -	 4.1	 0.4	 4.5	
Kirikkale	 0.7	 3.2	 0.6	 4.5	
Usak	 -	 4.3	 0.1	 4.4	
Isparta	 -	 4.2	 0.2	 4.4	
Nigde	 -	 4.0	 0.4	 4.4	
Malatya	 -	 4.0	 0.4	 4.3	
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Electricity	Capacity	(MW)	Province	name	 Biogas	from	sunflower	heads	 Biogas	from	cattle	manure	 Biogas	from	layer	manure	 Total	capacity	province	(MW)	
Kocaeli	 -	 3.8	 0.6	 4.3	
Antalya	 -	 3.9	 0.5	 4.3	
Karaman	 0.8	 2.4	 1.1	 4.3	
Sakarya	 -	 3.1	 1.2	 4.3	
Elazig	 -	 3.6	 0.6	 4.2	
Trabzon	 -	 3.8	 0	 3.8	
Kütahya	 -	 2.7	 1.1	 3.8	
Erzincan	 -	 3.3	 0.4	 3.7	
Cankiri	 -	 3.7	 -	 3.7	
Sinop	 -	 2.9	 0.1	 3.0	
Mardin	 -	 2.6	 0.4	 3.0	
Düzce	 -	 2.2	 0.3	 2.6	
Adiyaman	 -	 2.4	 0.2	 2.6	
Bitlis	 -	 2.4	 0.1	 2.5	
Gümüshane	 -	 2.4	 0.1	 2.5	
Bolu	 -	 1.9	 0.5	 2.4	
Bayburt	 -	 2.3	 0.1	 2.4	
Bingöl	 -	 2.3	 0.1	 2.4	
Giresun	 -	 2.1	 0	 2.1	
Batman	 -	 1.9	 0.2	 2.0	
Artvin	 -	 2.0	 0	 2.0	
Nevsehir	 -	 1.3	 0.7	 2.0	
Osmaniye	 -	 1.8	 0.2	 2.0	
Karabük	 -	 1.7	 0.2	 1.9	
Zonguldak	 -	 1.5	 0.2	 1.7	
Ordu	 -	 1.3	 0.2	 1.5	
Hakkari	 -	 1.0	 0	 1.0	
Bartin	 -	 0.8	 0.2	 1.0	
Sanliurfa	 -	 0.6	 0.4	 0.9	
Tunceli	 -	 0.9	 0	 0.9	
Siirt	 -	 0.7	 0.1	 0.8	
Bilecik	 -	 0.4	 0.2	 0.6	
Yalova	 -	 0.5	 0.1	 0.6	
Kilis	 -	 0.5	 0.1	 0.6	
Rize	 -	 0.4	 0	 0.4	
Sirnak	 -	 0.3	 0.1	 0.4	Total	Capacity	feedstock	(MW)	 226.1	 460.6	 80,3	 768	
Data	source:	Own	illustration	based	on	the	data	from	(FAO,	2016).		
5.5.5.	 Case	study:	IZAYDAS	Biogas	and	Waste	Management	Facility		As	it	is	indicated,	by	global	comparison,	Turkey	has	one	of	the	greatest	livestock	and	agricultural	potentials	 in	 the	world.	The	country	has	 the	potential	of	2,000	biogas	plants,	 which	 could	 operate	 with	 animal	 manure.	 Nevertheless,	 there	 are	 some	challenges,	which	constitute	an	 impediment	 to	biogas	potential	being	realised.	First	of	all,	 the	 authorisation	 process	 to	 run	 an	 anaerobic	 digestion	 facility	 is	 complex	 and	includes	 many	 steps,	 such	 as	 application,	 examination,	 evaluation,	 approval	 and	
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licencing.	 Second,	 the	 current	 situation	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 central	 grid	 connection	applications	 (electricity,	 gas,	 pipeline)	of	biogas	plants	 is	 still	 not	 clearly	 addressed	 in	the	 law.	 There	 is	 also	 a	 lack	 of	 necessary	 regulations	 concerning	 the	 properties	 and	methods	of	use	of	the	solid	product	(digestate)	resulting	from	biogas	plants.	Third,	the	public	 perception	 and	 social	 acceptance	 regarding	 the	 positive	 contribution	 of	 biogas	facilities	to	energy	and	climate	remains	low.	Considering	this	information,	many	agricultural	wastes	in	Turkey	are	still	largely	underutilised	 and	 left	 to	 rot	 or	 openly	 burned	 in	 the	 field.	 Animal	manure	 is	 utilised	directly	 in	the	area	without	undergoing	any	processing	or	cumulated	in	the	open	field.	Both	 methods	 and	 techniques	 cause	 serious	 health	 problems	 and	 increase	environmental	pollution.		For	 the	 purpose	 of	 utilising	 agricultural,	 animal	 and	 agro-industrial	 residues,	 a	biogas	power	plant	with	name	“IZAYDAS”	was	established	in	the	north-western	part	of	Turkey.	 The	 facility	 is	 a	 waste	 and	 residue	 treatment,	 incineration	 and	 utilisation	company,	in	operation	since	May	1996	in	Kocaeli,	an	industrial	metropolitan	city	in	the	Marmara	 region.	 The	 scope	 of	 the	 IZAYDAS	 biogas	 project	 is	 to	 develop	 biogas	production	systems	suitable	to	agricultural	and	animal	residues	with	high	efficiency	and	low	 cost,	 to	 integrate	 these	 systems	 with	 internal	 combustion	 engines	 and	 to	mainstream	 the	 biogas	 production	 technologies	 across	 the	 country	 (IZAYDAS,	 2014).	The	annual	input	of	the	biogas	plant,	fed	from	agricultural	and	animal	wastes,	was	3,025	tonnes	in	2015.	The	input	came	from	the	grass	residues	(29	tonnes),	fruit	and	vegetable	market	 residues	 (2	 tonnes),	 poultry	manure	 (134	 tonnes),	waste	 from	 inside	 of	 tripe	(148	tonnes),	cattle	manure	(2,593	tonnes),	and	other	residues	(119	tonnes).	In	addition	to	 155	 cubic	meters	 per	 hour	 biogas,	 350	 kilowatts	 electric	 power	 and	 350	 kilowatts	heat	 is	 obtained	 from	 a	 gas	 motor.	 Furthermore,	 2,023	 tonnes	 of	 very	 high	 quality	organic	 solid	 fertiliser	 and	 liquid	 fertiliser	 (2,019	 tonnes)	 have	 been	 achieved	 as	 an	outcome	in	the	facility.	For	the	electricity	generation	in	the	facility,	a	production	license	was	obtained	 from	 the	EPDK	as	of	12.01.2012	 for	 a	period	of	 ten	years.	A	part	 of	 the	obtained	 electric	 power	 is	 used	 for	 facility	 needs	 and	 the	 remainder	 is	 given	 to	 the	national	electric	distribution	grid.	In	the	cogeneration	unit,	released	heat	energy	is	used	for	heating	the	reactors	and	remaining	parts	are	used	for	the	other	heating	needs	of	the	facility.	In	2014,	400	MWh	electricity	was	generated	by	the	biogas	plant	from	the	given	quantity	of	wastes	in	Table	25	(IZAYDAS,	2014).			
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Table	25.	Quantities	of	the	wastes	taken	to	the	facility	and	outgoing	fertiliser	(Unit=kg)		
Waste	type	 2012	 2013	 2014	 2015	 2016	Grass	 648,720	 760,330	 698,960	 29,680	 3,260	Poultry	Manure	 260,200	 162,820	 152,780	 134,920	 67,630	Cattle	Manure	 2,972,560	 1,783,190	 3,865,830	 2,593,910	 2,808,640	Fruit/Vegetable		Market	Residue	 1,406,670	 370,390	 157,270	 2,200	 15,140	Waste	from		Inside	of	Tripe	 315,510	 242,690	 224,860	 148,680	 86,000	Other	 132,440	 62,910	 67,275	 119,300	 131,000	
Total	 5,736,100	 3,382,330	 5,166,975	 3,028,690	 3,111,670	
Data	source:	Own	illustration	based	on	the	data	from	(IZAYDAS,	2015).		 Arzu	Ulutas,	the	responsible	person	for	the	recycling	department	at	the	IZAYDAS	facility,	explained	that	the	major	problem	for	the	biogas	facilities	in	Turkey	is	the	lack	of	necessary	 regulations	 and	 frameworks	 regarding	 the	 operation	 of	 a	 biogas	 plant.	IZAYDAS	 established	 one	 of	 the	 first	 biogas	 facilities	 in	 Turkey	 without	 any	 legal	regulations,	which	would	explain	the	obligatory	issues	surrounding	the	operation	of	the	biogas	 facility.	There	 is	 an	ongoing	problem	regarding	 transportation	of	wastes	 to	 the	facility,	 for	which	 it	 is	obliged	to	provide	services.	Consequently,	 this	causes	the	waste	transportation	service	operations	to	become	very	costly.	The	 IZAYDAS	 corporation	 has	 facilities	 in	 the	 fields	 of	 clinical	 and	 hazardous	waste	 incineration	 and	 energy	 production,	 hazardous	 waste	 landfilling,	 domestic	industrial	waste	landfilling,	medical	waste	sterilisation,	domestic	landfilling	and	energy	production,	 marine	 waste	 management,	 excavation	 wastes	 storage,	 biogas	 and	integrated	 power	 generation,	 laboratory	 services,	 waste	 transportation	 services,	 and	electricity	generation	from	the	wind.	 In	the	 facility,	between	1997	and	2015,	a	 total	of	382,305	 tonnes	 of	 hazardous	 waste	 were	 accepted	 to	 the	 incineration	 plant,	 and	363,574	tonnes	of	this	were	disposed	of.	During	the	disposal,	207.3	GWh	electricity	was	produced,	and	82.1	GWh	of	this	sum	are	sold	to	TEIAS	(IZAYDAS,	2015).		
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Table	26.	Produced,	Consumed	and	Sold	Electricity	in	Izaydas	Incineration	Plant		
Izaydas	
Incineration	
Plant	
Unit	 2012	 2013	 2014	 2015	 2016	
Incoming	waste	
to	incinerator	 ton	 37,209	 30,815	 31,837	 24,499	 39,964	
Incinerated	
waste	in	facility	 ton	 33,374	 32,533	 31,289	 30,232	 35,028	
Produced	
electricity	
amount	
kwh	 16,890,700	 14,988,900	 12,093,500	 16,010,500	 16,594,500	
Received	
electricity	
amount	
kwh	 1,163,020	 1,052,250	 2,735,187	 1,121,810	 837,658	
Consumed	
electricity	
amount	
kwh	 9,427,860	 9,020,200	 11,258,447	 11,553,163	 11,987,638	
Sold	electricity	
amount	 kwh	 8,625,860	 7,020,950	 3,570,240	 5,579,147	 5,444,520	
Data	source:	Own	illustration	based	on	the	data	from	(IZAYDAS,	2016).			 In	2016,	39,964	tonnes	of	waste	were	disposed	of	 in	 the	 incineration	plant	and	16,594,500	 kwh	 of	 electrical	 energy	 were	 generated	 in	 return	 (Table	 26)(IZAYDAS,	2016).	11,987,638	kwh	electricity	were	consumed	within	the	facility	and	5,444,520	kwh	of	electric	energy	were	sold	to	the	national	grid	network	–	TEIAS.	Waste	management	systems	development	has	never	been	a	priority	policy	area	in	Turkey.	 The	 first	 significant	 step	 was	made	 towards	 a	 successful	 waste	 management	after	 the	 "by-law	 on	 solid	 waste	 control"	 was	 adapted	 in	 1991.	 Following	 this,	 some	other	 enactments	 came	 into	 force,	 to	 set	 the	 necessary	 framework	 for	 the	 waste	management	 in	 the	 country.	 Turkey	 aims	 to	 establish	 a	waste	management	 system	 in	accordance	with	the	related	national	and	EU	legislation	addressing	the	establishment	of	necessary	waste	treatment	facilities	(pre-treatment	facilities	and	landfills)	and	transfer	stations,	reduction	of	the	amount	of	waste,	ensuring	recycling	and	re-use,	and	reducing	the	waste	transportation	costs	(Bakas,	et	al.,	2013).		Turkey	still	does	not	have	a	developed	and	fully	functioning	waste-management	and	waste-disposal	system.	At	least	half	of	the	total	population	of	around	73	Million	does	not	 have	 access	 to	 any	 waste	 disposal/recovery	 and	 wastewater	 treatment	 services,	they	 are	 thereby	 being	 exposed	 to	 serious	 health	 threats	 and	 environmental	 damage.	Furthermore,	44%	of	the	municipal	solid	waste	is	still	dumped	into	open	dumping	sites	
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of	 municipalities,	 therefore	 allowing	 the	 release	 of	 the	 very	 potent	 greenhouse	 gas	methane	into	the	atmosphere	causing	explosion	risks.		Besides	 disposing	 of	 combustible	 plastic	wastes,	 used	 oils,	 pharmaceutical	 and	cosmetic	wastes,	petrochemical	wastes,	PVC,	 solvent,	dye	wastes,	 glues,	 adhesives	and	treatment	 sludge,	 the	 5,400	 kg	 p/hr	 capacity	 of	 clinical	 and	 hazardous	 waste	incineration	 plants	 also	 generates	 electrical	 power.	 A	 part	 of	 the	 generated	 power	 is	used	by	the	plant	and	the	remainder	is	sold	to	the	national	electric	distribution	network.	In	2015,	30,232	tonnes	of	waste	was	disposed	of	by	incineration,	which	generated	16.0	gWh	electric	energy.	11.5	gWh	from	this	generated	power	were	used	in	the	facility.	The	remaining	 4.5	 gWh	 of	 generated	 electric	 power	was	 sold	 to	 TEIAS,	 1.1	 gWh	 of	which	were	purchased	(IZAYDAS,	2015).	In	 the	 past,	 incineration	was	 considered	 as	 the	most	 efficient	way	 to	 get	 rid	 of	waste.	Nevertheless,	since	the	beginning	of	worldwide	industrialisation,	the	structure	of	waste	 management	 has	 massively	 changed.	 Today,	 the	 mass-production	 of	 chemicals	and	 plastics	make	 the	 incineration	method	 a	more	 complex,	 costly	 and	 high	 polluting	disposal	method.	 In	contrast	 to	 the	 fallacy	that	 incineration	 is	 the	most	efficient	waste	disposal	method,	incineration	is	transforming	the	waste	problem	of	Turkey	to	a	mortal	threat	of	pollution.		Incineration	 facilities	 release	 a	 high	 amount	 of	 dioxin,	 furan,	 sulphur,	 nitrogen	oxides,	 lead	and	other	heavy	metals	 into	 the	 environment.	Moreover,	 these	plants	 are	becoming	an	easy	way	for	the	industries	to	cover	up	their	waste	product	issues	and	thus	clear	 up	 their	 "from	 the	 cradle	 to	 the	 grave"	 responsibilities	 for	 their	 products.	 The	industries	are	then	able	to	continue	their	extravagant	production	process	(Greenpeace	Akdeniz,	2005).	
5.5.6.	 The	Environmental	Impacts		 Up	 until	 now,	 many	 studies	 and	 policies	 focused	 on	 liquid	 biofuel	 production	systems	 and	 quantifying	 the	 greenhouse	 gas	 emissions	 associated	 with	 direct	 and	indirect	 land-use	 change	 (REN21,	 2014).	 Currently,	 the	 focus	 of	 the	 carbon	 footprint	debate	 of	 biomass	 shifted	 to	 the	 increasing	 use	 of	 solid	 biomass	 –	 forest	 biomass	 in	particular	 –	 in	 modern	 applications	 (for	 instance,	 wood	 chips	 in	 district	 heating	 for	dwellings	 or	 co-firing	 of	 wood	 pellets	 in	 coal-fired	 power	 plants)	 (REN21,	 2014).	 As	indicated	 in	 the	 "Renewables	 2014	 Global	 Status	 Report",	 there	 is	 a	 general	 concern	among	 stakeholders	 that	 carbon	 emission	 through	 the	 combustion	 of	 biomass	will	 be	
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segregated,	if	the	quantity	of	biomass	used	can	be	associated	through	the	regrowth	of	a	crop	or	forest	in	a	sustainable	biomass	management	system	(REN21,	2014).	According	 to	 the	World	 Bioenergy	 Association’s	 newly	 published	 fact	 sheet	 on	forest	sustainability	and	carbon	neutrality,	 the	use	of	 forest	biomass	 is	carbon	neutral	because	the	carbon	contained	in	wood	originates	from	the	atmosphere	and	is	released	to	the	air	by	wood	decay	or	combustion.	Before	a	tree	can	be	burned,	it	has	to	grow	by	absorbing	carbon	from	the	atmosphere	(World	Bioenergy	Association,	2012).	However,	by	burning	fossil	fuels	like	coal	oil	and	natural	gas,	the	process	is	accelerating	and	thus	releases	vast	amounts	of	carbon	 into	 the	air,	which	 is	not	part	of	 the	"natural"	carbon	cycle	 (World	Bioenergy	Association,	2012).	Furthermore,	 future	carbon	payback	 times	could	 be	 shortened	 by	 increasing	 crop	 yields,	 changing	 petroleum	 sources	 and	improving	 biofuel	 technology	 (Gibbs,	 et	 al.,	 2008).	 Bioenergy	 crops	 can	 reduce	greenhouse	gas	emissions	by	removing	carbon	dioxide	from	the	air	and	storing	it	in	crop	biomass	 and	 soil.	 In	 addition	 to	 biofuels,	 these	 crops	 generate	 co-products	 such	 as	protein	for	animal	feed	(FAO,	2008).	Regarding	energy	production,	the	utilisation	of	some	open-fire	traditional	stoves	is	 quite	 inefficient.	 From	 the	 point	 of	 health	 and	 environmental	 concerns,	 it	 has	considerable	debilitative	impacts,	due	to	the	released	smoke	and	carbon	emissions.		
5.5.7.	 Public	Awareness	and	Social	Acceptance		 Energy	from	biomass	represented	3%	of	the	total	primary	energy	consumption	in	Turkey	 in	 the	 year	 2015.	 In	 general,	 it	 is	 quite	 difficult	 to	 evaluate	 how	 high	 the	knowledge	or	awareness	is	regarding	bioenergy	in	Turkey,	as	there	is	almost	no	relative	data.	Even	the	representatives	from	the	Directorate	General	for	Renewable	Energies	in	Turkey	could	not	give	concrete,	quantitative	data	regarding	how	the	public	perception	in	Turkey	 is	 concerning	 the	 energy	 production	 from	 the	 biomass	 sources.	 The	 only	available	data	was	the	survey,	performed	by	the	Kadir	Has	University,	Istanbul,	Turkey,	regarding	 the	 public	 perception	 of	 Turkish	 citizens	 regarding	 the	 utilisation	 of	renewable	energy	sources.	According	to	the	2016	survey	results,	although	many	of	the	respondents	are	not	particularly	aware	of	the	meaning	of	bioenergy	(20%),	they	support	the	 construction	 of	 a	 bioenergy	 power	 plant	 as	 much	 as	 they	 support	 solar	 or	 wind	energy	power	plants	close	to	the	area	in	which	they	are	living	(28.3%).	
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5.5.8.	 Results	and	Outcomes		 Turkey	 has	 a	 substantial	 amount	 of	 wide	 range	 biomass	 sources	 for	 the	production	 of	 biomass-based	 energy	 as	 well	 as	 biofuels.	 In	 terms	 of	 biomass-based	energy	production,	two	main	agricultural	residue	types	were	considered:	crop	residues	(collected	 or	 spread)	 and	 livestock	 residues	 (cattle,	 buffalo	 and	 chicken	manure).	 In	general,	western	provinces	show	a	greater	availability	potential	of	crop	residues	 than	the	 eastern	 provinces.	 Due	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 data	 on	 the	 current	 utilisation	 of	 livestock	residues,	 the	analysis	 solely	estimated	 the	 total	 residues	produced	at	 the	provinces	of	Turkey	 and	 not	 their	 availability.	 In	 this	 context,	 cattle	manure	 seems	 to	 be	 equally	distributed	 among	provinces.	Notwithstanding	 this,	 the	Eastern	 and	Central	Anatolian	regions	 have	 the	 largest	 share	 of	 manure,	 followed	 by	 the	 Aegean,	 Black	 Sea	 and	Marmara	 regions.	 Konya	 (Central	 Anatolia),	 Balikesir	 (Marmara),	 Erzurum	 (East	Anatolia),	 Izmir	 (Aegean)	 and	 Kars	 (East	 Anatolia)	 provinces	 have	 the	 largest	production	of	cattle	and	buffalo	manure,	each	with	production	of	more	than	4	million	tonnes	of	manure	annually.	The	highest	amount	of	chicken	(layer	and	broiler)	residues	were	found	in	Manisa	(Aegean),	Balikesir	(Marmara),	Bolu	(Black	Sea),	Afyon	(Aegean)	and	Sakarya	(Marmara)	provinces,	whereby	each	produces	more	than	600,000	tonnes	of	manure	 per	 annum.	 Manisa	 produces	 the	 most	 chicken	 manure,	 with	 annual	production	of	1	million	tonnes	each	year	(FAO,	2016).	The	 energy	 production	 from	 biomass	 resources	 remain	 in	 exceptionally	 low	levels	 in	 Turkey	 due	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 necessary	 regulation	 as	 well	 as	 legal	 framework,	government	 incentives	 and	 low	 public	 awareness.	 Even	 the	 Directorate	 General	 for	Renewable	Resources	(YEGM),	the	only	official	responsible	authority	in	Turkey,	does	not	have	the	relevant	information,	data	or	publication	regarding	future	forecasts	of	biomass	energy.	Despite	the	proven	potential	as	explained	above,	the	electricity	production	from	biomass	as	well	as	biogas	remain	 idle.	 In	order	to	tackle	this	challenge,	 it	 is	 important	that	the	YEGM	produces	more	data	about	biomass	energy	in	order	to	increase	the	social	awareness	 and	 the	 number	 of	 local	 biomass	 power	 plants.	 In	 addition	 to	 this,	 the	necessary	framework	for	the	electricity	generation	from	biomass	resources	needs	to	be	prepared	by	the	relevant	government	authorities.	
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5.6.	 Solar	Power		 The	 energy	 from	 the	 Sun	 is	 the	 source	 of	 all	 types	 of	 energy	 resources,	 either	directly	 or	 indirectly.	 Solar	 energy	 occurs	 from	 the	 fusion	 process	 in	 the	 Sun,	 where	Hydrogen	combines	 to	 form	Helium.	 It	 is	 the	conversion	of	 radiant	energy	of	 sunlight,	which	 is	used	 for	electricity	and	heat	production.	This	 thesis	 focuses	on	the	electricity	generation	 from	 solar	 energy,	 and	 not	 particularly	 on	 the	 heat	 generation.	 For	 the	electricity	 generation,	 solar	 PV	 is	 the	 conversion	 technology	 uses	 solar	 radiation	 by	photovoltaic	 cells.	 Solar	 thermal	 power	 generation	 systems	 collect	 and	 concentrate	sunlight	to	produce	the	high	temperature	needed	to	generate	electricity	(EIA,	2018).	There	 are	 different	methods	 to	 utilise	 energy	 from	 solar	 radiation.	 The	 easiest	and	 most	 direct	 application	 of	 solar	 energy	 is	 the	 conversion	 of	 sunlight	 into	 low-temperature	 heat.	 In	 low-temperature	 heating	 application,	 passive	 and	 active	 solar	energy	 conversion	 technologies	 can	be	 implemented.	 Solar	 collectors	 are	 used	 for	 the	active	 conversion	 of	 solar	 energy	 to	 heat	 (Benli,	 2016).	 This	 technology	 is	 commonly	used	in	Turkey	as	flat	plate	collectors	in	the	domestic	hot	water	systems	due	to	the	low	cost	of	operation,	such	as	solar	hot	water	systems	(Capik,	et	al.,	2012).	Capturing	solar	energy	is	the	main	feature	of	this	method	(mostly	used	in	the	sunny	coastal	regions)	that	can	reduce	electrical	consumption	(Capik,	et	al.,	2012).		
5.6.1.	 Solar-Photovoltaic	(PV)	Power	Generation	in	Turkey			 Photovoltaics	is	the	method	of	obtaining	electricity	from	the	sun	through	silicon	crystals.	 Currently	 it	 is	 the	 most	 popular	 technology	 among	 other	 solar	 power	technologies,	which	generates	electricity	with	the	photo-voltaic	effect.	Basically,	the	PV	system	uses	a	thin	sheet	of	semiconductor	material,	which	consists	of	two	layers:	n-type	and	p-type	layer.	These	two	different	types	of	layers	are	used	to	form	a	junction	at	the	interface	of	the	sheet.	An	internal	electric	field	at	the	junction	is	created,	electron	hole-pairs	 are	 generated	 by	 the	 solar	 photons	 in	 the	 electric	 field,	which	 creates	 negatives	charges	on	one	side	and	positive	charges	on	the	other	side	of	the	interface.	The	charge	separation	 creates	 a	 voltage	 and	 current	 flows	 lead	 to	 the	 generation	 of	 electricity	(Yazici,	2017).		A	 PV	 system	 can	 be	 installed	 either	 as	 an	 off-grid	 application	 or	 as	 a	 grid-connected	application.	If	the	system	is	installed	as	off-grid,	so	it	has	no	connection	to	a	national	power	grid.	Off-grid	applications	lead	PV	systems	to	be	preferable,	especially	in	
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the	 non-electrified	 areas	 since	 the	 size	 of	 the	 system	 is	 adjustable	 for	 individual	consumer	 applications.	 The	 grid	 connected	 systems	 have	 connection	 to	 national	 grid,	whereby	 the	 electricity	 generated	 can	 be	 transmitted	 to	 the	 electricity	 network.	 The	most	 popular	 PV	 panel	 installations	 are	 roof-top	 and	 ground-mounted	 panels	 (Yazici,	2017).	In	Turkey,	all	regions	except	for	the	Eastern	Black	Sea	region	is	suitable	for	the	electricity	generation	from	Solar	PV	technology.	The	potential	of	the	photovoltaic	market	in	Turkey	is	colossal,	the	country	has	a	significant	amount	of	solar	radiation	and	vast	areas	for	solar	farms	(Capik,	et	al.,	2012).	Due	to	the	high	installation	costs	of	photovoltaics,	the	economical	usage	of	them	is	not	available	 in	 Turkey	 (Benli,	 2016).	 Only	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Environment	 and	 Forestry	(forestry	 observation	 towers),	 Turkish	 Telecommunication	 Companies	 (transfer	stations),	 the	 Highway	 Board	 Department	 (emergency	 calling,	 traffic	 management	systems),	 EIE	 Group	 (demonstration	 applications)	 and	 various	 research	 associations	have	 a	 common	 installed	 photovoltaic	 capacity	 of	 300	 kV	 (Benli,	 2016).	Nevertheless,	due	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 interest	 of	 Turkish	 authorities,	 Turkey	 does	 not	 have	 an	 organised	commercial	and	domestic	photovoltaic	program,	which	ultimately	hinders	the	electricity	generation	of	photovoltaic.	
5.6.2.	 Concentrating	Solar	Power	(CSP)	Technology		 CSP	 technologies,	 also	known	as	 solar	 thermal	electricity,	 lead	 to	 collect	direct-beam	solar	irradiance	and	use	it	to	heat	a	liquid,	solid	or	gas	material.	The	heat	energy	stored	in	the	semi-conducting	material	is	used	in	the	engine	heating	process	to	generate	electricity	 (Yazici,	 2017).	 In	 Turkey,	 South-eastern	 Anatolia	 (examined	 on	 a	 regional	basis)	 is	 the	 most	 fertile	 region	 while	 the	 Black	 Sea	 is	 the	 most	 inefficient	 region	regarding	the	use	of	CSP	technologies	(Kaplan,	2015).		There	 are	 various	 advantages	 of	 using	 CSP	 technologies.	 One	 of	 the	 main	advantages	is	that	the	system	has	a	wide	range	capacity,	contrary	to	solar	PV	systems.	They	can	range	from	small	distributed	systems	to	large	centralised	power	stations.	The	materials	used	for	the	CSP	technology	are	also	common	and	accessible.	The	expectations	show	 that	 worldwide,	 the	 installation	 and	 the	 investment	 costs	 of	 CSP	 systems	 will	decrease	by	2050.	
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5.6.3.	 Solar	Thermal	Energy	Technology		 Solar	 thermal	 energy	 can	 be	 classified	 as	 active	 solar	 heating	 or	 cooling	technologies	 and	 thermal	 storage.	 In	 solar	 heating	 technologies,	 solar	 irradiance	 is	transformed	 into	heat	with	 solar	 collectors.	Afterwards,	 the	heat	 is	 transferred	with	a	carrier	fluid	to	a	storage	tank,	which	is	insulated	to	store	heat	(Yazici,	2017).	There	are	two	types	of	solar	water	heating	systems:	active	and	passive.	In	the	passive	solar	water	heating	system,	 the	water	 is	heated	with	and	stored	 inside	 the	collector.	Passive	solar	water	heaters	are	much	more	environmentally	friendly	and	low	cost,	however,	they	are	not	 the	 ideal	 technology	 for	 the	 colder	 seasons.	 In	 active	 solar	water	 heaters,	 carrier	fluid	circulation	is	controlled	with	electric	pumps	and	controllers	(Yazici,	2017).		Solar	cooling	technologies	can	be	classified	under	three	categories:		In	solar	electric	refrigeration,	PV	panels	are	used	for	the	power	necessity	of	conventional	refrigeration	machines.		In	 solar	thermal	refrigeration,	 solar	 thermal	 energy	 is	 used	 to	 produce	 a	 refrigeration	effect	 with	 solar	 mechanical	 compression,	 solar	 absorption	 or	 solar	 absorption	refrigeration.	
Solar	 thermal	 air	 conditioning	 is	 the	 system	 fir	 dehumidification	 of	 the	 air	 in	 air-conditioning	units	(Yazici,	2017).	Thermal	 storage	 technologies	 can	also	be	 classified	 as	 sensible,	 latent,	 sorption	and	thermochemical.	In	sensible	heat	storage	systems,	a	material	with	a	heat	capacity	is	used.	
Latent	heat	storage	stores	the	energy	generated	from	a	phase	change	of	a	material.	In	a	 sorption	 heat	 storage	 system,	a	 sorption	material	 is	used	 for	either	absorption	or	adsorption	to	store	heat	transferred	from	water	vapour.	
Thermochemical	heat	storage	systems	use	endothermic	chemical	reactions	to	store	heat.	
5.6.4.	 Solar	Energy	Generation	in	Turkey		 Due	to	its	geographical	location,	Turkey	is	a	lucky	country	regarding	its	potential	for	 solar	 photovoltaic	 energy	 (Map	 10).	 The	 country	 receives	 an	 average	 sunshine	duration	 of	 7.2	 hours	 per	 day	 and	 solar	 radiation	 of	 3.6	 kwh/m2.	 The	 total	 annual	radiation	 period	 is	 around	 2,610	 hours.	With	 regard	 to	 duration	 of	 the	 sunshine	 (8.2	hours/day)	and	solar	radiation	(4	kwh/m2/day),	the	South-eastern	Anatolia	Region	has	
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the	 highest	 solar	 energy	 potential,	 followed	 by	 the	 Mediterranean	 Region	 in	 second	place.	 Despite	 having	 immense	 potential,	 the	 energy	 generation	 from	 solar	 is	 only	practiced	 by	 flat	 plate	 solar	 collectors.	 Major	 demand	 for	 the	 utilisation	 of	 solar	collectors	comes	from	low-income	households	in	particular.	Moreover,	a	growing	share	is	 being	 installed	 on	 large	 apartment	 buildings,	 hotels,	 hospitals	 and	 military	accommodation	places,	which	are	predominantly	located	in	the	sunny	coastal	regions	to	produce	domestic	hot	water	for	their	facilities	(Benli,	2016).		
Map	10.	The	Solar	Power	Radiation	in	Turkey	 Clarifications:		
			
Data	source:	(YEGM,	2018).		 Solar	 technology	 in	 Turkey	 has	 experienced	 a	 fast	 growth	 rate	 during	 recent	years.	 In	 2015,	 energy	 consumption	 from	 solar	 energy	was	 0.65	 twh,	which	 is	 329%	higher	 than	 2014	 consumption	 levels	 (Yazici,	 2017).	 The	 expectations	 from	 a	Greenpeace	 Turkey	 Report	 assert	 that	 solar	 power	 industries	will	maintain	 a	 growth	rate	of	35%	in	the	renewable	energy	sector	(Greenpeace	International,	2015).	In	 a	 global	 comparison,	 Turkey	 ranks	 among	 the	 top	 countries	 with	 its	 solar	collector	areas	and	installed	capacity.	Turkish	industry	has	also	a	significant	experience	regarding	the	production	and	marketing	of	the	solar	water	heating	system.		Similar	 to	 the	 other	 renewable	 sources,	 the	 responsible	 law	 for	 solar	 energy,	which	provides	 the	basic	 legal	 framework	 for	 the	 support	of	 renewable	 energy,	 is	 the	
YEKA	 Law	 No.	 5346	 on	 the	 Utilisation	 of	 Renewable	 Energy	 in	 Electricity	 Generation.	TEIAS,	as	the	system	operator,	tenders	the	grid	capacity	for	solar	energy	projects	and	is	in	 charge	 of	 the	 feed-in-tariff	 collection	 and	 distribution.	 Moreover,	 regional	
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governments,	 such	 as	 provincial	 administrations,	municipalities	 and	 governors,	 are	 in	charge	 of	 granting	 construction	 and	 operation	 licenses	 for	 solar	 generation	 facilities	(IEA,	 2016).	 Turkish	 feed-in	 tariff	 for	 photovoltaic	 currently	 stands	 at	 $13.3	 kwh.	Nevertheless,	the	photovoltaic	sector	in	Turkey	is	still	not	sufficient	enough	to	provide	for	a	high	number	of	employees.	Based	on	the	legislation,	the	photovoltaic	power	plant	installations	 cannot	 be	 built	 in	 the	 agricultural	 areas.	 Furthermore,	 the	 land	 use	 for	photovoltaic	plants	is	limited	to	20	acres/MW	(Guden	Law	Firm,	2016).	Solar	photovoltaic	 technology	 initially	gained	popularity	 in	Turkey	 in	2011	and	achieved	 a	 considerable	 growth	 rate	 in	 the	 years	 following.	 Still,	 the	 developments	 in	solar	photovoltaic	 installations	remain	 low	despite	 its	high	potential.	The	 technologies	used	in	Turkey	are	PV	solar	power,	CSP	and	solar	water	heating.	At	the	end	of	2016,	total	installed	capacity	for	PV	power	and	CSP	were	832.5	MW	and	1	MW,	respectively	(Yazici,	2017).	 In	 the	global	 level,	Turkey	has	 the	second	highest	solar	water	heating	capacity.	The	most	 commonly	 used	 type	 are	 flat-plate	 collectors	 for	 domestic	 hot	water	 usage.	The	thermal	collectors	are	generally	used	in	the	Aegean	and	Mediterranean	regions.		In	2015	solar	energy	contributed	only	0.7%	to	total	primary	energy	supply	and	0.2%	 to	 electricity	 generation	 of	 Turkey.	With	 respect	 to	 the	 vision	2023	 goals	 of	 the	Turkish	 MENR,	 3,000	 megawatts	 solar	 photovoltaic	 installations	 are	 planned	 to	 be	installed	 by	 2023.	 Nevertheless,	 only	 solar	 projects	 up	 to	 600	 megawatts	 will	 be	licensed,	which	 prevents	 the	 development	 of	 large-scale	 PV	 installations.	 The	 Turkish	MENR’s	estimations	concerning	solar	installed	capacity	were	first	increased	to	300	MW	in	 2015,	 1,800	MW	 in	 2017	 and	3,000	MW	 in	 2019.	Nevertheless,	 the	 country’s	 solar	installations	only	increased	to	571	megawatts	in	2016,	which	was	far	from	the	country’s	1,800	 MW	 target	 in	 2017	 (Tsagas,	 2015).	 Moreover,	 the	 increase	 in	 distributed	electricity	generated	from	solar	photovoltaic	will	require	investment	in	the	distribution	grids	 and	 smart	 grid	 management	 (IEA,	 2016).	 The	 2013	 Electricity	 Market	 Law	 set	limits	for	solar	photovoltaic	and	wind	power	plant	expansion	and	created	a	framework	for	a	gradual	expansion	of	renewable	energies,	in	order	to	prevent	excessive	amounts	of	costs	 and	 to	 benefit	 from	 technology	 learning	 curves	 during	 the	 expansion	 of	 local	manufacturing	 supply	 chain	 (IEA,	 2016).	 This	 limitation	 stimulated	 solar	 and	 wind	energy	 power	 plant	 companies	 and	 investors	 to	 compete	 for	 grid	 access	 in	 case	 of	limited	 grid	 capacity.	 This	 can	 be	 identified	 as	 one	 of	 the	 main	 reasons	 why	 the	development	 of	 solar	 photovoltaic	 is	much	 slower	 than	 the	 other	 renewable	 sources.	The	 wind	 power	 plant	 projects	 are,	 in	 contrast,	 far	 larger	 than	 most	 of	 the	 solar	
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photovoltaic	 plant	 projects	 and	 thus	 have	more	 acceptance	 to	 being	 installed	 quickly	and	with	larger	amounts	of	capacity	(Tsagas,	2015).	
5.6.5.	 Environmental	and	Social	Obstacles	of	Solar	Power	Plants		Despite	 its	 significant	 contribution	 to	 the	 total	 primary	 energy	 supply	 of	countries,	 and	 range	 of	 utilisation	 areas	 (especially	 in	water	 and	 greenhouse	heating)	solar	photovoltaic	plants	may	have	potential	environmental	impacts	on	land	use,	water	use,	habitat	loss	and	life	cycle	global	warming	emissions.		Larger	utility-scale	solar	facilities	can	raise	concerns	about	soil	degradation	and	habitat	 loss.	Unlike	wind	 facilities,	 there	 is	 less	opportunity	 for	solar	projects	 to	share	the	land	with	agricultural	uses.	To	reduce	the	adverse	impacts	on	the	land,	it	is	essential	that	 the	 large	 utility-scale	 solar	 systems	 are	 built	 at	 lower-quality	 areas	 such	 as	brownfields,	 abandoned	 mining	 land,	 or	 existing	 transportation	 and	 transmission	corridors.	Small-scale	solar	photovoltaic	systems	can	be	sited	on	homes	or	commercial	buildings,	 where	 the	 impact	 on	 land	 use	 is	 relatively	 slight	 (Union	 of	 Concerned	Scientists,	 2013).	 For	 CSP	 technology,	 habitat	 disturbance	 is	 also	 a	 problem.	Concentrated	light	beams	can	also	be	a	risk	for	avian	animals.		Solar	 photovoltaic	 does	 not	 use	 water	 for	 generating	 electricity.	 However,	concentrated	solar	thermal	plants,	like	all	other	thermal	electric	power	stations,	require	water	for	their	cooling	process	(Union	of	Concerned	Scientists,	2013),	which	may	cause	water	scarcity	or	contamination	problems.	The	photovoltaic	cell	manufacturing	process	includes	 some	 hazardous	 materials	 and	 chemicals	 which	 include	 hydrochloric	 acid,	sulphuric	 acid,	 nitric	 acid,	 hydrogen	 fluoride,	 1,1,1-trichloroethane	 and	 acetone.	 Thin-film	 photovoltaic	 cells	 contain	 more	 toxic	 materials	 than	 the	 traditional	 silicon	photovoltaic	 cells,	 including	 gallium	 arsenide,	 copper-indium-gallium-diselenide	 and	cadmium	telluride.	If	these	materials	are	not	disposed	of	properly,	they	can	pose	serious	environmental	and	public	health	threats	(Union	of	Concerned	Scientists,	2013).	There	 are	 no	 global	 warming	 emissions	 detected	 associated	 with	 generating	electricity	 from	 solar	 energy.	 Nevertheless,	 there	 are	 other	 features,	 which	 cause	warming	 emissions	 like	 manufacturing,	 materials	 transportation,	 installation,	maintenance,	 decommissioning	 and	 dismantlement	 (Union	 of	 Concerned	 Scientists,	2013).	Turkey	 is	a	country	with	high	agricultural	activities;	agricultural	 lands	compose	49.7%	of	total	 land	area	 in	Turkey.	As	solar	energy	requires	placement	of	solar	panels	
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over	 large	 areas,	 a	 new	 solar	 farm	have	 a	 high	 possibly	 to	 be	 built	 on	 an	 agricultural	area.	 Additionally,	 Turkey	 is	 coping	with	 deforestation.	 Currently,	 only	 14.9%	of	 total	area	 is	 represented	 by	 forests.	 Accordingly,	 agricultural	 and	 forest	 lands	 may	 pose	difficulties	for	solar	farm	permits	(Yazici,	2017).	
5.6.6.	 Public	Perception	and	Social	Acceptance	of	Solar	Power		 Based	 on	 the	 survey	 results,	 performed	 by	 (Ertör	 Akyazi,	 et	 al.,	 2012),	 almost	two-thirds	of	the	2,422	residents	from	Urban	Turkey	supports	investment	in	renewable	energy	resources	(particularly	solar	and	wind),	while	only	a	small	minority	are	opposed	to	it.	 According	 to	 the	 2016	 survey	 results	 performed	 by	 the	 Kadir	 Has	 University,	Istanbul,	Turkey,	11%	of	 the	 respondents	use	solar	energy	 for	 their	heating	purposes.	100%	of	interviewees	pay	a	100	Turkish	Lira	bill	for	using	the	solar	energy.	Among	the	other	energy	sources,	solar	energy	is	identified	as	the	cheapest	(Table	27).		
Table	27.	The	share	of	respondents	regarding	the	amount	of	monthly	spend	for	consuming	a	particular	energy	source	
Which	type	of	
energy	do	you	
consume	
monetarily	at	
home	at	most?	
How	much	do	you	monthly	spend	for	consuming	this	particular	
energy	source?	
	 <50	TL	(%)	 50-100	TL	(%)	 100-150	TL	(%)	 150-200	TL	(%)	 >200	TL	(%)	 No	answer	 Nr	
Electricity	 2.8	 30.9	 33.4	 18.0	 13.9	 1.0	 599	
Natural	gas	 0.4	 4.7	 24.5	 20.9	 48.4	 1.1	 465	
Coal	 0.0	 26.6	 34.2	 10.1	 27.9	 1.3	 79	
Wood	 0.0	 43.6	 30.8	 7.7	 15.4	 2.6	 39	
Petroleum	
products	 0.0	 8.3	 8.3	 8.3	 75.0	 0.0	 12	
Bottled	gas	 0.0	 12.5	 25.0	 0.0	 62.5	 0.0	 8	
Solar	 0.0	 100.0	 0.0	 0.0	 0.0	 0.0	 1	
Total	 1.6	 20.6	 29.6	 18.0	 29.1	 1.2	 1204	
Data	source:	(Ediger,	et	al.,	2016).		 Further	survey	results	demonstrate	that	the	respondents	thoroughly	support	the	construction	 of	 solar	 and	 wind	 power	 plants	 in	 their	 local	 areas.	 Despite	 the	deforestation	thread,	as	both	power	plants	need	a	larger	area	to	be	installed,	the	social	acceptance	regarding	solar	and	wind	power	plants	remain	positive	(Table	28).	
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Table	28.	The	social	acceptance	regarding	the	utilization	of	renewable	energy	sources		
%	
Definitely	
no	
Support	
No	
Support	 Neutral	 Supports	
Definitely	
supports	
No	
answer	
Nuclear	 32.5	 17.1	 14.2	 20.7	 5.9	 9.6	
Hydroelectric	 13.8	 11.2	 14.4	 34.9	 15.5	 10.6	
Solar	 0.9	 2.1	 7.2	 28.7	 57.3	 3.8	
Wind	 0.8	 1.6	 6.6	 28.9	 57.3	 4.8	
Bioenergy	 6.3	 6.6	 16.1	 28.3	 21.8	 20.9	
Coal	 28.1	 17.8	 20.7	 21.2	 5.3	 6.9	
Natural	gas	 4.4	 4.9	 16.5	 41.5	 27.3	 5.4	
Geothermal	 4.8	 6.7	 15.1	 32.2	 26.0	 15.2	
Data	source:	(Ediger,	et	al.,	2016).	
5.6.7.	 Results	and	Outcomes		Owing	 to	 its	 climate	 conditions	 and	 geographical	 location,	 the	 Aegean	 and	Mediterranean	Regions	of	Turkey	have	particularly	substantial	potential	 for	electricity	production	 and	heat	 generation	 from	 solar	 power.	Despite	 this	 immense	potential	 for	solar	power	across	 the	country,	 there	are	still	no	 large-scale	solar	power	 installations.	Solar	 energy	 is	 mostly	 used	 for	 water	 heating,	 greenhouse	 heating	 and	 for	 drying	agricultural	products.	In	its	vision	2023	targets,	the	Turkish	government	aims	to	reach	3,000	MW	electricity	generation	 from	solar	energy.	Despite	 its	571	MW	installed	solar	photovoltaic	capacity	and	rapid	installations	in	the	last	years,	reaching	the	energy	target	does	not	seem	feasible.		Solar-photovoltaic	 creates	 more	 employment	 opportunities	 in	 comparison	 to	other	 renewables,	 in	 the	 construction,	maintenance,	 installation	 and	 operation	 stages.	Therefore,	 incentives,	 feed-in-tariffs	 and	 purchase	 guarantees	 by	 the	 state	 authorities	play	 an	 important	 role	 to	 promote	 the	 construction	 of	 large-scale	 solar	 photovoltaic	panels	and	power	stations.	The	MENR	determined	a	purchase	guarantee	through	feed-in	tariff	 spanning	at	 latest	up	until	2020.	 In	order	 to	accelerate	 the	electricity	generation	and	promote	 further	 investments,	 prolonging	 this	 guarantee	 is	 crucial.	The	 regulatory	uncertainties	and	bureaucratic	inefficiencies	in	providing	licensing	and	permits	for	solar	power	installation	must	be	eliminated.				
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6.	 UNCONVENTIONAL	ENERGY	RESOURCES	IN	TURKEY		 Unconventional	reserves,	consisting	of	tight	gas,	shale	gas	and	coalbed	methane	are	 found	 in	 geological	 formations	 which	 are	 peculiar	 for	 conventional	 natural	 gas;	respectively	tight	sands,	shale	formations	and	coal	beds	(Turkish	Review,	2014).	Every	shale	 reservoir	 has	 its	 unique	 geological	 structures	 which	 determine	 its	 production	capacity,	water	consumption	and	even	greenhouse	gas	emissions	level	(Turkish	Review,	2014).	Therefore,	adequate	knowledge	of	the	geologic	structure	of	the	shale	reservoir	is	crucial	to	estimate	costs	and	keep	them	under	control.	On	the	contrary,	conventional	gas	wells	 have	 a	 relatively	 stable	 lifespan,	 whereas	 shale	 gas	 wells	 give	 their	 maximum	production	 during	 the	 first	 two	 years,	 followed	 by	 a	 steady	 decline	 (Turkish	 Review,	2014).	In	order	to	extract	shale	gas	the	“hydraulic	fracturing”	method	is	frequently	used.	Fracturing	is	a	water-intensive	procedure,	which	raises	many	environmental	challenges,	particularly	in	water-scarce	areas.	Contrary	to	popular	myth,	Turkey	is	neither	a	country	with	 plenteous	 freshwater	 resources,	 nor	 is	 it	 the	 richest	 country	 in	 the	 region.	 The	country	has	only	about	one-fifth	of	the	water	available	per	capita	in	water	rich	regions	compared	to	North	America	and	Western	Europe	(MFA,	2011).	The	country	has	already	been	suffering	from	a	general	shortage	of	water	and	high	soil	salinity.	This	problematic	issue	will	continue	as	long	as	the	lakes	and	wetlands	of	the	country	continue	to	diminish	because	of	unrestricted	irrigation.	Furthermore,	Turkey	does	not	have	a	compatible	and	sustainable	water	management	policy.	Due	to	 the	great	receding	of	water	 levels	 in	 the	Central	Anatolia	region,	the	Lake	TUZ	and	the	Tersakan,	Bolluk	and	Kulu	Lakes	around	it,	 along	 with	 the	 Eşmekaya	 wetlands,	 have	 all	 come	 to	 the	 verge	 of	 complete	desiccation.	 Because	 Turkey's	 agriculture	 sector	 is	 heavily	 dependent	 on	 constant	freshwater	 supplies	 and	 its	 agricultural	 productivity	 is	 substantially	 dependent	 upon	sustainable	irrigation,	the	agricultural	sector	would	very	likely	be	heavily	affected	by	the	shale	gas	production	(Turkish	Review,	2014).	The	 hydraulic	 fracturing	 process	 often	 requires	 complicated	 and	 highly	developed	 extraction	 technology	 (e.g.,	 dewatering	 coalbed-methane	 wells,	 massive	fracturing	 programs	 for	 shale	 gas	 and	 different	 mining	 activities).	 Due	 to	 the	technological	 shortage,	 drilling	 costs	 in	 Turkey	 might	 be	 high	 and	 vary	 between	 $5	million	and	$24	million	per	horizontal	well	under	hydraulic	fracturing	(Turkish	Review,	2014).	According	to	Ibrahim	Palaz,	an	energy	expert	at	Hazar	Energy	Institute,	Turkey	
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has	not	done	scientific	research	on	its	shale	gas	reserves.	He	further	declares	that	there	is	 no	Turkish	 company	 technologically	 capable	 of	 accomplishing	 shale	 gas	 extractions	through	the	fracturing	method.	Since	each	unconventional	hydrocarbon	well	has	its	own	individual	 geological	 formation,	 it	 is	 hard	 to	 foresee	 Turkey's	 shale	 gas	 price.	 While	shale	gas	is	unlikely	to	be	cheaper	than	Russian	or	Azerbaijani	imports,	it	might	be	less	expensive	 than	 Iranian	 gas	 (Turkish	 Review,	 2014).	 Moreover,	 the	 level	 of	unconventional	 hydrocarbon	 exploration	 can	 be	 challenged	 by	 high	investment/operational	 costs	 and	 technological	 challenges.	 Furthermore,	 there	 are	enough	 companies	 in	 the	 sector	 with	 sufficient	 know-how	 about	 the	 hydrocarbon	exploration	process.		
6.1.	 Shale	Gas	and	Hydraulic	Fracturing	in	Turkey	
	 The	 combination	 of	 two	 old	 technologies	 –	 horizontal	 drilling	 and	 hydraulic	fracturing	(fracking)	has	resulted	as	a	"drilling	renaissance"	for	the	shale	gas	extraction.	The	shale	gas	is	trapped	in	thin	layers	between	the	rocks	und	cannot	flow	through	the	well	by	drilling	alone.	Hence,	in	order	to	extract	natural	gas	trapped	in	shale	formations,	the	producers	deployed	 fracking	method,	which	 is	 able	 to	pump	millions	of	 gallons	of	water,	sand	and	chemicals	at	high	pressure	to	clear	the	way	and	allow	oil	and	gas	flow	(Sergie	2013).	Although	natural	gas	is	cleaner	and	emits	lower	levels	of	carbon	dioxide	than	 coal	 or	 oil,	 the	 fracking	 method	 has	 a	 negative	 impact	 on	 the	 environment,	especially	 on	 water	 (Sergie,	 2013).	 The	 harmful	 chemicals	 mixed	 with	 water	 and	injected	into	wells	may	leak	if	the	wells	are	poorly	constructed.	When	the	fracturing	is	done,	 drillers	 remove	 the	 wastewater,	 which	 is	 then	 safely	 disposed	 of	 or	 re-used	(Sergie,	2013).		A	 survey	 of	 the	 EIA	 about	 the	 technically	 recoverable	 shale	 oil	 and	 shale	 gas	resources	worldwide,	show	that	USA,	China,	Argentina,	and	Algeria	possess	a	significant	amount	 of	 shale	 gas	 resources.	 Furthermore,	 more	 than	 half	 of	 the	 world's	 shale	 oil	resources	 are	 located	 in	 Russia,	 China,	 Argentina	 and	 Libya.	 Countries	 like	 Turkey,	Poland	 and	 Ukraine,	 which	 possess	 fewer	 shale	 resources,	 see	 it	 as	 potential	 game	changers	to	reduce	their	dependence	on	conventional	gas	exporters	such	as	Russia	and	Iran	(Sergie,	2013).	Turkey	 is	 looking	 forward	 to	exploiting	 the	estimated	4.6	 tcm	of	 shale	 reserves	that	have	been	detected	 in	 the	 country	 (Kashi,	2013).	The	country	 sees	 shale	gas	as	a	
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potential	boom	to	cut	down	on	its	energy	bills	in	the	future	and	focuses	predominantly	on	two	shale	basins:	The	South-east	Anatolia	Basin	in	southern	Turkey	and	the	Thrace	Basin	 in	 western	 Turkey	 (Map	 11).	 Turkish	 Petroleum	 and	 some	 other	 international	companies	 actively	 pursue	 shale	 oil	 and	 shale	 gas	 exploration	 activities	 on	 these	 two	basins.	Among	them,	Turkey	may	also	benefit	from	shale	gas	resources	in	Sivas	and	Salt	Lake	 basins	 (EIA,	 2013).	 The	 available	 reserves	 needed	 for	 new	 energy	 supplies	 and	new	 cutting-edge	 technologies	 galvanised	 high	 interest	 in	 Turkey's	 unconventional	hydrocarbon	potential.	 Oil	 and	 gas	 production	 from	 shale	 coalbed-methane	 and	 other	sources	 can	 potentially	 satisfy	 a	 considerable	 amount	 of	 Turkey's	 energy	 appetite	(Turkish	Review,	2014).	
	
Map	11.	Major	shale	basins	of	Turkey	
	
Data	source:	(EIA,	2015).		With	reference	to	the	estimations	of	EIA	and	Resources	Internation,	Inc.	(ARI)	in	2013,	the	Dadaş	 Shale	 in	 the	 South-eastern	 Anatolian	 Basin	 and	 the	Hamitabat	 Shale	 in	 the	Thrace	Basin	 contain	 163	 tcm	of	 risked	 shale	 gas	 in-place,	with	 24	 tcm	 as	 the	 risked,	technically-recoverable	 shale	gas	 resource	 (see	Map	11).	Additionally,	 these	 two	shale	basins	contain	94	billion	barrels	risked	shale	oil	in-place,	with	4.7	billion	barrels	as	the	risked,	technically-recoverable	shale	oil	resource	(EIA,	2015).	Royal	Dutch	Shell	Plc	 (RDSA),	TransAtlantic	Petroleum	Ltd.	and	Valeura	Energy	Inc.	are	the	explorers	to	drill	shale	rock	in	Turkey	that	holds	as	much	as	4.6	tcm	of	gas	and	 94	 billion	 barrels	 of	 oil,	 according	 to	 the	 EIA's	 2013	 report	 (Bauerova,	 2014).	Turkey	is	an	attractive	country	for	these	companies	because	the	government	has	so	far	avoided	all	environmental	protests	that	have	hindered	the	development	of	shale	gas	in	
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Europe.	 Yvonne	 Telford,	 an	 analyst	 at	Wood	 Mackenzie	 in	 London,	 assumes	 that	 the	country's	expanding	balance	of	payment	deficit	and	 the	weakening	of	Turkish	Lira	 led	the	 government	 to	 amend	 its	 natural	 resources	 law,	 in	 order	 to	 pave	 the	way	 for	 the	international	explorers	(Bauerova,	2014).	The	basins	with	estimated	shale	reserves	in	Turkey	are	as	follows:	I) The	South-east	Anatolian	Basin	is	an	active	and	primarily	oil-prone	basin,	which	encompasses	around	100	oil	field	discoveries	to	date	(EIA,	2013).	II) The	Silurian	Dadaş	Basin	contains	a	9.2	billion	m2	area	and	is	located	in	the	centre	of	the	83.1	billion	m2	South-east	Anatolian	Basin.	The	estimations	of	EIA	and	ARI	indicate	that	87	billion	barrels	of	risked	shale	oil	and	2.8	trillion	m3	of	associated	shale	gas	are	in-place	(EIA,	2013).	In	September	2012,	the	TP,	Turkey's	state-run	energy	company	and	Shell	started	fracking	operations	to	extract	shale	gas	 from	Dadaş	Shale	in	the	Sari	buğday-#1	natural	gas	field.	Anatolia	Energy	also	drilled	Dadaş	 Shale	 well	 in	 the	 Çaliktepe-#2	 field	 in	 early	 January	 2012.	 Texas-based	Transatlantic	Petroleum	Ltd.	has	already	drilled	31	horizontal	and	deviated	wells	(25	 in	 south-eastern	 Turkey	 and	 six	 in	 north-western	 Turkey).	 The	 company	reported	flowing	gas	and	light	oil	from	their	two	Dadaş	Shale	test	wells	(Natural	Gas	World,	2013).	III) The	Thrace	Basin	covers	16.8	billion	m2	area	in	the	north-western	part	of	Turkey.	Since	 the	 discovery	 of	 Hamitabat	 Gas	 Field	 in	 1970,	 Thrace	 Basin	 became	Turkey's	largest	gas	producing	area,	accounting	for	85%	of	the	country’s	total	gas	production	(EIA,	2013).	Up	until	now,	around	350	wells	in	thirteen	gas	fields	and	three	 oil	 fields	 in	 this	 basin	 have	 been	 drilled.	 In	 the	 Thrace	 Basin,	 significant	drilling	 activities	 are	 undertaken	 by	 TP	 and	 Transatlantic	 Petroleum.	Nevertheless,	there	was	no	solid	information	released	about	the	shale	well	tests	or	the	performance	of	the	companies	until	now.	While	 the	 drilling	 activities	 in	 two	major	 basins	went	 on,	many	 questions	 and	doubts	 were	 raised	 concerning	 the	 fracking	 method.	 As	 of	 yet,	 environmental	 and	regulatory	challenges	appear	to	be	the	biggest	barrier	on	the	way	to	Turkey's	so-called	"unconventional	revolution”	(Turkish	Review,	2014).	These	are:	
Ø Lack	of	reliable	data	on	resources:	There	 is	no	official	national	data	available	regarding	the	forecasts	of	Turkey's	shale	gas	potential.	The	only	reliable	data	was	delivered	in	the	EIA's	2013	report.	
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Ø Lack	of	 technical	 information	and	staff	on	 fracking	technique:	Turkey	does	not	have	the	enhanced	technology	required		to	apply	fracking	method.	Therefore,	the	 country	 needs	 to	 cooperate	 with	 other	 countries,	 like	 the	 USA,	 for	 the	technical	know-how	and	to	improve	the	qualification	skill	of	the	staff.		
Ø Uncertainty	 on	 the	 possible	 profitability	 of	 Turkey's	 shale	 gas:	 It	 is	 still	unclear	whether	 the	 exploration	 of	 shale	 gas	will	 be	 profitable	 for	 the	 country	and	how	this	will	affect	the	regional	gas	and	oil	prices	as	well	as	production	costs.	
Ø Environmental	 risks	 of	 the	 fracking	 process:	 Rapid	 expansion	 in	 shale	 gas	production	 has	 raised	 serious	 concerns	 regarding	 the	 impact	 of	 operations	 in	areas	 such	 as	 water,	 road,	 air	 quality,	 seismic	 and	 greenhouse	 gas	 emissions.	There	 are	 some	 arguments	 that	 the	 shale	 gas	 development	 may	 help	 reduce	greenhouse	gas	emissions	by	displacing	coal	burning.	Nevertheless,	the	fracking	method	has	negative	environmental	 impacts	on	groundwater,	drinking	aquifers	and	residential	water	wells.	Furthermore,	extracting	shale	gas	with	the	fracking	method	may	 elicit	water	 depletion	 and	water	 contamination	 through	 releasing	fracking	chemicals	and	gasses	to	the	surface.	Additionally,	noise,	seismic	activity,	cumulative	and	combined	health	and	environmental	impacts	on	communities	and	workers	in	the	unconventional	gas	industry	are	existent.		
Ø Lack	of	legal	framework:	Turkey's	legal	framework	is	quite	different	from	that	of	the	USA	or	European	countries.	The	landowners	in	Turkey	–	unlike	in	the	USA	–	 do	 not	 own	 the	 subsurface	mineral	 resources	 and	 are	 only	 compensated	 for	their	land.	This	may	partially	reduce	the	interest	level	of	the	local	population	in	shale	oil	and	gas	production	(Turkish	Review,	2014).	As	a	matter	of	 fact,	 compared	 to	European	countries,	Turkey	has	 the	necessary	framework	 and	 market	 conditions	 to	 attract	 potential	 investors	 for	 the	 domestic	unconventional	 hydrocarbons	 sector	 (Turkish	 Review,	 2014).	 Poland	 for	 instance,	ranked	as	Europe's	biggest	shale	gas	holder,	but	disappointed	interested	companies	like	Exxon,	 Eni	 SpA	 (ENI),	 Marathon	 Oil	 Corp.	 and	 Talisman	 Energy	 Inc.	 with	 poor	 test	results,	high	tax	demands	and	long	waiting	periods	for	permits	(Bauerova,	2014).	Unlike	Poland,	Turkey	ratified	 its	new	dynamic	Petroleum	Law	in	2013	and	thereby	removed	territorial	 restrictions	 on	 exploration	 activities	 as	 well	 as	 opened	 the	 country	 for	international	companies	(Bauerova,	2014).	In	this	new	Petroleum	Law,	the	combination	of	the	Royalty	Tax	(12.5%)	and	Corporate	Tax	(20%)	creates	an	investor-friendly	fiscal	regime,	 especially	 when	 oil	 prices	 undulate	 around	 the	 level	 of	 $90-100	 per	 barrel	
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(Turkish	 Review,	 2014).	 After	 taxes,	 duties,	 fees,	 rentals	 and	 royalties	 are	 paid,	 the	petroleum	 exploration	 and	 production	 holders	 may	 transfer	 their	 profit	 abroad.	Additionally,	energy	companies	may	export	up	to	35%	of	onshore	and	45%	of	offshore	oil	 and	 gas	 production	 in	 the	 fields	 discovered	 after	 January	 1980	 (Turkish	 Review,	2014).	In	 light	of	 this	 information,	Turkey	still	needs	a	better	 framework	that	assesses	potential	 gaps	 in	 existing	 legislation	 regarding	 chemical	 usage	 disclosure,	 foul	 water	treatment,	 the	 threshold	 for	 unconventional	 exploration,	 production	 and	 for	environmental	 impact	 assessments.	 Unconventional	 gas	 production	 may	 cohere	 with	Turkey's	 primary	 energy	 goals,	 like	 the	 security	 of	 supply	 and	 affordable	 energy.	Nevertheless,	 without	 a	 compatible	 legal	 framework	 for	 the	 proper	 application	 of	 a	comprehensive	 water	 management	 and	 methane	 leakage	 control	 system,	unconventional	 production	may	 contribute	 negatively	 to	 the	 country's	 environmental	sustainability	(Turkish	Review,	2014).	Turkey	 insists	 on	 implementing	 such	 energy	 policies,	 which	 target	 the	 full	utilisation	of	domestic	 conventional	energy	sources	and	nuclear	power	 to	diminish	 its	external	 energy	 dependency.	 Nevertheless,	 since	 the	 AKP	 came	 to	 power	 in	 2002	Turkey's	reliance	on	fossil	energy	imports	increased	to	73%,	rising	from	65,1%	in	2001	(Gürbüz,	2015).	Selami	 Incedalcı,	 former	 General	 Director	 of	 the	 TP,	 emphasised	 that	 shale	 gas	drilling	only	makes	economic	sense	if	the	value	of	total	organic	carbon	is	over	10%.	It	is	then	possible	to	produce	both	natural	gas	and	oil	if	the	hydrocarbons	contained	in	shale	layers	are	rich	in	total	organic	carbon.	Furthermore,	there	are	serious	discussions	as	to	whether	 the	 hydraulic	 fracturing	 method	 could	 trigger	 earthquakes	 in	 the	 region.	Turkey,	 in	 this	 sense,	 is	 one	 of	 the	 most	 seismically	 active	 areas	 in	 the	 world.	 Many	major	earthquakes	have	had	disastrous	effects	in	several	provinces	of	the	country.	A	common	pattern	emerging	 from	the	 larger	cities	 in	Turkey	has	been	 fast	and	uncontrolled	development,	achieved	by	overrunning	green	spaces	and	air	corridors	and	the	 construction	 of	 mostly	 uninsulated	 buildings.	 If	 these	 speeds	 and	 methods	 of	urbanisation	 continue,	 the	 country	 could	 become	 an	 urban	 sprawl	 in	 the	 upcoming	decades.	 In	parallel	 to	 this	expansion,	 the	energy	demand	of	 these	 immense	cities	has	unduly	 increased.	 In	 order	 to	 meet	 the	 rising	 energy	 demand	 of	 these	 cities,	 the	utilisation	of	shale	gas	as	a	local	source	instead	of	importing	crude	oil,	natural	gas	and	coal	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 better	 option	 regarding	 economic	 security	 and	 security	 of	 supply.	
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Furthermore,	 the	requisite	 infrastructure	 for	 the	transportation	of	shale	gas	 is	already	available	in	almost	all	cities	of	the	country.	Notwithstanding	this,	shale	gas	and	shale	oil,	in	spite	of	their	environmentally	friendly	nature	compared	to	coal,	are	still	fossil	energy	resources	 and	 cannot	 be	 substitutions	 for	 renewables.	 Critically,	 both	 the	 fracking	process	and	the	injection	of	wastewater	into	deep	disposal	wells	as	a	recycling	method	cause	small	earthquakes.		
6.2.	 Bituminous	(Oil)	Shale		 Oil	 shale	 is	a	general	 term	used	 for	usually	 fine-grained	sedimentary	rocks	 that	yield	 considerable	 amounts	 of	 shale	 oil	 upon	 pyrolysis.	 Oil	 shale	 forms	 a	 mixture	 of	tightly	 bound	 organic	 and	 inorganic	 materials	 and	 is	 mainly	 used	 in	 thermal	 power	plants	and	for	oil	and	gas	production.	The	USA	has	the	largest	oil	share	resources	known	in	the	world,	which	constitute	62%	of	the	world's	known	recoverable	oil	shale	potential	(Altun,	et	al.,	2006	S.	211-227)	Oil	shale	represents	the	second	largest	unconventional	energy	source	in	Turkey.	The	most	significant	oil	shale	deposits,	regarding	quality,	amount	and	exploitability,	are	located	 mainly	 in	 middle	 and	 western	 regions	 of	 Anatolia.	 Up	 until	 now,	 the	 proven	amount	of	the	explored	reserves	is	around	2.2	billion	tonnes,	while	the	total	reserves	are	expected	to	be	between	3-5	billion	tonnes.	Several	studies,	performed	to	recover	shale	oil,	 have	 concluded	 with	 positive	 but	 inapplicable	 results.	 Treating	 oil	 shale	 as	 a	supplement	 to	coal	or	 lignite	 in	power	production	 is	a	more	reasonable	approach	and	would	be	possible	in	boilers	used	for	firing	coal	(Altun,	et	al.,	2006).	
7.	 ENERGY,	ECONOMICS	AND	POLITICS	IN	TURKEY	
7.1.	 Turkey’s	Energy	Security	and	Impact	of	Turkish	Straits	
	 The	geopolitical	and	geostrategic	 importance	of	Turkey	arises	not	only	 from	 its	geographical	 position	 and	 role	 as	 an	 energy	 hub	 but	 also	 from	 having	 three	 crucial	straits:	"The	Strait	of	the	Dardanelles,	the	Sea	of	Marmara	and	the	Bosporus."	For	a	long	time,	the	Turkish	Straits	have	been	serving	as	a	North-South	"naval	silk	road"	between	the	Black	Sea	and	the	Mediterranean	nations.	Due	to	the	rapidly	increasing	international	transportation,	 the	 straits	 gained	 even	 more	 importance,	 not	 only	 for	 the	 Black	 Sea	neighbouring	 countries	 and	 provinces,	 but	 internationally.	 Since	 1936,	 the	 Montreux	
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Convention	has	regulated	the	legal	regime	of	the	Turkish	Straits.	In	1982,	United	Nations	Convention	on	the	Law	of	the	Sea	codified	the	law	of	the	transit	passage	through	straits	used	for	international	navigation	(Pavlyuk,	1998).	Over	the	centuries,	the	Turkish	Straits	bore	witness	to	the	many	fights	between	the	 nations	 seeking	 to	 overtake	 the	 domination	 of	 these	 significant	 bottlenecks.	 The	Greeks,	 Persians,	 Romans,	 Byzantines,	 and	 ultimately	 the	 Ottomans	 respectively	maintained	the	control	of	the	Straits.	Until	the	enforcement	of	the	Montreux	Convention,	the	development	of	the	Turkish	Straits	regime	can	be	split	into	three	timeframes:	I. The	era	of	Ottoman	Domination	(1453-1809):	 The	 Turkish	 Straits	 fell	 under	 the	Ottoman	domination	with	the	conquest	of	Istanbul	in	1453.	This	era	was	also	the	era	 when	 the	 Ottoman	 Empire	 was	 the	 sole	 authority	 controlling	 the	 passage	regime	 of	 the	 Turkish	 Straits.	 The	 foreign	 vessels	 were	 not	 allowed	 to	 pass	through	 this	passage,	 and	 this	had	become	a	 general	 rule	 over	 time	during	 the	rise	of	 the	Ottoman	Empire.	This	started	to	 lose	effect	 in	the	18th	century	when	the	Ottoman	Empire	began	declining.	As	Russia	took	control	of	Azak	Castle	under	the	 Karlofça	 Peace	 Agreement	 in	 1969,	 the	 status	 quo	 in	 the	 Black	 Sea	 had	changed.	After	that,	the	European	States	also	became	increasingly	involved	in	the	"Straits	 issue"	 between	 the	 Ottoman	 Empire	 and	 Russia.	 In	 1774,	 under	 the	Treaty	 of	 Küçük	 Kaynarca	 (between	 Russia	 and	 the	 Ottoman	 Empire),	 Russia	obtained	authorisation	to	have	a	commercial	vessel	in	the	Black	Sea	as	well	as	to	engage	in	trade	and	pass	its	trade	ships	through	the	straits.	Under	the	Ottoman-Russian	 alliance	 agreements,	 signed	 in	 1798	 and	 1805,	 the	 war	 vessels	 of	 the	third	States	were	not	permitted	to	use	the	Straits	as	a	transit	seaway.	The	1805	agreement	became	obsolete	as	the	Russo-Turkish	War	(1806-1812)	erupted.	II. The	bilateral	agreements	era	(1809-1841):	In	1809,	under	the	Treaty	of	Canakkale	and	 1829	 under	 the	 Treaty	 of	 Edirne,	 Ottomans	 were	 committed	 to	 granting	Russian	commercial	vessels	passage	through	the	straits	and	their	free	movement	both	in	the	Black	Sea	and	in	the	Straits.	The	Treaty	of	Hünkar	Iskelesi	was	signed	on	 July	8,	 on	 the	 condition	 that	 the	Ottomans	would	 close	 the	 straits	 to	France	and	 to	 Great	 Britain	 in	 the	 case	 that	 Russia	 came	 under	 attack.	 Through	 this	treaty,	 Russia	 gained	 a	 significant	 advantage	 over	 the	 straits	 and	 increased	 its	security	 in	 the	 Black	 Sea.	 On	 the	 other	 side,	 the	 treaty	 terminated	 the	 sole	sovereign	 rights	 of	 the	 Ottoman	 Empire	 over	 the	 straits.	 The	 security	 of	 the	straits	and	the	geostrategic	position	themes	thus	came	to	the	fore.		
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III. The	multilateral	agreements	era	(1841-1923):	On	July	13th	1841,	a	new	era	for	the	Turkish	 Straits	 started,	 as	 the	 Ottoman	 Empire	 signed	 "the	 London	 Straits	Convention"	 with	 Russia,	 United	 Kingdom,	 Austria,	 France	 and	 Prussia.	 The	London	 Straits	 Convention	 is	 significant;	 it	 made	 the	 straits	 international	passageways,	restricted	Ottoman	sovereignty	over	the	straits,	weakened	Russian	advantage	over	the	straits	and	increased	the	security	of	France	and	Great	Britain	in	the	Mediterranean.	The	Paris	Convention,	signed	in	1856,	forbade	the	passage	of	 military	 vessels	 of	 all	 states,	 including	 the	 Ottoman	 Empire.	 On	 March	 13th	1871,	the	London	Straits	Agreement	on	the	Black	Sea	was	signed,	which	allowed	the	navigation	of	war	vessels	of	 the	Ottoman	Empire's	allies	 through	the	straits	even	 in	 peacetime,	 under	 the	 permission	 of	 the	 Ottoman	 Sultan.	 Under	 the	London	Agreement,	 the	Ottoman	 state	was	 allowed	 to	 open	 the	 straits	 for	war	vessels	of	ally	countries	when	necessary	for	the	sake	of	its	security.	The	 regime	 of	 the	 Turkish	 Straits,	 founded	 under	 the	 19th-century	 agreements,	proceeded	until	the	outbreak	of	the	First	World	War.	The	President	Woodrow	Wilson's	principles	 played	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 determining	 the	 ensuing	 legal	 regime	 for	 the	Turkish	 Straits	 (Inan,	 2001).	 The	 fourth	 of	Wilson’s	 fourteen	principles	 appointed	 the	establishment	 of	 a	 system	 on	 the	 Straits	 under	 the	 competence	 of	 Turkey	 and	 other	Black	 Sea	 Powers	 (Orekhov,	 1946).	 His	 fifth	 principle	 suggested	 a	 joint	 Turco-Soviet	system	of	defence	 for	 the	Straits	–	a	 system	which	 tacitly	 contained	 the	 idea	of	Soviet	bases.	He	saw	Turkish	independence	as	vital	to	American	interests	in	blocking	Russia's	advance	to	the	Persian	Gulf	and	Suez	Canal.	According	to	him,	the	Turks	represented	a	great	asset	to	the	stability	of	the	Middle	East,	and	this	asset	could	not	be	trifled	away.	Nevertheless,	the	twelfth	principle	of	Wilson	undermined	the	power	structure	of	the	 Ottoman	 Empire.	 According	 to	 this	 principle,	 "the	 Turkish	 portion	 of	 the	 present	Ottoman	 Empire	 should	 be	 assured	 a	 secure	 sovereignty,	 but	 the	 other	 nationalities	which	are	now	under	Turkish	rule	should	be	assured	an	undoubted	security	of	life	and	an	absolutely	unmolested	opportunity	of	autonomous	development,	and	the	Dardanelles	should	 be	 permanently	 opened	 as	 a	 free	 passage	 to	 the	 ships	 and	 commerce	 of	 all	nations	under	 international	 guarantees"	 (Yale	 Law	School,	 2008).	 This	 point	 aimed	 to	separate	 ethnic	 groups,	 gave	 the	 Middle	 East	 Arabian	 groups	 a	 right	 to	 govern	 their	nation	 –	 and	 ultimately	 caused	 an	 internal	 disorder	 within	 the	 empire’s	 structure.	Anatolia	was	the	only	area	which	the	Ottomans	would	rule,	because	only	there	they	had	the	majority.	
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Under	the	Lausanne	Straits	Agreement,	signed	as	a	supplement	to	the	Lausanne	Agreement	 under	 Article	 23	 on	 July	 24th	 1923,	 the	 straits	 were	 made	 open	 to	commercial	vessels,	were	demilitarised	and	seizure	of	foreign	war	vessels	entering	the	Black	Sea	in	peacetime	was	subjected	to	certain	limitations.	The	regime	of	the	Lausanne	Straits	 Convention	 rested	 on	 the	 principle	 of	 freedom	 of	 passage	 of	merchant	 vessels	and	warships,	 taking	 into	 account	whether	Turkey	was	 in	 a	 time	of	peace	or	war	and	also	whether	it	was	a	neutral	or	a	belligerent	power	(Inan,	2001).	The	Lausanne	Straits	Convention	 did	 not	 fulfil	 the	 expectations	 of	 Turkey.	 The	 common	 guarantee	 system,	accepted	 for	 the	 security	of	 the	demilitarised	zones	and	 the	 security	of	Turkey	 in	 this	region,	was	weak	and	proved	 its	 insufficiency	during	1930	(Inan,	2001).	During	 those	years	 rising	 incidences	 began	 to	 occur,	 such	 as	 the	 revisionist	 policies	 of	 individual	states,	the	militarisation	of	certain	areas	in	the	South	Aegean	(close	to	Turkish	shores)	and	the	failure	of	global	demilitarisation	efforts.	These	circumstances	compelled	Turkey	to	appeal	 to	 the	principle	of	 law	known	as	 the	clausula	rebus	sic	stantibus	 and	ask	 the	parties	for	a	new	convention	to	safeguard	its	security	(Inan,	2001).	"The	Montreux	Convention	Regarding	the	Regime	of	the	Turkish	Straits",	signed	with	 the	participation	of	Bulgaria,	Great	Britain,	Australia,	France,	 Japan,	Romania,	 the	Soviet	 Union,	 Turkey,	 Yugoslavia	 and	 Greece	 on	 July	 20th	 1936,	 was	 the	 primary	instrument	 to	govern	passage	of	commercial	and	war	vessels	 through	the	Strait	 (Inan,	2001).	The	convention	regulates	the	current	international	status	of	the	Turkish	Straits.	Turkey's	domination	and	sovereignty	over	the	straits	are	heavily	restricted	through	the	Montreux	 Convention,	 which,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 threatens	 Turkey's	 energy	 security	dimension.	According	to	the	Montreux	Convention,	"merchant	vessels	enjoy	freedom	of	passage	 through	 the	 Turkish	 Straits	 (Turkish	 Straits	 Vessel	 Traffic	 Services	 Centre	regulates	 the	 passages	 according	 to	 the	 Maritime	 Traffic	 Regulations	 for	 the	 Turkish	Straits	 dated	 1998),	while	 passages	 of	 vessels	 of	war	 are	 subject	 to	 some	 restrictions	which	vary	depending	on	whether	these	vessels	belong	to	the	Black	Sea	riparian	States	or	not"	(MFA,	2011).	The	first	ordinances	of	the	Convention	were	as	follows:	i. Aircraft	carriers	are	not	allowed	to	pass	through	the	Turkish	Straits,	regardless	of	the	reason.	ii. Only	 submarines	 belonging	 to	 riparian	 states	 may	 pass	 through	 the	 Turkish	Straits,	with	the	intent	of	re-joining	their	base	in	the	Black	Sea	for	the	first	time	after	their	construction	or	purchase	(MFA,	2011).	
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iii. The	 total	 number	 and	 the	maximum	 aggregate	 tonnage	 of	 foreign	 naval	 forces	authorised	 to	 pass	 through	 the	 Straits	 shall	 not	 exceed	 9	 and	 15,000	 tonnes,	respectively.	iv. In	the	Black	Sea	the	total	aggregate	capacity	of	the	vessels	of	war	that	one	non-riparian	State	may	have	is	limited	to	30,000	tonnes.	v. Vessels	of	war	of	 the	non-riparian	 states	 are	not	 allowed	 to	 stay	more	 than	21	days	in	the	Black	Sea.	Approximately	3.7%	of	the	world's	daily	oil	consumption	is	shipped	through	the	Straits.	 Opening	 the	 way	 for	 such	 an	 oil	 flow	 through	 the	 Straits	 and	 increasing	 the	numbers	 of	 oil	 tankers	 passing	 this	 sea	 passage	 has	 raised	 a	 considerable	 amount	 of	natural,	 geographical,	 political	 and	 environmental	 concerns	 (Oztürk,	 2002).	 Turkish	Straits	are	considered	to	be	one	of	the	easiest	and	cheapest	routes	to	transport	the	oil	and	easy	money	to	the	petroleum	millionaires	around	the	world	–	from	ranches	of	the	oil-rich	Texas	state,	to	the	major	stakeholders	in	the	stock	markets	of	London,	Frankfurt	and	 New	 York	 (Oztürk,	 2002).	 Nevertheless,	 the	 more	 ships	 which	 pass	 through	 the	Straits,	the	more	the	threat	of	a	possible	maritime	disaster	increases.	Such	a	catastrophe	would	 ruin	 the	 entire	 environmental	 area	 and	 cause	 fatal	 injuries	 to	 thousands	 of	people.	The	EIA	 identifies	 the	Bosporus	and	Dardanelles	Straits	 as	 "one	of	 the	busiest	and	most	dangerous	chokepoints	in	the	world".	Every	year,	almost	60,000	vessels,	5,500	of	which	are	oil	tankers,	pass	through	these	narrow	straights,	mostly	carrying	weapons	and	radioactive	materials	(Starr,	2014).	Considering	this,	one	of	the	major	maritime	disasters,	occurred	on	the	Bosporus	Straits,	was	the	Independenta	mishap	(Oztürk,	2002).	On	November	15,	1979,	a	collision	between	 the	 Romanian	 oil	 tanker	 Independenta	 and	 the	 Greek	 freighter	 Evriyali	resulted	 in	 the	 death	 of	 43	 crew	 members.	 Around	 64,000	 tonnes	 of	 crude	 oil	 was	estimated	to	have	spread	into	the	Turkish	waters	and,	over	30,000	tonnes	of	crude	oil	was	burned	for	weeks,	covering	Istanbul	with	a	thick,	black,	oily	cloud	(Oztürk,	2002).	Another	 terrifying	maritime	 incident	 occurred	 on	March	 13th	 1994,	 when	 the	 66,822	tonnes	Cypriot	crude	oil	carrier	Nassia	collided	with	the	Cypriot	bulk	carrier	Shipbroker	at	the	Black	Sea	entrance	to	the	Bosphorus.	Twenty-nine	crew	members	lost	their	lives,	approximately	9,000	tonnes	of	crude	oil	spilled,	and	20,000	tonnes	burnt	for	four	days,	which	caused	severe	pollution	and	suspended	the	traffic	on	the	Straits	(Oztürk,	2002).	To	enhance	the	safety	of	navigation	in	the	Straits	and	to	protect	the	environment,	Turkey	 enacted	 the	 1994	 Turkish	 Regulations.	 Under	 these	 regulations,	 all	 merchant	
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vessels	must	 conform	 to	 the	 technical	 international	 rules	 and	 legislations	 of	 the	 State	whose	 flag	 they	 fly.	Furthermore,	 the	Turkish	authorities	must	be	 informed	about	any	deficiencies	 in	 the	vessels	 that	may	affect	 the	safety	of	navigation.	 In	addition	to	these	technical	 requirements,	 the	 1994	 Turkish	 Regulations	 prohibit	 the	 discharge	 of	 any	pollutants,	 such	 as	 refuse,	 bilge	water	 and	oil	 into	 the	 Sea	of	Marmara	or	 the	Turkish	Straits	 (Pavlyuk,	 1998).	 After	 the	 enactment	 and	 the	 implementation	 of	 1994	Turkish	Regulations,	Greece,	Russia	and	several	other	states	which	depend	on	the	Turkish	Straits	for	 shipping	 to	 and	 from	Black	 Sea	 ports	 objected.	 They	 claimed	 that	 the	Regulations	violated	the	Montreux	Convention's	grant	of	free	commercial	vessel	transit	through	the	Straits.	 They	maintained	 that	Turkey	had	 introduced	 the	1994	Turkish	Regulations	 to	diminish	oil	tanker	traffic	and	to	lobby	for	construction	of	an	oil	pipeline	through	Turkey	that	would	 replace	 boats	 and	 bring	 oil	 from	 the	 Caspian	 oil	 shelf,	 through	 Turkey,	 to	lucrative	Western	markets.	The	international	dispute	between	Turkey,	Russia	and	other	states	 remained	 unresolved.	 While	 Turkey	 claimed	 to	 be	 ensuring	 the	 safety	 of	navigation	and	environmental	concerns,	Russia	accused	Turkey	of	attempting	to	obtain	oil	 money	 and	 consolidate	 more	 power	 in	 the	 region	 by	 making	 all	 the	 surrounding	states	dependent	on	the	maritime	shipping	through	the	Turkish	Straits.	With	 the	 purpose	 of	 diminishing	 the	 heavy	 tanker	 traffic	 on	 the	 straits	 and	increase	 the	 energy	 security	 of	 Turkey,	 the	 necessity	 for	 opening	 a	 new	 waterway	emerged.	This	new	gateway,	named	"Canal	 Istanbul",	was	announced	for	the	 first	 time	by	Recep	Tayyip	Erdogan	 in	a	press	 conference	 in	April	2011.	The	plan	of	 the	project	was	to	build	an	artificial	sea-level	waterway,	by	digging	400	meters	wide	and	25	meters	deep,	crossing	through	the	entire	European	side	of	Istanbul,	connecting	the	Black	Sea	to	the	 Sea	 of	 Marmara	 (Odevci,	 2012).	 On	 the	 one	 side,	 it	 could	 be	 perceived	 as	 an	environmentally	friendlier	project,	as	due	to	the	decrease	of	petrol	tanker	traffic	marine	life	would	be	normalised	which	would	increase	the	seasonal	fish	migration	through	the	Bosphorus.	However,	 the	 other	 side	 of	 the	 medallion	 hid	 non-negligible	 environmental	aspects.	Istanbul	still	discharges	much	of	its	untreated	sewage	and	wastewater	directly	into	 the	 environment	 (Orhon,	 2014).	 In	 the	 1970s,	 as	 the	 limited	 scientific	 data	 was	available,	 the	 studies	 revealed	 that	 all	 dumping	 made	 into	 the	 lower	 layer	 of	 the	Bosporus	 and	 Marmara	 would	 be	 transported	 to	 the	 Black	 Sea	 without	 significant	mixing	with	the	upper	layer	and	thus	with	no	detrimental	effect	on	the	water	quality	of	the	Marmara	(Orhon,	2014).	Today,	more	than	two-thirds	of	the	Istanbul's	raw	effluent	
		 214	
is	poured	every	day	into	the	Marmara	Sea	and	the	Bosporus.	This	effluent	comprises	of	some	 1,100	 tonnes	 of	 organic	 matter,	 130	 tonnes	 of	 nitrogen	 and	 20	 tonnes	 of	phosphorus,	 as	 well	 as	 a	 wide	 spectrum	 of	 other	 chemicals	 and	 hazardous	materials	(Orhon,	2014).	In	contrast	to	the	findings	in	1970,	the	greater	part	of	this	pollution	is	not	dragged	along	to	the	Black	Sea.	The	significant	mixing	of	lower	and	upper	layers	of	the	Bosporus	 occurs	 in	 the	 zone	 between	 the	 Bosporus	 and	Marmara,	 which	 is	 the	most	unsuitable	 location	 for	wastewater	 disposal.	 The	 two	primary	 untreated	 sewage	 from	the	 districts	 of	 Kadiköy	 and	 Yenikapi,	 which	 account	 for	 around	 40%	 of	 the	 total	wastewater	load	in	Istanbul,	is	directly	located	in	this	mixing	zone.		Along	with	the	dumping	of	waste	at	sea,	bringing	the	Canal	Istanbul	project	into	action	would	only	worsen	the	situation.	The	level	of	pollution	of	the	Black	Sea	is	much	higher	than	Marmara	Sea.	Therefore,	opening	a	channel	in	the	mixing	zone	of	Black	Sea	with	Marmara	offers	a	new	route	for	polluted	water	to	head	south.	Some	of	the	studies	demonstrate	 that	 more	 than	 30	 tonnes	 of	 nitrogen	 and	 9	 tonnes	 of	 phosphorus	 are	carried	south	each	day	in	the	upper	flux	of	Bosporus	(Orhon,	2014).	Greenpeace	 Turkey	 indicates	 that	 opening	 a	 large-scale	 canal	 will	 change	 the	native	habitat	of	nature	in	that	area,	excavations	will	cause	erosion,	while	farmlands	and	water	resources	will	be	affected	negatively	(Odevci,	2012).	Furthermore,	regarding	the	Montreux	Convention,	merchant	 ships	 are	 allowed	 to	 pass	 the	Bosporus	 Strait	 free	 of	charge.	 How	 would	 it	 be	 possible	 to	 convince	 these	 ships	 to	 pass	 through	 the	 Canal	Istanbul	 if	 they	had	to	pay	a	certain	 fee?	 If	 there	 is	an	absolute	risk	that	 the	biological	structure	of	 the	Black	Sea	will	be	damaged,	should	we	still	 take	 into	account	what	 the	possible	reactions	from	Russia,	Ukraine	and	Romania	would	be?	These	questions	need	to	be	clarified	before	the	construction	of	such	an	artificial	canal,	which	inherently	brings	serious	environmental	and	marine	damages	with	it.	According	 to	 (Kottari,	 et	 al.,	 2013),	 Turkey	 cannot	 restrict	 the	 tanker	 traffic	(innocent	passage)	through	the	Straits,	"but	it	can	negotiate	an	international	accord	so	as	 to	 be	 designated	 to	 regulate	 the	 secure	 passage	 through	 the	 new	 canal,	 possibly	levying	transit	fees."	Furthermore,	Turkey	can	allege	that	the	tankers	and	the	new	Canal,	even	excluded	from	the	Convention's	provisions,	are	covered	by	the	Turkish	legislation	"and	thus,	control	the	passage	of	the	commercial	ships	indirectly,	therefore	the	tankers,	through	the	Canal”	 (Kottari,	et	al.,	2013).	All	 in	all,	due	 to	 the	environmental	concerns	and	 different	 points	within	 the	Montreux	 Convention,	 the	 positive	 contribution	 of	 the	Canal	Istanbul	Project	to	Turkey's	geopolitical	security	is	highly	speculative.	
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7.2.	 Economic	Vulnerability	and	Political	Instability	Aspects		 Turkey’s	unique	geographic	position,	by	being	an	energy	hub	between	West	and	East	 and	 having	 significant	 chokepoints,	 make	 the	 country	 not	 only	 special,	 it	 also	attributes	an	important	role	to	be	a	sustainable	and	reliable	partner	in	energeopolitical	relations	in	the	global	arena.	Nevertheless,	the	economic	strength	and	growth	of	Turkey	is	very	much	dependent	on	the	political	situation.	Due	to	this	heavy	dependency,	Turkey	has	 been	 suffering	 from	 financial	 vulnerabilities	 caused	 by	 political	 instabilities.	 The	party	 system	 and	 political	 parties	 have	 not	 been	 fully	 institutionalised	 since	 their	emergence	 in	 the	 late	1940s,	which	 increases	 volatility,	 fragmentation	 and	 ideological	polarisation	 of	 the	 Turkish	 political	 system.	 Turkish	 political	 history	 can	 be	 roughly	divided	into	six	periods	between	1923	to	present:		1) 1923-1938:	This	was	the	inter-war	period,	ruled	by	Mustafa	Kemal	Atatürk,	founder	of	the	Republic	of	Turkey,	on	well-established	principles	of	peace,	sovereignty	and	national	development.	The	most	esteemed	Kemalist	foreign	policy	goals	during	that	period	were:	 to	become	an	equal	member	of	 the	Western	world	of	nations	and	 to	create	 a	 strong,	 modern	 state	 which	 could	 defend	 its	 territorial	 integrity	 and	political	independence	without	any	external	assistance	(Criss,	1997).	2) 1939-1960:	This	was	a	period	of	change	for	Turkey,	as	it	became	a	NATO	member	in	1952.	 Turkey’s	 main	 goals	 were	 to	maintain	 security,	 political	 independence	 and	territorial	integrity.	Nevertheless,	the	Turkish	economy	became	dependent	upon	the	West	and	reinforced	the	pro-Western	policy	(Criss,	1997).	3) 1960-1980:	This	period	was	characterised	through	a	series	of	unstable	governments	and	 three	 military	 coups	 d’états	 in	 1960,	 1071	 and	 1980.	 Consequently,	 Turkey	suffered	from	an	increased	authoritarianism.	4) 1980-1990:	 The	 period	 was	 symbolised	 with	 further	 Western	 alignment	 and	reduced	 autonomy.	 During	 the	 Cold	 War,	 Turkey	 was	 a	 "wing	 country"	 under	NATO's	 strategic	 framework,	 resting	 on	 the	 geographic	 perimeter	 of	 the	Western	alliance.	 Until	 the	 1980s,	 Turkey	 was	 a	 sort	 of	 “closed”	 economy.	 Most	 of	 the	industries,	 companies,	 and	 banks	 were	 state-owned.	 Turgut	 Özal,	 who	 was	 the	Prime	Minister	at	 that	 time,	 introduced	 liberalisation	reforms	 to	open	 the	Turkish	economy	and	 introduce	 it	 to	 the	 global	markets.	Additionally,	Turkey	was	dealing	with	 internal	 and	 external	 conflicts	 in-	 and	 outside	 of	 the	 country.	 Since	 the	mid-1980s	 Turkey	 has	 been	 suffering	 from	 separatist	 terrorism	 –namely	 PKK–	
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particularly	 in	the	Eastern	and	South-eastern	provinces,	which	have	been	harming	the	social	and	economic	welfare,	reducing	the	human	and	physical	capital	stock,	and	introducing	higher	levels	of	uncertainty	within	the	society.	5) 1990-2002:	Was	a	period	of	high	political	 instabilities	 and	extraordinary	power	of	the	military	over	political	affairs.	The	most	remarkable	event	of	this	period	was	the	resignation	 of	 Turkey’s	 first	 Islamic-oriented	 Prime	Minister,	 Necmettin	 Erbakan,	due	 to	heavy	pressure	 from	 the	military.	The	 secular	 armed	 forces	of	 the	 country	accused	the	religious	policies	of	Erbakan	to	be	jeopardising	the	secular	nature	and	modern	values	of	 the	country.	This	event	has	been	called	as	 the	“postmodern	coup	
d’état”	by	a	Turkish	admiral	Salim	Dervisoglu.	Between	1980	and	2000,	Turkey’s	main	goal	was	economic	growth.	To	achieve	this	 goal,	 Turkey	 relied	 heavily	 on	 foreign	 investment.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 government	already	had	an	enormous	budget	deficit,	which	incited	the	already	high	inflation	rates	to	further	 increase.	 The	 International	 Monetary	 Fund	 (IMF)	 warned	 Turkey	 of	 the	possibility	 of	 facing	 a	 financial	 crisis	 due	 to	 the	 huge	 budget	 deficit.	 The	 foreign	investors	 observed	 political	 turmoil	 and	 the	 government’s	 efforts	 to	 eliminate	 the	budget	deficit	did	not	yield	a	positive	result.	All	in	all,	the	investors	withdrew	around	70	billion	dollars	from	the	country	within	a	few	months.	The	political	instabilities	reached	their	maximum	level	on	February	19th	2001,	during	a	crisis	between	the	former	Turkish	President	 Ahmed	 Necdet	 Sezer	 and	 the	 former	 Prime	 Minister	 Bülent	 Ecevit	 at	 the	National	 Security	 Council	 (Milli	 Güvenlik	 Kurulu).	 The	 2001	 crisis	 was	 the	 biggest	economic	 and	 political	 disaster	 in	 Turkish	 history,	 also	 known	 as	 Black	 Wednesday	(Kara	Çarşamba)	 and	 triggered	much	more	 economic	 turmoil.	 Stocks	 plummeted,	 and	the	interest	rate	reached	to	3.000%.		After	 the	 fiscal	 and	 financial	 crisis	 in	2001,	Turkey	 repaired	 its	public	 finances,	reformed	the	banking	system,	tamed	inflation	and	floated	the	lira	(The	Economist,	2017	S.	 58).	 In	May	 2001,	 Turkey	 signed	 a	 stand-by	 arrangement	 called	 “Transition	 to	 the	Strong	Economy	Program”	with	 the	 International	Monetary	Fund	(IMF).	This	program	was	supported	by	the	World	Bank	credits	and	introduced	by	Kemal	Dervis,	former	Head	of	the	United	Nations	Development	Program.	The	aim	of	the	program	was	to	fight	with	high	 inflation,	 sustain	 stability	 and	 achieve	 a	 good	 relationship	 between	 the	 financial,	fiscal	 and	 real	 sector.	 In	 the	meantime,	Recep	Tayyip	Erdoğan’s	 Islamic-rooted	 Justice	and	Development	Party	(AKP	–	Adalet	ve	Kalkinma	Partisi)	won	a	victory	in	the	general	elections	 on	 November	 3rd	 2002.	 Under	 the	 IMF’s	 austerity	 policy,	 Turkey	 had	
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promulgated	its	2002-2004	economic	program	and	was	able	to	draw	about	$16	billion	dollars	for	three	years	from	IMF.	This	program	was	indeed	successful	and	helped	Turkey	to	 establish	 new	 regulations	 regarding	 the	 financial	 sector	 and	 to	 achieve	 more	economic	stability.	6) 2002	–	present	is	 the	 period	 in	which	Recep	Tayyip	 Erdogan’s	 ruling	 conservative	party	 (AKP)	 came	 to	 power,	 after	 the	 elections	 of	 2002.	 After	 the	 AKP	 came	 to	power,	 Turkey	made	 great	 economic	 strides	 over	 13	 years	 until	 2015.	While	 the	average	 annual	 growth	 rate	 between	 1992	 and	 2001	was	 3%,	 it	 reached	 to	 5.2%	between	2002	and	2012.	The	 inflation	rate	dropped	down	to	17.6%	 in	2013	 from	74.9%.	Due	 to	 the	high	 fiscal	deficits,	 the	government	debt/GDP	ratio	was	76%	in	1999.	 This	 rate	 glided	 down	 to	 36.2%	 in	 2012,	 which	 was	 below	 the	 Maastricht	Criteria	(60%).	The	unemployment	rate	remained	high,	which	reached	above	10%	between	 1992	 and	 2001	 and	 9.7%	 annually	 in	 2013.	 The	 country	 has	 become	 a	trusted	 supplier	 of	 high-quality	 consumer	 goods	 and	 is	 still	 Europe’s	 biggest	manufacturer	 of	 television	 sets	 and	 light	 commercial	 vehicles	 (The	 Economist,	2016).	Based	on	the	World	Bank	data,	Turkey	is	the	eighteenth	largest	economy	in	the	 world	 and	 forty-three	 of	 the	 top	 250	 international	 construction	 firms	 are	Turkish.	 Moreover,	 Turkey	 is	 the	 world’s	 eighth	 biggest	 food	 producer	 and	 sixth	most	popular	tourist	destination	(The	Economist,	2016).	Nevertheless,	the	annual	average	growth	rates	in	Turkey	have	remained	modest	since	2007,	at	around	3.5%	per	annum.	There	is	too	much	volatility	associated	with	the	way	the	economy	is	run	in	Turkey.	The	economy	also	suffers	from	a	variety	of	domestic	troubles.	 Tedious	 regulations	 hamper	 small	 businesses	 to	 grow	 and	 become	 more	efficient.	One	such	is	that	labour-market	efficiency	in	Turkey	is	rather	low;	according	to	
The	World	Economic	Forum;	 it	ranks	131st	out	of	144	countries	(The	Economist,	2016).	Low	skills	are	a	key	barrier	 to	achieving	better	 labour	market	outcomes	 in	Turkey,	as	nearly	one	in	five	young	people	is	low-skilled,	neither	employed,	educated	nor	trained.	Another	example	is,	according	to	some	economists,	Turkey	struggles	to	move	up	into	the	club	of	rich	countries	from	the	“middle-income	trap”	(The	Economist,	2016).	Almost	all	Turkish	foreign	policy	scholars	are	sharing	the	same	opinion	that	the	traditional	 language	 of	 Turkish	 foreign	 policy	 has	 changed	 conspicuously	 during	 the	AKP	 era	 (Yesiltas,	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 In	 the	 first	 few	 years	 of	 the	 Islamic-oriented	 AKP	government,	 many	 Turkish	 foreign	 policy	 concepts	 reawakened:	 historical	 dimension,	
good	relations	with	neighbours,	co-operation	among	civilisations.	However,	some	of	them	
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came	 up	 with	 new	 concepts	 like	Multi-dimensional	Enhanced	Partnership	 and	 Energy-
Hub	 Corridor	 (Yesiltas,	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 Nevertheless,	 Turkey’s	 craving	 to	 be	 a	 regional	superiority	 and	 mediator	 country	 among	 different	 regional	 actors	 in	 such	 turbulent	times	has	failed.	Since	the	AKP	came	to	power,	it	has	supported	the	idea	of	“Neo-Ottomanism”	as	a	nostrum	against	the	model	of	the	nation-state	that	has	long	suppressed	cultural	plurality	and	promoted	centralist	unity.	Ottomanism	emerged	during	the	decline	of	the	Ottoman	Empire	 in	the	second	half	of	 the	19th	century,	aiming	to	guard	the	Ottoman	Empire	by	two	methods:	“First,	by	Westernising	the	country	and	becoming	part	of	Europe;	second	by	abolishing	 the	dominant	 status	of	Muslims	as	a	millet	system,	 thus	 integrating	non-Muslim	 communities	 into	 the	 state,	 preventing	 the	 emergence	 of	 nationalist	movements”	(Ozkan,	2014).	Millet	system	was	the	social	model	of	the	Ottoman	Empire.	The	leading	Turkish	historian	Prof.	Ilber	Ortayli	defines	the	Millet	system	by	referring	to	the	Millet	as	a	“form	of	organisation	and	a	legal	status	bestowed	by	the	Ottoman	Sultan	on	the	believers	of	monotheistic	religions	(ehl-i	zimmet)	such	as	Christianity	or	Judaism.	As	various	non-Muslim	communities	were	annexed	to	the	Empire,	the	Sultan	recognized	their	 formal	 status	 and	 granted	 his	 protection	 via	 a	 societal	 treaty	 called	 ahidname”	(Ortayli,	 2012).	 Consequently,	 the	 idea	 of	 Ottomanism	 concentrated	 more	 on	 the	domestic	 matters	 and	 had	 a	 defensive	 nature,	 although	 it	 could	 be	 a	 model	 for	 a	multicultural	and	tolerant	politic	of	plurality.	The	Ottoman	Empire	was	grounded	on	the	traditional,	 centralised	 governance	 of	 the	 elite.	 It	was	 neither	 a	multiculturalist	 nor	 a	pluralist	 system.	All	 traditional	 empires	were	multi-ethnic	 identities,	 but	 it	was	never	meant	 to	be	a	multi-ethnic	public	space,	as	 today’s	multiculturalism	aspires	 to	be.	The	plurality	 of	 ethnicities	 and	 religious	 communities	 cannot	 be	 explained	 as	 a	 sign	 of	pluralism	that	a	democratic	polity	aspires	to	achieve	(Mert,	2012).	Neo-Ottomanism,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 mainly	 came	 into	 existence	 due	 to	 the	economic	and	security	concerns	of	Turkey.	Ahmet	Davutoglu,	the	former	Turkish	prime	minister,	 was	 the	 figure	 “behind	 the	 scenes”	 who	 encouraged	 the	 idea	 of	 Neo-Ottomanism	 to	 implement	 as	 a	 pragmatic	 tool	 for	 Turkish	 foreign	 policy	 goals.	 In	 his	highly	criticised	2001	book	“Stratejik	Derinlik”	(Strategic	Depth),	Davutoglu	stated	that	by	using	 its	 geopolitical	 and	 geostrategic	position,	Turkey	 could	become	a	 regional	 as	well	as	a	global	actor.	Therefore,	 re-enhancing	 its	power	status	 in	 the	Middle	East	has	become	one	of	the	major	foreign	policy	goals	of	the	ruling	AKP	government.	Davutoglu	sought	 to	emulate	 the	 Islamism	of	 the	era	of	 Sultan	Abdülhamid	 II.	 In	his	view,	 in	 the	
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same	manner	as	 the	 Islamism	of	Abdülhamid’s	era	precluded	 the	disintegration	of	 the	Ottoman	 Empire;	 it	 was	 the	 only	 ideology	 that	 would	 make	 Turkey	 a	 leader	 in	 the	Middle	 East	 (Ozkan,	 2014).	 Based	 on	 these	 aspects,	 it	 can	 be	 claimed	 that	 Neo-Ottomanism	was	born	as	an	opposition	against	 the	Kemalist	 ideology	and	 the	Turkish	identity,	created	by	the	founders	of	the	Turkish	Republic,	first	and	foremost	against	the	idea	 and	 principles	 of	 Atatürk.	 Furthermore,	 Neo-Ottomanism	 is,	 in	 nature,	 rather	 an	aggressive	 policy.	 According	 to	 the	 ruling	 AKP	 government,	 increasing	 Turkey’s	influence	over	the	former	territories	of	the	Ottoman	Empire	(the	Middle	East	countries)	was	 determined	 as	 not	 only	 beneficial	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 Turkey	 but	 also	 essential	 for	security.	 However,	 the	 situation	 in	 the	Middle	 East	 brought	 different	 results	 than	 the	predictions	of	Davutoglu:	chaos	in	Libya,	Yemen,	Tunisia,	a	military	 junta	 in	Egypt	and	civil	 war	 in	 Syria.	 Furthermore,	 the	 increased	 engagement,	 even	 interference	 in	 the	internal	affairs	of	the	countries	like	Egypt	and	Syria,	strained	relationships.	Additionally,	the	Neo-Ottomanism	 concept	 raised	 concerns	 as	 to	whether	Ankara	had	been	moving	itself	away	from	being	a	NATO	member	and	its	ultimate	goal:	to	join	the	EU.	The	 expectations	 of	 Davutoglu	 did	 not	 come	 true	 and	 Turkish	 foreign	 policy	during	 the	 Arab	 Spring	 was	 unsuccessful	 (Ozkan,	 2014).	 The	 major	 reason	 for	 this	failure	 was	 the	 Pan-Islamist	 foreign	 policy	 of	 Davutoglu,	 which	was	 “ideologically	 ill-suited	to	the	realities	of	today’s	Middle	East”	(Ozkan,	2014).	His	assumptions	within	the	context	of	Pan-Islamismus	that	“it	will	be	possible	to	wipe	out	movements	 like	secular	Arab	nationalism	and	socialism	in	one	stroke,	and	set	the	Middle	Eastern	clock	back	to	1914”	did	not	occur	(Ozkan,	2014).	The	 right-wing	 conservatism	 is	 an	 output	 of	 the	 nation-state	 in	 Turkey.	 Their	remonstrance	 against	 republican	 nationalism	 was	 limited	 to	 their	 aversion	 with	 its	secularity.	The	Ottoman	system	was	an	irredentist	form	of	Turkish	nationalism	since	the	idea	was	the	Turkish	rule	over	vast	lands	and	various	communities	rather	than	the	idea	of	multinational	governance.	The	synthesis	of	“Turkishness”	was	embedded	in	the	idea	of	 Ottomanism	 from	 the	 beginning	 (Mert,	 2012).	 That	 is	 why	 when	 ex-Islamist	conservatives	 assumed	 the	 complete	 power	 to	 reshape	 Turkish	 politics,	 their	Ottomanism	 could	 not	 ease	 to	 overcome	 nation-state	 authoritarianism	 and	 could	 not	lead	to	pluralistic	democratic	politics.	Consequently,	the	idea	of	the	nation-state	turned	out	to	be	limited	politics	of	tolerance	toward	non-Muslim	minorities,	Alevi	and	Kurdish	openings	(Mert,	2012).	
		 220	
Since	 the	 AKP	 came	 to	 power,	 the	 military’s	 influence	 over	 politics	 has	dramatically	 diminished,	 as	 hundreds	 of	 officers	 have	 been	 imprisoned	 by	 a	 series	 of	prosecutions	–	 the	most	notorious	cases	were	“Ergenekon”	and	“Balyoz.”	The	effort	 to	curtail	the	military’s	power	to	interfere	with	politics	shifted	the	political	atmosphere	of	Turkey	towards	civilian	control	and	the	strengthening	of	the	civilian	institutions,	but	it	has	gone	far	beyond	the	aim	of	“democratisation	of	Turkey.”	Nevertheless,	the	role	and	position	 of	 the	military	 in	 Turkey	 are	 dissimilar	 to	 the	military	 powers	 in	 Europe	 or	other	 countries.	 Since	 the	 founding	 of	 the	 Turkish	 Republic	 in	 1923,	 the	military	 has	been	 a	 staunch	 supporter	 of	 the	 founder	 and	 leader	 of	 the	 Republic,	 Mustafa	 Kemal	Atatürk,	 his	 secularism,	 principles,	 reforms	 and	 have	 “stood	 as	 an	 unquestioned	guardian	of	secular	democracy,	intervening	when	it	deemed	necessary	to	keep	religion	out	of	politics”	(Zacharia,	2010).	Nevertheless,	as	a	result	of	the	decline	in	the	power	of	the	 army,	 Turkey	 has	 become	 a	 less	 and	 less	 secular	 and	 more	 and	 more	 religious	country.	 Especially	 since	 2007,	 the	 AKP	 has	 undermined	 secularism,	 promoted	Islamisation	more	apparently	and	maintained	and	strengthened	the	main	domineering	and	 interventionist	 state	 institutions	 (like	 Diyanet	 –	 Presidency	 of	 Religious	 Affairs)	(Somer,	2015).	As	Ahmet	Erdi	Öztürk	from	the	University	of	Strasbourg	stated,	in	recent	years,	these	institutions	(especially	Diyanet)	“has	been	transformed	into	a	pliable	state	apparatus	 geared	 towards	 implementing	 the	 political	 ideology”	 (Oztürk,	 2016)	 of	 the	AKP.	 These	 tendencies	 have	 brought	 a	 deteriorating	 general	 pattern	 of	 weakening	democracy:	“diminishing	checks	and	balances	and	division	of	powers	within	the	political	system,	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 AKP	 as	 the	 predominant	 party,	 growing	 government	authoritarianism	 and	 a	 lack	 of	 accountability”	 (Somer,	 2015).	 As	 a	 consequence,	 the	growing	political	and	social	divisions	within	the	country	and	the	polarisation	of	Turkish	society	 “along	 societal	 and	 political	 divides	 of	 secularism	 and	 Islamism”	 (Kaya,	 2015)	have	heavily	escalated.	Lastly,	on	July	15th	2016,	Turkey	witnessed	a	failed	coup,	which	marked,	however,	 the	bloodiest	attempt	on	record.	This	enhanced	the	already	existing	conservative	authoritarian	regime	of	Recep	Tayyip	Erdogan.	Turkey,	 as	 an	 EU	 candidate	 country	 since	 2003,	 has	 implemented	 a	 series	 of	reforms	which	promote	democratisation,	including	reforms	to	its	basic	framework	laws	affecting	civil	society	(ICNL,	2018).	Nevertheless,	Turkey	still	operates	under	the	1982	Constitution,	 which	 was	 written	 immediately	 following	 a	 military	 coup	 (ICNL,	 2018).	Although	there	are	basic	guarantees	of	rights	and	freedoms,	the	Constitution	is	not	up	to	the	 standards	 found	 in	 developed	 democracies	 (ICNL,	 2018).	 The	 state	 still	 has	 a	
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dominant	influence	over	society	and	has	gained	even	greater	strength	since	the	military	attempted	(allegedly	loyal	to	the	Muslim	cleric	Fethullah	Gülen)	the	failed	coup	on	July	15th	 2016.	 Since	 then,	 the	 country	has	been	under	 ‘state	of	 emergency’	 rules.	Up	until	now,	the	Turkish	government	has	been	prolonging	‘state	of	emergency’	measures	every	three	months	and	imposing	new	and	heavier	restrictions	on	civil	society	in	an	attempt	to	punish	those	who	allegedly	supported	the	coup.	Following	an	executive	decree	issued	on	November	22nd	 2016,	Turkish	 authorities	 ordered	 the	permanent	 closure	of	 375	non-governmental	organisations,	asserting	that	they	had	connections	to	the	Fethullah	Gülen	Movement	 or	 the	 PKK.	 According	 to	 John	 Dalhuisen,	 director	 of	 the	 European	 and	Central	Asia	Regional	Office	of	 the	Amnesty	 International,	 this	 closure	 is	 a	 ”part	 of	 an	ongoing	 and	 systematic	 attempt	 by	 the	 Turkish	 authorities	 to	 permanently	 silence	 all	critical	voices”	(Amnesty	International,	2016).	Consequently,	 the	power	of	 civil	 societies,	 non-governmental	 organisations	 and	unions	 are	 getting	 weaker	 over	 the	 time.	 Under	 these	 circumstances	 Turkey,	 which	struggles	against	low	wages,	lack	of	union	rights	and	unsteady	work,	is	becoming	even	more	problematic.	As	an	example,	after	the	tragic	mine	explosion	in	Soma	on	May	13th	2014,	which	killed	more	than	300	mineworkers,	the	Prime	Minister’s	Office	published	a	circular	claiming	that	all	aid	collected	by	individuals	or	civil	society	organisations	must	be	sent	to	a	singular	state	body	named	AFAD	(Directorate	for	Disaster	and	Emergency	Management).	AFAD	were	 then	accredited	as	 the	only	 institution	 to	 collect	aid	 for	 the	recovery	efforts	 related	 to	 the	accident.	 Such	an	arbitrary	 limitation	on	 collection	and	utilisation	of	aid	by	civil	society	can	be	articulated	as	an	example	that	demonstrates	the	problematic	nature	of	the	Law	on	Collection	of	Aid	in	Turkey	(ICNL,	2018).	Economic	 and	 political	 instabilities	 have	 substantial	 impacts	 on	 Turkey’s	employment	rates.	In	the	last	quarter	of	2015,	the	employment	rate	in	Turkey	reached	to	 47.8%	 –	 more	 than	 12%	 points	 below	 the	 OECD	 average	 (60.2%).	 The	 level	 of	unemployment	increased	from	9.9%	towards	the	end	of	2013	(TUIK,	2014)	to	10.5%	at	the	end	of	2014.	In	March	2016,	the	unemployment	rate	declined	to	9.6%	–	over	three	percent	higher	than	the	OECD	average	(6.3%).	Regarding	the	employment	rates,	a	vast	majority	 of	 the	 country	 produces	 low-value-added	 goods,	 which	 bring	 less	 income.	Outside	 the	 greater	 Istanbul	 area	 and	beyond	 the	Aegean	 coastline	 -	 two	 areas	which	export	products	such	as	refrigerators,	washing	machines,	televisions	and	vehicles,	which	generate	more	income	and	make	the	market	more	dynamic	and	competitive.	(Dombey,	2014).	The	owners	of	small	and	medium-sized	companies	in	Marmara	(Bursa,	Kocaeli),	
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Aegean	 (Denizli),	 Central	 (Ankara,	 Kayseri)	 and	 Anatolian	 part	 of	 Turkey	 (Gaziantep,	Kahramanmaras),	who	support	AKP,	have	become	 the	main	engine	of	Turkey’s	export	expansion	 into	 the	Middle	 East	 and	 North	 Africa	 (Jarosiewicz,	 2013).	 These	 so-called	“Anatolian	 Tigers”	 are	 partly	 traditional	 family	 firms,	 which	 accumulated	 sufficient	capital	stock	to	compete	with	Istanbul-based	holdings	and	thus	created	their	elite	status	in	 the	 country	 (Jarosiewicz,	 2013).	 Nevertheless,	 many	 of	 the	 Tigers	 were	 arrested	following	 an	 attempted	 coup	 on	 July	 15th	 2016.	 The	 economic	 boom,	 which	 these	conservative	businessmen	helped	 to	 create	 in	2000,	 is	 already	over;	 exports	 from	 the	region	have	fallen	by	at	least	4%	over	the	past	year	(The	Economist,	2017).	Turkey	 remains	economically	vulnerable	 to	withdraw	 foreign	capital,	due	 to	 its	high	amount	of	external	debts	and	deficits.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	the	Turkish	Central	Bank	is	 there	 to	 raise	 the	 interest	 rates,	 but	 it	 “has	 so	 far	 tightened	 only	 tentatively”	 (The	Economist,	 2017).	 Some	 economists	 argue	 that,	 despite	 the	 central	 bank’s	 statutory	independence,	 it	 is	 too	 early	 to	 contradict	 Turkey’s	 increasingly	 powerful	 president,	Recep	 Tayyip	 Erdogan,	 who	 has	 “fulminated	 against	 the	 ‘interest	 rate	 lobby’	 and	demanded	 lower	 borrowing	 costs”	 (The	 Economist,	 2017).	 Turkey’s	 growing	dependence	 on	 foreign	 investment	 funds	 to	 bolster	 its	 economy	 represent	 a	massive	problem	to	the	regulation	of	its	economic	volatility.	These	funds	are	mostly	short-term	investment	funds	and	play	a	significant	role	in	Turkey’s	economic	expansion	and	finance	its	growing	energy	needs.	Net	foreign	direct	investment	underwrote	just	US$7.3	billion	of	 the	 country's	 US$56.7	 billion	 of	 current	 account	 deficit	 between	 August	 2012	 and	August	 2013.	 Turkey	 suffers	 from	 big	 trade	 deficit	 financed	 by	 hot	 money,	 lots	 of	foreign-currency	debt	and	political	instability,	which	causes	fluctuations	in	the	financial	market	 and	 influences	 “hot	money”	 flows	negatively.	 The	 country’s	 persistent	 current	account	deficit	 (estimated	to	exceed	4%	of	GDP	in	2016)	has	 left	Turkey	with	a	short-term	 external	 debt	 amounting	 to	 over	 US$100	 billion	 at	 the	 end	 of	 November	 2016	(84%	of	which	is	denominated	in	foreign	currencies).	That	is	roughly	equal	to	its	entire	stock	 of	 foreign-currency	 reserves	 (worth	 less	 than	 US$98	 billion	 at	 the	 end	 of	November	(The	Economist,	2017).	The	 high	military	 expenditures	 also	 represent	 a	 huge	 burden	 for	 the	 country’s	economy.	According	to	the	2015	report	of	the	Stockholm	International	Peace	Research,	the	level	of	military	spending	in	Turkey	was	in	15th	place	in	the	world,	at	$22.6	billion	(Global	 Security,	 2016).	 In	 its	 fight	 against	 PKK,	 Turkey	 has	 increased	 its	 military	expenditures	 by	25%	 since	2014	 and	 shifted	 its	 resources	 from	productive	 sectors	 to	
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the	defence	industry.	Furthermore,	ongoing	terrorism	attacks	adversely	affects	specific	industries	of	the	country	such	as	airline	and	tourism	since	Turkey	is	a	tourism	hot	spot	for	many	tourists	(Bilgel,	et	al.,	2013).	These	factors	consequently	impose	a	huge	burden	on	the	country’s	volatile	economy.	Regional	 inequality	 has	 also	 been	 one	 of	 the	 major	 struggles	 of	 the	 Turkish	economy	 (Bilgel,	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 As	 Daron	 Acemoglu,	 Professor	 of	 Economics	 at	 the	Massachusetts	 Institute	 of	 Technology,	 asserts,	 “The	Turkish	economy	has	a	very	broad	
dual	 structure,	 where	 some	 regions	 –	 Istanbul,	 Ankara,	 provincial	 cities	 –	 have	 very	
modern	firms	producing	for	the	middle	class	and	export	sector,	but	where	there	are	also	a	
number	 of	 informal,	 lower-safety,	 lower-wage	 enterprises	 that	 are	 actually	 holding	 the	
economy	 down”	 (Dombey,	 2014).	 In	 the	 west	 of	 Turkey,	 we	 can	 observe	 the	agglomeration	of	high	economic	activity	with	a	better	social	and	economic	environment,	whereas	in	the	east	and	southeast	there	are	clusters	of	relatively	low	levels	of	business	activity	with	a	social	and	economic	environment	well	below	the	Turkish	(as	well	as	the	European)	average	(Bilgel,	et	al.,	2013).	Turkey	 has	 still	 not	 learned	 that	 financing	 current-account	 deficits	 with	 long-term	foreign	direct	investments	are	better	than	relying	on	hot	money.	“The	record	also	suggests	 that	 if	 the	money	 has	 to	 be	 hot,	 it	 is	 better	 that	 it	 takes	 the	 form	 of	 equity,	rather	than	debt.	And	if	it	has	to	be	debt,	better	that	it	is	denominated	in	the	country’s	currency,	not	someone	else’s”	(The	Economist,	2017).	The	2013	–	2014	World	Economic	Forum,	 Global	 Competitiveness	 Report	 ranked	 Turkey	 44th	 (dropping	 one	 position	compared	to	its	ranking	in	2012	–	2013)	(Schwab,	2013).	Due	to	its	rising	fiscal	deficit	and	 inflation	 nearing	 double-digits,	 the	macroeconomic	 environment	 has	 deteriorated	slightly	 (Schwab,	 2013).	 The	 report	 clearly	 states	 that	 Turkey,	 to	 enhance	 its	competitiveness,	must	 focus	on	building	up	 its	human	 resources	 through	much	better	education,	 training	 and	 healthcare,	 increasing	 the	 efficiency	 of	 its	 labour	market	 and	reinforcing	the	effectiveness	and	transparency	of	its	public	institutions	(Schwab,	2013).	The	report	further	demonstrates	that	Turkey	ranks	at	an	average	level	concerning	social	sustainability	and	environmental	sustainability	(Schwab,	2013).	Turkey’s	relatively	high	youth	 unemployment	 rate,	 its	 large	 informal	 sector	 and	 its	 limited	 social	 protection,	generate	 the	 main	 challenges	 for	 its	 social	 sustainability	 dimension	 (Schwab,	 2013).	High	 carbon	 dioxide	 emissions,	 intensive	 and	 inefficient	 water	 use	 for	 agriculture,	limited	 protected	 land	 area	 and	 lack	 of	 commitment	 to	 international	 environmental	agreements	diminish	the	viability	of	long-term	competitiveness	(Schwab,	2013).	
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7.3.	 Energy	Outlook	and	Future	Energy	Perspectives		 With	over	75	million	 inhabitants	 and	GDP	 levels	more	 than	doubling	 to	 $850.7	billion	dollars	in	2017	(World	Bank,	2018)	up	from	$303	billion	dollars	in	2003,	Turkey	is	a	booming	country	in	South-eastern	Europe.	In	less	than	a	decade,	per	capita	income	in	the	country	has	almost	tripled	and	currently	surpasses	$10,592	dollars	(World	Bank,	2018).	According	to	the	‘2015	Annual	Report’	data	of	the	Turkish	Ministry	of	Energy	and	Natural	Resources	(MENR),	Turkey	was	the	3rd	highest	growing	country	after	China	and	India	 by	 the	 second	 quarter	 of	 2015.	 As	 a	 result	 of	 this	 rapid	 economic	 growth,	especially	within	the	last	thirteen	years,	the	rate	of	electricity	demand	has	also	increased	to	5.5%	per	annum.	In	response	to	rising	electricity	demand,	4.3	GW	installed	capacity	licensed	electricity	power	plants	were	engaged	by	the	MENR	in	2015.	Furthermore,	396	unlicensed	power	plants	(362	solar,	nine	wind,	one	hydro	and	24	thermal	power	plant),	with	total	installed	capacity	of	270	MW,	have	joined	the	national	grid	system.	By	dint	of	government	subsidies,	the	share	of	renewable	energy	sources	(mainly	hydropower,	the	wind,	solar	and	geothermal)	has	shown	a	marked	increase	in	total	installed	capacity.	By	the	 end	 of	 2015,	 the	 total	 installed	 capacity	 in	 Turkey	 reached	 73,148	MW	 of	 which	43,2%	 consisted	 of	 renewable	 energy	 (hydropower	 35.4%,	 wind	 6.2%,	 geothermal	0.9%,	biomass,	biogas,	and	others	0.7%).	The	remaining	56.8%	came	from	other	sources	(natural	gas	29.1%,	thermal	plants	20.6%,	multi-fueled	5.9%	and	others	1.2%)	(MENR,	2015).	There	have	been	significant	changes	in	the	distribution	of	primary	energy	supply	to	 resources	 over	 the	 years.	 In	 1971,	 with	 46.5%	 petroleum	 constituting	 the	 biggest	share	in	total	energy	supply,	29%	of	supply	came	from	wood	and	animal-plant	residues	and	23.5%	from	domestic	coal	(lignite,	hard	coal,	and	asphaltite).	 In	2013,	around	240	twh	of	 the	total	electricity	generation	of	Turkey	was	supplied	 from	43.8%	natural	gas,	25.7%	 coal,	 24.8%	 hydropower,	 4.1%	 other	 renewables	 (including	wind,	 geothermal,	waste	 and	 other	 renewable	 power	 plants),	 along	with	 1.6%	 fuel	 oil	 (MENR,	 2015).	 In	2014,	natural	 gas	 (with	32.4%)	had	 the	biggest	 share	 in	 energy	 supply.	The	 shares	of	petroleum	and	petroleum	coke	declined	to	28.5%,	domestic	coal	to	13.5%,	as	well	as	the	wood	 and	 animal-plant	 residues	 to	 2.6%,	while	 the	 share	 of	 imported	 coal	 (hard	 coal	and	 coke)	 increased	 to	 15.6%.	 In	 2015,	 the	 share	 of	 natural	 gas	 in	 total	 electricity	generation	diminished	to	37.8%.	The	share	of	coal	increased	to	28.4%,	hydro	to	25.8%,	wind	to	4.4%,	geothermal	to	1.3%,	oil	(fuel	oil,	diesel,	naphta)	to	1.6%,	biogas	and	others	
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to	0.6%.	Turkey’s	 total	electricity	demand	increased	rapidly	and	reached	264	terawatt	p/hr	in	2015	from	132.6	billion	kilowatt-hours	in	2002	(Figure	23).		
Figure	23.	Total	installed	capacity	of	electricity	generation	in	Turkey	(in	billion	MW)	
	
Data	source:	Own	illustration	based	on	the	data	from	(MENR,	2015).		 In	 the	 last	decade,	Turkey’s	energy	consumption	has	 increased	by	41.1%,	while	the	 energy	 production	 only	 achieved	 a	 27.6%	 increase.	 Thus,	 the	 growth	 in	 energy	generation	 is	 significantly	 behind	 the	 energy	 consumption.	 Accordingly,	 the	 energy	production/consumption	 coverage	 ratio	 declined	 to	 25%	 by	 the	 end	 of	 2014,	 from	27.7%	in	2004.	Domestic	energy	production	did	not	sufficiently	meet	the	consumption	rate.	This	shortfall	was	made	up	by	energy	imports,	the	value	of	which	in	total	supply	is	gradually	 increasing.	 As	 of	 2014,	 while	 domestic	 energy	 sources	 met	 25.1%	 of	 the	energy	 consumption,	 74.9%	 came	 from	 import	 sources.	 Distribution	 of	 net	 energy	imports	to	resources	was	40.1	mtoe	natural	gas,	34	mtoe	oil,	and	19.4	mtoe	coal.	The	MENR	aims	the	full	utilisation	of	hydro	and	domestic	coal	potential	of	Turkey	for	 the	 electricity	 production	 by	 the	 year	 2023.	 Furthermore,	 as	 the	 nuclear	 power	plants	come	into	operation,	the	targeted	production	of	electricity	will	correspond	to	the	electricity	production	from	14.6	bcm	of	natural	gas.	According	to	the	calculations	of	the	Ministry,	 it	 is	 then	 possible	 to	 reduce	 natural	 gas	 imports	 equivalent	 to	 around	 $3.2	billion.	This	decline	in	natural	gas	imports	will	particularly	contribute	to	diminishing	the	country’s	current	account	deficit.	
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MENR	 is	 the	 main	 institution	 responsible	 for	 Turkey’s	 energy	 policy	 and	establishing	energy	strategies.	Within	MENR,	the	General	Directorate	of	Energy	Affairs	is	responsible	for	the	coordination	of	electricity	reforms.	Additionally,	there	are	other	non-ministerial	organisations	responsible	for	various	aspects	of	energy	policy:	- Energy	Market	Regulatory	Authority	 (EPDK):	 Responsible	 for	 the	 Energy	 policy-	and/or	regulations	- Turkish	Atomic	Energy	Authority	(government	entity)	(TAEK):	Responsible	for	the	regulatory	and	supervisory	activities	in	the	nuclear	field.		- TÜBITAK	 Marmara	 Research	 Centre	 (government	 entity):	 Having	 an	 energy	institute,	responsible	for	the	energy	efficiency	issues		- Turkish	 Standards	 Institute	 (TSE),	 International	 Electrotechnical	 Commission	
(IEC):	Responsible	for	the	determination	of	the	energy	standards	- Energy	 Systems	 and	 Environmental	 Research	 Institute	 /	 TÜBITAK	 Marmara	
Research	Centre:	Responsible	for	the	Research	&	Development	- Clean	 Energy	 Foundation,	 Turkish	 Wind	 Energy	 Association,	 International	 Solar	
Energy	 Society-Turkish	 Section,	 Geothermal	 Energy	 Association:	 Responsible	 for	the	renewable	energy	regulations.	Despite	the	existence	of	a	legal	framework	regarding	renewable	energy,	there	is	still	 no	 institution	 and	 no	 legislation	 responsible	 for	 biomass	 production	 and	 the	utilisation	 of	 biogas.	 The	 only	 association	 in	 Turkey	 responsible	 for	 the	 biogas	investments	is	Biyogazder.	This	association	has,	however,	no	political	power	of	sanction.	A	 long-term	strategy	 regarding	 the	 implementation	of	biogas	policy	 and	 technology	 is	essential.	Turkey’s	 energy	 hunger	 gradually	 increases	 each	 year	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	dynamic	 economic	 expansion.	 Dr.	 Fatih	 Birol,	 Chief	 Economist	 of	 the	 International	Energy	Agency	in	Paris,	determined	that	Turkey	needs	at	least	45	GW	additional	power	capacity	 to	 confront	 its	 high	 electricity	 consumption.	 The	 giant	 Atatürk	 Dam	 on	 the	Euphrates	 River	 on	 the	 border	 of	 Adıyaman	 Province	 and	 Şanlıurfa	 Province	 in	 the	South-eastern	Anatolia	Region	of	Turkey	has	a	total	installed	power	capacity	of	2.4	GW	and	 generates	 8.9	 GWh	 electric	 annually.	 The	 biggest	 coal-fired	 power	 plant	 (Afşin-Elbistan-B	thermal	power	plant	in	Kahramanmaraş	Province	in	southern	Turkey)	has	a	total	 installed	power	 capacity	 of	 around	1.4	GW.	 In	order	 to	meet	 its	 energy	demand,	Turkey	 needs	 a	 substantial	 amount	 of	 additional	 installed	 capacity	 in	 the	 form	 of	renewable	power	plants.	The	country	has	diverse	energy	resources.	However,	most	of	
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them	 are	 too	 limited	 in	 quantity	 to	 fulfil	 the	 country’s	 increasing	 energy	 needs.	Therefore,	Turkey	 imports	approximately	72%	of	 its	 total	primary	energy	needs	 from	energy-exporting	countries.	Hydroelectric,	biomass,	thermal,	 lignite	and	small	amounts	of	hard	 coal	provide	 the	main	 indigenous	energy	 resources	of	Turkey.	Turkish	energy	policy	aims	to	give	priority	to	the	development	of	its	lignite	and	coal	deposit	in	order	to	reduce	 its	 dependence	 on	 imported	 hard	 coal,	 natural	 gas	 and	 oil	 resources.	 Around	25%	of	 total	coal	 is	utilised	 for	electricity	production	and	the	rest	 is	used	 for	 industry	and	heating	purposes.	 In	coal-	and	 lignite-fired	power	plants,	a	great	emphasis	will	be	put	 on	 installation	 and	 utilisation	 of	 new	 technologies	 to	 provide	 low	 carbon	 dioxide	emission	and	high	efficiency.	The	principal	objective	of	Turkey	should	be	to	ensure	its	own	energy	security	by	implementing	energy	strategies	compatible	with	the	sustainable	utilisation	of	renewable	energy	resources.	In	its	budget	presentation	for	the	year	2016	to	Plenary	Session	at	the	Grand	National	Assembly	of	Turkey,	Dr.	Berat	Albayrak,	Former	Minister	of	Energy	and	Natural	Resources,	announced	the	main	energy	goals	of	Turkey	as	the	following:	- Diversifying	 energy	 resources,	 supply	 routes	 and	 source	 countries,	 by	 giving	priority	to	domestic	resources.	- Increasing	the	share	of	renewables	and	including	nuclear	in	its	energy	mix.	- Taking	concrete	steps	to	increase	energy	efficiency.	- Contributing	to	Europe’s	energy	security.	This	 is	 nothing	 new.	 Since	 the	 early	 1990s,	 the	 twin	 goals	 of	 Turkey’s	 energy	policy	have	been	to	secure	new	energy	supplies,	and	to	establish	Turkey	as	the	transit	country	 for	 energy	 flows	 from	 the	Caspian	Basin	 to	 the	 consumer	markets	 in	Europe.	There	 are	 several	 challenges	 for	 the	 realisation	 of	 these	 goals,	 including	 the	 ever-changing	interests	of	international	oil	industry	in	the	Caspian	region,	disputes	over	the	legal	status	of	the	Caspian	Sea	and	the	persistent	regional	conflicts	(Hill,	2004	S.	212)	in	the	 Middle	 East	 and	 the	 South-eastern	 part	 of	 Turkey.	 These	 challenges	 have	 forced	Turkey	to	adopt	a	neo-political	approach	to	 increase	 its	energy	transit	role	on	the	one	side	and	diversify	its	energy	suppliers,	sources	and	transport	routes	on	the	other	side.	In	 light	 of	 the	 government’s	 main	 goals,	 the	 MENR	 has	 set	 its	 “Strategic	 plan	2015-19”	for	the	following	purposes	(MENR,	2015):	
1)	 For	ensuring	energy	supply	security:	- Until	2023,	increasing	the	total	installed	capacity	of	electricity	over	110,000	MW	and	the	total	electricity	generation	to	416	billion	kwh.	
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- Until	 2023,	 the	 operation	 of	 two	 nuclear	 power	 plants	 and	 starting	 the	construction	of	the	third	nuclear	power	plant.	- Until	 2023,	 full	 utilisation	 of	 all	 known	 lignite	 and	 hard	 coal	 resources	 for	 the	electricity	generation.	- Until	the	end	of	2019,	increasing	the	electricity	generation	from	domestic	coal	to	60	billion	kwh	per	annum.	- Until	 2020,	 increasing	 the	 coverage	 ratio	 of	 domestic	 and	 foreign	 crude	 oil	production	consumption	to	13.6%.	- Until	2020,	increasing	the	total	natural	gas	storage	capacity	to	5.3	bcm	and	total	capacity	turnback	to	115	mcm	per	day.	- Until	the	end	of	2016,	completing	the	studies	regarding	the	production	potential	and	of	shale	gas,	methane	hydrate	and	rock	oil.	
2)		 For	utilising	various	renewable	energy	resources:	- Until	 2023,	 increasing	 the	 share	 of	 renewable	 energy	 resources	 in	 electricity	production	to	30%.	- By	the	end	of	2019,	raising	the	total	installed	power	capacity	of	renewable	energy	resources	to	46,000	MW.	- Until	 2023,	 increasing	 the	 total	 installed	 capacity	of	 electricity	 generation	 from	hydropower	to	34,000	MW.	- Until	 2023,	 increasing	 the	 total	 installed	 energy	 capacity	 from	wind	 energy	 to	20.000	MW.	- Until	 2023,	 increasing	 the	 total	 installed	 capacity	of	 electricity	 generation	 from	geothermal	energy	and	bio-power	from	solid	biomass	to	1	GW	for	each.	
3)	 For	boosting	energy	efficiency:	- By	 the	 year	 2023,	 achieving	 at	 least	 20%	 reduction	 in	 Turkey’s	 energy	consumption	per	GDP	(energy	intensity)	compared	to	2011	value.	- By	the	end	of	2019,	minimisation	of	the	technical	losses	in	electricity	generation,	generation	and	transmission	and	reduction	of	the	leakage	loss	rate	in	electricity	energy	distribution	to	10%.	- By	 the	 end	 of	 2019,	 completion	 of	 the	 necessary	 maintenance,	 repair,	rehabilitation	 and	 modernisation	 activities	 in	 the	 electricity	 power	 generation	plants	under	public	liability.	- By	the	end	of	2019,	expansion	of	on-site	production	and	meeting	at	 least	1,000	MW	of	total	consumption	from	the	on-site	production.	
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- Developing	 the	 regulatory	 framework	 for	 energy	 efficiency	 and	 increasing	 the	effectiveness	of	incentives.	- Creating	and	improving	public	awareness	of	energy	efficiency	and	saving	energy.	
4)	 For	diversifying	energy	supply	sources	and	routes:	- Until	 2020,	 ensuring	 the	natural	 gas	 import	 dependence	on	 a	 single	 country	 at	most	50%.	- Until	2020,	reduction	of	the	natural	gas-based	electric	energy	production	ration	in	total	production	to	38%.	- Increasing	the	share	of	domestic	and	renewable	energies	in	the	energy	mix.	- Preserving	the	domestic	petroleum	reserves	at	a	safety	level.	
5)	 For	 using	 geostrategic	 position	 effectively,	within	 the	 framework	 of	 regional	
cooperation	 processes,	 to	 transform	Turkey	 into	 an	 energy	 base	 and	 energy	
corridor:	- To	 turn	 Turkey	 into	 an	 energy	 terminal	 by	 carrying	 ‘energy	 exchange’	 and	‘international	market	integration’	projects	into	effect.	- By	the	end	of	2019,	redoubling	international	interconnection	capacity.	- Pursuing	other	pipeline	projects	and	continuation	to	position	itself	as	a	regional	energy	transit	hub.	- With	the	purpose	of	making	Turkey	an	energy	corridor,	starting	the	construction	of	at	 least	three	international	projects	and	the	completion	of	at	 least	one	by	the	end	of	2019.	- Transforming	 ‘Ceyhan	Region’	 into	an	 integrated	energy	 centre	where	 refinery,	petrochemical	 facilities	 and	 liquefied	 natural	 gas	 (LNG)	 export	 terminals	 are	located	and	where	different	quality	and	specification	of	crude	oil	can	be	offered	to	international	markets.	
6)	 For	minimising	 adverse	 impacts	 of	 the	 activities	 in	 the	 fields	 of	 energy	 and	
natural	resources	on	the	environment:	- Operating	power	generation	plants	compatible	with	the	environment.	- Conducting	 environmental	 inspections	 to	 the	 mining	 enterprises	 operating	 in	mining	areas.	
7)	 For	enhancing	the	investment	climate:	- Associated	with	the	establishment	of	‘Energy	Exchange	Istanbul	(EXIST)’	in	2015,	the	intraday	market	in	the	electricity	market	gained	functionality	and	the	energy	markets	have	become	more	efficient,	transparent	and	reliable.	
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- To	complete	the	infrastructure	works	in	natural	gas	balancing	and	functionality	of	day-ahead	markets.	- By	 the	 end	 of	 2015,	 implementation	 of	 governance	 and	 process	 structure	 to	facilitate	energy	and	natural	resource	investments.	
8)	 For	 promoting	 the	 effective	 management	 of	 natural	 resources	 and	 their	
contribution	to	the	economy:	- By	the	end	of	2016,	establishing	an	effective	supervision	and	inspection	practice	for	safe	and	efficient	mining	held	to	international	standards.	- Within	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 ‘E-government	 Project’,	 the	 execution	 of	 all	 mining	operations	on	a	digital	platform.	- Increasing	drilling	operations	for	the	mining	carried	out	by	public	establishments	to	a	total	of	200,000	meters	by	the	end	of	the	year	2019.	- Preparation	 of	 the	 national	 strategy	 document	 for	 raw	materials	 by	 the	 end	 of	2015	(still	in	process)	and.	- Increasing	production	and	export	of	processed	goods.	By	 the	 year	 2023,	 Turkey’s	 total	 electricity	 consumption	 is	 estimated	 to	 be	530,000	 GWh.	 To	 meet	 this	 high	 level	 of	 consumption,	 the	 country	 is	 planning	 to	establish	an	electric	power	generation	capacity	of	100,000	MW.	According	to	this	plan,	30%	 of	 production	will	 come	 from	 natural	 gas,	 35%	 from	 coal,	 30%	 from	 renewable	energies	and	ultimately	5%	from	the	nuclear	power.	In	order	to	meet	 its	 increasing	energy	demand	and	be	able	to	supply	affordable	energy	to	its	citizens,	Turkey	needs	large-scale	investments	in	natural	gas	and	electricity	infrastructure,	 especially	 in	 generation	 and	 transportation.	 The	 energy-intensive	manufacturing	 industries	 of	 Turkey	 will	 demand	 competitive	 energy	 supplies.	 The	industrial	sector	requires	the	most	electricity,	which	is	provided	from	various	imported	and	domestic	 sources,	 such	 as	 natural	 gas,	 petroleum	and	domestic	 coal.	 The	Turkish	electricity	 grid	 already	 faces	 challenges	 from	 the	 country’s	 rapid	 economic	 growth,	 as	the	main	centres	of	consumption,	such	as	Istanbul,	Ankara,	Izmir	and	the	main	centres	of	industry,	 such	 as	 Izmit,	 are	 located	 far	 away	 from	 the	 resources,	 like	 coal	mines	 and	hydroelectricity	generation	areas.	
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7.4.	 The	Legal	Framework	of	Turkey’s	Electricity	Market		 The	liberalisation	and	privatisation	activities	in	the	Turkish	energy	market	began	after	the	1980s	and	resulted	in	the	enactment	of	the	Electricity	Market	Law	No.	4628	of	2001.	 Since	 then,	 the	 share	 of	 state-owned	 enterprises	 in	 the	 energy	 sector	 has	gradually	 diminished	 (EPDK,	 2012).	 Through	 these	 revolutionary	 efforts,	 the	obstructions	 against	 competition	 and	 private	 participation	 in	 electricity,	 natural	 gas,	petroleum	 and	 LPG	 markets	 have	 been	 removed	 (EPDK,	 2012).	 As	 a	 result	 of	 the	reorganisation	 of	 state	 structure	 in	 the	 energy	 field,	 EPDK	 (Enerji	Piyasasi	Düzenleme	
Kurumu)	was	established	in	2001	through	the	enactment	of	the	Electricity	Market	Law.	One	of	 the	 fundamental	 tasks	of	 the	EPDK	is	 to	ensure	the	development	of	 financially-sound	and	transparent	energy	markets	and	to	deliver	sufficient,	good	quality,	 low-cost	and	environmentally	friendly	energy	to	consumers	(EPDK,	2012).	Until	 very	 recently,	 there	 had	 been	 quite	 limited	 competition	 in	 the	 Turkish	electricity	 sector,	 due	 to	 the	 monopoly	 of	 a	 single,	 state-owned,	 vertically	 integrated	company:	the	Turkish	Electricity	Authority.	This	authority,	founded	by	the	Law	No.	1312	in	 1970,	 was	 responsible	 for	 rendering	 of	 generation,	 transmission,	 distribution	 and	trade	 of	 electricity	 services	 required,	 as	 defined	 in	 the	 comprehensive	 energy	 and	economy	policies	of	Turkey.	The	initial	degradation	of	the	sector	occurred	in	1994	as	the	division	of	the	Turkish	Electricity	Authority	into	two	state-owned	companies	took	place;	Turkish	Electricity	Generation	Transmission	Company	(TEAS),	which	is	responsible	for	generation	 and	 transmission	 activities	 and	 Turkish	 Electricity	 Distribution	 Company	(TEDAS),	 which	 is	 responsible	 for	 distribution	 and	 retail	 sale	 activities.	 Under	 the	enactment	of	the	Electricity	Market	Law,	during	the	restructuring	process	of	the	Turkish	Electricity	 Generation	 Transmission	 Company	 (TEAS),	 three	 separate	 state-owned	economic	 enterprises,	 which	 were	 joint-stock	 companies,	 were	 formed.	 These	companies	 are:	 1)	 Turkish	 Electricity	 Transmission	 Company	 (TEIAS),	 which	 is	responsible	for	operating	the	national	grid,	2)	Turkish	Electricity	Generation	Company	(EÜAS),	which	is	in	charge	of	the	operation	of	the	state-owned	hydro	and	thermal	power	plants	and	3)	Turkish	Electricity	Contracting	and	Trading	Company	 (TETAS),	which	 is	responsible	 for	 purchasing	 the	 electricity	 from	 the	 producers	 and	 the	 sale	 of	 this	electricity	to	the	distribution	companies.	Following	 a	 trial	 period	 that	 started	 in	 September	 2010,	 TEIAS,	 as	 Turkey's	transmission	system	operator,	signed	a	long-term	agreement	in	January	2016	becoming	
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the	 first	 observer	 member	 with	 the	 ‘European	 Network	 of	 Transmission	 System	Operators	 for	 Electricity	 (ENTSO-E)'	 to	 establish	 a	 permanent	 connection	 to	 the	continental	 European	 grid.	 By	 joining	 the	 European	 grid	 system	 and	 through	interconnection	 with	 Greece	 and	 Bulgaria,	 Turkey	 plans	 to	 increase	 its	 net	 import	capacity	 from	550	MW	 to	650	MW	and	export	 capacity	 in	 reverse	direction	 from	400	MW	 to	 500	 MW.	 Two-thirds	 of	 the	 capacity	 is	 distributed	 to	 the	 Bulgarian-Turkish	border	and	a	third	in	the	direction	of	Greece.	Full	ENTSO-E	membership	would	require	Turkey	 to	 implement	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	 EU's	 third	 energy	 package	 such	 as	 those	related	 to	 transparency,	 congestion	 management	 and	 market	 transactions	 (Sabadus,	2015).	The	Regional	Group	of	ENTSO-E	Europe	has	decided	that	the	monitoring	period	for	 Turkey	 will	 remain	 until	 the	 current	 problems,	 such	 as	 the	 sudden	 voltage	fluctuations	in	the	grid	system	caused	by	the	South-eastern	Anatolian	Region	irrigation,	are	prevented.	In	Turkey,	all	Turkish	distribution	grid	companies	were	privatised	in	2013.	Since	2011,	 Turkey	 has	 been	 in	 the	 process	 of	 establishing	 competitive	 electricity	 and	 gas	markets,	 based	 on	 similar	 principles	 as	 the	 EU	 internal	 energy	 market.	 The	 country	primarily	seeks	to	diversify	its	electricity	generation	capacity	in	two	ways;	through	the	development	of	 its	 significant	renewable	energy	potential	and	by	preparing	 to	 include	nuclear	 power	 in	 the	 total	 energy	mix.	 The	 liberalisation	 steps	 yielded	 the	 result	 that	half	of	the	electricity	produced	in	Turkey	is	now	privately	operated	(EPDK,	2012).	The	reform	of	Turkey’s	electricity	market	increased	with	the	adoption	of	the	New	
Electricity	 Market	 Law	 No.	 6446	 in	 2013.	 This	 new	 law	 regulated	 the	 rights	 and	obligations	 of	 all	 participants	 in	 electricity	 generation,	 transmission,	 distribution,	wholesale	 and	 retail	 sale,	 import,	 export	 and	market	 operation	 activities	 (IEA,	 2016).	The	law	increased	the	maximum	capacity	threshold	for	the	authorisation	of	renewable	energy	 plants	 without	 a	 license	 (from	 0.5	 MW	 to	 1	 MW),	 in	 order	 to	 encourage	distributed	 generation.	 Moreover,	 the	 law	 introduced	 the	 preliminary	 licensing	mechanism,	where	a	generation	company	can	receive	a	preliminary	license,	effective	for	maximum	24	months,	allowing	it	to	proceed	with	the	investment	before	the	finalisation	of	the	environmental	and	regulatory	permits	(IEA,	2016).			
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7.5.	 Turkey’s	Climate	Strategy	and	Commitments			 One	of	the	most	important	steps	to	fight	against	global	warming	caused	by	human	activities	was	 taken	with	 the	conclusion	of	 the	United	Nations	Framework	Convention	on	 Climate	 Change	 (UNFCCC).	 This	 was	 opened	 for	 signature	 at	 the	 United	 Nations	Environment	and	Development	Conference	 in	1992,	 in	Rio	de	 Janeiro.	The	 convention	came	into	force	on	March	21st	1994.	More	than	190	countries	including	Turkey	and	the	European	 Communities	 are	 party	 to	 the	 Convention	 (MFA,	 2012).	 These	 parties	 are	obliged	 to	 reduce	 gas	 emissions,	 cooperate	 on	 research	 and	 technology	 and	 to	encourage	the	protection	of	sinks	 in	respect	 to	 their	development	priorities,	goals	and	special	circumstances	(MFA,	2012).	As	the	greenhouse	gas	emission	levels	continued	to	rise	around	the	world,	it	was	clear	that	only	a	binding	commitment	by	developed	countries	could	send	a	message	to	convince	 businesses,	 communities	 and	 individuals	 to	 act	 on	 climate	 change	 and	 to	reduce	 emissions.	 Therefore,	 the	 member	 countries	 started	 negotiations	 to	 create	 an	international	 agreement	 which	 would	 be	 linked	 to	 the	 UNFCCC	 Treaty,	 but	 would	effectively	 stand	 on	 its	 own	 (MFA,	 2012).	 After	 one	 and	 a	 half	 years	 of	 intense	negotiations,	 on	December	11th	 1997	 the	Kyoto	Protocol	was	 adopted	 in	Kyoto,	 Japan	and	 entered	 into	 force	 after	 the	Russian	 Federation's	 accession	 in	 2005.	 The	Protocol	required	developed	countries	 to	reduce	their	greenhouse	gas	emissions	below	defined	levels	which	were	individually	specified	for	each	country,	within	the	treaty	(MFA,	2012).	The	 UNFCCC	 categorises	 the	 countries	 in	 line	 with	 the	 fundamental	 principle,	"common	 but	 differentiated	 responsibilities",	 which	 refers	 to	 the	 country's	 national	mitigation,	 adaptation,	 technology,	 finance	 and	 capacity	 building	 policies	 (CYGMEN,	2010).	 Regarding	 these	 principles,	 the	 Convention	 divided	 the	 parties	 into	 three	categories:	Annex	I	countries,	Annex	II	countries,	and	countries	that	were	not	 listed	 in	either	 of	 the	 annexes	 (the	 so-called	 “non-Annex	 I”	 countries).	 Annex	 I	 includes	industrialised	 countries	 as	 well	 as	 many	 states	 of	 the	 former	 Soviet	 Union	 (the	Economies	in	Transition,	or	EIT).	Annex	II	is	a	further	subset	of	Annex	I;	it	includes	only	countries	 that	were	members	 of	 the	 OECD	 at	 that	 time.	 Thus,	 non-Annex	 I	 countries,	which	are	the	large	majority,	mostly	correspond	to	developing	countries	(Climate	Policy	Observer,	 2017).	 Annex	 I	 countries	 are	 obliged	 to	 ‘adopt	 national	 policies	 and	 take	corresponding	measures	on	the	mitigation	of	climate	change’	(Climate	Policy	Observer,	2017).	 Annex	 II	 countries	 ‘shall	 provide	 new	 and	 additional	 financial	 resources’,	
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including	for	the	transfer	of	technology,	to	support	developing	countries	in	their	climate	mitigation	 and	 adaptation	 efforts	 (Climate	 Policy	 Observer,	 2017).	 In	 contrast,	 non-Annex	I	countries	only	have	to	communicate	national	inventories	of	GHG	emissions	and	removals	 and	 to	 “formulate,	 implement,	 publish	 and	 regularly	 update	 national	 […]	programmes	containing	measures	to	mitigate	climate	change”	(Climate	Policy	Observer,	2017).	Turkey	 is	 perceived	 as	 a	 developed	 OECD	 member	 country.	 Therefore,	 the	country	was	listed	both	in	Annex-I	and	II	when	the	Convention	was	signed	(MFA,	2012).	Turkey	 rejected	 this	 position	 to	 become	 a	 party	 to	 the	 Convention	 and	 started	diplomatic	efforts	 to	change	 this	position.	Later,	 in	2011,	 the	7th	Conference	of	Parties	has	 adopted	a	decision	 to	 “...delete	Turkey’s	name	from	the	Annex	II	and	to	place	Turkey	
among	the	Annex	I	countries,	taking	into	account	its	special	circumstances,	differentiating	
it	from	other	Annex	I	countries..."	(MFA,	2012).	After	this	decision	was	entered	into	force	on	June	28th	2002,	Turkey	could	adhere	to	Convention	on	May	24th	2004.	On	February	5th	2009,	Turkey	ratified	an	agreement	to	sign	the	Kyoto	Protocol,	after	intense	pressure	from	 both	 the	 EU	 and	 international	 environmental	 organisations.	 Given	 the	 fact	 that	Kyoto	Protocol	entered	into	force	in	2005	and	was	signed	by	more	than	170	countries,	Turkey	was	already	 late	 in	participating	 in	 the	United	Nations	Framework	Convention	on	Climate	Change	and	in	ratifying	Kyoto	Protocol	(Hürriyet	Daily	News,	2008).	Referencing	 historically	 low	 greenhouse	 gas	 emissions,	 Turkey	 refused	 any	commitment	 to	 the	 reduction	 of	 greenhouse	 gas	 emissions	 based	 on	 any	 particular	reference	year.	The	main	reason	for	this	rejection	was	that	Turkey	viewed	these	kinds	of	commitments	as	a	threat	to	further	economic	expansion.	The	energy	model	of	Turkey	is	unsustainable.	Referencing	economic	growth	as	the	only	indicator	of	progress	does	not	only	 significantly	 decrease	 quality	 of	 life,	 but	 also	 disrupts	 the	 ability	 to	 reach	 food,	decreases	 fresh	 air,	 increases	 water	 pollution	 and	 disturbs	 the	 relationship	 with	 the	planet	Earth,	which	 is	 already	disrupted.	 Furthermore,	 the	unsustainable	 and	growth-oriented	 energy	 policy	 of	 Turkey	 adds	 to	 its	 current	 account	 deficit	 and	 increases	 its	energy	dependency	as	a	result	of	high	amounts	of	 fossil	 fuel	 imports.	Notwithstanding	this,	Turkey	aims	to	increase	the	share	of	renewable	energy	sources	to	90%	of	the	total	electricity	 production	 by	 2050.	 The	 new	 renewables	 will	 come	 mainly	 from	 wind,	geothermal	 and	 solar	 PV,	 and	 contribute	 68%	 of	 the	 total	 electricity	 generation	(Greenpeace	International,	2015).	The	country	seeks	to	increase	the	share	of	renewable	electricity	generation	to	47%	by	2023	and	65%	by	2030.	According	to	country’s	targets,	
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the	 installed	 capacity	 of	 renewables	will	 reach	 85	 GW	 in	 2030	 and	 156	 GW	 by	 2050	(Greenpeace	 International,	 2015).	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 Turkey	 plans	 to	 limit	 its	 future	greenhouse	gas	emissions	through	measures	which	will	not	compromise	its	sustainable	development	 and	 poverty	 reduction	 priorities.	 Henceforth,	 the	 country	will	 carry	 out	mitigation	 activities	 in	 a	measurable,	 reportable	 and	 verifiable	manner,	 in	 agreement	with	its	national	programs	and	strategies.	Since	the	industrial	revolution,	Turkey	has	been	responsible	for	only	0.7%	of	the	global	emissions.	Turkey’s	greenhouse	gas	emissions	per	capita	are	much	lower	than	the	EU	 and	 OECD	 average.	 In	 spite	 of	 this,	 the	 impacts	 of	 climate	 change	 are	 already	discernible,	especially	in	the	Mediterranean	region	along	the	southern	coast	of	Turkey.	Such	 notable	 attributes	 include	 alterations	 in	 climate	 parameters,	 increases	 in	temperature	and	decreases	in	precipitation	and	water	exiguity	(Kum,	et	al.,	2014	S.	600-608).	 The	 International	 Panel	 on	 Climate	 Change	 reported	 that	 the	 frequency	 and	intensity	of	drought	is	expected	to	increase	in	the	Mediterranean	region	(Stocker,	et	al.,	2013).	Like	the	wider	Mediterranean	and	Middle	East	countries,	Turkey	will	experience	mainly	decreases	in	precipitation.	Decreases	of	over	20%	are	expected	in	the	Southern	region	of	the	country,	whereas	smaller	changes	between	0%	and	10%	are	projected	for	the	North.	These	projections	show	that	the	average	temperature	increase	in	Turkey	will	be	around	2.5-3°C	 in	 the	North,	3-3.5°C	 in	 the	Central	and	South-western	regions,	and	3.5°C-4°C	 in	 the	East	 (Gosling,	 et	 al.,	 2011).	 The	 average	 annual	 temperature	 increase	between	 the	years	2011	and	2040	 is	expected	 to	vary	between	0.5°C	and	1°C	(Energy	Charter	 Secretariat,	 2014).	 The	 scientific	 research	 shows	 that	 the	 countries	 located	 in	the	Mediterranean	basin	will	be	substantially	affected	by	climate	change	(MFA,	2012).	The	amount	of	rainfall	is	expected	to	decrease	(mainly	in	the	Mediterranean	and	South-east	Anatolian	regions)	and	increase	in	the	Black	Sea	area.	Climate	change	in	Turkey	has	negative	impacts	on	water	and	soil	resources	and	consequently	on	rural	development.	These	are	vital	for	food	production	and	food	safety.	The	 first	 signs	of	global	warming	were	 the	weakening	water	resources,	desertification	due	to	the	reduction	in	rainfall	and	ecologic	degradation.	In	this	regard,	the	Konya	Basin,	the	biggest	basin	of	the	country	and	having	the	most	fertile	lands,	is	facing	the	threat	of	complete	desertification	by	2030,	in	the	case	that	necessary	preventative	measures	are	not	taken.	Furthermore,	Gediz	and	the	Greater	Menderes	Basin	in	the	Aegean	coastline,	are	expected	to	experience	a	50%	reduction	in	surface	water	by	the	end	of	21st	Century	(MFA,	2012).	The	majority	of	global	and	regional-scale	studies	predict	declines	in	maize	
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yields,	which	 is	one	of	Turkey’s	major	 crops.	Considering	 land-based	 food	production,	Turkey	 is	 not	 projected	 to	 face	 severe	 food	 insecurity	 over	 the	 next	 40	 years.	 The	undernourishment	levels	in	Turkey	are	very	low	and	the	majority	of	global-scale	studies	forecast	a	positive	outlook	for	the	impact	of	climate	change	on	food	security	within	the	country	(Gosling,	et	al.,	2011).	In	 the	 Fourth	 Assessment	 Report	 of	 the	 Intergovernmental	 Panel	 on	 Climate	Change,	for	the	2011-2040	period,	it	is	declared	that	for	Turkey,	the	average	increase	in	temperature	is	estimated	to	be	around	2.5°C,	reaching	up	to	5°C	in	inner	regions	and	up	to	4°C	in	the	Aegean	and	Eastern	Anatolia	areas.	The	surface	temperature	is	projected	to	increase	 all	 over	 Turkey	 by	 around	 0.5°C	 in	 winter	 and	 1.0°C	 in	 summer	 (CYGMEN,	2012).	 During	 the	 second	 period	 (2041-2070)	 the	 amount	 of	 growth	 in	 surface	temperature	will	be	around	1.5°C	in	winter	and	2.4°C	in	summer	(CYGMEN,	2012).	Despite	 all	 projections	 regarding	 possible	 climate	 change	 impacts,	 Turkey’s	approach	 to	 international	 negotiations	 and	 national	 climate	 change	 actions	 are	incompatible	 both	 to	 Turkey’s	 vulnerability	 and	 its	 rising	 greenhouse	 gas	 emissions.	Based	on	the	Turkish	Statistical	Institute’s	data,	Turkey's	total	greenhouse	gas	emissions	reached	475	million	tonnes	of	CO2	in	2015,	from	214	million	tonnes	of	CO2	in	1990.	The	country’s	 greenhouse	 gas	 emissions	 have	 increased	 more	 than	 120%	 since	 1990	(TurkStat,	 2016).	 Although	 Turkey	 is	 not	 historically	 or	 currently	 among	 the	 top	polluters,	 it	 is	 ranked	 19th	 in	 total	 greenhouse	 gas	 emissions	 and	 81st	 in	 per	 capita	emissions	(Sahin,	2016)	(Figure	24).	
Figure	24.	Turkey’s	greenhouse	gas	emissions	in	total	and	by	sectors	(in	mtoe)	
 
Data	source:	Own	illustration	based	on	the	data	from	(TurkStat,	2016).	
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	 Economic	growth	and	rapid	increase	in	population	have	been	the	main	drivers	in	the	 increase	 of	 carbon	 dioxide	 emissions	 between	 1971	 and	 2010.	 The	 energy	production	sector	is	responsible	for	the	majority	of	Turkey’s	gas	emissions:	71%	of	total	greenhouse	 gas	 emissions	 and	 83%	of	 carbon	dioxide	 emissions	 are	 attributed	 to	 the	energy	 sector	 (TurkStat,	 2016).	 Moreover,	 the	 electricity,	 manufacturing	 and	transportation	 sectors	 are	 counted	 among	 the	 top	 contributors	 to	 energy-related	emissions	 in	 Turkey.	 The	 statistical	 data	 shows	 that	 there	 is	 a	 constant	 connection	between	economic	growth	and	carbon	dioxide	emissions	 in	Turkey	(Sahin,	2016).	The	leading	 motive	 of	 this	 constant	 increase	 in	 emissions	 is	 the	 continuous	 fossil	 fuel	dependency	of	the	Turkish	economy.	Turkey's	GDP	per	unit	of	energy	use	ranged	between	$10.9	and	$12.0	from	1990	to	2013,	while	OECD's	varied	between	$6.4	and	$8.8	constant	2011	purchasing	power	parity	 (PPP)	 per	 kilogram	 of	 oil	 equivalent	 for	 the	 same	 period	 (IEA,	 2015).	 The	country's	use	of	energy	 intensity	 is	much	above	the	OECD	average.	Energy	 intensity	 is	measured	 by	 the	 quantity	 of	 energy	 required	 per	 unit	 output	 or	 activity.	 In	 this	 way	using	less	energy	to	produce	a	product	reduces	the	intensity	(U.S.	Department	of	Energy	-	 Energy	 Efficiency	 and	 Renewable	 Energy	 2012).	 The	 energy	 intensity	 is	 the	 total	energy	consumption	divided	by	GDP.	High	energy	intensity	indicates	a	high	price	or	cost	of	 converting	 energy	 into	 GDP	 (Akal	 2016).	 Turkey	 can	 reduce	 its	 energy	 intensity	through	 the	 adoption	 of	 energy-efficient	 technologies	 and	 by	 promoting	 spheres	 of	production	which	are	less	energy-intensive.	Therefore,	the	country	needs	to	focus	on	the	demand	side	(energy	efficiency)	substantially	and	 less	on	the	supply	side	 in	 its	energy	security	policies.	In	the	short-run,	shifting	emphasis	to	less	energy	intensive	sectors	can	be	perceived	as	domestically	unfavourable,	but	in	the	long-run,	it	will	accelerate	Turkey	to	become	an	advanced	economy.	Both	technological	advances	and	higher	world	energy	prices	contribute	to	energy	use	efficiency	while	lowering	energy	intensity.	Furthermore,	higher	GDP	per	 capita	 improves	 energy	 efficiency	 via	 increasing	purchases	 of	 energy-saving	equipment.	In	 the	 early	 years,	 Turkey	 perceived	 its	 involvement	 in	 international	 climate	policies	 as	 a	 part	 of	 international	 environmental	 politics.	 In	 this	 regard,	 the	 State	 of	Meteorological	 Institute	 was	 the	 assigned	 institution	 to	 follow	 the	 negotiations.	 The	major	 target	 of	 the	 Institute	was	 to	 extricate	 Turkey	 from	 the	 annexes	 (Sahin,	 2016).	Only	after	its	exclusion	from	Annex	II	in	2001,	Turkey	started	to	establish	the	"National	
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Climate	Change	 Strategy",	 to	 contribute	 to	 global	 efforts	 to	 reduce	 adverse	 impacts	 of	climate	change	(while	still	considering	its	particular	circumstances	and	capacity).	For	a	long	 time,	 the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	has	been	 the	head	of	 the	Turkish	delegation	during	 the	 negotiations	 (Sahin,	 2016).	 The	Ministry	 of	 Environment	 and	Urbanisation	only	 began	 leading	 the	 negotiations	 after	 2014,	 but	 the	 influence	 of	 MFA	 on	 the	negotiations	 is	 still	 present.	 The	 impact	 of	 the	 economic	 bureaucracy	 on	 Turkey’s	climate	 policies	 is	 a	 significant	 element	 in	 Turkey’s	 institutional	 background.	 The	Ministry	 of	 Development	 and	 the	 MENR	 have	 been	 the	 representatives	 of	 Turkey’s	defensive	 position	 on	 climate	 policies	 (Şahin	 2016).	 Therefore,	 energy	 security	 issues	and	conventional	development	policies	took	priority	over	sustainable,	environmentally	friendly	 and	 low-carbon	 development	 in	 the	 policy	 strategies	 of	 these	 two	ministries.	Until	the	2009	Copenhagen	Climate	Conference,	the	conventional	policy	of	the	Ministry	of	Development	sided	with	the	implementation	of	environmental	policies	as	long	as	they	did	 not	 harm	 economic	 development	 (Şahin	 2016).	 Although	 the	 importance	 of	sustainable	 environmental	 policies	 was	 mentioned	 in	 the	 development	 goals	 of	 the	Turkish	 Ministry	 of	 Development,	 the	 integration	 of	 these	 policies	 to	 economic	 and	social	 policies	 have	not	 been	optimised.	MENR’s	 policy	 approach	 aims	 to	 increase	 the	utilisation	 of	 renewable	 sources,	 but	 still	 promotes	 coal	 to	 become	 major	 national	source	in	its	energy	policy.	Turkey’s	"National	Climate	Change	Strategy"	program	includes	a	set	of	objectives	to	be	implemented	in	the	short-term	(undertaken	or	completed	within	one	year),	mid-term	(within	1	to	3	years)	and	long-term	(over	a	ten-year	period).	The	short-term	strategies	are	(CYGMEN,	2010);	
Ø the	maximum	utilisation	of	 all	 domestic	 resources,	 primarily	hydro	and	wind	with	cleaner	production	technologies	and	best	available	techniques,	
Ø installation	of	renewable	energy	systems	at	new	buildings,	
Ø installation	 of	 solar	 power	 collectors	 for	 central	 heating	 and	 sanitary	 hot	water	 at	new	hospitals,	hotels,	dormitories,	sport	centres	and	other	non-residential	buildings	used	for	accommodation	purposes.			 The	midterm	strategies	are	(CYGMEN,	2010);	
Ø the	 evaluation	 of	 energy	 efficiency	 potential	 in	 the	 construction	 sector	 and	identification	of	energy	efficient	construction	and	material	technologies,	
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Ø utilisation	 of	 low	 and	 zero	 greenhouse	 gas	 emission	 technologies,	 primarily	renewable	energy,	nuclear	power	and	clean	coal	technologies,		
Ø rehabilitation	 of	 existing	 thermal	 plants	 and	 more	 efficient	 operation	 of	hydroelectric	power	plants.		 The	long-term	strategies	are	(CYGMEN,	2010);	
Ø increasing	the	share	of	renewables	in	total	electricity	generation	up	to	30%	by	2023.	Within	 this	 framework,	 full	utilisation	of	economic	and	hydro	potential	 is	 targeted.	Wind	 power	 generation	 capacity	 will	 be	 raised	 to	 20.000	 MW,	 and	 geothermal	electricity	 generation	 capacity	will	 be	 increased	 to	 600	MW.	Electricity	 generation	from	solar	PV	will	be	promoted.		
Ø Reducing	energy	intensity	by	2020	with	respect	to	2004	levels,		
Ø decreasing	greenhouse	gas	emissions	from	electricity	generation	to	be	7%	less	than	the	Reference	Scenario	2020.	Turkey	 enhanced	 its	 institutional	 capacity	 (especially	 after	 2004)	 with	 the	support	 of	 international	 organisations	 such	 as	 the	 United	 Nations	 Development	Program,	 the	 Regional	 Environmental	 Centre	 for	 Central	 and	 Eastern	 Europe	 (REC)-Turkey	 and	 the	 EU	 (Sahin,	 2016).	 Nevertheless,	 a	 lack	 of	 transparency	 (like	 non-transparent	 economic	 projections),	 participation	 and	 deliberation,	 still	 constitute	 the	characteristics	of	the	climate	policy	field	of	Turkey	(Sahin,	2016).	For	example,	Turkey	submitted	 its	 “Intended	National	Determined	Contribution”	 in	September	2015,	which	includes	a	greenhouse	gas	 reduction	decrease	of	up	 to	21%	 from	business-as-usual	 in	2030.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 report	 did	 not	 include	 Turkey’s	 greenhouse	 gas	 emission	projects	 and	 an	 emissions	 peak	 date,	which	 essentially	 represent	 the	most	 important	chapter	 of	 the	 report.	 One	 of	 the	 primary	 reasons	 of	 this	 secrecy	 is	 the	 insufficient	research-based	 policy	making	 in	 the	 climate	 change	 policy	 field	 rather	 than	 a	 lack	 of	scientific	 expertise	or	 technology	 (Sahin,	2016).	Other	 reasons	 could	be	 that	 the	2023	energy	 vision	 of	 Turkey	 to	 quadruple	 its	 coal-fired	 energy	 generation	 capacity.	According	 to	 this	 aim,	 Turkey’s	 gas	 emissions	 could	 peak	 any	 time	 before	 2030.	 This	approach	 could	 also	 be	 attributed	 to	 the	 unwillingness	 of	 the	 Turkish	 government	 to	adopt	sound	mitigation	policy	(Sahin,	2016)	due	to	the	fears	of	scant	economic	growth.	Turkey	will	be	confronted	with	air	and	water	pollution	as	long	as	the	proportion	of	 fossil	 energy	 sources	 in	 total	 energy	 consumption	 increases.	 Based	 on	 the	 World	Health	 Organisation's	 2012	 report,	 which	 includes	 data	 from	 the	 year	 2011	 on	 air	
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pollution	 in	 cities	 around	 the	 world,	 seven	 provinces	 of	 Turkey	 are	 in	 the	 first	 fifty	polluted	cities	 in	global	 terms	 (Gürbüz,	2014).	To	ensure	cleaner	air	and	water	 for	 its	environment	 and	 also	 for	 its	 citizens,	 Turkey	 needs	 to	 avoid	 fossil	 fuels	 and	 head	towards	 the	 utilisation	 of	 renewable	 energy	 resources	 like	 hydropower,	 wind,	 solar	photovoltaic	and	biomass,	in	which	the	country	shows	maximum	potential.	As	 it	 is	 indicated	 in	 Article	 2,	 the	 long-term	 goal	 of	 the	 Paris	 Agreement	 is	 “to	achieve	a	balance	between	anthropogenic	emissions	by	sources	and	removals	by	sinks	of	greenhouse	gases	in	the	second	half	of	this	century”	(UNFCCC	2015b).	The	era	of	the	Paris	agreement	is	a	great	opportunity	for	Turkey	to	emancipate	itself	from	its	path	of	energy	 dependency.	 Through	 this,	 the	 country	 may	 observe	 the	 co-benefits	 of	 low	carbon	 development	 policies,	 such	 as	 improving	 air	 quality,	 embracing	 new	 energy	efficient	technologies	and	enhancing	welfare	benefits	(Sahin,	2016).	On	the	one	hand	the	country	 is	 increasing	 the	 share	 of	 renewable	 sources	 in	 its	 total	 installed	 capacity	gradually	 each	 year.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 still	 has	 ambitious	 coal-friendly	 energy	policies,	 which	 are	 jeopardising	 its	 climate	 policy	 commitments.	 If	 Turkey	 wishes	 to	achieve	the	use	full	potential	of	renewable	energy	sources	and	speed	up	the	deployment	in	support	of	climate	goals	by	2030,	the	next	phase	of	renewable	energy	growth	requires	the	adoption	of	regulatory	and	administrative	changes	(IEA,	2016).	
8.	CONCLUSIONS	AND	POLICY	RECOMMENDATIONS		 This	 thesis	 aimed	 to	 analyse	 the	 contribution,	 role	 and	 potential	 of	 renewable	energy	 sources	 in	 the	 pursuit	 of	 Turkey’s	 energy	 independence,	which	would	 in	 turn,	increase	the	country’s	energy	security.	Furthermore,	 the	thesis	elucidated	the	fact	that	Turkey	 has	 sufficient	 amounts	 of	 renewable	 energy	 resources	 to	 achieve	 a	 gradual	independence	 from	 external	 fossil	 energy	 imports.	 Turkey,	 with	 its	 geographical	position	 in	 the	middle	 of	 energy-scarce	 (consumer)	 and	 energy-rich	 (producer)	 Asian	and	 European	 countries,	 plays	 a	 significant	 and	 emerging	 role	 as	 an	 energy	 hub.	 The	country	itself	is	deficient	in	domestic	conventional	energy	sources	(except	charcoal)	and	is	highly	dependent	on	fossil	fuel	imports,	particularly	natural	gas	and	oil.	In	geopolitical	and	 geostrategic	 terms,	 Turkey	 is	 a	 significant	 country.	 It	 hosts	 many	 existing	 and	proposed	 international	oil	and	gas	pipeline	projects,	which	pass	 through	 the	country’s	territories.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 pipelines	 are	 under	 the	 influence	 of	 domestic,	 external	political	 and	 security	 challenges,	 which	 threaten	 the	 energy	 security	 of	 Turkey	
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remarkably.	 These	 challenges	 undermine	 the	 development	 of	 energy	 projects	 and	disambiguate	the	evaluation	of	Turkey's	own	energy	potential	and	resources.	As	a	result	of	the	rapid	economic	growth,	the	country’s	energy	demand	has	increased	incrementally	over	 the	 last	 decades.	 In	 order	 to	 meet	 the	 energy	 demand,	 fossil	 fuel	 imports	 were	raised	substantially,	which	impose	a	serious	burden	on	Turkey’s	current	account	deficit	and	 price	 stability.	 Nonetheless,	 Turkey	 has	 abundant	 potential	 for	 all	 types	 of	renewables,	including	hydro-	and	wind	power,	solar,	geothermal	and	biomass,	which	are	sufficient	 to	compensate	with	Turkey’s	energy	gap.	By	establishing	elaborative	climate	and	energy	policies	and	support	mechanisms	which	address	the	variable	distribution	of	renewable	 sources,	 Turkey	 could	 increase	 the	 electricity	 generation	 share	 from	 each	renewable	energy	source	in	its	total	primary	energy	supply.	Increasing	the	proportion	of	renewable	energy	sources	in	the	energy	mix	and	the	gradual	abandonment	of	fossil	fuel	energy	sources	are	the	only	compatible	and	sustainable	solutions	for	Turkey	to	achieve	its	 transfer	to	a	post-fossil	 fuel	energy	era,	sustain	 its	 long-term	energy	 independence,	increase	 its	supply	security	and	contribute	to	 the	gradual	reduction	of	greenhouse	gas	emissions.		Based	 on	 these	 assumptions,	 the	 following	 conclusions	 and	 policy	recommendations	can	be	provided:		
• Implementation	 of	 a	 “multi-dimensional	 energy	 policy”:	 The	 country	 must	diversify	 its	 energy	 supply	 sources	 and	 routes,	 secure	 its	 energy	 hub	 role	 in	 the	geopolitical	 arena	 as	 a	 reliable	 energy	 partner	 while	 also	 realising	 a	 gradual	reduction	of	 conventional	 energy	 resources	 and	 increasing	 the	 share	of	 renewable	sources	in	the	country’s	total	energy	mix.		
• Withdrawal	 of	 energy	 strategy:	 The	 Turkish	 government	 should	 withdraw	 its	energy	strategy,	which	aims	at	the	full	capacity	utilisation	of	domestic	coal,	including	nuclear	 energy,	 into	 the	 total	 energy	 basket.	 Otherwise,	 further	 dependence	 on	conventional	 sources	 will	 jeopardise	 the	 energy	 goals	 of	 Turkey,	 increase	 energy	dependency,	 reduce	 energy	 security,	 increase	 greenhouse	 gas	 emissions	 and	contradict	with	country’s	climate	commitments.			
• Reduction	of	energy	dependence:	A	high	incidence	of	growth	has	been	observed	in	Turkey’s	energy	demand,	in	parallel	with	demographic	and	economic	expansion	over	the	last	two	decades.	The	rising	demand	is	met,	to	a	large	extent,	through	natural	gas,	
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coal	 and	 crude	 oil	 imports,	 which	 increase	 the	 country’s	 energy	 dependence	 on	foreign	 imports	 and	 its	 long-term	 current	 account	 deficit.	 There	 are	 two	 certain	aspects,	 which	 could	 help	 to	 reduce	 external	 energy	 reliance:	 increasing	 energy	efficiency	 and	 the	 gradual	 shift	 from	 fossil	 to	 renewable	 energy	 sources.	 In	 this	context,	 the	 Turkish	 government	 must	 implement	 a	 coherent	 energy	 policy	 in	harmony	with	its	national	strategies	(so	called	milli	strateji).	Turkey	can	achieve	this	by	 putting	 more	 emphasis	 on	 the	 expansion	 of	 renewable	 energies	 and	 energy	efficiency	measures.	 This	will	 allow	Turkey	 to	 be	more	 self-sufficient	 in	 its	 energy	necessities	 and	 to	 implement	 a	 sustainable	 and	 environmentally	 friendlier	 climate	action	to	achieve	a	significant	reduction	in	national	greenhouse	gas	emission	rates.		
• Re-drafting	current	energy	policies:	Turkey’s	energy	demand	has	been	increasing	in	 parallel	 with	 its	 economic	 growth	 for	 many	 decades.	 The	 country	 is	 highly	dependent	on	hydrocarbon	imports,	which	add	evermore	to	its	energy	bill	and	thus	increase	its	current	account	deficit.	Turkey	should	redraft	and	implement	a	coherent	energy	policy	by	putting	more	emphasis	on	 reliable	 climate	action	and	sustainable	energy	policies	 such	as	 the	 expansion	of	 renewable	 energies	 and	energy	efficiency	measures.	By	implementing	efficient	and	convenient	energy	policies,	the	country	can	be	 self-sufficient	 in	 its	 energy	 needs.	 In	 line	 with	 this	 purpose,	 the	 utilisation	 of	renewable	 energy	 sources	 is	 vital	 for	 Turkey	 to	 ensure	 a	 long-term	 energy	independence	 and	 avoid	 hydrocarbon	 imports,	 which	 are	 subject	 to	 domestic	 and	external	political	and	security	challenges.		
• Non-inclusion	 of	 shale	 gas:	 Based	 on	 the	 exploitation	 results,	 it	 is	 proven	 that	Turkey	 has	 vast	 amount	 of	 shale	 gas	 (around	 5.8	 trillion	 m3),	 particularly	 in	 the	Thrace	 Basin	 and	 South-eastern	 Anatolia	 Region,	 which	 has	 the	 potential	 to	contribute	to	Turkey's	primary	energy	strategy	for	reducing	fossil	fuel	dependency.	Nevertheless,	 there	 are	 some	 challenges	 to	 prevent	 boosting	 shale	 gas	 extraction	such	as	the	lack	of	technologies	and	available	equipment,	high	drilling	costs,	absence	of	fiscal	and	regulatory	regimes	for	the	shale	gas,	environmental	concerns	like	water	contamination,	 water	 scarcity	 and	 potential	 earthquake	 risks.	 Therefore,	 the	contribution	 from	 shale	 gas	 production	 into	 the	 total	 energy	mix	 of	 Turkey	 is	 not	foreseen	 in	 the	 near	 future.	 Moreover,	 the	 public	 perception	 and	 knowledge	regarding	the	shale	gas	industry	in	Turkey	is	quite	low.	Therefore,	so	far	there	have	
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been	 no	 environmental	 protests	 in	 Turkey,	 particularly	 in	 the	 areas	 or	 provinces,	which	are	underpopulated	and	where	the	potential	reserves	have	been	detected.	The	lack	of	sufficient	public	opinion	regarding	the	ongoing	activities	also	restricts	public	discussion	on	shale	gas.		
• Inclusion	 of	 renewable	 energy	 technologies:	 Turkey	 has	 one	 of	 the	 highest	hydropower,	geothermal,	and	wind	energy	potential	among	European	countries.	Its	biomass	and	solar	photovoltaic	potential	are	considerably	high	as	well.	The	continual	integration	of	renewable	energy	into	power	generation,	as	well	as	adoption	of	local	and	 small-scale	 renewable	 energy	 projects	 that	 serve	 the	 local	 needs	 (i.e.	 South-eastern	Anatolian	Project),	will	contribute	to	the	country’s	energy	independence.	In	this	regard,	besides	the	new	amended	laws	and	regulations,	the	Turkish	government	should	 further	promote	 the	purchase	guarantees	 (such	as	 feed-in	 tariffs)	and	price	incentives	for	developing	the	usage	of	renewable	sources	for	generating	electricity.		
• Climate	 policy	 challenges:	 Since	 the	 industrial	 revolution,	 Turkey	 has	 been	responsible	 for	 only	 0.7%	 of	 the	 global	 greenhouse	 gas	 emissions.	 Per	 capita,	 the	greenhouse	 gas	 emission	 of	 the	 country	 are	 much	 lower	 than	 the	 EU	 and	 OECD	average.	Through	the	adoptions	of	the	‘National	Strategy	on	Climate	Change'	and	the	‘National	Climate	Change	Action	Plan'	in	2010	and	2011,	Turkey	aims	to	contribute	to	 the	 collective	 efforts	 for	 combatting	 climate	 change	 in	 line	 with	 its	 national	circumstances	 and	 capabilities.	 Nevertheless,	 Turkey's	 coal-friendly	 energy	 policy	aiming	 the	 full	 utilisation	 of	 coal	 power	 plants	 is	 jeopardising	 its	 climate	commitments.	Furthermore,	Turkey’s	domestic	coal	production	is	not	solely	enough	to	meet	the	coal-energy	generation	targets	without	the	inclusion	of	coal	imports.	The	imported	 amount	 of	 coal	 is	 raising	 the	 import	 bills,	 which	 simultaneously	 puts	 a	burden	 on	 the	 country’s	 economy	 and	 contributes	 to	 the	 existing	 energy	dependency.	Moreover,	Turkish	authorities	are	encouraging	mines	(like	incentives	to	private	 companies	 to	 invest	 in	 thermal	 power	 plants,	 revocation	 of	 environmental	penalties,	lack	of	a	particular	climate	target)	to	produce	as	much	coal	as	possible	at	a	lower	price,	regardless	of	the	poor	and	risky	working	conditions.	In	order	to	achieve	its	 national	 climate	 targets,	 the	 Turkish	 government	 should	 withdrawal	 its	 coal-friendly	energy	policy.	Nevertheless,	Turkish	authorities	are	still	encouraging	private	coal	mining	 companies,	 operating	under	 the	 state-owned	mining	 company	Turkish	
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Coal	 Enterprises	 –	 TKI	 (Türkiye	 Kömür	 Isletmeleri);	 i.e.	 incentivising	 multiple	companies	 to	 invest	 in	 thermal	 power	 plants	 and	 reducing	 their	 environmental	penalties.	This	encouragement	engenders	serious	societal	and	ethical	challenges,	as	these	 companies	 are	 only	 seeking	 to	 produce	 as	much	 coal	 as	 possible	 at	 a	 lower	price	 and	 hire	 subcontracted	 workers	 to	 work	 in	 inappropriate	 and	 precarious	working	 conditions.	 In	 this	 regard,	 Turkey	 should	 opt	 out	 of	 its	 coal	 energy	programme	 and	 target	 the	 gradual	 shut	 down	 of	 coal	 mines.	 The	 government’s	energy	policy	aims	should	be	re-oriented	towards	a	more	environmentally	 friendly	direction,	which	dissolves	the	profit-oriented	perception	of	the	agencies.		
• Withdrawal	of	nuclear	plant	projects:	The	construction	of	planned	nuclear	power	plants	 contradicts	 Turkey’s	 energy	 policy	 aims	 to	 decrease	 the	 external	 energy	dependency.	 As	 both	 proposed	 nuclear	 power	 plant	 projects	 –	 namely	 Sinop	 and	Akkuyu	–	are	constructed	by	Japan	and	Russia	respectively,	Turkey’s	external	energy	dependence	 will	 not	 be	 terminated.	 Especially	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Akkuyu	 nuclear	power	 plant	 project,	 the	 Turkish	 Government	 holds	 no	 shares	 in	 the	 project	company	and	interacts	only	as	regulator.	On	the	one	side,	due	to	the	type	of	reactor,	the	 fuel	of	 the	power	plant	must	be	produced	 in	Russia,	and	hence,	delivered	 from	Russia.	 Ultimately,	 Turkey’s	 energy	 dependency	 on	 Russia	 will	 continue	 and	 even	increase.	On	 the	other	 side,	 the	disposal	of	waste	and	 reprocessing	 issues	 for	both	power	plants	 remain	 still	 unclarified.	 In	 this	 regard,	 due	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 sustainable	domestic	nuclear	 infrastructure,	unclear	 frameworks	regarding	 the	management	of	spent	fuel	and	radioactive	waste,	potential	environmental	risks	and	the	continuation	of	 non-transparent	 statements	 especially	 regarding	 the	 Environmental	 Impact	Assessment	 Report	 –	 CED	 (Cevresel	 Etki	 Deperlendirmesi	 Raporu),	 both	 planned	nuclear	projects	should	not	be	pursued.	Turkey	should	immediately	withdraw	from	its	nuclear	energy	programme	and	head	towards	the	installation	of	local	and	national	renewable	power	plants.		
• Extended	 feed-in-tariffs	 and	 incentives	 for	 wind	 power:	 Turkey	 has	 a	 high	potential	for	electricity	generation	from	wind	power	plants,	due	to	its	coastal	length	of	7,200km	and	high	average	annual	wind	velocities.	These	create	the	potential	 for	efficient	 utilisation	 of	 the	 Mediterranean	 shores,	 Aegean	 Sea	 coast	 areas	 and	northern	and	western	parts	of	the	Marmara	Sea	coast.	To	reach	its	2023	target	of	20	
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GW	wind	 power	 plants,	 a	 total	 installed	 capacity	 of	 nearly	 16	 GW	 of	wind	 power	plants	must	be	constructed	and	integrated	into	the	grid	between	2015-2023.	Due	to	the	high	production	costs	and	limited	lifetimes	of	wind	turbines,	Turkey	must	invest	between	 $18	 and	 $22.7	 billion	 in	 total	 for	 the	 construction	 and	 operation	 of	wind	plants	 until	 2023,	which	 puts	 a	 huge	 burden	 on	 country’s	 economy.	 Furthermore,	due	to	the	indefinite	number	of	newly	proposed	power	plants	and	their	investment	status,	it	is	not	possible	to	define	implicitly	whether	Turkey	will	be	able	to	achieve	its	vision	 2023	 target	 regarding	 the	 installed	 capacity	 of	 wind	 energy.	 Besides	 the	necessity	of	clear	data	concerning	wind	power	installations,	Turkish	authorities	need	to	put	new	 feed-in-tariffs	 and	 incentives	 in	place	 and	extend	purchase	 guarantees.	Moreover,	the	construction	of	wind	power	plants	should	be	away	from	the	nesting,	dispersal,	 wintering	 and	migration	 areas	 of	 bird	 species,	 i.e.	 especially	 concerning	the	 Eastern	 Imperial	 Eagles.	 Last	 but	 not	 least,	 as	 the	 amount	 of	 electricity	generation	 from	 wind	 power	 plants	 is	 very	 much	 dependent	 on	 wind	 speeds,	 air	density	and	turbine	characteristics,	some	necessary	measures	should	be	set	with	the	grid	connection	in	order	to	avoid	fluctuations.		
• Re-designation	 of	 hydropower	 projects:	 The	 country	 needs	 to	 add	 12,357	 MW	hydropower	 installation	 to	 its	 total	 domestic	 supply	 to	 reach	 its	 36,000	 MW	hydroelectricity	 target	 by	 2023.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 calculations	 state	 that	 the	construction	 of	 plants	 will	 be	 much	 higher	 than	 expected.	 Therefore,	 the	 viable	economic	potential	of	the	proposed	hydropower	plants	should	be	widely	examined	before	 beginning	 construction.	 If	 feasible,	 the	 installation	 of	 small-scale	 (run-of-river)	hydropower	plants	should	be	considered,	as	they	provide	not	only	electricity	and	 water	 for	 both	 irrigation	 and	 drinking	 purposes,	 they	 also	 create	 job	opportunities	in	rural	areas	and	prevent	migration	of	local	inhabitants.	The	country	also	needs	to	adopt	a	new	water	and	nature	conservation	policy	to	protect	the	rich	biodiversity	 and	 normal	 functioning	 of	 ecosystem	 around	 the	 hydropower	 plants.	The	construction	of	new	proposed	dams	and	hydroelectric	power	plants	 shall	 first	begin	when	 the	 new	policy	 and	 legislations	 on	water	 and	 nature	 conservation	 are	enacted	 and	 if	 the	 installation	 and	 operation	 of	 proposed	 new	 dams	 and	 power	plants	are	in	line	with	the	new	regulations.	The	design	of	hydroelectric	plants	should	be	developed	through	a	co-creation	process,	which	includes	not	only	the	officials	of	Turkish	 authorities	 but	 also	 chambers,	 labour	 unions,	 civil	 society	 organisations,	
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local	 inhabitants	 and	other	 citizens.	The	 inclusion	of	 all	 related	 actors	 into	 the	 co-design	and	co-construction	process	will	enable	the	operation	of	hydropower	plants,	which	 are	 compatible	 with	 its	 environment,	 living	 species	 as	 well	 as	 inhabitants.	Today,	 the	 local	people	are	still	 forced	by	 the	Turkish	authorities	 to	abandon	 their	residencies	 in	 order	 to	 open	 up	 the	 terrains	 for	 the	 construction	 for	 dams	 and	hydropower	 plants.	 Hence,	 in	 parallel	 to	 these	 pending	 conflicts,	 the	 current	 law	permitting	 the	 opening	 of	 the	nature	 conservation	 areas	 to	 dam	and	hydroelectric	power	plant	constructions,	should	be	cancelled	and	redrafted.	Turkey	needs	to	adopt	a	new	water	and	nature	conservation	policy	to	protect	the	rich	 biodiversity	 and	 normal	 functioning	 of	 ecosystems.	 The	 projections	 regarding	the	construction	of	new	dams	and	hydroelectric	power	plants	 should	be	placed	on	stand-by,	until	the	new	policy	and	legislations	on	water	and	nature	conservation	are	enacted.	The	installation	and	operation	of	new	dams	and	power	plants	should	be	in	line	with	the	new	regulations.	Moreover,	in	accordance	with	the	Environmental	Law,	the	 authorities	 should	 render	 the	 full	 participation	 milieu	 of	 the	 professional	chambers,	unions,	civil	society	organisations,	local	people	and	other	citizens.	Turkish	authorities	 should	consider	 the	demonstrations	of	 the	 local	 inhabitants	against	 the	construction	 of	 dams,	 reservoirs	 and	 hydroelectric	 power	 plants.	 The	 violations	against	 the	 human	 rights	 and	 the	 forcing	 of	 local	 people	 to	 abandon	 their	 homes	should	 immediately	 end.	 The	 new	 law,	 permitting	 the	 opening	 of	 the	 nature	conservation	 areas	 to	 dam	 and	 hydroelectric	 power	 plant	 construction	 should	 be	cancelled	and	redrafted.	The	necessity	to	build	large	dams	and	reservoirs	should	be	examined	in	detail	by	the	 authorities.	 Furthermore,	 small-scale	 hydro	 plants	 are	 quite	 enduring	 (power	plant	system	can	last	for	50	years	or	more	with	little	maintenance).	Unlike	the	other	renewable	 energy	 sources,	 they	 can	 produce	 some	 electricity	 on	 demand	with	 no	need	for	storage	or	backup	systems	(Dursun,	et	al.,	2011	S.	1233)	and	consequently,	have	the	capacity	to	act	as	an	immediate	replacement	of	fossil	sources.		
• Expansion	 of	 geothermal	 as	 local	 energy	 source:	 Turkey	 ranks	 as	 the	 seventh	richest	 country	 in	 the	 world	 and	 second	 richest	 country	 in	 Europe	 with	 its	geothermal	energy	potential	and	can	produce	5%	of	its	electric	energy	consumption	and	30%	of	 its	heat	 energy	 consumption.	 In	 its	 “Vision	2023”	 goals	of	 the	Turkish	government	 aims	 to	 generate	 1,000	 MW	 of	 electricity	 from	 geothermal	 power	
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generation.	With	respect	to	the	above-indicated	data,	there	is	a	substantial	increase	both	in	geothermal	applications	and	in	electricity	generation	from	geothermal	power	in	Turkey.	According	 to	 the	 latest	data,	Turkey	has	already	achieved	 its	1,000	MW	target.	Nevertheless,	due	to	renewable	sources	accounting	for	the	smallest	share	of	this,	geothermal	energy	can	only	meet	a	 tiny	amount	of	Turkey’s	enormous	energy	demand	by	2023.	Consequently,	geothermal	energy	should	rather	be	considered	as	a	local	energy	source	than	a	countrywide	energy	supply.	Moreover,	geothermal	power	may	 stimulate	 Turkey	 to	 move	 towards	 a	 more	 decentralised	 form	 of	 electricity	generation,	where	the	installed	plant	meets	the	necessities	of	local	customers,	avoids	transmission	 losses	 and	 increases	 flexibility	 in	 system	 use.	 Thereby	 the	diversification	of	power	 generation	plants	will	 be	 ensured	which	 in	 turn	 increases	competition	in	electricity	generation.	The	 geothermal	 energy	 facilities	 should	 be	 co-designed,	 co-developed	 and	 co-constructed	 together	 with	 the	 participation	 of	 different	 stakeholders,	 such	 as	 the	local	government,	energy	companies,	NGOs,	civil	society	organisations	and	residents	of	 the	 planning	 area.	 The	 participation	 of	 local	 people	 to	 the	 co-design	 process	increase	the	social	acceptance	and	the	further	development	of	geothermal	energy	as	a	de-centralised	energy	source	in	Turkey.		
• Increase	 of	 bioethanol	 and	 biodiesel	 production:	 Turkey	 has	 a	 substantial	amount	 of	 wide	 range	 biomass	 sources	 for	 the	 production	 of	 biofuels	 (bioethanol	and	 biodiesel)	 and	 biomass-based	 energy	 (biogas).	 The	 country	 has	 an	 installed	capacity	of	more	 than	1.5	million	 t	biodiesel	plant,	 including	34	biodiesel	 facilities.	Nevertheless,	 these	 plants	 are	 not	 fully	 utilised	 due	 to	 the	 low	 oil	 seed	 self-sufficiency	ratio	and	increasing	trade	account	deficit.	Therefore,	biodiesel	production	based	on	oilseeds	is	not	sustainable	for	Turkey	in	economic	terms.	On	the	contrary,	bioethanol	 production	 in	 Turkey	 seems	 to	 be	 sustainable	 and	 can	 meet	 the	mandatory	 blending	 ratio	 requirement	 in	 total	 biofuel	 production,	 as	 set	 by	 the	Turkish	EPDK.	Bioethanol	production	from	sugar	beet	is	a	more	rational	choice	than	from	corn,	due	 to	 the	 sufficient	plantation	areas	and	 the	 reprocessing	of	 remained	molasses	 as	 feed	 and	 as	 raw	 material	 for	 the	 pharmaceutical	 industry,	 cosmetic,	construction,	 alcoholic	 beverages	 and	 yeast	 purposes.	 Furthermore,	 compared	 to	corn,	 sugar	 beet	 has	 less	 negative	 environmental	 impacts	 such	 soil	 degradation,	water	pollution,	and	contributes	less	to	greenhouse	gas	emissions.	
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• Inclusion	of	further	biogas	plants	to	the	total	energy	production:	Based	on	the	“Vision	2023”	targets	of	the	Turkish	MENR,	the	government	intends	to	increase	use	of	 biomass-based	 energy	 generation	 to	 1,000	MW	by	 2023.	 The	 country	 uses	 two	bioenergy	 pathways	 to	 obtain	 electricity	 from	biomass	 sources:	 direct	 combustion	from	combined	heat	power	(CHP)	plants	and	biogas	plants.	Based	on	the	outcomes,	the	most	 promising	 crops	 in	 terms	of	 quantities,	 energy	potential	 and	 cost	 for	 the	electricity	 generation	 from	CHP	plants	 are	 corn	 cob	and	 corn	husk.	Hazelnut	 shell,	groundnut	husk,	cotton	stalk,	hazelnut	husk,	soybean	husk,	sunflower	head	and	rice	husk	 are	 also	 profitable	 feedstock,	 which	 could	 be	 used	 for	 electricity	 generation.	The	 total	production	 capacity	of	 these	 crops	 ranks	243.4	MW.	From	 the	electricity	generation	 in	 biogas	 plants,	 the	 assessments	 prove	 that	 sunflower	 heads,	 cattle	manure	 and	 poultry	 layer	 are	 the	 most	 promising	 feedstock.	 Based	 on	 the	calculations,	Turkish	provinces	would	achieve	a	total	combined	production	capacity	of	768	MW	from	biomass.	243.4	MW	production	is	expected	to	be	obtained	from	CHP	combustion	plants	for	direct	residues.	Ultimately,	Turkey	will	reach	a	total	capacity	of	 at	 least	 1,011	MW	 generated	 electricity.	 This	 amount	will	 be	 sufficient	 to	meet	Turkey’s	 energy	 target	 for	 biomass	 by	 the	 year	 of	 2023.	 Nevertheless,	 similar	 to	geothermal,	 the	 contribution	 of	 biomass-based	 energy	 to	 Turkey’s	 total	 energy	production	remains	low	and	insufficient.		
• Sustentation	 of	 solar	 power	 plants:	 Owing	 to	 its	 climatic	 conditions	 and	geographical	 location,	 especially	 in	 the	 southern	 region,	 Turkey	 has	 substantial	potential	 for	 solar	photovoltaic	 and	 solar	heating.	The	 estimated	average	 sunshine	duration	 ranks	 7.2	 hours	 per	 day,	 and	 the	 solar	 radiation	 ranks	 3.6	 kwh	m2/day.	Despite	this	immense	potential	of	solar	power	across	the	country,	there	are	still	no	large-scale	solar	power	installations.	Solar	energy	is	mostly	used	for	water	heating,	greenhouse	heating	and	for	drying	agricultural	products.	In	its	“Vision	2023”	targets,	the	Turkish	government	 aims	 to	 reach	3,000	MW	electricity	 generation	 from	solar	energy.	 Despite	 its	 580	 MW	 installed	 solar	 photovoltaic	 capacity	 and	 rapid	installations	 in	 the	 last	 years,	 reaching	 the	 energy	 target	 does	 not	 seem	 feasible.	Solar	 photovoltaic	 creates	 much	 more	 employment	 possibilities	 in	 comparison	 to	other	renewables,	in	its	construction,	maintenance,	installation	and	operation	stages.	Therefore,	 the	 construction	 of	 large-scale	 solar	 photovoltaic	 panels	 and	 power	
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stations	 should	 be	 promoted	 through	 incentives,	 feed-in	 tariffs	 and	 purchase	agreements	 by	 the	 state	 authorities.	 Consequently,	 if	 further	 installations	 are	continued	 and	 promoted	 by	 the	 Turkish	 authorities,	 solar	 energy,	 with	 its	 high	potential	 for	electricity	generation,	could	be	the	foremost	renewable	energy	source	to	increase	Turkey’s	energy	independence.		
• Increasing	social	awareness	regarding	renewable	energy:	The	public	perception	and	 the	 awareness	 of	 Turkish	 people	 regarding	 the	 renewable	 energy	 sources	remain	 low.	 According	 to	 the	 results	 of	 the	 survey,	 performed	 by	 the	 Kadir	 Has	University	 in	Turkey	 in	2016,	 14.2%	of	 1,200	 respondents	have	no	 idea	 regarding	the	 government’s	 renewable	 energy	 policy.	 Despite	 sufficient	 promotions,	inadequate	 incentives	 and	 lack	 of	 regulations	 for	 the	 particular	 renewable	 energy	sources	(such	as	biomass),	34.9%	of	people	think	that	the	government’s	renewable	energy	 policies	 are	 going	 well.	 The	 majority	 of	 the	 respondents	 who	 find	 the	government’s	renewable	energy	policies	to	be	in	a	good	situation,	are	supporters	of	AKP	 and	 MHP,	 the	 nationalist	 right-wing	 parties.	 3.6%	 of	 respondents	 think	 that	Turkey’s	 biggest	 5th	 problem	 is	 that	 the	 Turkish	 government	 does	 not	 use	 the	renewable	energy	potential	sufficiently.	A	huge	majority	of	people	(69.9%)	find	that	the	 biggest	 energy	 problem	 in	 Turkey	 is	 “high	 energy	 prices”.	 62.3%	 of	 people	complain	 about	 the	 “external	 energy	 dependency”.	 20.3%	 of	 respondents	 remark	that	 the	 potential	 of	 renewable	 energy	 is	 used	 by	 the	 government	 inefficiently.	Although	 knowledge	 regarding	 the	 renewable	 energies	 remain	 low,	 39.5%	 of	respondents	 raise	 their	 voice	 to	 say	 that	 Turkey	 should	 aim	 to	 use	 renewable	energies	rather	than	fossil	energy,	despite	the	higher	related	costs.	Under	these	circumstances,	it	is	clear	that	government	incentives	and	support	for	the	utilisation	of	renewable	energy	sources	are	not	solely	enough.	Especially	for	the	gradual	ascending	of	local	power	plants	(such	as	geothermal),	public	awareness	and	social	 acceptance	 play	 a	 very	 important	 role.	 The	 local	 renewable	 energy	 projects	should	be	installed	through	the	co-design	and	co-creation	process	with	the	inclusion	of	 a	broad	 range	of	 stakeholders	 coming	 from	 industry,	 civil	 society	organisations,	universities,	 research	 institutes,	 investors	 and	 citizens.	 Moreover,	 the	 government	authorities	 as	 well	 as	 the	 universities	 should	 organise	 seminars	 and	 activities	 to	inform	the	citizens	regarding	 the	benefits	of	utilising	renewable	energy	sources,	 in	order	to	increase	the	public	knowledge	and	awareness.	
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